Setting the context
Nationality is a very niche concept and closely related to the sovereignty of the States. But with the advent of time, as the world is more interconnected than ever and the territorial boundaries become more ambiguous in its traditional sense, there is a need for the concept of nationality to evolve. In this light, a very old and almost discarded case of Nottebohm1 in 1955 comes to mind because of its unique and very abstract and subjective judgment. Herein I will try to determine whether some parts of its judgment can be revived on the basis of its merits due to the contemporary situations that have cropped up recently.
Under public international law (PIL), rules applicable on the States are on the basis of consent. The sources of law acceptable in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the PIL matters are inter alia, the treaties or conventions signed by the State parties, customary laws and general principles of law.2
So the case that we are reviewing in this paper, Nottebohm judgment3 has recently come under attack in the context of the European Commission’s position on citizenship by investment (CBI) schemes, also known as “golden passport” program. The Commission launched infringement proceedings against Malta and Cyprus over their CBI schemes, and, on 9-6-2021, urged those States to stop “selling” European Union (EU) citizenship. In its press release, and with reliance on Nottebohm case4, the Commission observed that “the granting of EU citizenship for predetermined payments or investments without any genuine link with the member States concerned violates the principle of sincere cooperation and undermines the essence of EU citizenship.
The relevant article, Article 4 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 20065 (DADP) states: “State of nationality of a natural person — For the purposes of the diplomatic protection of a natural person, a State of nationality means a State whose nationality that person has acquired, in accordance with the law of that State, by birth, descent, naturalisation, succession of States or in any other manner, not inconsistent with international law.” The interpretation of the aforementioned case has, primarily, been done in that context.
Basic facts of the case
Nottebohm was a German by birth, and still possessed German nationality when, in 1905, he went to Guatemala to settle down. He took up residence there and made that country the headquarters of his business activities, which increased and prospered. He continued to have business connections in Germany. He used to pay a few visits to a brother in Liechtenstein. He himself continued to have his fixed abode in Guatemala. However, due to the ongoing World War II, he was facing problems in his business as he was a German national. So, in 1939, he applied for nationality through naturalisation in Liechtenstein, which he was granted, thereby losing his German nationality. A certificate of nationality was produced, signed on behalf of the Liechtenstein Government for the same. Then he returned to Guatemala at the beginning of 1940, where he resumed his former business activities. In 1943, the Guatemalan Government seized all his property and business and arrested him on the pretext of him being a German national as Guatemala was in direct conflict with Germany. In reaction to that, Liechtenstein went to the ICJ on behalf of him to demand for diplomatic protection.
Interpretation by the ICJ
Here, the Court interpreted the word nationality and what it means to be a national of a State.
Firstly, even though the circumstances in which Nottebohm got the nationality was suspicious, as under naturalisation, inter alia a person has to be a resident of a State for a long period of time and Nottebohm did not meet those requirements, the Court respected the sovereignty of Liechtenstein, holding that “it is for Liechtenstein to confer its nationality by naturalisation in accordance with its legislation”. This was held in the light of the well-established customary international law (CIL)6, that a State has the right to determine its nationals in accordance with its laws. As a corollary, other States are required to recognise such determination insofar as it is consistent with international law.7
Then the Court further went on to say that, however, this case does not only involve the aspect of sovereignty of the States in purely domestic matters. It recognised that State sovereignty on nationality law is not unlimited. The Court resorted to an existing rule of customary law to determine whether the legitimate exercise of national law by a State should engraft obligations under international law on another State. For this, it relied on the Hague Convention and rightly noted that national law on the attribution of nationality “shall be recognised by other States insofar as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality”. Therefore, the Court has to further decide on the aspect of “international effect” of the lawfully acquired Liechtenstein nationality. This is so because its opposability to Guatemala i.e. if adjudicated upon, the consequences would have to be borne by Guatemala as well, was an international matter.
So, now the matter was that “whether the nationality conferred on Nottebohm can be relied upon as against Guatemala” for diplomatic protection purposes. This is so, because from the facts we can understand that Nottebohm had been living in Guatemala and had his business there as opposed to Liechtenstein, where he had spent negligible time and yet got its nationality through naturalisation. So, in this light, he should be considered a national of Guatemala as well, and here arose the concept of dual nationality. To resolve this issue, ICJ resorted to “dominant and effective” test, which is a widely recognised customary rule of international law. This test, the Court rightly observed, requires showing “stronger factual ties”, also referred to by the Court as “genuine connections”, between the person concerned and the State whose nationality is invoked.8 In applying the rule, the Court found that, since Nottebohm’s “actual connections with Liechtenstein were extremely tenuous” when compared to the existing “long-standing and close connection between him and Guatemala”, Liechtenstein’s nationality should not be given international effect.
According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinion of writers, nationality is the legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual’s connection which has made him its national.9
Hence, it was finally held that Guatemala is under no obligation to recognise a nationality, which is not “real and effective”, granted in such circumstances. Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis Guatemala and its claim must, for this reason, be held to be inadmissible.
Analysis — Consequences/implications of such an interpretation
There are two arguments that form the whole discussion on ICJ’s take on interpreting what it means to be a national on a global level. One side argues that the court was right in its decision as it did not deviate from the rules of international law, while reiterating the principles of good faith. On the other hand, implementation of such an interpretation of nationality meant creating a possibility where a person could be left without any nationality, and hence, no representation or agency whatsoever.10
If we first talk about the credibility of this take on nationality, the ICJ did not, as critics generally argue, depart from international law on nationality nor did it seek to create an international rule based on a “genuine link” requirement. A closer look at the majority’s reasoning reveals that, in fact, this decision is not ultimately about genuine links, but rather about preventing the misuse of nationality. Lastly, Nottebohm judgment11 is currently present in other overlooked areas where nationality serves a transnational purpose, such as international investment law.
