Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: A Division Bench of Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Jyotsna Rewal Dua, JJ., dismissing the present claim against the increment accrued post-retirement, reiterated the effect of relevant Pension Rules and settled precedents.

Brief Facts

Petitioner was appointed as Technical Assistant in the Department of Industries (Geological wing) on 01-03-1968 in the pay scale of Rs 250-550. He retired as Senior Hydrogeologist on 31-03-2003 in the pay scale of Rs. 10025- 15100. His grievance is that even after rendering twelve months of continuous service from 01-04-2002 to 31-03-2003, he has been retired without giving him the benefit of one increment which was due to him on 01-04-2003. A petition in this regard was moved before the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal which was later dismissed by an order dated, 08-08-2016. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner herein prays for the following reliefs, namely;

  1. To quash the order dated 08-08-2016, by the State Administrative Tribunal as it failed to give due consideration to the grounds raised by the petitioner.
  2. To strike down the offending part of impugned provision of R 56(a) of Fundamental Rules being unconstitutional to the extent it causes undue hardship and is discriminatory to the petitioner as it deprives him from getting the benefit of due and legitimate one increment even after rendering 12 months continuous and uninterrupted service for the reason that his date of birth falls on 1st April which also happens to be his date of next increment.
  3. Alternatively, the respondents may kindly be directed to grant necessary relaxations in favour of the petitioner by invoking the provision of FR 5-A as undue recurring financial hardship has been caused to the petitioner in his pension and pensionary benefits and thereby enabling the petitioner to get the benefits of one increment since the petitioner has already rendered 12 months continuous and uninterrupted service in the time scale of his post but on superannuation, has been illegally deprived of the benefits of one increment due to the wrong interpretation of FR 56(a) by the Respondents, with a further prayer to grant consequential necessary benefits flowing therefrom alongwith admissible interest on the arrears accruing thereto.


Counsel for the petitioner, B. Nandan Vashishta and Rajesh Kumar, placed reliance on a ruling by the High Court of Madras, P. Ayyamperumal v. Registrar, CAT, WP No. 15732 of 2017, wherein it was observed, that on completing one year of service from 01-07-2012 to 30-06-2013, the petitioner therein became entitled to the benefit of increment which accrued to him ‘during that period’ though the increment fell due on 01-07-2013 when he was not in service. The counsel also brought into light that the Supreme Court dismissed an SLP and later a review petition against the same, insisting upon the rightful claim of the petitioner. He further pressed upon the observation of Delhi High Court in Gopal Singh v. Union of India, 1969 SCC OnLine Del 53 whereby relying upon the aforementioned judgment, the writ petition was allowed and respondents were directed to grant notional increment to the petitioner with effect from 01-07-2019 for the service rendered by him from 01-07-2018 to 30-06-2019.

Additional Advocate General, Vinod Thakur and Shiv Pal Manhans, placed reliance upon a decision rendered on 29-07-2020 by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Madhav Singh Tomar v. M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd., WP No. 9940 of 2020, wherein relying upon an earlier order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court in writ appeal No. 717 of 2016, the writ petition claiming next annual increment due immediately after retirement was dismissed keeping in view the Fundamental Rules governing service conditions of the petitioner. Reliance was also placed upon a Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court delivered on 27-01-2005 in Principal Accountant General v. C. Subba Rao, where the impugned order of the Tribunal holding the employee entitled to an annual increment that fell due on 01-01-2002 after his retirement on 31-12-2001, was quashed and set aside.


The Court made significant observations including relevant rules and cases;

FR 56 (a); a Government servant retires on the last day of the month in which he attains the age of superannuation. In case his date of birth is the first of a month, then he shall retire on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining age of superannuation. Petitioner with the date of birth as 01-04-1945 had retired from sevice on 31-03-2003 on attaining 58 years of age.

FR 17(1); provides that an officer shall begin to draw pay and allowances attached to the post with effect from the date when he assumes duties of that post and shall cease to draw them as soon as he ceases to discharge those duties.

Rule 5 of CCS Pension Rules; says that date of retirement of the person shall be treated as his last working day and his claim to pension shall be regulated by provisions of rules in force at the time of his retirement.

