A man is a man; an act is an act; rape is a rape, be it performed by a man the “husband” on the woman “wife”
Karnataka High Court: M Nagaprasanna J. dismissed and disposed of WP Nos. 48367 of 2018, 12976 of 2017, 10001 of 2018 and partly allowed 50089 of 2018.
The facts of the case, as according to the narration of the victim, clearly indicates as to how brutally the petitioner used to have sex, anal sex with the complainant/wife in the presence of his daughter who was 9 years old at that point in time and later used to touch the private parts of the daughter and also indulged in sexual acts against the daughter. The complaint was filed by the victim wife and the charge sheet was filed by the Police for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 376, 354, 506 of the Penal Code, 1860 i.e. IPC and Section 5(m) and (l) of the Act. The petitioner, on filing of the final report, filed an application under Section 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code i.e. Cr.P.C seeking a prayer to drop the first charge framed under Section 376 of the IPC, as the offence would not get attracted in the case of the petitioner who is the husband of the complainant which was rejected by the Sessions Court in terms of its order dated 16-10-2018. Thus the petitioner knocked the doors of the instant Court in the subject petition in the garb of calling in question the Constitutional validity of clauses of presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of POCSO Act.
(i) Whether cognizance being taken against the petitioner-husband for offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC is tenable in law?
(ii) Whether the allegation against the petitioner for other offences is tenable in law?
(iii) Whether the prosecution notwithstanding the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the Act has to prove the foundational facts beyond all reasonable doubt?
(iv) Whether the designated Court to try the offences under the Act has jurisdiction to try both the offences under the IPC and the Act in the facts of this case?
(v) Whether charge sheet against the petitioner should be altered to include addition of the offence punishable under Section 377 of IPC?
(vi) Whether proceedings under the POCSO Act against the petitioner need to be interfered with?
History of Section 375 Penal Code, 1860
The genesis of Section 375 of the IPC and its exception has its roots in the Code propounded by Macaulay in 1837. It is Macaulay’s Code that becomes the basis for the Indian Penal Code of 1860, which governs the penal provisions even as on date with certain changes on certain occasions. Exception to Section 375 has existed in the IPC since the time of its enactment by the British in the year 1860. Exception-2 then was guided by the laws that were existent in all the countries where the British had their foot on. They were several decades ago. It was founded and remained on the premise of a contract in the medieval law that husbands wielded their power over their wives. In the Victorian era women were denied the exercise of basic rights and liberties and had little autonomy over their choice. Their statuses were nothing beyond than that of materialistic choices and were treated as chattels.
Post Republic, India is governed by the Constitution. The Constitution treats woman equal to man and considers marriage as an association of equals. The Constitution does not in any sense depict the woman to be subordinate to a man. The Constitution guarantees fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 which are right to live with dignity, personal liberty, bodily integrity, sexual autonomy, right to reproductive choices, right to privacy, right to freedom of speech and expression. Under the Constitution, the rights are equal; protection is also equal.
Justice JS Verma Committee: Recommendations
79. We, therefore, recommend that:
i. The exception for marital rape be removed.
ii. The law ought to specify that:
a. A marital or other relationship between the perpetrator or victim is not a valid defence against the crimes of rape or sexual violation;
b. The relationship between the accused and the complainant is not relevant to the inquiry into whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity;
c. The fact that the accused and victim are married or in another intimate relationship may not be regarded as a mitigating factor justifying lower sentences for rape.
80.We must, at this stage, rely upon Prof. Sandra Freedman of the University of Oxford, who has submitted to the Committee that that “training and awareness programmes should be provided to ensure that all levels of the criminal justice system and ordinary people are aware that marriage should not be regarded as extinguishing the legal or sexual autonomy of the wife”.
Section 375 of the IPC came to be amended with effect from 10-05-2013 after introduction of Criminal Law Amendment Bill before the Parliament, pursuant to the constitution of J.S.Verma Committee for suggesting amendments to criminal law.
The Exception to pre-amendment reads as follows:
“Exception.—Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”
The Exception to post-amendment reads as follows:
“Exception 2.—Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”
The Court thus remarked, “a woman being a woman is given certain status; a woman being a wife is given a different status. Likewise, a man being a man is punished for his acts; a man being a husband is exempted for his acts. It is this inequality that destroys the soul of the Constitution which is Right to Equality. The Constitution recognizes and grants such equal status to woman as well.”
The Court observed that the Code practices discrimination. Under the Code every other man indulging in offences against woman is punished for those offences. But, when it comes to Section 375 of IPC the exception springs. Thus, the expression is not progressive but regressive, wherein a woman is treated as a subordinate to the husband, which concept abhors equality.
Therefore, the situation now emerges is equality pervades through the Constitution, but inequality exists in the Code qua – Exception-2 to Section 375 of the IPC.
The Court held “I find no error committed by the learned Sessions Judge in taking cognizance, framing the charge under Section 376 of the IPC and also rejecting the application to drop the said charge.”
The Court held “Other offences alleged against the petitioner, the ones punishable under Sections 498A, 354, 506 of the IPC are clearly brought out in the complaint and in the charge sheet. This is again a matter of trial”
The Court relied on GS Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 3 KCR 2276 wherein it was observed “In a case where an offence is committed against a child, having regard to the very nature of the offence where it is difficult for the prosecution to prove the facts and circumstances in which the offence had taken place, the Act has cast the burden on the accused to prove the facts within his knowledge as it is easier for the innocent accused to produce evidence contrary to the case proved by the prosecution. This is called reverse burden whereby the burden is shifted to the accused to disprove the facts established by the prosecution. The question of discharging the reverse burden by the accused would arise only when the initial burden cast on the prosecution is discharged to the satisfaction of the Court. Therefore it follows that without the proof of basic facts constituting the offence charged against the accused, the accused cannot be called upon to disprove the case of the prosecution.”
The Court thus held the prosecution has to prove the foundational facts beyond all reasonable doubt and cannot rest its case on preponderance of probability, merely because the statute imposes reverse burden upon the accused on proving innocence in place of the prosecution proving the guilt.
The Court relied on judgment Vivek Gupta v. CBI, (2003) 8 SCC 628 and held “I am of the considered view that the trial that is now sought to be held before the POSCO Court by the Sessions Judge can also try the offences alleged under the Code. Therefore, the point that has arisen for consideration is answered against the petitioner.”
The Court observed and held that the finding that when the allegations made against the husband attracts Section 376 of the IPC and a charge is also framed in respect of the said offences, question of considering the request to frame a charge under Section 377 of the IPC does not arise, is erroneous. The allegations clearly make out an offence punishable under Section 377 of the Code which deals with unnatural sex. Therefore, the order under challenge is to be set aside allowing the application filed by the prosecution under Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. with a direction to the trial Court to frame the charge for the offence punishable under Section 377 of the IPC as well.
The Court held “Allegations against the petitioner-husband for offences punishable under the POCSO Act for alleged sexual acts on the daughter cannot be interfered with. It is yet again a matter of trial.”
[Hrishikesh Sahoo v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 371, decided on 23-03-2022]
For petitioner: Mr. Hashmath Pasha and Mr. Ranjan Kumar
For respondent: Mrs. Namitha Mahesh., R D Renukaradhya, Mr. Madanan Pillai, and A D Ramananda