Case BriefsDistrict Court

Dwarka Courts, New Delhi: Deeksha Sethi, MM (NI Act)—06, reiterated that, even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

In the present matter, Raj Singh was referred to as ‘complainant’ and the accused were relatives as the marriage of the son of the complainant and daughter of the brother of the accused was solemnized.

The complainant’s case was that in the second week of April 2015 accused along with his brother approached him and requested a sum of Rs 12 lakhs and 8 lakhs respectively as they were in dire need of money. It was assured to the complainant that they would return the money within 12 months along with interest @ 2% per month.

It was stated that, the accused and his brother paid the interest only on two occasions and thereafter neither paid the interest nor principal amount despite repeated requests.

Thereafter, in the discharge of their liability accused’s brother gave a cheque amounting to Rs 8 lakhs as part payment and accused Yashpal Singh also gave a cheque amounting to Rs 12 lakhs.

Both the above cheques were dishonoured with the remarks ‘Insufficient Funds’.

The complainant had informed about the dishonouring of the cheque by the accused and his brother, however, the accused and his brother refused to return the amount and threatened the complainant with dire consequences.

Later, since the accused failed to make payment despite the notice, therefore liability to be tried and punished for an offence under Section 138 NI Act.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Court noted that the accused had admitted the fact that the cheque in question had his signatures and in such scenario, a presumption was raised under Section 139 read with Sections 118/20 of the NI Act, that cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability.

With regard to the contention of the accused regarding certain particulars of the cheque were not filled by the accused and hence it was difficult to believe the complainant’s version, Court expressed that, even it was admitted for the sake of argument that blank cheque was given by the accused to the complainant, it is a well-settled principle of law that,

“…even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”

Hence, the contention of the accused could not be accepted.

Misuse of Cheque

The Bench noted that the accused neither placed on record any complaint made to the police or bank in the said regard nor led any other evidence in support of the misuse of the cheque.

Further, the Bench added that, it is well settled that bare statements and story-telling would not help the accused to rebut the presumption raised under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act.

Whether the accused had been able to shake the version given by the complainant in his evidence affidavit and had been able to point out discrepancies or contradictions which may throw doubt on his version?

The only suggestion that had been given was that a blank signed cheque was issued by the accused to the complainant as it was agreed in Panchayat that the accused and his brother would give the cheque in question and the complainant’s son would take back the accused’s niece. Thus, no discrepancy had emerged out of the cross-examination which may demolish the complainant’s version even on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.

The Court concluded that the accused was not able to prove any probable defence and had failed to rebut the presumption raised under Sections 118/139 of the NI Act.

Therefore, Yashpal Singh was held guilty and convicted for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act in respect of the cheque in question. [Raj Singh v. Yashpal Singh Parmar, 2022 SCC OnLine Dis Crt (Del) 16, decided on 25-4-2022]

Patiala House Courts, Delhi
Case BriefsDistrict Court

Patiala House Courts, New Delhi: Shreya Arora Mehta, Metropolitan Magistrate, while addressing a matter with regard to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stressed the liability of a Director for such offences.

Accused Company through accused 2 – Chairman cum Managing Director along with accused 3 its Managing Director and accused 4 Deputy Managing Director approached the complainant in the year 2006 to engage their services for releasing advertisement of the accused company in various newspapers and publications.

The complainant agreed to extend a credit period of 60 days for payment of the bills with statutory taxes and services charges/commission. The accused persons sent a release order to the complainant for advertisement in various print media. Bills were raised on monthly basis for service provided.

It was stated that till the second quarter of 2008 the complainant received most of the payment but thereafter there was a default by the accused persons in making the time-bound scheduled payment. Later bills of 6 months were kept pending due to which the complainant was forced to ask the Indian Newspaper Society to issue a caution notice to its members regarding the accused company.

The accused company issued 84 cheques with the assurance that on presentation the same would be encashed, but all the cheques were dishonoured and returned unpaid for the reasons either “funds insufficient” and or exceeding arrangement.

