More than twenty years since liberalisation, as the Indian economy matured and marched towards global competitiveness, a dire need was felt to overhaul the existing legal regime governing the corporate and commercial sector and make it more modern and robust. This led to the enactment of several new legislations and significant amendments in existing legislations impacting these sectors. These include the Companies Act, 2013, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, statutes incorporating the Goods and Service Tax, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, the Specific Relief (Amendment Act), 2018, etc. all of which were aimed at streamlining the functioning of business, simplifying the tax structure and payment of taxes, enabling easier enforcement of contracts and quicker resolution of disputes. These legislations enabled India to leap frog its way to 77th place in the Work Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” rankings in 2019 from a dismal 142nd place in 2015.
While the intent and substance of these legislations may be noble, there are a few transitional glitches which have impaired their effective implementation. As a matter of fact, transitions in law always bring about some uncertainties requiring judicial or parliamentary clarifications. However, the transitional phase in respect of these legislations has been more disruptive than one would have imagined.
Where an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing enactments, it commonly also includes provisions which regulates the coming into operation of those enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition. These provisions generally are intended to take care of the events during the period of transition. This article undertakes a critical analysis of the transitional provisions of three recent legislations, more particularly the Goods and Service Tax Acts, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. The article opines how the transitional provisions in these legislations have been drafted with a lack of foresight and vision, which in turn has led to multiple litigations and manifold issues in interpretation of these provisions. The article highlights the immediate need for legislative review and revision of these transitional provisions so as to infuse some much-needed clarity, avoid multiple litigations and ensure a smoother transition to a new legal and regulatory regime.
Part I – Goods and Service Tax
A. Brief legislative history
India’s move towards a unified and comprehensive goods and service tax (GST) regime took concrete shape with the enactment of the Constitution (101st Amendment) Act, 2016  (the “Amending Act”) notified in the Official Gazette on 8-8-2016. The Amending Act made suitable changes to the Constitution to pave way for implementation of GST.
Pursuant to the redefining of legislative powers between the State and the Centre under the aforesaid Amending Act, Parliament enacted the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST), the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (IGST) and the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (UGST) and the States also enacted their respective State Goods and Services Tax Acts (SGST). Consequently, GST was launched at midnight on 1-7-2017 bringing into effect all these statutes with the hope of creating a simple and integrated system of indirect taxation in India. Almost all indirect taxes (apart from customs) including excise, sales tax, service tax, etc. were sought to be done away with and subsumed under one umbrella head of “Goods and Service Tax”.
B. The transitional provision
Section 19 of the Amending Act sets out the overarching transitional clause and provides as under:
- Transitional provisions. —Notwithstanding anything in this Act, any provision of any law relating to tax on goods or services or on both in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution as amended by this Act shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority or until expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier.
The aforesaid provision is a sunset clause which mandates the State/Parliament to either repeal or amend all existing indirect tax laws (including sales tax/value added tax, excise, service tax etc.) and make them consistent with the Amending Act within a period of one year from 8-9-2016 (the date of notification of the Amending Act) after which all such laws would cease to remain operational.
C. Cause for concern
It is pertinent to note that while the Amending Act saves the applicability of the erstwhile indirect tax laws up to 8-9-2016, there are no provisions saving actions initiated/proposed to be initiated under such laws against erring assessees. Most State Sales Tax/VAT Acts permit assessment up to 3-5 years from the date of assessable tax. Similarly, the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits initiation of proceedings up to 2 years from the incidence of non-payment of duty and up to 5 years in cases where extended period of limitation can be invoked. There is no clarity on whether such right to initiate action/undertake assessment for past years (provided for under the earlier indirect tax laws) survives after GST is brought into effect.
In order to safeguard the rights of initiating actions/continuing proceedings already initiated under the erstwhile indirect tax laws, Parliament and the State Legislatures sought to incorporate wider transitional clauses in the principal Acts introducing GST. For instance, the CGST Act incorporates a wide savings clause under Section 174 which is similar to Clause 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and provides for saving of all actions initiated, rights accrued and remedies proposed to be instituted under the repealed Central Acts including Excise Act, Chapter 5 of the Finance Act, 1994 (Service Tax) etc. Furthermore Section 174(3) also saves the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Similarly, even the various SGST Acts provide for wide transitional clauses under Section 174 of their respective State GST legislation, saving all actions undertaken/proposed to be undertaken thereunder the erstwhile State tax laws including the Sales Tax/VAT Act, tax on entry of goods, etc.
