Chhattisgarh High Court: In a criminal appeal filed against the acquittal of the respondent who allegedly yelled ‘I love you’ at a minor girl, the Single Judge Bench of Sanjay S. Agrawal, JJ., dismissed the appeal, thereby upholding the acquittal, since none of the offences stood proved against the respondent.
Background
In 2019, the victim, a 15-year-old girl, lodged a written report with the Police alleging that on the day of the incident, when she was returning home from school along with her friends, the respondent shouted “(her name) I Love You” at her. It was alleged further that she had been harassed by his misbehaviour previously as well, for which the Teachers had reprimanded him. However, he did not stop harassing her. Based upon the aforesaid complaint, an FIR was registered against the respondent under Sections 354-D, 509 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) read with Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’) and under Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘the SC/ST Act’).
The Trial Court acquitted the respondent, holding that he was not involved in the alleged crime. Aggrieved, the State filed the present appeal.
Issues and Analysis
1. Whether the victim was a minor at the relevant point in time?
The Court noted that to establish the ‘minority’ of the victim, her birth certificate was seized from her father. The certificate was issued by the competent authority under the Janm Mrityu Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1969; therefore, it has its evidentiary value, particularly when its authenticity was undisputed. The Court further noted that since the certificate was issued way before the alleged incident, it could not be presumed that it was obtained with an ulterior motive to implicate the respondent. Thus, the Court held that evidently, the victim was a minor on the day of the incident.
2. Whether the alleged offences were committed by the respondent?
a. Sexual Assault under Section 8 of the POCSO Act:
Regarding commission of sexual assault under the POCSO Act, the Court referred to Section 7, which defines sexual assault and Section 8, which provides punishment for the same. Upon perusal of Section 7, the Court noted that “physical contact” without penetration may not necessarily involve “touch”. The “other act” involving “physical contact” may involve direct physical contact by the offender, with any other body part (not mentioned in the first part of Section 7) of the victim; other act, such as use of an object by the offender, engaging physical contact with the victim; or in the given circumstances of the case, even no contact by the offender. The Court added that the most important ingredient for constituting the offence of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act was the “sexual intent” and not a physical contact with the child. For proving the charge of “sexual assault” under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, the prosecution was not required to prove a physical contact of the offender with the child.
In this regard, the Court placed reliance on Attorney General v. Satish, (2022) 5 SCC 545, wherein, while considering the word “touch” and “physical contact” used in the aforesaid provision, it was held that, if the act of touching the sexual part of the body or any other act involving physical contact is done with “sexual intent”, then it would fall within the definition of “sexual assault” provided under Section 7 of the POCSO Act.
Noting the aforesaid, the Court examined the victim’s testimony under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and stated that it was his solitary act while showing his “expression of love”. A scrutiny of her statements, vis-à-vis the statements of her friends, revealed that the expression was not made with an intention of his “sexual desire”. Accordingly, the Court held that his alleged expression alone would not constitute “sexual assault” under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, as none of the ingredients provided under Section 7 were established.
Thus, the Court held that the respondent could not be held guilty under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.
b. Stalking under Section 354-D of the IPC:
Upon perusal of the victim’s testimony, the Court noted that the victim deposed that when she was returning home from the School on the day of the incident along with her friends, the respondent came and shouted at her, “(her name) I Love You” and when she tried to leave, he started abusing with filthy and obscene words. Further, she stated that when she was in Class 8th, the respondent misbehaved with her, and when she complained to her parents and the teachers, the teachers reprimanded the respondent. However, the Court noted that the allegation of the respondent uttering abusive words was not mentioned in her written complaint (lodged on the said day itself. Further, neither was her disinterest depicted in her testimony, nor was this allegation corroborated by her friends.
Regarding the respondent’s previous misbehaviour, the Court noted that the same was not corroborated by her friends. Further, the teachers who had reprimanded the respondent for his alleged act were not examined, and no report was ever lodged either by her or her parents for the same. The Court stated that the victim was raising this allegation after a delay of more than two years.
In this regard, the Court relied on Navendu Sudhir Gupta v. Honey Navendu Gupta, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2078, wherein it was held that the offence would not be complete by a mere act of following only as it must be coupled with the attempt by the accused to repeatedly contact such woman with the intent or aim to foster personal interaction. Further, even if the accused was to follow the victim and attempt to repeatedly have personal interaction with her, the offence would be brought home only if there is material to demonstrate that the victim clearly indicated to the accused her disinterest in his advances, aimed at fostering personal interaction.
Thus, the Court held that the essential ingredients of Section 354-D were not established by way of any cogent and reliable evidence against the respondent.
c. Outraging the Modesty of a Woman under Section 509 of the IPC:
The Court stated that, though in her testimony she made the allegation about the respondent uttering filthy and obscene words, she did not mention this in her written complaint. Further, this version was not mentioned by her friends in their testimonies or corroborated by the victim’s parents.
Thus, the Court held that it appeared that, except for the alleged ‘expression’ of him towards the prosecutrix, she was not insulted with filthy words. Her version of this effect was, therefore, not found to be trustworthy and/or sufficient to implicate the respondent under Section 509 of the IPC.
d. Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act:
At the outset, the Court noted that the Trial Court failed to give any findings regarding the allegations that the respondent committed the alleged offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act despite knowing that the victim belonged to the Scheduled Caste (‘SC’) community. However, a bare perusal of her written complaint and her testimony would show she did not mention that the respondent committed the alleged offence because of knowing that she was a member of the SC community. Thus, it could not be said that the alleged act was done by the respondent with an intention that the prosecutrix belongs to the SC community, to hold the respondent guilty under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act.
In this regard, the Court referred to Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763, wherein it was held that unless it is shown that the alleged offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the “Scheduled Caste community”, the alleged offence cannot be held to be proved.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for being devoid of merit.
[State of Chhattisgarh v. Rupendra Das Manikpuri, ACQA No. 215 of 2022, decided on 22-07-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the petitioner: Government Advocate R. N. Pusty
For the respondent: Shobhit Koshta
Buy Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 HERE
Buy Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 HERE
Buy Penal Code, 1860 HERE
