Case BriefsHigh Courts

Tripura High Court: S.G. Chattopadhyay, J., elaborated on the aspect of economic abuse in term of Section 3 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Factual Matrix

Wife had presented an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, wherein she referred to several incidents of domestic violence against her husband.

Further, she alleged that her husband subjected her to harassment and torture for dowry and since she was unable to meet his demand, she was physically assaulted by her husband on various dates. Gradually he developed an extramarital affair. When the wife raised a protest against his conduct he assaulted her.

Trial Court found the wife to be entitled to a protection order, residence order and monetary relief, respondents were directed to make payment of Rs 2000/- per month as rent for accommodation to the aggrieved and further payment of Rs 15,000/- per month as monetary relief in the form of maintenance.

Additional Sessions Judge also partly allowed the appeal of the husband, his mother, brother and sister, by which the husband was solely proved to have committed domestic violence upon his wife and others were discharged from the liabilities.

In the present revision petition, husband has challenged the impugned judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge.

Core Issue agitated by the husband’s counsel:

Relief under the DV Act had been provided to the wife in absence of any proof of domestic violence.

Under Section 12 of the DV Act only the aggrieved person or a protection officer appointed under the DV Act or any other person on behalf the aggrieved person may present an application to the magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act.

Allegation of domestic violence is a sine qua non for pursuing a petition under the DV Act.

Further, Court observed that under Section 3 of the DV Act which defines domestic violence, ‘economic abuse’ is a form of domestic violence.

Section 3 relates to ‘economic abuse’ which includes deprivation of all or any economic financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise.

Bench held that in the present matter, wife is obviously legally entitled to maintenance allowance from her husband who is a government employee since she made a good case of justifying why she was living separately.

Denial of maintenance to wife would definitely cause ‘economic abuse’ within the meaning of Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act, therefore no infirmity in the impugned judgment was found.

Court directed that the monetary relief shall be paid by the husband by depositing the same in the wife’s savings bank account. The Family Court will determine the mode of payment of the outstanding arrear till 31-01-2021 after issuing notice to the parties and hearing them in person.

If the husband fails to pay the arrear, the same shall be deducted from his salary and paid to the wife.

In view of the above. Petition was dismissed. [Ramendra Kishore Bhattacharjee v. Madhurima Bhattacharjee, Crl. Rev. P. No. 36 of 2020, decided on 10-02-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

For the Appellant: Mr B. Deb, Adv.

For the Respondent: Mr S. Debnath, Addl. PP Mr Raju Datta

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: Mary Joseph, J., while addressing an issue of maintenance under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, expressed that the said provision does not say that wife, children or parents who are at the mercy of the parents, grandparents or relatives are not entitled to get monthly maintenance or else in the case of a wife, children or parents who are neglected and surviving at the mercy of other near relatives are not entitled to get maintenance.

Respondents in the present matter had sought for enhancement of the sum ordered originally by the Family Court as monthly maintenance which was ordered at the rate of Rs 1,000 but the petitioner defaulted in payment after some time.

Revision petitioner contended that he was physically handicapped and that the eldest of the children being employed and financially affluent were maintaining the respondents. Hence, due to being devoid of any means of livelihood he submitted that he was not liable to maintain the respondents.

Petitioner had proved before the Family Court that the respondent was remarried and respondents contention that he had no means and therefore was not liable to pay maintenance to the petitioners could not be accepted for the sole reason that he got married secondly and begotten children.

Muslim Personal Law is self-contained of the obligation of the husband to maintain his wife by providing her with food, clothing and lodging. In the Code, a legal recognition is given to the right of a deserted wife, son/daughter, and parents who are unable to maintain themselves.

Section 125 CrPC specifically provides that wife, children or parents unable to maintain themselves are entitled to receive monthly maintenance from a male who holds status respectively with reference to them as husband, father or son.

Bench held that the Husband cannot be exonerated from his legal obligation to maintain on the ground that deserted or neglected ones are surviving somehow or else being maintained by someone.

Hence, the Family Court rightly appreciated the evidence and passed the impugned orders modifying the monthly maintenance payable to the petitioner justly and reasonably. [Mohammedkunhi v. Safura, 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 407, decided on 04-01-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: The Division Bench of A.S. Chandurkar and N.B. Surawanshi, JJ., upheld the decision of the family court.

Present appeal was filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Acts, 1984 by the appellant-husband, in view of his petition being dismissed by the Family Court for judicial separation and in the alternative for a decree of divorce on cruelty and desertion ground.

According to the husband, he was Mangalik as per his horoscope and hence was in search of a girl who was having a Mangalik horoscope. As per the girl’s biodata, she was depicted as Mangalik.

After her marriage with the appellant she started living in the joint family of her husband where she usually used to stay aloof. Further, it has been stated that she avoided giving her educational certificates on the pretext that they were lost.

On receiving her educational certificates from her father, the husband was shocked to know her actual date of birth therefore she was Non-Mangalik. She had even failed BA-II.

The wife left the matrimonial house at midnight without informing anyone and during the search, she was found with her brother and brother in law who were taking her to her maternal home.

The husband along with his family members went to bring the wife back, but her parents refused to send her and also threatened to involve them in a false case. According to the husband, the wife lodged false complaint on that day.

Husband alleged that the wife caused mental and physical harassment to the husband. He, therefore, contended that the wife deserted him on account of false complaint lodged by the wife and the husband from time to time.

Due to the continuous torture by the wife, the life of the husband had become miserable. He was not in a position to concentrate on his work due to continuous harassment by the wife. The husband, therefore, lost all the hopes that the smooth relations between him and wife were possible. Hence, he filed the petition seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion.

Wife while declining all the above allegations claimed that she was ready to cohabit with the husband and hence prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the husband.

Family Court dismissed the petition of the husband, hence the husband preferred the present appeal.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Points for determination:

  1. Whether the appellant is entitled for decree of divorce?
  2. Whether the learned Family Court dismissing the petition of husband is legally correct?

Bench noted in the cross-examination of the appellant that he admitted that prior to his marriage there were negotiations as well as internal talks and his sister had inquired about the education of the respondent as well as her family background. The appellant also admitted that he married the respondent as he liked her. He also stated that he did not take decision in his life on the basis of horoscope. The marriage was performed after verifying the background, houses and all the details of both the families. His father in his evidence admitted that the horoscopes of the appellant and the respondent were not tallied. Further, he deposed that he did not have any document to show that the appellant was a Mangalik. He even admitted that at the time of marriage the age of the appellant was beyond marriageable age.

Hence, all these admissions belie the case of the appellant that there was cheating on the part of the respondent and her parents at the time of settlement of marriage.

In view of the above, Bench observed that there was no fraud played by the wife or her family.

Appellant failed to make out a case of fraud and even if it is assumed that there was misrepresentation in respect of the date of birth, it does not affect the matrimonial relations between the appellant and the respondent, as the appellant failed to prove that he was Mangalik and he intended to marry the girl having Mangalik Yog.

Father of appellant, admitted that for initial two years of the marriage, there was no dispute between the appellant and the respondent in respect of age difference as well as the respondent being non-mangalik. According to the respondent, the ill-treatment started only after the appellant got government job.

Therefore, evidence laid by the respondent did not spell out cruelty caused by the respondent to him.

With regard to Desertion, Court noted that as per the evidence led by the respondent she was beaten and her sister and her husband saw the marks of beating on her person. After they left, she was again beaten and threatened with life. Apprehending danger to her life, she had to take shelter in the house of neighbour Shri Gordey. From there, she called her parents and her brother, sister Kiran, her husband and others took her from the house of Shri Gordey to her parent’s house

Further, there was no material that depicted that the appellant tried to bring the respondent back for cohabitation.