Thus, on account of the absence of a wide, all encompassing transitional clause under the Amending Act, Parliament and the State Legislatures have provided for additional transitional clauses (under the head of repeal and savings clauses) in the CGST Act and respective SGST Acts. This gives rise to a debatable issue as to whether a principal Act, which owes its genesis to a constitutional Amendment Act, can incorporate provisions which not only go beyond such an Amending Act but are also seemingly in variance with the provisions of the Amending Act.
Moreover, different States have incorporated different repeal and savings clauses in their respective SGST legislations. For instance, the Value Added Tax Acts in Kerala, Karnataka and Delhi are repealed under Section 173 of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 of their respective SGST legislations. On the other hand, the Value Added Tax Acts in Gujarat and Maharashtra do not find a mention in the list of repealed Acts under their respective SGST legislations. While the savings provisions under Section 174 of most of these SGST statutes are identical, these savings provisions only save actions undertaken/proposed to be undertaken under the repealed statutes (referred to in Section 173). Conversely, if a statute is not repealed under Section 173, actions undertaken/proposed thereunder are not saved under Section 174. Therefore, while pending and proposed actions under the State VAT Act may get saved in Kerala, Karnataka and Delhi similar actions under the Gujarat VAT Act, 2003 may not be saved based on a literal interpretation of the repeal and savings provisions of the respective SGST Acts of these States. While even the Maharashtra VAT Act, 2002 (MVAT Act) is not repealed under Section 173 of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (MGST Act). The MGST Act carves out an extremely wide-ranging savings provision which saves the levy, returns, assessment, reassessment, etc. of taxes under all erstwhile laws in force immediately before the enactment of the MGST Act. Thus, the difference in the repeal and savings provisions in different SGST legislations is likely to lead to an unwelcome situation where the impact of GST on the applicability of erstwhile indirect tax laws will have to be looked into separately for each individual State based on its respective SGST legislation and the repeal and savings clauses incorporated therein. This, in turn leads to multiplicity in litigations and brings about ambiguity, uncertainty and inefficiency in the implementation of the GST regime.
D. Judicial opinion
A plethora of litigations in relation to the transitional issues arising pursuant to implementation of GST have been filed across various high courts. The Kerala High Court recently disposed of 3250 petitions (the lead matter being Sheen Golden Jewels (India) (P) Ltd. v. State Tax Officer) upholding the right of the State Authorities to proceed against pre-existing VAT liability even after the introduction of the GST regime on the strength of the savings provision incorporated in Section 174 of the State GST Act. A similar view was taken by the High Court of Karnataka in Prosper Jewel Arcade LLP v. CCT, although on the basis of different reasoning. It was observed that it is the law applicable on the date of the taxable event which is relevant for the purpose of imposition of tax and therefore the introduction of GST cannot weigh down the legality of orders passed under the Karnataka VAT Act for taxable events of the past, even if such orders were passed after the introduction of the GST regime. The Gauhati High Court, in Laxminarayan Sahu v. Union of India was called upon to determine the validity of show-cause notices issued for non-payment of service tax under the Finance Act after the introduction of GST. In conjunction with the rulings of the Karnataka High Court and the Kerala High Court, the Gauhati High Court upheld the validity of such notices. The reasoning adopted however, was that the actions under the erstwhile laws get saved under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Thus, the view taken by a majority of courts, although based on different reasoning, is that the revenue authorities retain the power to levy appropriate taxes under the erstwhile indirect tax laws for events prior to the introduction of GST.
A similar challenge to the authority of the State to levy, assess and collect tax under the State GVAT Act, 2003 after the introduction of the GST regime was brought before the High Court of Gujarat but vide order dated 26-2-2020 the petitions were withdrawn without any arguments on merits.
E. Analysis and way forward
Section 19 of the Amending Act sets out the date when the new GST regime comes into effect and at the same time provides for continuance of operation of provisions of erstwhile indirect laws up to a period of 1 year from 8-9-2016. The provision contains elements of both, a transitional clause and a savings clause. One of the generally accepted norms of legislative drafting is that lumping transitional and savings provisions in a single section is never a good idea.