Rule 83(1) of CCS Pension Rules; pension becomes payable from the date a Government servant ceases to be borne on the establishment.

Rule 34 of CCS Pension Rules provides for determination of average emoluments with reference to emoluments drawn by a Government servant during last ten months of the service. Under Rule 33 ‘emoluments’ means basic pay as defined in Rule 9(21)(a)(i) of Fundamental Rules which a Government servant was receiving immediately before his retirement.

Denying any claims of availing the increment by the petitioner, subsequently accrued, the Court observed, “The petitioner was not on duty on 01-04-2003. Increment can be drawn only when an employee is on duty. The increment in terms of FR 24 & 26 did not become due during the period of service of the petitioner. Therefore, increment on 01-04-2003 cannot be sanctioned in favour of petitioner on the ground that he had completed twelve months of continuous service. The date of increment falls due on the first day of the succeeding month after the retirement. Petitioner retired on the basic pay drawn by him on 31-03-2003, that is, his date of retirement. His pension has to be determined accordingly. Petitioner had become pensioner on 01-04-2003. He cannot be held entitled to any increment which may fall due post his retirement. He is entitled only to those increments which fall due to him during the period of his service.”

With respect to the contention of the petitioner that the judgment by the Madras High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court, by rejecting SLP as well as Review petition against the same, the Court observed, “It is settled law that an order refusing Special Leave to Appeal may either be a speaking order or the non speaking one. In either case, it will not attract doctrine of merger. In the instant case, the order refusing Special Leave to Appeal is non-speaking, therefore, it does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to paragraph 44 of the judgment passed by apex Court in (2000) 6 SCC 359 titled Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, relied upon in (2019) 4 SCC 376, titled Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., Kollegal.”

The Court further cited State of Orissa v. Dhirendra Sunder Das, (2019) 6 SCC 270, where the principle of law was reiterated that dismissal of an SLP in limine without giving any detailed reason does not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent under Article 141.


Dismissing the present petition on lack of merits, the Court concurred with the findings of the tribunal and further took up the task of clarifying the effect of the dismissal of SLP, in the absence of any speaking order.[Hari Prakash v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2020 SCC OnLine HP 2362, decided on 06-11-2020]

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Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In the case where the employees of Municipal Corporation governed by the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 claimed gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, the bench of MM Shantanagoudar and Hemant Gupta, JJ held that liberal payment of gratuity is in the interest of the employees, thus, the gratuity would be payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act.

Court noticed that the Payment of Gratuity Act is applicable to

(1) every factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port and railway company;

(2) every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State, in which ten or more persons are employed, the said provision has two conditions, viz.

(i) a shop or establishments within the meaning of a State law and

(ii) in which ten or more persons are employed; and

(3) the establishments or class of establishments which Central Government may notify.

The Court, hence, said that in terms of the above said Section 1(3)(c) of the Act, the Central Government has published a notification on 08.01.1982 and specified Local Bodies in which ten or more persons are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months as a class of establishment to which this Act shall apply. It, therefore, held,

“Such notification makes it abundantly clear that the Act is applicable to the local bodies i.e., the Municipalities. Section 14 of the Act has given an overriding effect over any other inconsistent provision in any other enactment. … In view of Section 14 of the Act, the provision in the State Act contemplating payment of Gratuity will be inapplicable in respect of the employees of the local bodies.”

[Nagar Ayukt Nagar Nigam, Kanpur v. Sri Mujib Ullah Khan, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 462, decided on 02.04.2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Tripura High Court: While deciding upon the present writ petition wherein the petitioner’s appointment in Group- D post was cancelled by the respondents (High Court of Tripura) on the ground of an FIR registered against him, the Division Bench of Ajay Rastogi, C.J., and S. Talapatra,J., held that the FIR once registered has been quashed by the Court under Section 482 of Cr.PC, no inference can be drawn to impute any adverse antecedents which in any manner may deprive an individual from seeking public employment.