 “…since the appellant attributed cheating and fraud to the respondent and her parents, it is not possible to believe that he tried to bring the respondent back for cohabitation.”

Therefore, family court rightly appreciated the evidence on record and appellant failed to prove cruelty and desertion on the part of respondent-wife.

In view of the above discussion. The appeal against the family court’s decision was dismissed. [Kartik Narayan Dhawle v. Vaishali Kartik Dhawle, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 241, decided on 23-02-2021]


Advocates who appeared before the Court:

B.R. Hindustani, Advocate holding for A.N. Ansari, Advocate for the appellant,

S.N. Thengari, Advocate for the respondent.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: Revati Mohite Dere, J., while addressing a very significant issue of assault, expressed that:

“There is imbalance of gender roles, where wife as a homemaker is expected to do all the household chores.”

Factual Matrix

Appellant was married to Manisha (deceased) and they both used to reside with the appellant’s mother.

According to the prosecution, the appellant was suspecting Manisha’s character as a result of which, there used to be frequent quarrels between them.

On 19-12-2013, Manisha was leaving the house without preparing tea on account of which, there was an exchange of words between the appellant and the deceased. Since the appellant was suspecting Manisha’s character and as she refused to make tea for the appellant, it was alleged that the appellant had given a blow on Manisha’s head from behind, with a hammer.

Further, it was alleged that the said incident was witnessed by Rohini, the appellant and Manisha’s daughter.

Prosecution submitted that after Manisha was assaulted, the appellant gave her a bath, wiped the bloodstains from the spot and thereafter took Manisha to Vitthal Hospital.

At the time when Manisha was admitted, her uncle visited, during that time appellant informed Manisha’s uncle that he had assaulted Manisha. Hence a complaint was lodged and a charge sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Penal Code, 1860.

Sessions Judge convicted the appellant for the above-stated offences.

Analysis, Law and Decision 

High Court observed that on the day of the incident on being refused tea, the appellant assaulted Manisha with a hammer, but in Court’s opinion:

“…deceased-Manisha, by refusing to make tea for the appellant, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to have offered grave and sudden provocation for the appellant to assault her, much less, such a brutal assault.”

Bench also observed that:

“…a wife is not a chattel or an object.”

Cases as the present one, reflect the imbalance of gender – skewed patriarchy, the socio-cultural milieu one has grown up in, which often seeps into a marital relationship.

While making very essential observations, Bench quoted from a study, ‘The Man Who Mistook His Wife For Chattel’ by Margo Wilson and Martin Daly:

“by `proprietary’, we mean first that men lay claim to particular women as songbirds lay claim to territories, as lions lay claim to a kill, or as people of both sexes lay claim to valuables. Having located an individually recognizable and potentially defensible resource packet, the proprietary creature proceeds to advertise and exercise the intention of defending it from rivals. Proprietariness has further implication, possibly peculiar to the human case, of a sense of right or entitlement”. 

Medieval notion of the wife being the property of the husband to do as he wishes, unfortunately, still persists in the majority mindset. Nothing but notions of patriarchy.

Bench refused the appellant counsel’s argument the deceased by refusing to make tea for the appellant offered grave and sudden provocation.

In view of the present set of circumstances and arguments, Court stated that appellant not only assaulted his wife, but also after assaulting her, he wasted precious and crucial time by wiping the blood from the spot and bathing Manisha before taking her to hospital, if the deceased would have been rushed to the hospital, her life could have been saved.

Therefore, Court found no infirmity in the impugned judgment and dismissed the present appeal.[Santosh Mahadev Atkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 248, decided on 02-02-2021]


Advocates who appeared before the Court:

Sarang Aradhye for the Appellant

V. Gavand, A.P.P for the Respondent–State

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: The Division bench of A.S. Chandurkar and Pushpa V. Ganediwala, JJ., upheld the family court’s finding that “the behaviour and the conduct of the husband of making wild and unsubstantiated allegations resulted in causing mental cruelty to the wife.”

Factual Matrix

Appellant and the respondent were married since 2008 and a child was born out of the said wedlock. Appellant and his family started ill-treating the respondent. Respondent was driven away from her matrimonial home, after all, her gold articles were taken away.

In view of the above, she proceeded to file a case under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal rights.

The above proceedings were however withdrawn and later, wife filed a petition seeking divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. She alleged that the appellant and his family members were ill-treating the respondent physically and mentally. Respondent approached the Mahila Cell with her grievances and after understanding given to both the parties, they started residing together, but the same did not continue for long as the respondent found herself in an unsafe environment and proceeded to file the present proceedings.

Family Court held that the respondent had proved that the appellant was treating her with cruelty. Hence by the impugned judgment, the Family Court proceeded to pass a decree for divorce on the ground of cruelty. Being aggrieved the appellant has preferred this appeal.

Issue for Consideration:

Whether in the facts of the case the Family Court was justified in granting a divorce on the ground of cruelty?

Decision

Bench in view of the facts and circumstances found the Family Court’s decision to be justified.

“…making of unfounded allegations against the spouse or his/her relatives in the pleadings or making complaints with a view to affect the job of the spouse amounts to causing mental cruelty to the said spouse.”

Mental Cruelty: What led to it?

Court elaborated on the above point that the conduct of the husband of not pleading that the wife was suffering from epilepsy and stating the same for the first time in his deposition as well as making wild allegation that the wife and her relatives had secured false caste certificate without attempting to substantiate the said allegation resulted in causing mental cruelty to wife.

Bench also added regarding the husband’s conduct that, it appeared from his conduct in one or the other he intended to prejudice the service of the wife.

The impugned judgment was affirmed. [Thalraj v. Jyoti, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 255, decided on 10-02-2021]


Advocates who appeared for the parties:

P.K. Mishra, Advocate for the appellant.

A.B. Bambal, Advocate for the respondent.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: K. Murali Shankar, J., addressed the issue with regard to payment of maintenance, whether from the date of application or date of order.

Factual Matrix

In the present matter, the second respondent is the mother and respondents 3 and 4, brothers of the first respondent who had married the petitioner. After a while misunderstandings arose between the petitioner and first respondent due to which they started living separately.

Petitioner had filed a maintenance case earlier and the Magistrate passed an order directing the first respondent to pay monthly maintenance at Rs 5,000 per month to the petitioner and her minor children.

Petitioner’s case

Petitioner stated that in order to avoid the payment of maintenance, respondents conspired and took the petitioner and her children to Chennai so as to resume their cohabitation. In the period of two months that the petitioner lived with first respondent, she was harassed and tortured physically and mentally and the petitioner was forcefully sent out of the matrimonial home by forcibly retaining the minor children.

In view of the above petitioner invoked the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic violence Act, 2005.

Trial Court passed impugned order, wherein first respondent was directed to pay the maintenance of Rs 5,000. On not being satisfied with the maintenance amount also the order of the trial court directing the first respondent to pay maintenance from the date of the order, petitioner/wife came forward with the present revision.

Analysis

Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not provide the date from which the maintenance to be awarded and there is no provisions in the Hindu Adoption and Marriage Act with respect to the date from which the maintenance order may be made effective. But, at the same time, Section 125(2) CrPC, contemplates that the Magistrate may award maintenance either from the date of order or from the date of application.

 In the Supreme Court decision of Jaiminiben Hirenbhai Vyas v. Hirenbhai Rameshchandras Vyas, (2015) 2 SCC 385, it was held that Section 125 CrPC, impliedly requires the Court to consider making the order for maintenance effective from either of the two dates, having regard to the relevant facts.

It is neither appropriate nor desirable that a Court simply states that maintenance should be paid from either the date of order or the date of the application in matters of maintenance.

As per Section 354(6) of the CrPC, the Court should record reasons in support of the order passed by it, in both eventualities and that the purpose of the provision is to prevent vagrancy and destitution in society and the Court must apply its mind to the options having regard to the facts of the particular case.

