2020 SCC Vol. 1 January 28, 2020 Part 4

Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 — S. 4 r/w Sch. IV — Compensation — Quantum — Computation of — Functional disability — Estimation of: In this case, appellant driver of heavy vehicles, aged 33 yrs at time of accident, earning Rs 4000 p.m., was permanently incapacitated consequent to injury on his right leg resulting in complete disability to continue his vocation, besides losing prospect of securing other manual labour job since he required assistance to ensure his mobility and could walk only with help of walking stick. Assessing his functional disability at 100%, considering income of Rs 4000 p.m., and applying relevant factor of 201.66, the Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to compensation amounting to Rs 4,83,984 with interest @ 6% p.a. from date of accident till date of payment. [Chanappa Nagappa Muchalagoda v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 1 SCC 796]

Courts, Tribunals and Judiciary — JudiciaryJudicial misconduct/corruption/offences — Error of judgment in decision-making — When punishable/cannot be condoned: Standard or yardstick for judging conduct of judicial officer, held, given the nature of the office, necessarily strict. Dispensation of justice is not only an onerous duty but also a pious one and hence, standards of probity, conduct, integrity that may be relevant for performance of other job is higher for judicial officer who holds office of public trust. Standard or yardstick for judging conduct of judicial officer has therefore to be necessarily strict. However, that does not mean that every inadvertent flow or error would make judicial officer culpable. Bona fide error may need correction or counselling but conduct which creates perception beyond ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained legal mind, judicial order speaks for itself. [Ram Murti Yadav v. State of U.P., (2020) 1 SCC 801]

Armed Forces — Promotion — Permanent Secondment in Directorate General Quality Assurance (DGQA) — Consideration of Technical Assessment Reports (TARs) — Dispensation with in view of OM dt. 12-5-2011 superseding OM dt. 8-4-2004: In terms of OM dt. 8-4-2004, consideration for Permanent Secondment to DGQA was based on TARs. In OM dt. 12-5- 2011, no reference to TARs was made while stipulating large number of criteria for consideration for Permanent Secondment to DGQA. Cl. 4 of OM dt. 12-5-2011 specifically stated that said memorandum superseded all previous instructions/guidelines applicable. Hence, the Supreme Court held that OM dt. 12-5-2011 superseded OM dt. 8-4-2004 and TARs could not be considered for Permanent Secondment in DGQA. Submission that OM dt. 8-4-2004 was in nature of executive instructions approved by Raksha Mantri and continued to apply liable to be rejected since OM dt. 12-5-2011 was also in nature of executive instruction issued with approval of Raksha Mantri and it must be assumed that authorities who issued subsequent OM were aware of earlier one. [Union of India v. Sameer Singh, (2020) 1 SCC 809]

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