Himachal Pradesh High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: Chander Bhusan Barowalia J. disposed of the petition and quashed the FIR/complaint.

The facts of the case are such that marriage between Mukesh Sharma (son of petitioners 1 and 2 and brother of petitioner 3) and respondent No. 2/wife was solemnized on according to the Hindu rites and ceremonies and out of their wedlock one son namely, Master Kartik, was begotten. However, immediately after the marriage, differences arose between them and the wife has lodged a complaint against her husband and his family members, wherein allegations of harassment for bringing less dowry and maltreatment have been leveled. Consequently, F.I.R was registered under Sections 498A, 406, 120B and 506 Penal Code, 1860 i.e. IPC. However, the parties settled their dispute amicably, vide Compromise Deed, as per terms of the Compromise Deed, they do not want to continue with the present case. Hence, the present petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure i.e CrPC for quashing the F.I.R.

Counsel for petitioner Mr. Ashok Kumar Thakur submitted that the parties have compromised the matter vide compromise deed, no purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive, therefore, the FIR, along with consequent proceedings arising out of the same, may be quashed and set aside.

Counsel for respondent Mr. C N Singh and Mr. Devender Sharma submitted that parties have settled their dispute amicably, the present petition may be allowed.

The Court relied on judgment Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi, (2013) 4 SCC 58 wherein it was observed that “Even if the offences are non compoundable, If they relate to matrimonial disputes and the court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.”

The Court thus observed that even if, the trial is allowed to be continued, as the parties have compromised the matter, there are bleak chances of conviction to secure the ends of justice. Thus, taking into consideration the law as discussed hereinabove and the compromise arrived at between the parties vide Compromise Deed, placed on record, I find that the interest of justice would be met, in case, the proceedings are quashed, as the parties have compromised the matter and do not want to proceed further with the case in order to live peacefully.

The Court heldpresent is a fit case to exercise jurisdiction vested in this Court, under Section 482 of the Code and, therefore, the present petition is allowed and F.I.R No. 105, dated 01.06.2013, under Sections 498A, 406, 120B and 506 of IPC, registered at Police Station Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., is ordered to be quashed.”

[Parkash Chand v. State of H P, 2021 SCC OnLine HP 7918, decided on 15-11-2021]


Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: H P Sandesh J. allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings initiated against the petitioners.

This petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code i.e. Cr.P.C., praying this Court to quash the order of the Civil Judge and JMFC, Muddebihal, dated 13.07.2018 passed in C.C.No.167/2018 (Crime No.107/2018 of Muddebihal Police Station) taking cognizance against the petitioners   for the offences punishable under Section 171H of Penal Code, 1860 i.e. IPC and Section 3 of the Karnataka Open Places (Prevention of Disfigurement) Act, 1981.

Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Rajesh G Doddamani submitted that the Act invoked i.e., the Karnataka Open Places (Prevention  of Disfigurement) Act, 1981 is not applicable to  Muddebihal and the said Act is applicable only in respect  of particular places. Unless the same is notified in respect of particular place of Muddebihal, the police ought not to have initiated proceedings against the petitioners under Section 3 of the Act. It was also submitted that the respondents have also invoked Section 171H of IPC. The complaint is not filed under Section 195 of Cr.P.C., but the case has been registered against the petitioners and based on the police report, cognizance was taken. Therefore, when non-cognizable offence is invoked, it requires permission from the Magistrate under Section 155(2) of Cr.P.C., and hence, it requires interference of this Court.

Counsel for respondents Mr. Gururaj V Hasilkar submitted that the election was declared in respect of Muddebihal assembly constituency in 2018. When the election notification was issued by the State, the order was passed by the District Election Officer and District Magistrate, Vijayapura dated 31.03.2018 appointing flying squads and the same includes Muddebihal  Constituency. The learned counsel also relied upon the  order of the State Government dated 10.04.2018 and so also the revised order dated 31.03.2018 appointing officers consisting of flying squads. The learned counsel also relied upon the Notification of Election Commission of India dated 02.05.2018 wherein it is clarified that as per Section 126(1)(b) of the Representative of People Act, 1951, there shall not be displaying of any stickers and flags of any particularly party and the said act is in  violation of the same and there is no specific notification  for applying the above Act but election notification is  issued. It is not in dispute that the petitioners herein came to the Tahsildar’s office in vehicles displaying stickers and flags of a particular party. Hence, the proceedings initiated against the petitioners cannot be quashed.Issue: Whether Karnataka Open Places (Prevention of Disfigurement) Act, 1991 is applicable to Muddebihal or not?