As stated earlier, most taxing statutes envisage a substantial time gap between occurrence of cause of action against assessees and actual institution of proceedings. In such a scenario, if the power to initiate proceedings/levy taxes under the erstwhile laws for past events of default/past assessment years, is taken away upon the introduction of GST, it will practically create a legal vacuum in respect of levy, assessment and collection of taxes for a certain time period prior to the introduction of the GST. This would deprive the revenue of legitimate and tax arrears, interest and penalty and enable assessees to unjustifiably escape from the tax network, which certainly could not have been the legislative intent. In this background, clubbing a savings provision with a transitional clause, and failing to provide a comprehensive savings provision in the Amending Act, is absurd and irrational, more so when the country is on the cusp of a revolutionary overhaul of the entire indirect tax regime
While it may be argued that States/Centre have the right to incorporate appropriate repeal and savings provisions in their respective GST legislations, the same may lead to a lot of ambiguity and discrepancies as observed earlier. It is suggested that in order to remove any scope for ambiguities and uncertainties, it would be advisable to amend the Amending Act so as to incorporate a broad, comprehensive savings clause akin to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act in order to save actions/proposed actions under all the erstwhile indirect tax laws. Section 19 of the Amending Act ought to be immediately amended to provide for an additional savings sub-clause, which may read as under:
Section 21(2)-Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) above, the coming into operation of this Act shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment relating to tax on goods or services or on both in force in any State for the purpose of or the purposes of determination of the levy, returns, assessment, reassessment, appeal, revision, rectification, reference or any other proceedings initiated or proposed to be initiated under the said enactments within the period of limitation as envisaged under the said enactments.
Part II – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
A. Legislative history
In order to address the concerns of an inadequate framework governing bankruptcy in India, a Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC) was constituted in October 2014 and tasked with drafting a single unified framework which provides for a quick and effective insolvency process for individuals, partnerships, companies, etc. In November 2015, the BLRC came out with a report which proposed a complete institutional overhaul of the existing framework and suggested a quick, time-bound, creditor controlled and regulator driven insolvency process. This led to the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
B. Transitional provisions
The enactment of the Insolvency Code led to repeal and amendments of several enactments in order to unify a fragmented network of laws dealing with insolvency. The repealed enactments include the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 and the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985. Unlike the repeal and savings provision of the Amending Act heralding GST, Section 243 of the IBC provides for an exhaustive savings clause clearly specifying what is proposed to be saved under the repealed statutes.
In addition to repeal of the aforesaid statutes, the Insolvency Code also provided for amendments to approximately 11 other statutes, most significant amongst those being amendments to the Companies Act, 2013.
Since the CA 2013 and the IBC function in overlapping areas, more particularly in the area of winding up of companies, there is a likelihood of transitional conflict over the pending cases with regard to the appropriate forum as well as the applicable statute. In order to deal with such conflict, the Central Government notified the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 (the “Rules”) in exercise of powers under Section 434 of the CA, 2013 and Section 239 of the IBC. The Rules provide for the bifurcation of proceedings between the CA, 1956/CA, 2013 and the IBC and between Court and National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). So far as treatment of pending winding-up petitions is concerned, based on the nature stage of the proceedings, some winding-up petitions were to be retained by the High Court while others were to be transferred to NCLT
C. Cause for concern
The aforesaid Rules brought into place a splintered structure for dealing with the transition of various proceedings from the CA 1956/CA 2013 to the IBC. The overlapping of jurisdiction as well as subject-matter is riddled with severe concerns and needs to be addressed urgently.
The constitutional validity of these Rules was challenged by Nissan Motor India and Renault Nissan Automotive before the High Court of Madras. It was alleged that on account of operation of the Rules, winding-up petitions filed against these companies in the High Court were transferred to the NCLT in spite of the fact that the entire pleadings were already over, and the matter was about to conclude, thereby causing severe prejudice to these companies. The High Court granted an interim order in favour of the companies by staying the NCLT proceedings against them.
Furthermore, there is no clarity on a scenario where multiple proceedings in respect of the same company have arisen before different forums. For instance, in a situation where a notice for winding-up petition has been served upon the respondent prior to 15-12-2016, the same is retained by the Court for adjudication as per the stipulations under the Rules and is not transferred to the Tribunal. Now, if a fresh petition for winding up against the same company is filed by a financial or operational creditor or the corporate debtor itself under the provisions of IBC, it gives rise to several questions including:
- Whether such a fresh petition is maintainable notwithstanding the pendency of another winding-up petition against the same company in the Court?
- If maintainable, whether the parallel proceedings before the Tribunal under the IBC and those before the court under the Companies Act, 1956 can proceed simultaneously?
- If simultaneous proceedings are permitted, would the proceedings under the Companies Act, 1956 stall in the event of a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC? On the other hand, would proceedings under IBC stall in the event a winding-up order is passed under Companies Act, 1956 on account of the operation of a moratorium under Section 446 of the Companies Act?
- If simultaneous proceedings are not permitted, which statute is to be given a primacy over the conduct of winding-up proceedings?
D. Judicial opinion
The aforementioned issue as to whether the IBC can be triggered in the face of a pending winding-up petition has led to wide-spread litigations seeking judicial clarification on the quandary being faced by all stakeholders in an insolvency proceeding.