Accused persons did not reply to the legal notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Hence the present complaint was filed.

Accused 3 admitted his signatures on all the cheques but stated that the same was done under the pretext of accused 2 who was the chairman cum director of the accused 1. The accused 4 submitted that he had no dealings whatsoever with the complainant company.

Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, does not say that a Director of a company shall automatically be vicariously liable for commission of an offence on behalf of the company.

“…the complainant has to make specific averments in the complaint that the accused persons were incharge or were responsible to the company or conduct of the business of the company. And prosecution could be launched not only against the company on behalf of which the cheque issued has been dishonoured, but it could also be initiated against every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.”

In the present case, specific averments were made against accused 3 and 4 that they are in charge of and responsible to the accused 1 company for the conduct of the business of the company and were looking after the business of the company and the offence under Section 138 NI Act had been committed with the knowledge, consent and connivance of the accused 3 and 4 besides other and was attributable to neglect on their part.

“…under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 there is a presumption in favour of the complainant that the cheques in question were issued by the accused in discharge of his lawful liability. It is mandatory for the court to draw a presumption against the drawer/accused. However, the said presumption is rebuttable.” 

Accused persons raised arguments that no work order, release order or publication bill was placed on record nor the complainant produce the details of the newspapers etc. To substantiate the same, the accused person had failed to prove on record any admissible and reliable evidence to discharge their onus of rebutting the initial presumption in favour of the complainant as enshrined under Section 139 NI Act.

In view of the above, the essentials of Section 138 NI Act stand duly established and accused persons failed to rebut the same.[Prominent Advertising Services v. Koutons Retail India Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Dis Crt (Del) 12, decided on 22-3-2022]

Case BriefsDistrict Court

Rohini Court, North-West, Delhi: Ritika Kansal, MM(NI) reiterated the settled position of law that,

“…an accused has to prove his defence by preponderance of probabilities, but a defence would be considered probable only if it appeals to the Court as probable and reasonable keeping in mind the natural course of conduct of a prudent human being of reasonable intelligence.”

Present complaint was filed against the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).

Complainant on account of good friendly relations advanced a loan of Rs 80,000 to the accused as the latter was in dire need of the money for her parlour with a promise by the latter to repay the same within 6 months.

It was alleged by the complainant that after much insistence in the month of August 2020, the accused sought some time “due to financial crisis” and “lockdown” but thereafter issued two cheques each of Rs 40,000 in the complainant’s favour which were dishonoured due to insufficiency of the funds in her bank account, leading to the complainant issuing a legal demand notice and eventually the present complaint.

Analysis, Law and Discussion

High Court observed the following significant points:

(a) Initially, it is upon the complainant to prove foundational facts.

(b) Once foundational facts are proved, it is mandatory upon the court to raise presumption under Section 118 r/w Section 139 of NI Act i.e., cheque has been issued/drawn for consideration by the accused to discharge a debt or a liability in favour of the holder of cheque. In other words, it shall be presumed that the accused/drawer of the cheques owes any legal liability or debt to the holder of the cheque/complainant.

(c) Accused can rebut the presumption.

(d) The burden of proof upon accused is not to prove his defence beyond all reasonable doubts but raise a probable defence

(e) Accused needn’t examine himself to prove his defence. He can do so with help of material already on record i.e. by cross-examining the complainant and/or his witnesses.

(f) Though, rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established, nevertheless, the evidence must be such that the court either believes the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the prudent man.

In the present matter, the complainant had established by virtue of Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act, that a presumption arises in his favour and against the accused.

While adjudging whether in a case the presumption of consideration has been rebutted, it becomes important to underscore that a mere denial of liability or vague defence of blank cheque as security, cannot be taken at the mere ipse dixit of the accused. 