As per the facts, the petitioner was duly selected in Group D post. However the petitioner’s selection was cancelled owing to the fact that an FIR was registered against him under Sections 3,4,5,6(2)(4) & 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. Th petitioner challenged the FIR and it was subsequently quashed by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of CrPC. Yet even after the quashment, the respondents refused to consider the petitioner’s appointment on the ground that his conduct does not generate confidence for employment in the service of the High Court. The petitioner argued that there was no misrepresentation on his part and the FIR against him was a result of false implication; and once this Court has quashed the FIR, the petitioner had a clean record again. Therefore there was no ground upon which he could be denied employment. The petitioner via his counsel Raju Datta, contended that the act of the respondents in rejecting the petitioner’s employment, was arbitrary, therefore it demands judicial interference. Counsel for the respondents contended that mere selection and offer of appointment does not confer any vested right and the decision of the authority cannot be said to be per se arbitrary.

Upon perusal of the issue and facts, the Court observed that Rule 9 of High Court of Tripura Services (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 2014 prescribe certain disqualifications for appointment and sub-rule (c) of Rule 9 clearly envisages that if one has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude could be a reason for disqualification for appointment. However in the present case, the FIR was found to be fabricated, hence quashed. Other than the quashed FIR, there is no criminal history of the petitioner which could render him disqualified for public employment. The Court thus directed the respondents to not to draw any adverse inference to implicate the petitioner, and consider his candidature for appointment in Group D post. [Tapas Chakraborty v. High Court of Tripura, 2018 SCC OnLine Tri 57, decided on 10-04-2018]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Paying heed to the plight of the retired Government Servants who had alleged unfair treatment pertaining to reimbursement of medical claims under the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS), the bench of R.K. Agrawal and Ashok Bhushan, JJ directed:

  • with regard to the slow and tardy pace of disposal of MRC by the CGHS, all such claims shall be attended by a Secretary level High Powered Committee in the concerned Ministry which shall meet every month for quick disposal of such cases.
  • the concerned Ministry to device a Committee for grievance redressal of the retired pensioners consisting of Special Directorate General, Directorate General, 2 (two) Additional Directors and 1 Specialist in the field which shall ensure timely and hassle-free disposal of the claims within a period of 7 days.
  • There shall be a timeframe for finalization and disbursement of the claim amounts of pensioners. The Court, hence, said that after submitting the relevant papers for claim by a pensioner, the same shall be reimbursed within a period of 1 (one) month.

The Court was hearing the matter where, out of the total bills amounting to Rs. 13,84,440, a 70-year-old pensioner was paid only Rs. 5,84,885. Hence, the petitioner was denied Rs. 7,99,555. The State had, on the other hand, contended that the rates charged by the hospitals were exorbitant whereas the rates charged for such facility shall be only at the CGHS rates and that too after following a proper procedure given in the Circulars issued on time to time by the concerned Ministry. The Court, however, noticed that the petitioner was taken to hospital under emergency conditions for survival of his life which requirement was above the sanctions and treatment in empanelled hospitals and hence, it directed the reimbursement of the due amount.

The Court said:

“The relevant authorities are required to be more responsive and cannot in a mechanical manner deprive an employee of his legitimate reimbursement. CGHS was propounded with a purpose of providing health facility scheme to the central government employees so that they are not left without medical care after retirement. It was in furtherance of the object of a welfare State, which must provide for such medical care that the scheme was brought in force.”

[Shiva Kant Jha v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 370, decided on 13.04.2018]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In the light of serious irregularities in the selection process of appointment of assistant teachers in government lower primary schools, the Bench of AK Goel and RF Nariman, JJ directed that for the purity of selection to the public posts, as far as possible the selection process conducted by the selection bodies, especially the State Public Service Commissions and the State Selection Boards, is videographed.

Directing the Registry to send a copy of the order to Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, for being forwarded to the concerned authorities for compliance, the Bench further directed:

“at examination centres as well as interview centres CCTV cameras should be installed to the extent viable. Footage thereof may be seen by an independent committee of three members and report of such committee may be placed on the website concerned.”

The Court gave the said order when the irregularities in the State of Meghalaya was brought to it’s notice. The Court noticed that such incidents were being reported in several cases as it had recently dealt with such a matter in Avinash C. v. State of Karnataka, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 330, decided on 4.4.2018. [State of Meghalaya v. Phikirba Khariah, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 336, order dated 06.04.2018]