The NCLT Benches at Chennai (Alcon Laboratories (India) (P) Ltd. v. Vasan Health Care (P) Ltd.) and Ahmedabad (SBI v. Alok Industries Ltd. ) took the view that the pendency of a winding-up petition cannot be a bar under the Code for initiating a corporate insolvency resolution process unless a winding-up order is passed by the High Court or Official liquidator is appointed. On the other hand, the Hon’ble NCLT Bench at Delhi (Nauvata Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Punj Llyods Ltd.) took the view that in cases where winding-up petitions are pending against a company, it would not be conducive for the NCLT to trigger insolvency resolution process against that very company and therefore, the proceedings instituted earlier in point of time may constitute a better basis for adjudication. On account of the aforesaid divergent views taken by coordinate benches of the NCLT, a Special Bench at NCLT, Delhi referred the issue to a larger Bench in Union Bank of India v. Era Infra Engg. Ltd.. The Hon’ble three-member larger Bench came to the conclusion that there is no bar on NCLT against triggering an insolvency resolution process even when a winding-up petition is pending, unless an official liquidator is appointed and winding-up order is passed.
Apart from various NCLT Benches, the issue has also been raised before the High Court of Bombay on several occasions. In Ashok Commercial Enterprises v. Parekh Aluminex Ltd. the Court was pleased to pass a winding-up order notwithstanding the pendency of the IBC proceedings, observing that as per the Rules, not all winding-up proceedings are to be transferred to NCLT. The legislative intent was that two sets of winding-up proceedings would be heard by two different forum i.e. one by NCLT and another by the High Court depending upon the date of service of petition.
On the other hand, in Jotun India (P) Ltd. v. PSL Ltd., the Bombay High Court observed that there was no bar on NCLT from proceeding with an application filed by a corporate debtor under Section 10 of IBC even though a winding-up petition was admitted against the same corporate debtor in the High Court. It was observed that “Till the company is ordered to be wound up i.e. the final order is passed, NCLT can entertain a petition or an application.”
In order to address the ambiguities arising as a consequence of divergent judicial opinions, the Insolvency Law Committee in its report of March 2018 proposed amendments to the CA, 2013 to clarify that there was no bar on the application of the Code to winding-up petitions pending under prior legislations before any court of law. However, to avoid duplication of proceedings, it was suggested that the leave of the High Court or NCLT, if applicable, under Section 446 of the CA, 1956 or Section 279 of the CA, 2013, must be obtained, for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) under the Code, if any petition for winding up is pending in any High Court or NCLT against the corporate debtor.
In pursuance of the aforesaid recommendation, Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013 was amended with effect from 6-6-2018 and a proviso was added permitting parties to approach the High Court and request for transfer of a pending winding-up proceeding to the NCLT under the IBC regime. However, it is pertinent to note the amendment is not in consonance with the recommendation of the Committee. The recommendation of the Committee was to seek permission of the High Court/NCLT, if applicable, for initiation of CIRP under the Code. Therefore, the recommendation presupposes the grant of permission for even initiation of CIRP. However, the amendment proposes that the High Court is to be approached only for the purpose of seeking a transfer of proceedings and not for initiation of CIRP per se.
Pursuant to the amendment to Section 434 of the CA, 2013 the Supreme Court in Forech India Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd., somewhat settled the issue with regard to the apparent transitional conflict between the IBC and the Companies Act holding that an insolvency resolution may be filed against a corporate debtor notwithstanding the pendency of a winding-up petition before the High Court, since proceedings under IBC are independent proceedings. It further gave liberty to the party that had filed the pending petition before the High Court to seek transfer of the petition to NCLT in accordance with the amendment to Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013.
While the aforesaid judgment lends clarity on the right to initiate CIRP under the IBC during the pendency of a winding-up proceedings in the High Court under the CA 1956, there is no clarity on the probable issues that are bound to arise as a consequence of the duality in proceedings under the IBC and the Companies Act. Questions with regard to the impact of moratorium period on the winding-up proceedings in the High Court, potential revival of winding-up proceedings at the end of the moratorium period in case of failure of resolution, etc. remain unanswered. Furthermore, there is no clarity with regard to the stage of winding-up proceedings at which fresh applications may be made under the IBC and proceedings before the High Courts may be allowed to be transferred to the NCLT. In Sicom Ltd. v. Hanung Toys & Textiles Ltd., the High Court of Delhi observed that if the process is at a nascent stage and only a provisional liquidator is appointed, proceedings before the High Court may be transferred to the NCLT, but if the proceedings are at an advanced stage and the chances of insolvency resolution process are bleak, proceedings are not to be transferred to the NCLT. Recently, the Supreme Court, in the case of Action Ispat and Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Shyam Metalics and Energy Ltd. held that even post-admission and appointment of Official Liquidator transfer of winding up petition to NCLT may be permitted, if no irreversible steps have been taken in relation to the properties of the company in liquidation i.e. so long as no actual sale of movable or immovable properties has taken place.
