Rajasthan High Court: In a batch of petitions filed under Sections 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 19731 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashment of multiple FIRs registered against former MLA Pramod Jain Bhaya, his family members, friends, and associates, and alternatively, directions for clubbing of all FIRs and transfer of investigation to an IPS officer posted outside Baran and Jhalawar districts, a single-judge bench of Sameer Jain, J., dismissed all the petitions and held that the FIRs are not liable to be quashed at the threshold, the prayer for clubbing of FIRs is legally unsustainable and the plea for transfer of investigation is vague and unsupported by specific averments.
Factual Matrix
The instant petitions arose in the aftermath of the 2023 Rajasthan Legislative Assembly elections, following which the petitioner, a former MLA, who held the position of Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Gopalan in the State of Rajasthan, lost his seat and ceased to be affiliated with the ruling party. Thereafter, a slew of FIRs were registered across various police stations in Baran district, against him and persons connected to him.
The petitioners sought for quashment of all 19 FIRs on grounds of abuse of process, political vendetta, and absence of prima facie cognizable offence and alternatively, consolidation of all FIRs into a single investigation to be conducted under an IPS officer posted outside Baran and Jhalawar.
Parties’ Contentions
The petitioners contended that these FIRs are politically motivated, based on vague and unsubstantiated allegations, and lodged by complainants aligned with the ruling party. The petitioners contended that “a sequence of FIRs began to be registered one after another, implicating several persons affiliated with the opposition party,” and were clearly intended to harass and malign the petitioner. The petitioners cited including precedents State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 and Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI, (2013) 6 SCC 348, and argued that multiple FIRs on the same facts are impermissible and should be quashed.
However, the respondents argued that the petitioners’ reliefs were “inherently contradictory and mutually inconsistent.” It was contended that the FIRs are relate to “distinct and independent causes of action,” including illegal mining, forgery of public documents, land fraud, and economic offences. It was further contended that the petitioners have abstained themselves from joining investigation and rendering cooperation thereto despite interim protection. It was argued that there is no allegation of mala fides against any specific investigating officer, hence prayer for transfer is unfounded. It was further argued that the petitions bypass available statutory remedies under Section 154(3), 156(3), and 210 CrPC.
Court’s Observations
The Court found that the FIRs revealed allegations with substance, although political rivalry may form a backdrop, that alone could not be the basis for quashing proceedings. The Court noted that the record reveals that the impugned FIRs are registered, each concerning distinct and independent allegations, involving different witnesses, different documents, and separate causes of action.
The Court stated that “the allegations leveled in the FIRs per se makes it unambiguous that they do not arise out of the same transaction.” The Court stated that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate any legal basis for clubbing the FIR. i.e., “of nexus inter se or res gestae, a continuing transaction forming one chain of events”, is not satisfied.
On the prayer for quashing, the Court found that the allegations in the FIRs “constitute commission of cognizable offence” and require investigation. The Court cited Parbatbhai Ahir v. State of Gujarat and Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra, where it was held that “the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases.”
On the issue of transfer of investigation, the Court held that “no concrete incident, act, or omission is brought on record, nor have the concerned officers been impleaded as parties to the proceedings.”
While rejecting the petitioners’ argument that the FIRs were lodged belatedly and under political pressure, the Court laid emphasises on principle ‘vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt’ and stated that “the complainants at the most possible juncture have lodged the FIRs and the delay in lodging of FIRs, by itself, cannot be a ground for quashing, particularly when the allegations pertain to serious economic offences.” The Court referred to Dinesh Sharma v. Emgee Cables, where it was emphasised that economic offences warrant full and thorough investigation regardless of delay.
The Court noted that no individual investigating officer was accused of bias or misconduct and stated that in the absence of specific averments of mala fides, mere apprehension of unfair investigation is insufficient.
“The law requires that for an allegation of malafide to be sustained, it must be pleaded with specificity and supported by material facts. In the absence of mens rea or a demonstrable element of ill-intention, such a prayer cannot be entertained.”
Rejecting petitioners’ contention on choosing their Investigating Officer, the Court applied the principle laid down in Romila Thapar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 753, and stated that “the accused has no locus standi to dictate or choose the Investigating Officer, unless the process is vitiated by apparent bias or illegality… The right to fair investigation is sacrosanct, but it does not imply the right to tailor or manipulate the course of investigation.”
“This Court is constrained to hold that the pleas raised by the petitioners are not only premature but also legally unsustainable. Therefore, while taking note of the legal principle fiat justitia ruat caelum — let justice be done though the heavens fall — the allegations, involving suspected misuse of public office, systemic corruption, and economic wrongdoing, warrant a full, impartial and uninterrupted investigation in accordance with law.”
The Court found the petitions premature and noted that investigation in most FIRs was still ongoing. The Court stated that petitioners had failed to avail statutory remedies under Sections 154(3), 156(3), or 210 of the CrPC and hence could not directly invoke inherent jurisdiction. The Court cited Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409, where it was held that
“High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the Police or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done…”
Court’s Decision
The Court dismissed all the petitions and held that the FIRs are not liable to be quashed at the threshold, the prayer for clubbing of FIRs is legally unsustainable and the plea for transfer of investigation is vague and unsupported by specific averments.
[Hussain Mohd. v. Tolaram, 2025 SCC OnLine Raj 1742, Decided on 01-05-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
Mr. Madhav Mitra, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Jaya Mitra, Mr. Veerendra Singh, Mr. Rajendra Sharma, Mr. Rahul Tiwari, Ms. Simran Bharti for Mr. Abdul Kalam Khan, Counsel for the Petitioners
Mr. Manoj Sharma, AAG with Ms. Pooja Sharma, Mr. S.M. Sharma, Mr. Naman Pareek, ASAGC, Mr. Rakesh Kumar Bairwa, Mr. Omendra Singh, Dy. S.P., Baran, Mr. Manish Gupta, Mr. Avtar Singh Rathore, Mr. Shiv Lal Meena and Ms. Ayushi Shrivastava for Mr. DK Shrivastava, Counsel for the Respondents
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1. Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