The Court observed that on perusal of Section 1(2)(i) of the Act makes it clear that the Act is applicable for the cities viz., Bangalore,  Mysore, Hubli-Dharwar, Mangalore and Belgaum constituted or continued under the Karnataka Municipal  Corporation Act, 1976 or under any other law, on the fifth day of May, 1981 and Section (1)(2)(ii) of the Act says that the same come into force in the municipalities, notified areas, sanitary boards, constituted or continued under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 or under any other law, or in any other local area, on such date, as the State Government may by notification appoint and different dates may be appointed in respect of different areas.

But, no such Notification was issued in respect of Muddebihal. Hence, unless the Act is applicable to particular city and municipal area, the initiation of proceedings under the said Act is unsustainable under law.

The Court further observed that Section 171H of IPC deals with illegal payments in connection with an election. But, in the  case on hand, the allegation against the petitioners is  that they came in vehicles with flag of political party and no allegations with regard to illegal payments in  connection with election are found in the complaint.  Under the circumstances, very initiation of proceedings against the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of process of law. Hence, it is appropriate to exercise power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., or otherwise it leads to miscarriage of justice.

The Court having considered the allegation made in the complaint as well as in the charge sheet observed that it does not attract offence under Section 171H of IPC and so also Section 3 of the Act as there is no notification. “….complaint averments and charge sheet averments do not attract the offences invoked and apart from that, the above Act is not applicable to Muddebihal and without any notification for application of the Act, proceedings have been initiated.”

The Court held “….very initiation of  proceedings against the petitioners is not sustainable in the eye of law, as there was no notification for applicability of the above Act to Muddebihal and also no ingredients of offence under Section 171H of IPC.”

[Hanmagouda v. State of Karnataka, Criminal petition No. 200377 of 2019, decided on 26-11-2021]


Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a case where the Gujarat High Court had quashed criminal proceedings at the behest of persons who were not named in the FIR purely on the basis of their names appearing in the draft charge-sheet, the bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud* and BV Nagarathna, JJ has found it to be a “clear abuse” of High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. The Court noticed that the High Court cannot place reliance on a “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed before the Magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482.

In a dispute over the title of a land, a sum of money running into crores of rupees is alleged to have been demanded from the appellant, stating that the lands had been sold to land mafias. While the sixth and seventh respondents were named in the FIR, the eighth and ninth respondents were arraigned as accused in the draft charge-sheet. The allegations against the sixth to ninth respondents are that as a part of a criminal conspiracy, they colluded to execute false powers of attorney and MoUs to jeopardize the right and title to the land belonging to the appellant and were party to the extortion of money from him. It is alleged that sixth, seventh and ninth respondents executed champertozus agreements with the legal heirs of the land owner and were alleged to be involved in the extortion of money from the appellant. The eighth respondent, who is an advocate, is alleged to have helped the other accused in drafting the powers of attorney and MoUs.

While the High Court permitted the continuation of investigation in the allegations against the fourth and fifth respondents under Section 385 of the Penal Code 1860 for extortion, it quashed an FIR which was registered against the private respondents under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

Not only this, but in its interim order, the High Court allowed the investigation to continue against the accused but directed that the final report cannot be submitted to the Magistrate without its permission. The direction was not supported by any reasoning whatsoever.

The Supreme Court noted that,

“Even at the interim stage, the High Court must demonstrate an application of mind and furnish reasons for issuing any interlocutory direction, which is capable of being tested before this Court in an appropriate case. The interim direction amounted to an unnecessary interference in the investigative process envisaged under the CrPC. The High Court transgressed the scope of the powers conferred upon it by restricting the police from submitting the charge-sheet before the Magistrate and by further perusing the contents of the “draft charge-sheet” in the proceedings before it.”