Supreme Court in its decision of Rajnesh v. Neha,2020 SCC OnLine SC 903, after analyzing the provisions in various enactment of the Judgments of the appeal and considering the divergent views taken by the various Courts issued necessary direction to bring about the uniformity in the orders passed by all the Courts.

Right to claim maintenance must date back to the date of filing of the application, since the period during which maintenance proceedings remained pending is not within the control of the applicant. Considering the above, the Supreme Court categorically directed that all the Courts award maintenance from the date of application.

 Conclusion

In the present matter, the petitioner had filed the case in the year 2014 and the impugned order was passed on 11-07-2017.

In view of the above discussion, Court held that it has no hesitation to hold that the impugned order granting maintenance from the date of order is liable to be set aside and the petitioner would be entitled to get maintenance from the date of application.

Hence, criminal revision case was partly allowed. [Mohamed Nisha Banu v. Mohamed Rafi, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 801, decided on 17-02-2021]


Advocates who appeared for the parties:

For petitioner : S.M. Jinnah

For Respondent: No appearance

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Dr Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J., expressed that:

The remedy of writ of habeas corpus at the instance of a person seeking to obtain possession of someone whom he claims to be his wife would therefore not be available as a matter of course.

The present matter for writ of habeas corpus was filed to produce the corpus of petitioner 1 stated to be under detention.

On investigation, it was revealed that petitioner 1 had left her matrimonial home on her own on account of discord with her husband, petitioner 2 for the reason that he is stated to have entered into another marriage and a child was also stated to have been born out of the wedlock.

Petitioners counsel though disputing the factum of the second marriage did not controvert the fact of petitioner 2 being in an extra marital relationship and also that a child was born out of the said relationship.

Analysis and Decision

The writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ and an extraordinary remedy.

Bench observed that writ of habeas corpus is of right and not a writ of course and may be granted only on reasonable ground or probable cause being shown, as held in Mohammad Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., 1964 AIR 1625 and Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate Darjeeling, (1973) 2 SCC 674.

Elaborating more on writ of Habeas Corpus, Court added that it has been held as a festinum remedium and accordingly the power would be exercisable in a clear case.

Hence, High Court held that in view of the other remedies available for the purpose under criminal and civil law, issuance of writ of habeas corpus at the behest of a husband to regain his wife may not be available as a matter of course and the power in this regard may be exercised only when a clear case would be made out.

Therefore, petitioner 1 having left the matrimonial home on her own due to a matrimonial discord, the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus at the behest of husband would not be entertainable.[Soniya v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 174, decided on 10-02-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: The Division Bench of Vipin Sanghi and Rekha Palli, JJ., upheld the Family Court’s decision and directed the parties approach the local Court of Singapore with regard to sorting out their matrimonial dispute. 

Issue

Present appeal was filed seeking a direction against the Family Court’s decision, wherein the appellant/plaintiff sought an anti-suit injunction against the defendant/respondent to seek restraint against him for proceeding with a divorce petition filed by him to seek dissolution of marriage before the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore.

Family Court had granted injunction till the next date of hearing, restraining the defendant/respondent from prosecuting, pursuing or going ahead with his divorce action or any other proceedings as emanating from the matrimony in the case pending in Singapore Court.

Analysis

Bench found that the Family Court took note of the law laid down by the Supreme Court decisions on the aspect of grant on anti-injunction suit. Following were decisions of Supreme Court that were relied upon by the Family Court:

Y.Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451

Modi Entertainment Network v. WSG Cricket PTE Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 341

Dinesh Singh Thakur v. Sonal Thakur., AIR 2018 SC 2094

Appellant’s submission before the Court is that she would be severely prejudiced in case the divorce proceedings were allowed to continue in Singapore Courts, since the divorce would be granted without the appellant being granted any maintenance, or alimony, as also the custody of the children.

Opinion

Court on perusal of the submissions, facts and circumstances of the case stated that:

Firstly, regarding the rights of the parties in a matrimonial dispute according to the law of Singapore can hardly be a reason for the Court to grant the injunction, for the simple reason that the parties were domiciled in Singapore and were continuously residing there since 2012.

Secondly, no reason can be seen why the Singapore Courts would treat the appellant unfairly. Pertinently she had moved an application before the Court at Singapore to seek maintenance. Therefore, the Court cannot accept her claim that she would be prejudiced in any manner on account of her being the wife in the matrimonial dispute before a Singapore Court.

Appellant had also moved an application challenging territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Singapore, which application was rejected.

Decision

Hence, the High Court held that the Family Court had rightly rejected the application preferred by the appellant under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC.

Bench reiterated that parties being permanent resident of Singapore, residing there since 2012, should sort out their matrimonial dispute before the local Court in Singapore.

Adding to the above, Court expressed that Courts in India cannot be said to be forums that would be convenient to either of the parties. Enforcement of orders passed by the Courts in India- when the parties; their children, and; their assets/properties are situated in Singapore, would be a practical impossibility.

On finding no merit in the appeal, it was dismissed. [Rakhee Bahl v. Pankaj Bahl, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 766, decided on 03-02-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

For Appellant: Osama Suhail with Surabhi Diwan, Advs.

For Respondent: Shashank Agrawal, Adv.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: J. Nisha Banu, J., while addressing a revision petition directed the Family Court to waive off the cooling-off period in view of the petitioners living separately for the past 13 years.

The instant petition was filed to seek direction to waive off the cooling period.

The revision petitioners had preferred the petition on the file of the Family Court under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Husband and Wife had been living separately for 13 years and mutually agreed to dissolve their marriage.

The grievance that arose was that, since they had been living separately for the past 13 years, the family Court ought to have disposed of the petition. Hence, petitioners are constrained to move the present revision petition before the Court for granting speedy disposal of the petition.

Revision petitioners’ counsel while narrating the facts of the matter, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746, wherein it was held that:

18. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory or directory, language alone is not always decisive. The Court has to have the regard to the context, the subject matter and the object of the provision. ….

… we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following :

i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself;

ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts;

iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties;

iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.

The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned Court.

  1. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation.”

Hence, High Court concluded in the present matter that since the petitioners had been separated for the past 13 years and had entered into a compromise along with this in view of the above-referred decision, Family Court shall waive the cooling period and dispose of the petition.[Jaishankar, In Re., 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 708, decided on 01-02-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Suresh Kumar Kait, J., while addressing a criminal revision petition concerning a matrimonial dispute expressed that:

“..husband cannot wriggle out of his responsibilities to provide shelter to his wife and minor children.”

Issue: Modified Maintenance Amount to Wife

Petitioner/Husband sought to quash the Family Court’s Order through which maintenance amount was enhanced to Rs 22,000 from Rs 10,000 to respondent/wife.

Wife whereas sought modification of the Order passed by Family Court vide which interim maintenance amount of Rs 10,000 awarded by the trial court had been enhanced to Rs 22,000 while claiming it to be on the lower side.

Both the above-stated issues have been clubbed together and are being disposed of by this common Judgment.

Analysis

Wife claimed that her husband was living a luxurious life, whereas she herself was unemployed and helpless, and had two children, hence she claimed that her husband could easily maintain her and the children, but he has been deliberately neglecting his responsibilities.

In view of the above status of the husband, she claimed interim maintenance of Rs 40,000 per month.

As far as monthly income of the husband was concerned, as per his affidavit of income, he had declared his income as Rs37,418/- p.m., whereas as per ITR for the assessment year his monthly income was Rs 43,305/- p.m. Further, as per credit in bank account, his salary was shown to be Rs 44,560/- p.m, which the trial court had taken into consideration.

According to his salary slip, his total gross pay was Rs 50,003 per month and deduction of Rs 10,249 was made towards the pension scheme, insurance, society membership and repayment of the loan.