In the instant case, the whole defence of the accused was based upon the existence of a document marked as “A” and “B”. She had deposed that the same had been signed by the complainant in her presence. It was on the basis of said document, that the accused claimed that she has made payment in monthly instalments. Thus, clearly the initial burden to prove the alleged factum of issuance of the said documents lied upon the accused.

Cheques Issued as Security cheques

The question of maintainability of complainant under Section 138 in case of security cheque was examined by Delhi High Cout in judgement of Suresh Chandra Goyal v. Amit Singhal Crl.L.P. No. 607.2014.

It was observed: “There is no magic in the word “security cheque”, such that, the moment the accused claims that the dishonoured cheque (in respect whereof a complaint under Section 138 of the Act is preferred) was given as a “security cheque”, the Magistrate would acquit the accused. The expression “security cheque” is not a statutorily defined expression in the NI Act. The NI Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a ‘security cheque’ to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would not be maintainable…”

The Court opined that, merely because cheques in question were security cheques, would not save accused from clutches of law, latter having admitted taking loan against the cheques.


The Bench held that the accused failed miserably to prove the alleged factum of repayment.

Accused failed to prove that the documents “A” & “B” purportedly the money lending cards, bear the signature of the complainant/appellant, also no witness was examined by her who may have seen the accused’s husband making payment in installments.

Further, the accused testified in her evidence that she made repayments in monthly instalments in cash. However, to substantiate the same, neither she has placed on record any bank account statement reflecting withdrawals nor examined any witness

With regard to the contention that the complainant was engaged in money lending business without a licence, the accused did not place on record any material to substantiate the same and it is well settled that for an activity to be called money lending, there should be a systematic business of money lending which should be repetitive and continuous, and the loans are granted to a large number of persons. Even if the said contention was accepted, the accused’s sinking ship could not be saved in light of the settled position of law.

Accused in response to the legal notice did not even insist on taking back the cheques in question, rather stated therein that she had returned 80% of the amount and expressed anguish over the cheques being presented without her knowledge.

Bench also noted that,

“…the accused didn’t issue any “stop payment” instructions to the bank. Despite opportunity, she didn’t place on record any police complaint as referred to by her during her evidence. Even if everything is taken out of the purview, I fail to understand how a reasonably prudent person who has paid a sum of money more than she borrowed would wait in silence, and not protest over her cheques not being returned.”

Noting the sheer lack of even an iota of material on the record, lead to the irresistible conclusion that the defence of the accused was a sham and nothing but an implausible story.

Accused had miserably failed to probablise lack of legal liability with respect to the cheques in question. The presumption of legal liability, therefore, has gone unrebutted.

Therefore, accused was convicted of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. [Manmohan Bansal v. Saroj Sharma, CC NI Act No. 119 of 2021, decided on 7-2-2022]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: Rajendra Badamikar, J., reversed an order of the Magistrate which had directed the petitioner accused to deposit 20% of the cheque amount before the court. The High Court said that Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is not a mandatory provision.

Factual Matrix

The respondent herein had filed a private complaint before the Trial Court against the present petition for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

As per the Respondent-Complainant, the petitioner accused had taken a hand loan of Rs 9 lakhs from the complainant in order to purchase a plot. But the sale deed was not executed and when complainant requested the accused-petitioner for repayment of the amount or else to execute the sale deed he issued a cheque and when the said cheque was presented through the banker of the complainant it was returned for insufficient funds.

Further, it was alleged that the complainant issued a legal notice calling upon the petitioner for payment within 15 days, but he failed to make any payment as such he filed a private complaint under Section 138 of NI Act.

Magistrate passed the impugned order directing the accused-petitioner to deposit 20% of the cheque amount before the Court.

Analysis, Law and Decision

High Court noted that the complaint was filed under Section 138 of NI Act in respect of bouncing of cheque issued by present accused of a sum of Rs 9 lakhs. After recording the sworn statement, the Magistrate took cognizance and issued the process against the accused/petitioner who appeared and enlarged on bail.