The Court, however, clarified that a distinct position arises when the chargesheet has been filed before a Magistrate and proceedings under Section 482 are pending before the High Court. In such cases, the High Court must take into consideration the material collected during the investigation. However, the High Court cannot place reliance on a “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed before the Magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482.

Further, the police have a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence under Sections 154 and 156 of the CrPC. Sub-Section 2 (i) of Section 173 of the CrPC provides that after the completion of investigation, the police officer in charge of the police station shall forward the final report to the Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance of the offence alleged in the report. Before taking cognizance of the offence, the Magistrate has to apply their own mind and is not bound by the conclusions drawn by the police.

In Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi, (2007) 12 SCC 369 a two-judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court can neither direct an investigating agency to submit the investigation report before it nor can it quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 relying on such a report when the report has not been submitted to the Magistrate.

In the impugned judgment, while the High Court has held that the allegations on their face disclose that the fourth and fifth respondents committed the offence of extortion under Section 385 of the IPC and directed that the investigation be continued against them, it has completely failed to examine the allegation of criminal conspiracy qua the other accused where it has been alleged that they were also privy to such extortion. Thus, in such circumstances, when a specific role was attributed to the accused, the High Court could not have quashed the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Following an unusual, if not extraordinary course, the High Court proceeded to entertain petitions for quashing under Section 482 at the behest of persons who were not named in the FIR purely on the basis of their names appearing in the draft charge-sheet. A draft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court by the investigating officer only in order to seek its permission, pursuant to the interim order, for submitting the charge-sheet to the competent court. Knowledge in regard to what has transpired during the course of the investigation is obtained by the accused once a copy of the charge-sheet is made available under Section 207 of the CrPC.

It is important to note that even before the charge-sheet was brought to the notice of the High Court, petitions for quashing had already been filed. The High Court ought to have taken note of these developments. The appellant has submitted both in the course of the oral and written submissions that these developments indicate that the accused were complicit with the police. The High Court should have been alive to the abuse of its process.

Also, during the course of the investigation, the sixth to ninth respondents, who were apprehending arrest, moved an application for anticipatory bail, which was allowed by the Sessions Judge.

“While the apprehension of arrest may have led to the filing of an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Judge, this could not furnish the basis of a petition for quashing under Section 482 at the behest of persons who were not named in the FIR and who, as stated earlier, had instituted proceedings for quashing even before the draft charge-sheet came to be submitted before the High Court.”

The judgment of the High Court indicates that while analyzing the case set up before it by the applicants in various quashing petitions, it has proceeded to quash the FIR and the draft charge-sheet in respect of applicants who were not even arraigned as accused in the FIR. Hence, the interference by the High Court in the investigation against the eighth and ninth respondents was at a premature stage and was not warranted.

[Jitul Jentilal Kotecha v. State of Gujarat, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1045, decided on 12.11.2021]


Counsels:

For appellant: Advocate Nikhil Goel

For respondents: Advocates Karan Bharihoke and Khilan Chandrani


*Judgment by: Justice Dr. DY Chandrachud

Know Thy Judge| Justice Dr. DY Chandrachud

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The bench of NV Ramana, CJ and Surya Kant* and Hima Kohli, JJ has held that the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused.

Putting a further caveat, the Court held that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post-conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum.

The Court, however, clarified that the purpose of these extra-ordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow-hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).

“This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is sub-judice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine-qua-non to involve the superior court’s plenary   powers to do complete justice.”

Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide.

The Court went on to clarify that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far-reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum.

“True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court’s power to do “complete justice”. However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly.”

Court’s power while dealing with offences under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989

Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes.

“The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities.”

On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is

  • primarily private or civil in nature, or
  • where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or
  • where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law,

the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings.

On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement,

“…if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.”

Ruling on facts

The Court was deciding a civil dispute over the ownership and possessory rights of a piece of land between the Appellant and his neighbour Prembai took an ugly turn when the Appellant allegedly not only threw a brick on the Complainant but also made filthy and slur remarks on her caste. The Appellant was convicted under the unamended Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

The Court held that in such cases, the Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant-victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress.