Court’s Opinion: Calculating Quantum of Maintenance

High Court opined that the income has to be ascertained keeping in mind that the deductions only towards income tax and compulsory contributions like GPF, EPF, etc. are permitted and no deductions towards house rent, electric charges, repayment of loan, LIC payments etc. are permitted.

In view of the above aspect, Bench referred to the Supreme Court decision in Dr Kulbhushan Kunwar v. Raj Kumari, (1970) 3 SCC 129, which was followed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Seema v. Gourav Juneja, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 3045.

Applying the similar ratio as was in above cases, Court found that while calculating the income of the husband, deduction of Rs 1,000 towards NZRE BH NDLS contribution (which is a kind of saving) and Rs 4,451 NZRE BH Loan, from his gross income of Rs 50,003/-, cannot be permitted. Hence, the husband’s net income in hand comes to Rs 44,552/- p.m. and rounding it off to Rs 44,560.

Argument with regard to accommodation by the husband, that he has to pay rent for the same could not be considered as husband is duty-bound to arrange accommodation for his wife and children who are dependent upon him.

Court also cited the Supreme Court decision in Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. Distt. Judge, Dehradun (1997) 7 SCC 7.

Trial Court’s Error

Whether the court below was right in dividing husband’s income into six shares while calculating and granting interim maintenance?

Husband’s mother used to receive a pension of Rs 17,199 and medical benefits, etc. and she used to live in three-storeyed building wherein one floor was occupied by her, one by her husband a and another by husband’s brother.

Since the husband pays Rs 8,000 as monthly rent and the same would be the position of the other son of the husband’s mother, her rental income would amount to Rs 16,000.

Even if it’s assumed that the rent agreement placed on record might have been manipulated to save income tax, then also it cannot be lose sight of that mother is receiving a good amount of pension and is thus, financially independent.

Another plea that the husband placed was that he had gotten employment on compassionate grounds when his father passed away, hence he is liable to maintain his mother.

On noting the above, Supreme Court decision on Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353 was referred, wherein it was held that:

“2. Be it ingeminated that Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish, financial suffering of a woman who left her matrimonial home for the reasons provided in the provision so that some suitable arrangements can be made by the court and she can sustain herself and also her children if they are with her. The concept of sustenance does not necessarily mean to lead the life of an animal, feel like an unperson to be thrown away from grace and roam for her basic maintenance somewhere else. She is entitled in law to lead a life in the similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. That is where the status and strata come into play, and that is where the obligations of the husband, in case of a wife, become a prominent one. In a proceeding of this nature, the husband cannot take subterfuges to deprive her of the benefit of living with dignity. Regard being had to the solemn pledge at the time of marriage and also in consonance with the statutory law that governs the field, it is the obligation of the husband to see that the wife does not become a destitute, a beggar. A situation is not to be maladroitly created whereunder she  is compelled to resign to her fate and think of life “dust unto dust”. It is totally impermissible. In fact, it is the sacrosanct duty to render the financial support even if the husband is required to earn money with physical labour, if he is able-bodied.” 

In view of the above discussion, Court found an error in the trial court’s decision in keeping the mother’s share in the income of the husband.

Hence, in this view of the matter, taking the income of husband @ Rs 44,560/- p.m. and diving it into two shares for him and remaining for his dependants i.e. wife and two children, that is to say by making five shares, each one is entitled to the share @Rs 8912/- (round of Rs 8910/-p.m.). Resultantly, the wife shall be entitled to interim maintenance @Rs 26,736/- p.m. and in round figure Rs 26,000/- instead of Rs 22,000/- p.m.

Bench modified the impugned order in the above terms. [Nitin Sharma v. Sunita Sharma, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 694, decided on 18-02-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: The Division Bench of Sadhana S. Jadhav and N.J. Jamadar, JJ., while addressing the present matter, expressed that:

Where the prosecution succeeds in discharging its primary burden and brings evidence on record which indicates that the facts, thereby proved, rest within the special knowledge of the accused, Section 106 of the Evidence Act comes into play.

Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.

Factual Matrix

Accused-Appellant has challenged the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge, wherein he was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 for having committed the murder of his wife Sunita (the deceased).

The accused harassed and ill-treated the deceased on suspecting fidelity of the deceased. The deceased and accused shifted to Beghar Vasti wherein they erected a temporary shed adjacent to the house of the first informant. Later the accused and deceased desired to erect a shed with a thatched roof.

To erect the shed with a thatched roof, both the accused and deceased went to the field in order to collect a wooden log. The first informant also went to the fieLd to graze the goats, wherein he saw that the deceased was lying near a mango tree and her clothes were stained with blood. However, first informant did not find the accused in the vicinity of the said spot. Thus, he suspected that the accused to have done so, after which he lodged a report.

 During the investigation, it was found that the deceased was carrying six months pregnancy and the said occurrence resulted in the death of quick unborn child as well. The accused came to be arrested.

Additional Sessions Judge framed charge against the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 316 of the IPC.

After the trial, offence for Section 316 IPC was not established against the accused, though he came to be convicted under Section 302 IPC.

Aggrieved with the above, present appeal was preferred.

Analysis and Decision

Bench noted that the fact that the accused did not offer any explanation regarding the circumstances in which he parted the company with the deceased and how the deceased sustained those fatal injuries weighed with the Additional Sessions, Judge.

In the context of the marital relationship between the deceased and the accused and the indisputable fact that they were residing at Khatgun along with the first informant, the “last seen theory” constitutes the linchpin of the prosecution case. 

Court added that the fact that the deceased was found beneath the mango tree in the said field, within a couple of hours of the accused and the deceased having left the house, can also be said to have been proved beyond the shadow of doubt.

Further, since there has been ample evidence to indicate that the first informant found the deceased lying in a motionless state with fatal injuries and when she raised alarm, the prosecution witnesses, Dharam Pawar (PW-6) and Sushila Pawar (PW-9) went to the scene of occurrence and found the deceased lying beneath the mango tree.

Adding to the above, Court also stated that in any event, the interval of time between the accused and the deceased leaving together their home and the deceased having been found dead in the field ‘Kolki’, did not exceed three hours.

It is trite law that the ‘last seen’ theory comes into play when the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead, is so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused being the perpetrator of the offence, is inconceivable.

In view of the above law and facts of the case, Court held that the prosecution succeeded in establishing that the accused and the deceased were “last seen together”.

Nature of the death

The nature of the injuries found on the person of the deceased and the attendant circumstances are of determinative significance. Bench stated that the injuries found on the person of the deceased were on accessible and elective parts i.e. wrist and neck.

It is true that the accused did not endeavour to offer an explanation as regards the circumstances in which the deceased suffered the aforesaid injuries, when confronted with the incriminating material.

The question that triggers in the above circumstances is whether the failure to offer the explanation is sufficient to fasten the liability on the accused?

In the circumstances of the present case, in the absence of any positive evidence, motive to eliminate the deceased cannot be attributed to the accused on the premise that, before the accused and the deceased shifted to Khatgaun, their marital life was afflicted with discord.

Accused having changed the clothes with a view to conceal the fact that the clothes which he wore at the time of occurrence were stained with blood, is not of conclusive tendency and incriminating nature. Admittedly, the accused was found in an injured condition. Wounds were found on both the wrists and neck of the accused.

Adding to the above, Court expressed that the accused had visible injuries, on his person, when he was apprehended. The presence of bloodstains on the clothes of the accused, which he wore on the day of occurrence, therefore, cannot be construed as an incriminating circumstance.

Though prosecution made an endeavour to draw home the point that the accused had self-inflicted the above-stated injuries overcome by the feeling of guilt. Bench found it hazardous to draw an inference that the said attempt on the part of the accused to cause injuries to himself was due to the fact that the accused was overcome by the guilt, as held by the Additional Sessions Judge.