E. Analysis and way forward
The Rules failed to clarify if fresh proceedings could be initiated under the IBC even where there were pending winding-up proceedings against the same debtor company being heard by Court and left the same to judicial discretion. After divergent views taken by different forums, the Supreme Court in Forech International case (supra) finally took the position that the pendency of winding-up proceedings under the CA, 1956/CA, 2013 has no bearing on fresh proceedings under the IBC. However, this stand taken by the Supreme Court does not appear to be in tune with legislative intent and raises other important issues as a consequence.
First and foremost, it is questionable as to what purpose the savings provision in the Rules retaining certain proceedings in the High Court would serve if the legislative intent was to anyway permit fresh proceedings under the IBC notwithstanding the pending proceedings in the High Court. The interpretation sought to be given by the Supreme Court destroys the very purpose and essence of saving proceedings under the Rules.
Secondly, the Rules were amended vide Notification dated 29-6-2017. Pursuant to the same a proviso was added under Section 5 of the Rules clearly laying down that where a winding-up petition is retained by the High Court in accordance with the Rules, all other winding-up petitions against the same company pending on the cut-off date would also be retained by the High Court, regardless of service/non-service of such petitions. The proviso appears to indicate that the legislative intent is to ensure that once the High Court is seized of a winding-up matter of a particular debtor company in accordance with the Rules, it should operate as the sole forum to adjudicate upon all winding-up petitions pertaining to such debtor company. However, the Supreme Court has taken a different view which appears to be contrary to legislative intent.
Furthermore, even from a practical perspective, this duality in regime for dealing with winding-up matters has harsh consequences for all stakeholders involved. Petitioner creditors who have spent a considerable amount of time and resources in a winding-up petition may have to restart all over again and prove their claims before the insolvency resolution professsional and the Committee of creditors. Corporate debtors may be burdened with the task of defending themselves in two parallel proceedings of a similar nature. Even resolution applicants will be circumspect and cautious in submitting resolution plans during the moratorium period under the IBC, if faced with the prospect of revival of a winding-up petition against the corporate debtor under the CA, 1956/CA, 2013, after the end of the moratorium period/approval of the resolution plan.
In order to avoid multiple proceedings, ensure a smooth transition and avoid the risk of contrary orders by different forums in parallel winding-up petitions, it would be advisable to suitably amend the Rules in such a manner that the transitional/savings provision in the Rules operate upon the debtor company as a whole and not only upon a particular winding-up proceeding against that debtor company. In other words, once winding proceedings against a particular debtor company are retained by the High Court in terms of the Rules, all other pending winding-up petitions, if any, as well as fresh proceedings under the IBC in respect of the same debtor company ought to be consolidated and continued before the said High Court. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the benefit of a time-bound process is not lost out in the course of a winding-up proceeding, it would be apt to amend the law in a manner so as to ensure that all pending winding–up proceedings are completed within a period of one year from a particular cut-off date, failing which the proceedings pertaining to the corporate debtor concerned would automatically be transferred to the Tribunal. In light of the aforesaid, it would be appropriate to suitably amend Rule 5 of the Transfer Rules and add an additional proviso, in the following manner:
Provided also that where a petition relating to winding up of a company is not transferred to the Tribunal under this rule and remains in the High Court and where there is another petition under clause (e) of Section 433 of the Act for winding up against the same company pending as on 15-12-2016 or a fresh petition under Sections 7, 9 or Section 10 of the 1BC is initiated in respect of the same company after 15-12-2016, such other petitions shall not be transferred to or heard by the Tribunal, even if the petition has not been served on the respondent.
Provided that all pending winding-up petitions pending and retained before the High Court pursuant to the commencement of these Rules shall be disposed of by the Hon’ble Court by (cut-off date) failing which such proceedings shall be converted to IBC proceedings and transferred to the Tribunal.
A legislative clarification in accordance with the aforesaid terms will ensure that winding-up proceedings in the High Court do not get delayed indefinitely. Moreover, certainty in forum of adjudication will also resolve jurisdictional conflict, reduce the burden on NCLTs and ensure finality and conclusiveness in adjudication of winding-up matters.
Part III –Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015
A. Legislative history
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (the “Amendment Act”) was enacted on the basis of the proposals made by the Law Commission of India in its 246th Report on “Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996”. The Commission was tasked with reviewing the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”) in view of the several inadequacies observed in the functioning of the Act, which included exorbitant costs, protracted proceedings, excessive court intervention, etc. In order to address these issues and promote India as an arbitration friendly regime, the Commission recommended ample amendments to the Act.