“It cannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of coercion, and therefore ought to be accorded a higher level of protection. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accused party. What factors the Courts should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

Invoking the powers under Article 142 and quashing the Criminal proceedings with the sole objective of doing complete justice between the parties, the Court recorded the following reasons:

  1. the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to deter caste-based insults and intimidations when they are used with the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community. The case of the Appellant, from the very beginning, has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account of frustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis of the deprecated incident was the civil/property dispute. Considering this aspect, it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle undertones of criminality, even though the provisions of a special statute have been attracted in the present case.
  2. the offence in question, for which the Appellant has been convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim of the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes from atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. Although the Appellant may not belong to the same caste as the Complainant, he too belongs to the relatively weaker/backward section of the society and is certainly not in any better economic or social position when compared to the victim. Despite the rampant prevalence of segregation in Indian villages whereby members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict their quartes only to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case, the Appellant and the Complainant lived in adjoining houses. Therefore, the overriding objective of the SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedings are quashed.
  3. the incident occurred way back in the year 1994. Nothing on record indicates that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident had transpired between the parties.
  4. the Complainant has, on her own free will, without any compulsion, entered into a compromise and wishes to drop the present criminal proceedings against the accused.
  5. given the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the trial against the Appellant had been concluded.
  6. the Appellant and the Complainant parties are residents of the same village and live in very close proximity to each other. The parties themselves have voluntarily settled their differences.

Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healed wounds, and to advance peace and harmony, the Court found it prudent to effectuate the present settlement.

[Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966, decided on 25.10.2021]


*Judgment by: Justice Surya Kant

Know Thy Judge | Justice Surya Kant

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Answering the “hotly debated” question as to in what circumstances and categories of cases, a criminal proceeding may be quashed either in exercise of the extraordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, or in the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, the bench of Indu Malhotra* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ has held that in the matter of exercise of inherent power by the High Court, the only requirement is to see whether continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of the process of the Court

“… the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an extraordinary power which has to be exercised with great care and circumspection before embarking to scrutinise the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in deciding whether the case is the rarest of rare case, to scuttle the prosecution at its inception.”

The Court observed that in order to exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and the High Court at that stage was not under an obligation to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. The offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and other documentary evidence, if any, on record.

“The Criminal Procedure Code contains a detailed procedure for investigation, framing of charge and trial, and in the event when the High Court is desirous of putting a halt to the known procedure of law, it must use proper circumspection with great care and caution to interfere in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.”

The Court was dealing with a case where a property, belonging to 2nd Respondent was mortgaged with State Bank of Patiala and the total legal liability payable to the Bank was Rs. 18 crores. In order to clear the said dues, 2nd respondent hatched a conspiracy with a broker so as to cheat and defraud the appellants/complainants and to further misappropriate the amounts paid by the complainants as part of the deal, the 2nd respondent breached the trust of the appellants/complainants deliberately and falsely stating to the appellants/complainants that the 2nd respondent would be liable to pay a sum of Rs. 25.50 crores to the complainant if the deal is not carried forward by the 2nd respondent.

While an FIR was lodged in the case at hand for offence of cheating, arbitral proceedings were also initiated at the instance of the appellants/complainants.

On a careful reading of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet, the Court noticed that the ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet.

“… whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the course of trial. Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellants, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing such proceedings.”

The Court noticed that the facts narrated in the present complaint/FIR/charge-sheet indeed reveal the commercial transaction but that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such transaction. In fact, many a times, offence of cheating is committed in the course of commercial transactions and the illustrations have been set out under Sections 415, 418 and 420 IPC. So far as initiation of arbitral proceedings is concerned, there is no correlation with the criminal proceedings.

The Court, hence, held that the issue involved in the matter under consideration is not a case in which the criminal trial should have been short-circuited. The High Court was not justified in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has primarily adverted on two circumstances,

(i) that it was a case of termination of agreement to sell on account of an alleged breach of the contract and

(ii) the fact that the arbitral proceedings have been initiated at the instance of the appellants.

The Court held that both the alleged circumstances noticed by the High Court are unsustainable in law.