What emerges from the above discussion?

From all the above discussion, Court observed that there has been clear evidence of ‘last seen’ and the death of the deceased within a couple of hours of the deceased and the accused having been last seen together.

The wounds found on the person of the deceased especially the situs, elective parts, and nature were suggestive of suicidal infliction.

As the fundamental fact of the deceased having met a homicidal death itself is in the corridor of uncertainty.

In Court’s opinion, the circumstance of ‘last seen’, and the failure of the accused to offer a plausible explanation, on their own, were not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the prosecution of its general or  primary burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

 Supreme Court’s decision in Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193 was also referred for the above purpose.

Propositions that emerged from the above discussion:

  • If an accused is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company with the deceased.
  • The failure of the accused to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the said burden provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against the accused.

In the present matter, homicidal nature of the death was not established and the prosecution case rested upon the circumstance of “last seen” to a great extent.

With regard to the legal position in respect to sustaining the guilt on the only circumstances of “last seen”, Court referred to the decision of Supreme Court in Dharam Deo v. State of U.P., (2007) 3 SCC 755.

Hence, Bench held that circumstance of ‘last seen’, in the totality of circumstances, cannot sustain the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, especially when the fact of homicidal death is in the realm of uncertainty.

High Court concluded its decision by referring to the decision in Navaneethakrishnan v. State, (2018) 16 SCC 161, wherein the legal position in the context of sustaining conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence was expounded.

Conviction under Section 302 IPC could not sustained in view of the above discussion. [Krishna Mahadev Chavan v. State of  Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 191, decided on 12-02-2021]


Advocates who represented the parties:

Aashish Satpute, Advocate appointed by Court for appellant.

S.R. Agarkar, APP for respondent-State.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Prathiba M. Singh, J., dismissed an application filed under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act on finding no interest in the same by the wife.

Petitioner filed a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking divorce from his wife. To which Family Court granted a decree of divorce to dissolve the marriage. However, on the same date, a notice was issued in the application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, Family Court called for the detailed affidavits to be filed as to the expenditure, assets and liabilities of both the Petitioner and Respondent.

The above-said application has been challenged.

Bench noted from the Family Court’s decision that the respondent did not contest the divorce petition at all. Respondent’s defence was struck off and cross-examination of the petitioner was also of a limited nature.

Further, the Court added that since the respondent did not set out any substantial defence and the decree of divorce was granted without contest, respondent didn’t seem to be interested in pressing the application under Section 24 of the Act, which is meant for interim maintenance pendente lite.

 While concluding with the decision, Court expressed that the legal position is that a Section 24 application under the Act can survive beyond the dismissal of the main proceeding for grant of divorce, in respect of the period till the dismissal of the said petition.

Adding to the above, bench stated that the decision in Rita Mago v. V.P. Mago, 20(1981) DLT 103 may no longer be good law.

Hence, Bench concluded that in view of the above facts and circumstances the respondent doesn’t seem to be interested in pursuing the application under Section 24 for interim maintenance, therefore the said application was dismissed. [Apurva Anand v. Chanchal Niranjan, CM (M) 426 of 2020 and CM Appl. 20237 of 2020, decided on 29-01-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: Dr Aman Hingorani and Himanshu Yadav, Advocates

 Respondent: None

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Subramonium Prasad, J., while addressing the present revision petition expressed that:

“A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of the evidence.”

The instant revision petition was filed under Section 397/401 CrPC against the Order passed by Additional Sessions Judge. Further, the petitioner has also challenged the Order passed by Metropolitan Magistrate in an application for claiming interim maintenance under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act.

Facts leading to the present revision petition:

After marriage, Respondent/wife was inducted as a whole-time Director in the company run by the petitioner/husband. Later, the respondent-wife started living separately claiming that she was deserted by the petitioner after which she filed an application under Section 23 of the protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 for seeking interim maintenance.

Since the respondent was continuing as the Director in the said company of the husband she wasn’t able to take up any other job and was not even getting any salary from the husband’s company which all lead to her not being able to maintain herself.

Initially, she was granted interim maintenance of Rs 1,00,000 but it was rejected by the lower court.

Respondent also approached the Company Law Board for a direction that she should be paid salary during the period she served as the Director of the Company to which the Company Law directed the above-stated company to pay the salary to the respondent.

When the petitioner moved an application under Section 25 of the Domestic Violence Act for the modification in the maintenance order since now the respondent was getting a salary from the Company, the said request was rejected.

Analysis and Decision

Bench opined that the scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow.

Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case.

 Court noted that the findings of the Metropolitan Magistrate as upheld by the Sessions Court was that the petitioner was not providing adequate maintenance to the respondent and since the said maintenance was not being paid, petitioner was directed to pay a sum of Rs 1,00,000 towards maintenance.

Further, the Company which was being run by the petitioner did not release her salary. The respondent had to move the Court and fight for getting her legitimate salary.

To the above, Bench stated that even though the company is distinct from the petitioner but the company is being run by the petitioner and it can be assumed that the salary was not being paid to the respondent only at the instance of the petitioner.

While concluding, the Court held that it is open for the petitioner to raise all the contentions in the matrimonial proceedings pending between the husband and wife while deciding the issue of grant of alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. [Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312, decided on 25-01-2021]


Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: Vishesh Wadhwa, Advocate

Respondents: Hirein Sharma, APP for the State

Joel, Advocate for the respondent 2.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Suresh Kumar Kait, J., dismissed a petition seeking enhancement of maintenance granted to a wife.

The instant petition was filed to seek enhancement of maintenance granted to the petitioner.

Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner/wife got married to respondent 1 husband in a 5-star hotel, organized by the family of the petitioner due to persistent demands by the respondents because it was within the knowledge of the respondents that petitioner was a divorced lady, but they had an objection to the same.

It was stated that the petitioner was a housewife with no independent income whereas respondent 1 a doctor had an admitted salary of Rs 92,000. Respondent 1 earned additional income through consultancy and interest from FDRs which was not disclosed by him.

Further, it was added that the mother of the petitioner was also a housewife whereas father of petitioner was 100% paralyzed and disabled for last about 20 years and during pendency of the present lis, father of petitioner succumbed to COVID-19 and passed away.

Respondent 1’s family lead a luxurious lifestyle and admittedly, he was not required to maintain his parents or any other relative.

Counsel for the respondents submitted that respondent 1 was getting a gross salary of Rs 92,000 and his expenses per month were of Rs 89, 483. He had no FD, property or inherited property by any law of succession.

Hence respondent 1 was not in a position to pay even Rs 8,000 as directed by the Court, therefore, he sought the dismissal of the instant petition.

Analysis and Decision

Bench noted that the petitioner was undisputedly highly qualified and her qualifications were as under:

(i) BBA from ITM College Gurgaon

(ii) MBA from IILM College Lodhi Road, New Delhi

(iii) Core Franchisee Certificate, Sydney, Australia

Court also noted the working proof of the petitioner as stated by the respondents. Though the petitioner had claimed that her deceased father was handicapped, but never disclosed that they had received Rs 32,93,224 + 7.5% p.a. interest as compensation from the date of accident awarded by this Court, beside this he has also received a lumpsum amount from its employer along with regular benefits i.e. D.A.

A list of inherited properties of the petitioner was also laid down by respondents. Moreover, the petitioner had claimed that her parents spent Rs 1 crore on her previous marriage and also spent a good amount on her second marriage.

The explanation with respect to the money spent was not given when none of them were working as stated by the petitioner to the Court.

Court expressed that the petitioner failed to establish that respondent 2 was having more income than the admitted or assets in his name. Whereas, on the other hand, the petitioner was wealthier than respondent 1 and maintaining a better standard of life.