Present petitioner appeared before the Trial Court and was enlarged on bail and the matter was adjourned to 28-11-2019 for recording the plea. On that date, the counsel for the complainant/respondent herein filed an application under Section 143A of NI Act.

Magistrate’s order disclosed that as per the mandatory provisions of Section 143A he passed the impugned order for deposit of 20% of the cheque amount. It was noted that he did not hear the counsel for the accused and no opportunity of being heard was given to him.

Bench expressed that,

Section 143A (1) is not a mandatory provision and it says that Court may order the drawer of the cheque to pay the interim compensation as per conditions stipulated there under.

It was evident that the power under Section 143A was vested with the magistrate to be exercised judiciously after recording the plea and it was not mandatory, but the Magistrate was required to exercise his judicious discretion under Section 143A of the Act.

But in the instant case, the impugned order disclosed that the Magistrate had not even applied his mind and in a mechanical way as per the mandatory provisions of Section 143A he has directed the accused to deposit 20% of the cheque amount. The provisions of Section 143A are not mandatory but the discretion was given to the magistrate to be exercised judiciously.

In Court’s opinion, the entire approach of the Magistrate was against the settled principles of natural justice and he did not even pass a summary speaking order giving reasons for passing such an order.

The order itself disclose that he carried on impression that Section 143(A) of the Act is a

mandatory provision of law but ignored the fact that the word used in the Section is ‘may’ and not ‘shall’ which gives a discretion to the Court to be exercised in a judicious way.

 Therefore, the entire approach of magistrate was against the settled principles and the impugned order called for interference. [Jahangir v. Farooq Ahmed Abdul Razak, Criminal Petition No. 201213 of 2020, decided on 6-7-2021]

Advocates before the Court:

For the Petitioner: Sanjay A. Patil, Advocate

For the Respondent: S.S. Mamadapur, Advocate

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Subramonium Prasad, J., addressed a matter wherein it was reiterated that the initial burden of proving the burden of the non-existence of debt is on the accused under Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The instant revision petition was filed against the order passed dismissing the appeal and affirming the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order convicting the petitioner for offences punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Petitioner has also challenged the order wherein the petitioner has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two months and also directed the petitioner to pay an amount of Rs 13 lakhs as fine payable as compensation to the respondent as per the provision of Section 143 (1) of NI Act read with Section 357 (1)(3) of CrPC.

Facts that lead to the case

Respondent financed a bus for the petitioner by giving a loan and in discharge of the liability, petitioner handed over the cheques in favour of the respondent. When the said cheques were deposited they were returned as unpaid/dishonored for the reason ‘Funds Insufficient’.

Petitioner submitted that the vehicle was handed over to the respondent company for getting the vehicle converted to CNG but the said vehicle was never returned to the petitioner nor the accounts related to the hire purchase were settled. In fact, the blank cheques given to the respondent earlier were misused.

Though Metropolitan magistrate found the petitioner’s deposition to be inconsistent and found that the bus was already sold by the petitioner.

Metropolitan Magistrate, therefore, held that the accused/petitioner was not been able to rebut the presumption that the cheques had been paid for the discharge of any liability and hence convicted under Section 138 NI Act.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Section 118 of the NI Act raises a presumption that a cheque is issued for consideration until the contrary is proved. It is well settled that the initial burden in this regard lies on the accused to prove the non-existence of debt by bringing on record such facts and circumstances which would lead the Court to believe the non-existence of debt either by direct evidence or by preponderance of probabilities.

In the instant matter, other than mere ipsi dixit of the petitioner there was no debt due and payable nothing was on record to show that the cheques were not issued for discharge of liability for the bus.

Bench stated that the purpose of introducing Section 138 of the NI Act was to bring sanctity in commercial transactions.

Further, the Court noted that the lower courts on perusal of records came to the conclusion that the cheques were given in discharge of the debt.