The amendments are promising and in sync with the larger objectives of bringing about expediency, transparency and efficiency in arbitral proceedings. However, as was the case with GST and the IBC, the lack of clarity in transitional provisions led to a flurry of litigations on technical and transitional issues, which somewhat constricted the impact and essence of the Amendment Act.
B. Transitional provisions
The transitional provision, provided for under Section 26 of the Amendment Act, reads as under:
- Act not to apply to pending arbitral proceedings.—Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of this Act.
On a prima facie reading, it appears as though the Amendment Act is to apply prospectively to arbitrations commencing after the date of enforcement of the Amendment Act i.e. 23-10-2015. However, there is no clarity on whether the Amendment Act applies to court proceedings emanating from arbitral proceedings commenced under the Act prior to 23-10-2015. The Act envisages court intervention at various stages before, during and after the commencement of arbitral proceedings. Considering the same, it is baffling as to how and why the Amendment Act is silent on the said issue.
It is pertinent to note that the Law Commission of India, which proposed the amendments in the Act had recommended the insertion of Section 85-A, a comprehensive transitory provision that provided clarity to the effect that the Amendment Act was prospective in nature and was to apply only to fresh arbitrations and to fresh applications filed before the court or a tribunal after the date of enforcement of the Amendment Act. However, for some inexplicable reason, the proposed Section 85-A never found its way into the Act and instead the legislature enacted Section 26 in the Amending Act.
C. Cause for concern
The lack of clarity in Section 26 of the Amendment Act highlights the apparent lack of legislative foresight to consider three peculiar but extremely foreseeable issues:
- Applicability of the Amendment Act to court proceedings initiated prior to 23-10-2015 under the Act;
- Applicability of the Amendment Act to court proceedings initiated/proposed to be initiated on/after 23-10.- the Act,
- Applicability of the Amendment Act to fresh applications before the Arbitral Tribunal for pending arbitrations initiated prior to 23-10-2015; (for instance whether an application filed under Section 17 of the Act after 23-10-2015 in a pending arbitration which has commenced prior to 23-10-2015 would be governed by the old provision or the amended provision)
Since the Amendment Act has made some significant and substantial changes in the arbitration regime, the aforesaid issues have caused confusion and chaos in pending arbitrations. The lack of procedural clarity has led to multiple litigations for determining the appropriate applicable provisions under the Act in pending arbitrations at the cost of the merits of disputes being sidetracked. This in turn has caused unnecessary delays in arbitrations, which ironically, was one of the primary issues sought to be addressed by the Amendment Act.
D. Judicial opinion
One of the foremost issues that has arisen on account of the ambiguity in Section 26 of the Amendment Act is with regard to the applicability of Section 36 as substituted under the Amendment Act to (1) court proceedings initiated prior to the enforcement of Amendment Act; and (2) court proceedings initiated after the enforcement of the Amendment Act.
Prior to the Amendment Act, Section 36 provided that an arbitral award shall be enforced only after the time-limit for filing an application for setting aside the award under Section 34 of the Act has expired, or such application having been made has been refused. Thus, this implied that there would be an automatic stay on enforcement of the award as soon as an application is filed under Section 34 for setting aside the award. The Amendment Act sought to do away with such automatic stay on enforcement by appropriately substituting Section 36. The substituted Section 36 provided that in order to stay enforcement of an arbitral award, it was necessary for the party seeking to set aside the award to file a separate application for stay of enforcement. Further, upon filing of the application, the stay is not to be granted as a matter of right, but the Court “may” in its discretion grant such a stay, subject to such conditions, and on recording of specific reasons.
In light of such substitution of Section 36, various courts have given divergent opinions with regard to the application of substituted Section 36 to court proceedings initiated/proposed to be initiated in respect of arbitrations which took place prior to the enforcement of the Amendment Act i.e. prior to 23-10-2015.
The view taken in Electrosteel Castings Ltd. v. Reacon Engineers (India) (P) Ltd., and Ardee Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Anirudh Bhatia was that that if an arbitration has commenced before 23-10-2015, the entire gamut court proceedings in respect of such arbitrations will be governed under the old regime and will not be covered by the Amendment Act. As a consequence, the unsubstituted Section 36 would continue to apply to such court proceedings, and this would amount to an automatic stay on enforcement of award pursuant to filing of a Section 34 petition. On the other hand, a starkly contrasting view was taken in New Tirupur Area Development Corporation Ltd. v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. and Rendezvous Sports World v. Board of Control for Cricket in India (Bombay High Court) that that the Amending Act will be applicable to all court proceedings pending on 23-10-2015 or filed after 23-10-2015 in relation to arbitration proceedings initiated prior to the enforcement date of the Amendment Act. As a consequence, Section 36 in its substituted form would be applicable to such court proceedings and there would be no automatic stay on enforcement of an arbitral award.