Hence, the instant petition was dismissed. [Shiny Verma Bakshi v. Dr Gurneet Singh Bakshi, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 156, decided on 27-01-2021]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Central Information Commission (CIC): Neeraj Kumar Gupta (Information Commissioner) held that:

“Since filing of the Income Tax Returns by an individual with the Income Tax Department is not a public activity and rather it is in the nature of an obligation which a citizen owes to the State viz. to pay his taxes, this information could not be disclosed to the appellant in the absence of any larger public interest.”

In the instant application, the appellant sought the following information from the CPIO, Income Tax Officer:

  • “Please inform name and branch address of all those banks wherein my spouse Ms Mamta Arora was having account, at any point of time, during the financial years 2012-2013 to 2017-2018, the information is requested financial year-wise, the date of opening and closure of each bank account concerned be also informed and if any of the account is functional till the date of disposal of this application, then its functional status be also informed. The PAN card number of my spouse is APSPM8586N and her Aadhaar Card number is 319568028653.
  • Please provide details as to name and branch address of all those banks wherein my spouse Ms Mamta Arora has held any account, at any point of time, during the present financial year 2018- 2019. Date of opening and closure of each bank account concerned be also informed and if any of the bank accounts is functional till the date of disposal of this application, then its functional status is also informed.
  • Please inform what were the income tax slabs, for all the categories i.e. males, females, senior citizens etc. during the financial years 2012-2013 to 2017-2018, for assessment of income tax on the annual income of any resident Indian individual Etc.”

On being dissatisfied with CPIO’s response, appellant filed the instant second appeal before the Commission requesting to take appropriate legal action against the CPIO under Section 20 of the RTI Act and also to direct him to provide the sought-for information.

Decision

Commission observed that the opening words of Section 11 of the RTI Act are “CPIO…intends to disclose” which indicate that the procedure of Section 11 has to be followed only if CPIO intends to disclose the third party information.

Bench deduced that the CPIO is expected to follow the procedure of Section 11 when he “intends to disclose any information on record”.

Since the CPIO found no merit in disclosure, hence Section 11 was not invoked. Further, with regard to applicability of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005 for non-disclosure of the third party bank details and Income Tax returns Commission referred to the Supreme Court’ decision in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commission, (2013) 1 SCC 212.

Legal Issue

Whether the appellant claiming to be the legally wedded husband is entitled to seek information regarding his wife’s bank details and income tax returns?

To answer the stated question, Commission referred to the decision of Delhi High Court in Vijay Prakash v. UOI,2009 SCC OnLine Del 1731, wherein it was clarified that in a private dispute between husband and wife, the basic protection afforded by virtue of the exemption from disclosure enacted under Section 8(1)(j) cannot be lifted or disturbed unless the petitioner is able to justify how such disclosure would be in ‘public interest’.

Commission referred to the following decisions in regard to the disclosure of the information as sought in the instant application was of not larger interest:

[Bombay High Court] Shailesh Gandhi v. CIC, WP No. 8753 of 2013

[Delhi High Court] Naresh Kumar Trehan v. Rakesh Kumar Gupta, WP(C) No. 85 of 2010, 24-11-2014.

[Delhi High Court] Harish Kumar v. Provost Marshall, LPA No. 253 of 2012, 30-03-2012.

In light of Section 2(n) of the RTI Act, 2005 bench stated that Ms Mamta Arora being a person other than the RTI applicant came within the definition of ‘third party’.

Hence, while concluding the decision, Commission held that the in view of the above-decision, Bench opined that in the absence of any larger public interest in the matter, the appellant was not entitled to seek information regarding the bank details and income tax returns of his wife which is exempted under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.

Appeal was disposed of in view of the above. [Pawan Kumar Saluja v. CPIO, Income Tax Officer; Second Appeal No. CIC/CCITD/S/2019/120284; decided on 05-01-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Raj Beer Singh, J., observed that:

“The object of the Section 125 CrPC being to afford a swift remedy, and the determination by the Magistrate as to the status of the parties being subject to a final determination by the Civil Court, when the husband denies that the applicant is not his wife, all that the Magistrate has to find, in a proceeding under Section 125 CrPC, is whether there was some marriage ceremony between the parties, whether they have lived as husband and wife in the eyes of their neighbours, whether children were born from the union.”

The instant revision was preferred against the order passed under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code.

Contention that falls for consideration:

Whether respondent 2 has been able to show herself as married wife of revisionist in order to claim maintenance from revisionist under Section 125 CrPC?

Proceedings under Section 125 CrPC. are summary proceeding. In Supreme Court’s decision of Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit, (1999) 7 SCC 675, it was observed that the standard of proof of marriage in a Section 125 proceeding is not as strict as is required in a trial for an offence under Section 494 IPC.

Bench expressed that it is a well-settled law that for the purposes of a proceeding under Section 125 CrPC, the factum of marriage has to be prima facie considered.

“If there is prima facie material on record to suggest that the parties have married or are having relationship in the nature of marriage, the court can presume in favour of the woman claiming maintenance.”

 Court also stated that an order passed in an application under Section 125 CrPC does not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties and the said section is enacted with a view to provide a summary remedy for providing maintenance to a wife, children and parents.

In the decision of S. Sethurathiuam Pillai v. Barbara it was observed that maintenance under Section 488 CrPC, 1898 (similar to Section 125 Cr.P.C.) cannot be denied where there was some evidence on which conclusion for grant of maintenance could be reached. It was held that order passed under Section 488 is a summary order which does not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties; the decision of the criminal court that there was a valid marriage between the parties will not operate as decisive in any civil proceeding between the parties.

Court observed that in a proceeding for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, a Magistrate or Judge of the Family Court has to be prima facie satisfied about the marital status of the parties, as a decision under Section 125 CrPC is tentative in nature, subject to the decision in any civil proceeding, as has been held in Santosh v. Naresh Pal (1998) 8 SCC 447.

In light of the above discussions, High Court states that if from the evidence which is led, the Magistrate/Court is prima facie satisfied with regard to the performance of marriage in proceedings under Section 125 CrPC which are of summary nature, strict proof of performance of essential rites is not required.

In the instant matter, respondent 2 had submitted that her nikah was solemnized with the revisionist and out of that marriage, she gave birth to a daughter, but she was killed by the revisionist, whereas the case of the revisionist was that his nikah was never solemnized and they never lived as husband and wife together.

Limited Scope of Revisional Court

Question whether the respondent 2 was a married wife of revisionist, is a question of fact and thus, this court cannot upset the finding of the trial court by entering into re-appreciation of evidence, unless it is shown such a finding is not based on evidence or some patent error of jurisdiction is shown. In the instant case, no such eventuality could be shown. In fact, if the wife had been neglected and the wife was entitled to maintenance, the scope of interference by the Revisional Court is very limited.

Further, the Court added that in view of evidence on record, the grant of maintenance from the date of application cannot be said arbitrary or against law. The quantum of maintenance also appeared reasonable and appropriate.

“If a party deliberately delays the proceedings for long period, such party must not be allowed to take advantage of such tactics.”

 High Court found no illegality, perversity or error of jurisdiction in the impugned order.

While parting with the decision, Court added that the Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. [Irshad Ali v. State of U.P., Criminal Revision No. 1555 of 2020, decided on 08-01-2021]


Advocates who appeared on behalf of the parties:

 Counsel for Revisionist: Krishna Mishra

Counsel for Opposite Party: G.A.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: Mangesh S. Patil, J., in the present application directed the husband to pay an amount of Rs 10,000 towards alimony pendente lite under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Petitioner-wife has impugned the order passed by the Family Court, Judge wherein her application was rejected in which she sought interim alimony under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in a divorce proceeding filed by the respondent-husband under Section 13(i–a) of that Act.

Petitioner submitted that she was unable to maintain herself since the time she and her husband separated. She was even unable to work due to the psychological pressure and harassment meted out to her by the respondent.