While expressing that the scope of revision petition under Sections 397/401 CrPC read with Section 482 CrPC is extremely narrow Court referred the following Supreme Court decisions:

State v. Manimaran, (2019) 13 670

State of Haryana v. Rajmal, (2011) 14 SCC 326

In view of the above discussion, Bench did not find any that required the interference in the lower court’s judgment.

Further, the Court added that the respondent did not file the books of accounts was not fatal to the case of the respondent. It was open to the petitioner to produce his books of accounts to rebut the presumption and bring out a prima facie case that there was no debt due and payable on the date the cheques were dishonoured.

Petitioner failed to show as to how there was no subsisting debt on the date when the cheques were dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds.

In view of the above discussion, the revision petition was dismissed. [G.D. Kataria v. AVL Leasing & Financing Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1056, decided on 03-02-2021]

Advocates for the parties:

Petitioner: Medhanshu Tripathi, Advocate

Respondent: Anuj Soni, Advocate

Tripura High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Tripura High Court: S.G. Chattopadhyay, J., highlights the essence of the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act, in light of the object of a statutory notice.

It has been stated that the Courts below have concurrently held that the respondent has already established his case under the provisions of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981 against the accused, who is the present petitioner.

The present petitioner was convicted for committing an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and he/she was penalised for a sentence of 1 year along with a fine of Rs 7,00,000.

Session Judge had also affirmed the above decision of the Chief Judicial Magistrate while reducing the sentence to fine and directing the petitioner to pay only Rs 4,00,000.

Being aggrieved with the above, the present criminal revision petition was filed.


Since both the petitioner and respondent were on good terms and known to each other, the petitioner used to borrow money from the respondents and repay the same in time. On 15-01-2014, he took a loan of Rs 3,50,000 and promised to repay the money within 30-11-2014.

On being requested for the above-amount, past the said date, petitioner handed over a cheque to the respondent but the said cheque was returned with an endorsement “insufficient funds”.

Demand Notice was issued with 15 days of time given for the repayment of the said amount. Every time that the postman visited the house for the service of the demand notice, housemates of the petitioner refused to receive the said letter and said that the petitioner was out of station.

Hence, in view of the above circumstance, the notice was returned to the respondent.

Later the matter reached the trial and the petitioner was convicted under Section 138 NI Act.

Misutilization of the Cheque

Petitioner contended in regard to the cheque that the accused had never issued any cheque in discharge of any debt or liability, but only a blank cheque was issued as a security for the loan which was borrowed by him from the complainant and after the loan was repaid, the complainant, instead of returning the cheque, misutilized it against him.

Statutory Presumption

Respondent’s counsel submitted that the presumption under Section 139 read with the Rule of Evidence as provided under Section 118, NI Act with regard to the existence of debt or liability is not a discretionary presumption, it is a statutory presumption which is obligatory on the part of the Court. Hence, a heavy burden is cast on the accused to rebut such presumption.

Further, the counsel added that apart from making mere denial of the existence of debt or liability, the accused did not lead any evidence to prove that he had no legal liability to be discharged and as such the courts below had drawn the statutory presumptions against him.

Section 138 NI Act requires proof of the essential ingredients:

  • there is legally enforceable debt
  • a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by the accused with his banker for payment of any amount to another person from his account in the discharge in whole or in part of the debt or liability
  • the cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the insufficient fund in the account of the accused to honour the cheque or that the cheque amount exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank.

Bench noted that the petitioner in his defence merely offered an explanation throwing suggestion to the prosecution witnesses in their cross-examination that he gave a blank signed cheque as security and did not deny the fact that he borrowed loan from the complainant.

Question for consideration:

In the instant matter, whether such an explanation offered by the petitioner is enough to disprove the statutory presumptions under Sections 138 and 139, NI Act?

In the decision of Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16, Supreme Court that the presumptions to be drawn by the court under Sections 138 and 139, NI Act are presumptions of law which cast the evidential burden on the accused to disprove the presumptions.