[Priti Saraf v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 206, decided on 10.03.2021]


*Judgment by: Justice Indu Malhotra

Appearances before the Court by:

For appellants: Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi,

For Second Respondent: Senior Advocate P. Chidambaram,

For State: Additional Solicitor General  Aishwarya Bhati

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of Ashok Bhushan*, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah, JJ has reiterated that an application by a person who is in no way connected with the criminal proceeding or criminal trial under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot ordinarily be entertained by the High Court.

Background

The Court was dealing with a case wherein a person (respondent no. 2) who is “a social activist and an advocate” and “a person having an urge to positively contribute to the society in all possible ways” had filed application under Section 482 Cr.P.C in an ongoing case against one Sanjai Tiwari under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, seeking direction to Special Judge to expedite and conclude Special Trial. He, further, stated in his application that although FIR was lodged in 2006 but it got delayed by tactics opted by the accused persons. “The Vigilance Department completed the investigation after about 14 years and still the accused persons are trying to get away from the charges.”

On 09.09.2020, the High Court disposed of the said application directing the Court concerned “to expedite the proceedings of the aforesaid case and conclude the same, at the earliest possible, on day to day basis without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties, in accordance with law, provided there is no impediment.”

Analysis

In order to answer the issue relating to locus of a third party to challenge the criminal proceedings or to seek relief in respect of criminal proceedings of accused, the Court referred to the judgment in Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and others, (1993) 1 SCC 756, wherein it was held,

“Even if there are million questions of law to be deeply gone into and examined in a criminal case of this nature registered against specified accused persons, it is for them and them alone to raise all such questions and challenge the proceedings initiated against them at the appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties under the garb of public interest litigants.”

The Court further noticed that criminal trial where offences involved are under the Prevention of Corruption Act have to be conducted and concluded at the earliest since the offences under Prevention of Corruption Act are offences which affect not only the accused but the entire society and administration. It is also well settled that the High Court in appropriate cases can very well under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in any other proceeding can always direct trial court to expedite the criminal trial and issue such order as may be necessary.

“A criminal trial of an accused is conducted in accordance with procedure as prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code. It is the obligation of the State and the prosecution to ensure that all criminal trials are conducted expeditiously so that justice can be delivered to the accused if found guilty.”

However, in the present, the proceeding initiated by respondent No.2 did not appear to be a bona fide proceeding. He is in no way connected with initiation of criminal proceeding against the appellant.

“The present is not a case where prosecution or even the employer of the accused have filed an application either before the trial court or in any other court seeking direction as prayed by respondent No.2 in his application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.”

Hence, noticing that the respondent No.2 has no locus to file the application which was not clearly maintainable, the Court held that the impugned judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 09.09.2020 cannot be sustained.

The Court, however, observed that it will be open for the trial court to expedite the criminal trial, the offences being the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, subject to any order passed by the High Court in pending proceedings.

[Sanjai Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1027, decided on 16.12.2020]


*Justice Ashok Bhushan has penned this judgment.

Patna High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Ashwini Kumar Singh, J. dismissed an application filed under Section 482 CrPC against the order of Additional Sessions Judge whereby prosecution’s application under Section 311 CrPC was dismissed.

The applicant was the informant in a case registered under Section 302 IPC. During the trial, the Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 311 submitting that the Investigating Officer and the doctor concerned were not examined, and their non-examination would cause prejudice to the prosecution’s case. However, such application was dismissed by the trial court. The present petition was filed against the said order.

The High Court perused all the material available on record and found that the trial court kept open the prosecution case for about three years, but the said witnesses did not turn up. The prosecution was not diligent in pursuing the trial. Therefore, the order challenged in the petition did not suffer any fault. Right to speedy trial is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. This apart, the Court categorically observed that the petitioner had no locus in the matter. A private person may instruct the Public Prosecutor and may submit written arguments with the permission of the court after the evidence is closed. However, a private person, even if the informant, had no locus to pursue an application under Section 311 in the court below, or to challenge the order which may have been passed on an application filed by the prosecution under Section 311 CrPC. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. [Sriram Singh v. State of Bihar, 2018 SCC OnLine Pat 1163, dated 06-07-2018]