As against this, the respondent is a Medical Officer earning around Rs 60,000 to Rs 65,000 salary. No-one is dependent on him and therefore, she claimed interim maintenance at the rate of Rs 15,000 per month and also claimed Rs 200 for rickshaw fare for attending the Court for each date and Rs 25,000 for engaging Advocate.

Analysis and Decision

Bench stated that as far as the right of a wife, who is capable of earning, to claim alimony is concerned, Supreme Court in the decision of Rajnesh v. Neha,2020 SCC OnLine SC 903, considered it in clause (c) of Part III under the head of ‘Criteria for determining the quantum of maintenance’.

Court in view of the above concluded that even if the petitioner in the matter in hand is a medical practitioner and was earning something for her livelihood, the same cannot be a ground to refuse alimony to her under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

Quantum of Maintenance

Bench observed that though the petitioner had produced her Income tax Returns, respondent did not reciprocate the gesture. Supreme Court’s decision in Rajnesh v. Neha, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 903, laid down several guidelines requiring both the parties to make several disclosures in the form of affidavits inter alia touching the income aspect as well. Conspicuously, in that matter, the Supreme Court had directed the husband to produce Income Tax returns before passing the order for granting interim maintenance.

Consequently, without indulging into further discussion, Court held that the failure of the respondent to come with disclosure as to his own income and taking into consideration all the aforementioned facts and circumstances and bearing in mind the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh v. Neha, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 903 and resorting to inevitable guesswork, it would be just and proper to award interim maintenance to the petitioner at the rate of Rs 10,000 per month.

Along with the above direction of interim maintenance respondent shall pay all the arrears up to date to her within 12 weeks from the date of this judgment.

In view of the above discussion, the petition was partly allowed. [Arpana Vijay Manore v. Dr Vijay Tukaram Manore, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 3925, decided on 09-12-2020]


Advocates who appeared for the matter:

B.R. Warma, Advocate holding for Shrirang B. Varma, Advocate for the petitioner

A.M. Gholap, Advocate for the respondent

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gujarat High Court: The Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and Vireshkumar B. Mayani, JJ., while addressing the issue of grant of permanent alimony to a Muslim Woman noted the significant difference between permanent alimony and periodical maintenance.

An instant appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 was filed at the instance of the original defendant (husband) and was directed against the judgment and decree passed by Principal Judge, Ahemdabad for a decree of divorce under the provisions of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Question for consideration:

Whether the Family Court committed any error in passing the order of permanent alimony in favour of the wife while granting the decree of divorce to the wife?

There are two types of alimony:

1. Given at the time of court proceedings- This is usually the maintenance amount.

2. Given at the time of legal separation- This can be given either in a lump sum or as a fixed monthly or quarterly payment or as per the requirements of the spouse.

Supreme Court on a creative and meaningful interpretation of the MWPRDA, 1986, upheld its constitutionality. It held that a Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of his divorced wife extending beyond the Iddat period.

In the Supreme Court decision of Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, (2010) 1 SCC 666, the question that fell for consideration was whether a Muslim Divorced wife would be entitled to receive the amount of maintenance from her divorced husband under Section 125 CrPC, and if yes, then through which forum.

In the above decision of the Supreme Court, it was held that petition under Section 125 CrPC would be maintainable before the family court as long as the wife does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 of the CrPC cannot be restricted for the Iddat period only.

Main Argument

The most significant submission on behalf of the appellant was that no provision exists in the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 for the maintenance or permanent alimony. Further, it was stated that Family Court had no jurisdiction to pass any order with respect to maintenance or permanent alimony once the suit is allowed and the marriage is dissolved at the instance of the wife.

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

The Muslim Women Act is “to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by or have obtained a divorce from their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Hence the Muslim Women Act professes to deal with Muslim divorced women and their rights against their former husbands.

Family Court

Bench observed that, where a Family Court has been established, the power and the jurisdiction of the Family Court under Section 7(2) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 to entertain an application for maintenance, even by a divorced Muslim wife, under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been taken away, either expressly or even by implication by the Muslim Women Act of 1986.

And once such an application is made to a Family Court under Section 7(2) of the Family Courts Act, and not to a Magistrate, the same has got to be disposed of by the Family Court in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Muslim Women Act of 1986, including its Section 5, would have no manner of application.

Matrimonial Property

Further, it was stated that the right to maintenance and right in the matrimonial property are the consequences of the marriage or its dissolution. Those reliefs are incidental to the main relief of ‘dissolution of marriage’ and therefore, these reliefs are very much an integral part of the decree of ‘dissolution of marriage’.

Section 4 of the Act, 1986

It was also sought to be argued on behalf of the appellant that in view of Section 4 of the Act, 1986, the former husband had no liability to make any provision for the Post-Iddat period.

Bench observed that the right of maintenance given to the wife and the minor children under the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, is in addition to the right, which the minor children are having under Muslim Law to get maintenance from the father. The law expects that the parties should not be driven to approach the different forums but in one forum itself, they should be granted whatever reliefs to which they are entitled.

Supreme Court in the decision of K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. Shahida, (2003) 4 SCC 166 was concerned with the provisions of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 as to whether the Family Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any question relating to the properties of the parties not only of the subsisting marriage but also divorced parties and the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that the reason for the enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1984, was to set up a Court to deal with all the disputes concerning with the Family and it is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a Court created specifically for the resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally.

Wife has remarried

Counsel submitted that the wife was remarried and in view of there was no question of any lump sum permanent alimony.

Bench observed that

A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to receive, from her husband, inter alia, “maintenance”, “reasonable and fair provision”, “Mahr” etc. under Section 3 of the Act, 1986.

Permanent Alimony

Bench stated that what is significant to note is that the relief of permanent alimony is a relief incidental to the granting of the substantive relief by the Court in the main proceeding. It is an incidental relief claimed in the main proceeding, though an application is necessary for claiming it.

The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the question whether a Muslim woman obtaining a divorce under the provisions of the Act, 1939 is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, and it was held in Zohara Khatoon v. Mohd. Ibrahim, (1981) 2 SCC 509 that there are three distinct modes in which a dissolution of marriage can be brought about and Clause(b) of the Explanation to Section 125(1) envisages all the three modes, whether a wife is divorced unilaterally by the husband or where she obtains divorce under the other two modes, she continues to be a wife for the purpose of getting maintenance under Section 125 of the Code.

The Supreme Court held that divorce resulting from the dissolution of marriage under the provision of Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 is also a legal divorce under the Mohammedan law by virtue of the Statute (1939 Act).

Conclusion

Bench observed that when the Court would make an award of permanent alimony or for one-time payment, it is not founded on any stipulation that any part of the sum would be either actually refunded in whole or in part. Such sum is not granted on the condition against remarriage for all times to or for any particular period.

The permanent alimony in a way is an estimated sum in a lump sum to discharge the judgment debtor from his future liabilities unconditionally.

The grant of periodical payment by way of maintenance to a divorced wife is in recognition/obligation to the spouse to maintain her so long as she enjoys the continued status of a divorcee.

On remarriage status of divorcee comes to an end and she acquires another marital status as someone’s spouse. Under the Act, 1986 as under Section 125 CrPC, the wife includes a divorcee.

In view of the above discussion, it can be said that:

when the wife remarries, her claim of maintenance primarily comes to stand against her new husband coming into existence in a new relationship.

The proposition of law laid down by the Court should be looked into keeping in mind Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986.

A divorced woman is entitled to ‘a reasonable and fair provision” and “maintenance” to be made and paid to her within and post the Iddat period by her former husband.