Further, in the case of Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao v. Thavikonda Ramulu Firm, (2008) 7 SCC 655, it was held that it is a settled position that the initial burden lies if the accused to prove the non-existence of consideration.


Bench on perusal of the above held that the explanation offered by the accused petitioner is not founded on proof and it does not stand to reason.

The object of the statutory notice is to protect an honest drawer of the cheque by providing him with a chance to make the fund sufficient in his bank account and correct his mistake.

Accused had an opportunity to explain himself, he instead repeatedly avoided the service of demand notice and did not state that he already has the repayment of the loan.

Therefore, Court held that the prosecution successfully discharged its burden in proving the case against the petitioner with the help of the statutory presumptions under the NI Act, and the accused failed to rebut those presumptions and prove the contrary by offering provable explanation founded on the proof.

Adding to the above, Bench also observed that the overall conduct of the accused depicted that he wanted to avoid the service of the notice. Impugned judgment by the below courts does not require any interference and the conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court.

Bench directed the fine of Rs 4,00,000 within a period of 2 months.[Nitai Majumder v. Tanmoy Krishna Das, 2020 SCC OnLine Tri 537, decided on 17-11-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: C.V. Bhadang, J., set aside an order passed by the Magistrate whereby process was issued against the petitioner for an offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The complainant gave a flat to the petitioner on leave and license basis. According to the complainant, the petitioner handed-over to her a cheque in the sum of Rs 12,000 drawn on State Bank of India, towards payment of license fee for one month. However, when presented for encashment, the cheque was returned dishonoured on account of “insufficient funds”. In such background, the complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 against the petitioner, in which the impugned order of issue of process was passed.

Galileo Francisco Teles, Advocate represented the petitioner. On the other hand, John Abreu Lobo, Advocate appeared for the complainant.

The High Court noted that the petitioner simply handed over the cheque in question to the complainant, allegedly towards payment of one month’s license fee. It was not a case that the cheque was issued by the petitioner, much less on his account with SBI. There was letter produced from SBI stating that the account number on which the cheque was issued did not stand in name of the petitioner. The Court observed, “It is trite that a complaint under Section 138 of the Act, lies only against the drawer of the cheque, when the cheque issued by the drawer, on his account is dishonoured for want of funds. It was not seriously disputed during the course of the arguments at bar that the petitioner is neither a drawer nor the cheque is issued on his account. It is thus difficult to see as to how, process can be issued against the petitioner in the absence of the basic requirements of the offence under Section 138 of the Act being satisfied.” Stating thus, it was held that the impugned order was not sustainable and was therefore set aside. [Hiralal Govekar v. Sheela Surlakar, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 507, dated 20-03-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: The Bench of P. Velmurugan J. convicted the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for dishonour of cheque) and sentenced him to undergo 6 months simple imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs 1,50,000 to be paid to the complainant.

The complainant and the accused were running a partnership firm which was subsequently dissolved. The accused issued a cheque for a sum of Rs 1,50,000 in favour of the complainant in at the time of the settling of accounts. The cheque was presented in ICICI Bank and was returned due to insufficient funds. The complainant issued statutory notice to the accused but even after that repayment was not made. Therefore, the complainant initiated proceedings under Section 138. However, the trial court acquitted the accused. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal was filed by the complainant.

The High Court noted that the accused admitted that the cheque was issued in favour of the complainant but contended that it was not for legally enforceable debt and was executed at the time of admitting him in the firm only for security purpose. The court observed, “once execution of cheque is admitted, it is a legal presumption under Section 139 of Negotiable Instrument Act. The cheque was issued for discharging legally enforceable debt. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable.” In the present case, the court found that the accused was not able to rebut the presumption in any manner known to law. The mere contention raised by him could not suffice. Finding the accused guilty for offence punishable under Section 138 , the Court set aside the impugned judgment of the trial court. The appeal was allowed and the accused was sentenced as mentioned above.[A.K. Mohammed Farook v. M. Syed Jaheer Hussain, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 187, dated 19-1-2019]