The divergent views taken by different high courts culminated into a series of special leave petitions before the Supreme Court of India, which heard these petitions together with the lead matter being Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket (P) Ltd.
Analysing the language of Section 26 of the Amending Act, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that a careful reading of the section indicates that :-(1) the Amendment Act will not apply to arbitrations that commenced prior to 23-10-2015, unless the parties agree; but (2) the Amendment Act will apply to court proceedings initiated after 23-10-2015 emanating from arbitrations that commenced prior to 23-10-2015.
With regard to the question as to whether the Amendment Act will retrospectively apply to court proceedings initiated before 23-10-2015, the Court observed that Section 36 embodies the procedure of enforcement. The same being procedural in nature any change/amendment in Section 36 does not affect any accrued/vested substantive rights of the judgment-debtor and therefore, the substituted Section 36 ought to be applied retrospectively. The Court further opined that if the substituted Section 36 is not applied retrospectively, it would defeat the very object of the Amendment Act, which is to ensure speedy dispute resolution and reduce court interference at various stages.
Thus, pursuant to the aforesaid judgment, the position with regard to the applicability of the Amended Act was clarified in the following manner:
- The Amended Act will not apply to arbitration proceedings instituted prior to 23-10-2015 unless parties agree otherwise.
- The Amended Act will apply to all court proceedings instituted on or after 23-10-2015 in relation to arbitration proceedings which commenced prior to 23-10-2015
- Section 36 as substituted under the Amended Act will apply retrospectively to all court proceedings instituted before 23-10-2015 in relation to arbitration proceedings which commenced prior to 23-10-2015
E. Analysis and way forward
While the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Supreme Court rendered some much-needed clarity on the interpretation of Section 26 of the Amendment Act, the issue was rekindled when in 2017, a High-Level Committee headed by Justice (Retd.) B.N. Srikrishna suggested that the Amendment Act should apply only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the enforcement of the Amendment Act and to court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings. The proposal found its way in the Arbitration Amendment Bill, 2018 which provided for insertion of Section 87 in the principal Act as per which, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the Amendment Act shall not apply to: (1) arbitral proceedings that have commenced prior to 23-10-2015; and (2) court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings irrespective of whether such court proceedings are commenced prior to or after 23-10-2015. The said Bill received assent from the President on 9-8-2019 and led to the enactment of Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019. (2019 Amendment Act). As a consequence, the Act stood amended with effect from 30-8-2019 (date of notification in Official Gazette) with a newly inserted Section 87 which specified that:
Unless the parties otherwise agree, the amendments made to this Act by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 shall—
(a) not apply to––
(i) arbitral proceedings commenced before the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015;
(ii) court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings irrespective of whether such court proceedings are commenced prior to or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015;
(b) apply only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 and to court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings.
The aforesaid legislative clarification with regard to the applicability of 2015 Amendment completely diluted the ratio of the Kochi Cricket case and reversed the position in respect of applicability of the 2015 Amendment Act. In other words, pursuant to the 2015 Amendment Act would no longer apply to any proceedings under the Act initiated prior to 23-10-2015, regardless of whether such proceedings were arbitral proceedings or court proceedings in relation to such arbitral proceedings. This led to a scathing criticism of the 2019 Amendment Act, which was derided by jurists and practitioners for completely watering down the beneficial impact of the 2015 Amendment Act, which aimed at reducing court interference and improving the speed and efficacy of proceedings under the Act. The constitutional validity of Section 87 of the 2019 Amendment Act was subsequently challenged in the case of Hindustan Construction Company v. Union of India and vide a unanimous verdict of a 3-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the said Section was set aside on the ground of being manifestly arbitrary, and the position as propounded by the Kochi Cricket case was restored.
Thus, as seen in the case of other legislations, failure to draft a conspicuous transitional provision in the Arbitration Amendment Act, 2015 led to confusion regarding the applicability of the amendments proposed therein, which in turn led to multiple litigations as discussed hereinabove. While the dust seems to have been finally settled on the issue with the Supreme Court’s seminal verdict in the Hindustan Construction Company case, one cannot help but ponder how a needless squandering of judicial time and resources could have been avoided with clear, concise and unambiguous legislative drafting.
Transitional provisions in a legislation play a key role in regulating its coming into operation and effect. A carefully worded transitional provision is therefore an indispensable necessity to ensure a smooth change in a legal regime with minimum disruption of existing rights and liabilities. Transitional provisions, may affect relatively few cases, but they are extremely complicated; and they can be important to the cases affected. The absence of clarity in transitional provisions causes chaos and confusion leading to multiple litigations requiring the judiciary to draw inferences based on apparent legislative intent.