Point-wise Conclusion of the decision:

  • After the Act of 1939, a wife had a statutory right to obtain a divorce from her husband through the Court on proof of the grounds mentioned in the Act.
  • The ex-wife, having obtained a divorce from her erstwhile husband under the provisions of the Act, 1939 is entitled to the reasonable and fair provision under Section 3 of the Act, 1986.
  • The Family Courts Act has in its comprehension all community including the Muslims. All disputes between the Muslim community within the purview of the Family Courts Act are to be settled by the Family Courts.
  • Dispute contemplated by Section 3 of the Act, 1986 is within the purview and four corners of the Family Courts Act as the dispute under Section 3 of the Act, 1986 also relates to matrimonial relations between the parties.
  • Right of maintenance and right in the matrimonial property are the consequences of the marriage or its dissolution.
  • The Law contemplates that the husband has two separate and distinct obligations; (I) to make “reasonable and fair provision” for his divorcee wife and (ii) to provide “maintenance” for her. The obligation to make a reasonable and fair provision for the divorced wife is not restricted until the divorced wife remarries. It is within the jurisdiction of the Family Court to pass an order for a lump sum amount to be paid to the wife in the discharge of the obligation of the husband under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986 and such order cannot be modified upon remarriage of the divorced Muslim wife.
  • Provision for permanent alimony is incidental to the granting of a decree or judicial separation, divorce or annulment of marriage.
  • The permanent alimony in a way is an estimated sum in a lump sum to discharge the husband from her future liabilities unconditionally.
  • If the wife gets remarried, her status of divorcee comes to an end and the liability of the husband to pay periodical maintenance would also come to an end.

Another significant observation of the High Court was which was placed by the counsel for the parties was that the appellant had remarried way back in the year 2014. Before the respondent herein instituted the proceedings in the Family Court for divorce, the husband had already remarried and raised a family. The appellant could do so because polygamy is permissible amongst the Muslim Community. It does not constitute an offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 of the Penal Code.

The materials on record indicated that the husband hardly paid anything towards maintenance. The respondent had to leave her matrimonial home soon after the marriage, i.e., sometime in 2010. Ultimately, she was constrained to institute the proceedings of divorce in the Family Court. Even during the pendency of such proceedings, nothing was paid to the wife. The wife, ultimately, succeeded before the Family Court in getting the marriage dissolved and was also successful in getting an order of permanent alimony. The husband now cannot turn around and say that he is not liable to pay the lump sum amount because the respondent is remarried.

Hence, in Court opinion, the Family Court’s line of reasoning ad the ultimate conclusion that was drawn by the family court was just and proper.

Therefore the appeal was dismissed.[Tarif Rashidbhai Qureshi v. Asmabanu, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 711, decided on 19-03-2020]


Advocates who appeared for the parties:

Nishant Lalakita for Appellant 1

Javed S Qureshi for Appellant 1

SP Majmudar for Defendant 1

Shashvata U Shukla for Defendant 1

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Anu Malhotra, J., addressed a matter wherein the husband and wife reach a settlement and the wife agrees to a clause wherein her minor daughter would also not be liable to claim anything against the petitioners.

In the instant application, petitioners have been stated to be under judicial custody, Vaibhav Jaiswal was alleged under Section 376 of Penal Code, 1860 and under POCSO Act, 2012.

Other petitioners were alleged to have committed offences under Sections 498 A, 406 and 34 of IPC.

The above-stated FIR was sought to be quashed in light of a settlement arrived between the petitioners and respondent 2 and that the marriage between the petitioner 1 and respondent 2 has been dissolved.

Respondent 2 affirmed the factum of the settlement arrived between her and petitioner 1.

Bench stated that in view of the above there appears no reason to disbelieve that the statement made by respondent 2 that she has arrived at a settlement with petitioners was made of her own accord.

Hence, all the proceedings against the petitioners are quashed.

However, in regard to the settlement deed, it was observed that under clause 7 states as follows:

“It is agreed between the parties that the above settlement is with respect to all claims of wife past, present, future, alimony, stridhan, maintenance, executions, articles property etc. and neither she nor her relatives shall claim anything from husband or from his family members in future for herself or on behalf of Child/children.”

Court stated that it is essential to observe that respondent 2 gave up all the rights of the minor child Vaishanvi qua the petitioners.

But the above could not have been done so in light of the Supreme court decision in Ganesh v. Sudhi Kumar Shrivastava, Civil Appeal Nos. 4031-4032/2019 arising out of SLP (C)  Nos. 32868-32869/2018, a verdict dated 22.4.2019 adhered to by this Court in Rakesh Jain  v. State, Crl. MC No. 2935 of 2019.

Hence, the minor child would be entitled to seek her claims against the petitioners and respondent 2 qua maintenance or otherwise in accordance with the law. [Vashno Jaishwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1504, decided on 20-11-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Pankaj Naqvi and Vivek Agarwal, JJ., observed that,

Right to live with a person of his/her choice irrespective of religion professed by them, is intrinsic to right to life and personal liberty.

The writ petition was filed seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent concerned, not to arrest the petitioners under Sections 363, 366, 352, 506 of Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7 and 8 POCSO Act.

Salamat Ansari and Priyanka Kharwar along with two others invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for seeking quashment of an FIR under Sections 363, 366, 352, 506 IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of POCSO Act on the premise that the couple is of the age of majority, competent to contract a marriage, performed Nikah as per Muslim rites and rituals, after Priyanka Kharwar renounced her Hindu identity and embraced Islam.

Further, it was submitted that the couple had been living together as husband and wife since last one year peacefully and happily. FIR was lodged by the father of petitioner 4 prompted by malice and mischief only with a view to bringing an end to marital ties, no offences are made out, hence FIR be quashed.

DECISION

The mere fact that this petition is filed and supported by an affidavit of Priyanka Kharwar alleged victim, goes to show that she is voluntarily living with Salamat Ansari as a married couple.

Age of Priyanka Kharwar was not in dispute as she was reported to be around 21 years, therefore, petitioners 1 to 3 cannot be made accused of committing an offence under Sections 363 or 366 IPC, as the victim on her own left her home in order to live with Salamat Ansari. Similarly, as Priyanka Kharwar was not found to be juvenile, the offence under Sections 7/8 POCSO Act was not made out.

Hence, the allegations made were malafidely motivated with a view to implicate the family.

Bench stated that,

“Priyanka Kharwar and Salamat as Hindu and Muslim, rather as two grown-up individuals who out of their own free will and choice are living together peacefully and happily over a year.”

Adding to the above, it was observed that the Courts and the Constitutional Courts, in particular, are enjoined to uphold the life and liberty of an individual guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Interference in a personal relationship, would constitute a serious encroachment into the right to freedom of choice of the two individuals.

Court stated that it fails to understand that if the law permits two persons even of the same sex to live together peacefully then neither any individual nor a family nor even State can have an objection to the relationship of two major individuals who out of their own free will are living together.

By relying on the Supreme Court decision of Shaffin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368, it was stated that the Supreme has consistently respected the liberty of an individual who has attained the age of majority.

Supreme Court in the decision of Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192, came down heavily on the perpetrators of “honour killings” which the Court found not only horrific and barbaric but also interfering with the right to choose a life partner and the dignity of an individual.

Bench stated that though the above observations were made in connection with ‘honour killings’ but the Court is of the firm view that the said principle would apply in the present context too where a relationship of two matured individuals is sought to be jeopardized at the whim and caprice of a parent.

Right to choose a partner irrespective of caste, creed or religion, is inhered under the right to life and personal liberty, an integral part of the Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Before parting with the present decision, Court reiterated that the FIR is being quashed primarily on the ground that no offences are made out, as two grown-up individuals have been living together for over a year of their own free will and choice.

Before concluding, however, the Court expressed that it expects the daughter to extend all due courtesy and respect to her family. [Salamat Ansari v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 1382, decided on 11-11-2020]


Advocates who appeared for the parties:

Counsel for the petitioner: Rakesh Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Respondent: G.A., Ritesh Kumar Singh.