The newly enacted commercial legislations in India aim at making business easier, transparent, and efficient by providing for simplicity in taxation structure, facilitating easy exits and offering a speedier mode for dispute resolution. However, loosely worded transitional provisions in these legislations coupled with baffling judicial opinions have substantially diluted the impact of positive changes sought to be brought about by these legislations. The colossal litigations that have arisen in respect of these transitional provisions stand as a testimony to the poor draftsmanship. As discussed in the chapters hereinabove, the judiciary often outweighs practical considerations in the eagerness to give effect to the so-called object and purpose of a newly enacted legislation. Based on the developments so far, it appears as though the judiciary as well as the Government are bent upon simply ensuring quick operationalisation of these legislations at the cost of their effective implementation. Such an approach will defeat the very purpose and essence of these legislations. It is imperative for India to immediately address these transitional issues through appropriate legislative amendments and clarifications, failing which, the true potential of these newly enacted legislations are likely to get sidetracked in the face of a convoluted web of unnecessary and avoidable litigations.
* Advocate, High Court of Gujarat.
 World Bank Group Project Report, Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency, 12th Edition, sourced from: http://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB15-Full-Report.pdf
 Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn., LexisNexis, p. 442 (as cited in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco, (1990) 1 SCC 277
 See Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003-, S.38(9); Karnataka Value Added Tax, 2003-,S. 40 http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/0s79tGDg.
 See Central Excise Act, 1944, S. 11-A(1)
 See Central Excise Act, 1944, S. 11-A(4)
 See Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, S. 174(g)
 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 973
 2018 SCC OnLine Kar 3887
 2018 SCC OnLine Gau 1457
 Preston India (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 3048
 Prof. Henlen Xanthaki, Thornton’s Legislative Drafting, Bloomsbury Professional, 5th Edn., 2013 (as cited in Sheen Golden Jewels (India) (P) Ltd. V. State Tax Officer, supra note 22, para 98).
 http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/f2dr6UL1 S. 243, IBC, 2016.
 Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act of 2003 notified on 1-12-2016
 S. 255 of the Code read with Sch. 11, provides for about 36 amendments to the Companies Act, 2013.
 See Rr. 4 and 5 of the Companies (Transfer of Pending ProFceedings) Rules, 2016
 2017 SCC OnLine NCLT 547
 2017 SCC OnLine NCLT 7586
 2017 SCC OnLine NCLT 16255
 2018 SCC OnLine NCLT 813
 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 421
 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1952 .
 Report of the Insolvency Committee, March 2018, Para 25.7 accessed at: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/ReportInsolvencyLawCommittee_12042019.pdf.
 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/4mkp5CaB, S. 39 – Amendment of Section 434 of CA 2013: “Provided further that any party or parties to any proc eedings relating to the winding up of companies pending before any Court immediately before the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018, may file an application for transfer of such proceedings and the Court may by order transfer such proceedings to the Tribunal and the proceedings so transferred shall be dealt with by the Tribunal as an application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.”
 (2019) 18 SCC 549
 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10399
 2020 SCCOnline SC 1025
 (2019) 18 SCC 549
 Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Second Amendment Rules, 2017, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Notification dated 29-6-2017
 R. 5 http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/bK498A3y; The proviso states that “Provided also that where a petition relating to winding up of a company is not transferred to the Tribunal under this rule and remains in the High Court and where there is another petition under cl. (e) of Section 433 of the Act for winding up against the same company pending as on 15-12-2016, such other petition shall not be transferred to the Tribunal, even if the petition has not been served on the respondent..”
 The portion highlighted in bold is the suggested amendment
 See, S. 8 (reference to arbitration) , S. 9 (grant of interim measures) , S. 11 (appointment of arbitrator) , S. 34 (Setting aside of arbitral award), S. 36 (enforcement of awards)
 2016 SCC OnLine Cal 1257
 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6402
 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 16027
 (2018) 6 SCC 287
 Report of the High Level Committee to Review the Institutionalisation of Arbitration Mechanism in India
accessed at <http://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/Report-HLC.pdf>.
 Unless parties agree otherwise the Amendment Act, 2015 shall not apply to the following:
(1) arbitral proceedings that have commenced prior to the Amendment Act, 2015 coming into force i.e. prior to 23-10-2015; (2) -court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings irrespective of whether such court proceedings are commenced prior to or after the commencement of the Amendment Act, 2015.
 (2018) 6 SCC 287
 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1520, Decided on 27th November, 2019
 Craies on Legislation, Sweet & Maxwell, South Asian Edn. 2010, p. 399 (cited in Sheen Golden Jewels (India) (P) Ltd. v. State Tax Officer, supra note 22,para 97).