Recent developments show that the criteria used by the ICJ to establish “authentic citizenship” are influencing some areas of international law, including investment treaty arbitration and cases involving claims by dual nationals. In these cases, tribunals considered the rule of “dominant and effective” nationality to ascertain the legal standing of dual nationals, as established by this case, as a relevant authority to determine the dominant and effective nationality of the investor.
However, there is no denying the fact that treating this judgment as a reliable precedent would open Pandora’s box. Robert Sloane, an international law expert, argues that Nottebohm judgment12 should “be read as a narrow decision in which the ICJ tacitly invoked a general principle of law, viz. abuse of rights, to prevent what it saw as a manipulative ascription of nationality”. According to the ICJ, the newly acquired nationality of Nottebohm was one of convenience and hence this rule should only be limited to this case and not applied in the future.
This is because relying on this judgment would endanger millions of people who would not come under any government’s protection as diplomatic protection by a State is only extended to its nationals. And the basis of conferring nationality, if we go by the above interpretation, would be factors such as inter alia the habitual residence of the individual, their center of interests and their participation in public life.13
The real implication of this been aptly explained in the commentary of DADP Article 4, which has also become a source of customary international law over time.14 It says that Draft Article 4 does not require a State to prove an effective or genuine link between itself and its national, along the lines, suggested in Nottebohm case15, even in the case of a single nationality. Despite divergent views as to the interpretation of the case, the Commission took the view that there were certain factors in the judgment, like being very particular with the facts and not expounding general rules that might be applicable to all the States, that served to limit Nottebohm judgment16 to the facts of that case.17 Moreover, it is necessary to be mindful of the fact that if the genuine link requirement proposed by Nottebohm case18 was strictly applied it would exclude millions of persons from the benefit of diplomatic protection as in today’s world of economic globalisation and migration there are millions of persons who have moved away from their State of nationality and made their lives in States whose nationality they never acquire or have acquired nationality by birth or descent from States with which they have a tenuous connection.19
Therefore, a number of scholars have fiercely opposed the proposition that a Member State must only grant citizenship to individuals who have genuine links with it. Peter Spiro labels Nottebohm judgment20 as a “jurisprudential illusion”, arguing that “there may be no other judgment of an International Tribunal which has had so much purchase on the imagination”. Dimitry Kochenov considers that this judgment is unquestionably bad law and the Commission was obliged to know this to be the case.
Conclusion
This case law reinforces the principle that, whereas the conferral of nationality is a matter of internal law, its international legal functions are a matter of international law. The ICJ did not fabricate a novel doctrine of international law in the field of nationality. Rather, the Court rightfully resorted to an existing rule of customary law to determine whether the legitimate exercise of national law by a State should engraft obligations under international law on another State. The rationale behind the ruling was to prevent abusive nationality practices.21
Conceived as an important particularisation of the principle of good faith, abuse of rights is overwhelmingly accepted as a general principle of law or as part of customary international law. The principle requires, inter alia, that “every right be exercised honestly and loyally. Any fictitious exercise of a right for the purpose of evading either a rule of law or a contractual obligation will not be tolerated”.
The ICJ does not follow the doctrine of precedents i.e. it is not bound to follow its previous judgments.22 However, in Cameroon v. Nigeria23, the ICJ held that the Court must follow its previous judgments in its spirit, unless it has a very substantive reason to deviate from it. This would give the States a sense of certainty and predictability regarding the consequences of their actions. It must be noted here that Nottebohm case24 has neither been frequently cited by later authorities nor has it been relied upon by the court around the world. This is because of its inherent flaws in its interpretation of nationality. However, I propose that the judgment should not be discarded in its entirety, but must have a restricted application and reliance based on its usefulness in some of the areas of international matters like commercial and arbitration matters, but not in the cases like those of migrants and refugees. Therefore, its restricted use can actually be beneficial to the legal community.
*BA LLB (Business Law Hons.), National Law University, Jodhpur. Author can be reached at: lavanya.agarwal@nlujodhpur.ac.in.
1. Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 1955 SCC OnLine ICJ 5.
2. International Court of Justice, Statute of ICJ, 1920, Art. 38(1).
5. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 2006.
6. Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 1930, Art. 1; Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 2006, Art. 4; Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8th, 1921, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine PCIJ 1, para 24.
7. Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 1930, Art. 1; Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 2006, Art. 4; Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8th, 1921, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine PCIJ 1, para 24.
8. International Law Commission, Draft Articles, 2006, Art. 7.
10. Alfred M. Boll, Multiple Nationality and International Law (2nd Edn., Brill, 2008) p. 267.
13. 1955 SCC OnLine ICJ 5, Merge Case (US v. Italy), Decision No. 55, 10-6-1955, para 247; Abbas Ghaffari v. National Iranian Oil Co. (1990).
14. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection Report of the ILC, 58th Sess. G.A. 63rd Sess. Supp. No. 10 A/61/10, Art. 4.
17. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Eighth Session (A/61/10) (ADP Commentary).
19. H.F. Van Panhuys, The Role of Nationality in International Law (5th Edn., Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 290.
21. Javier García Olmedo, “Nottebohm under Attack (Again): Is it Time for Reconciliation?” (ejiltalk.org, 10-12-2021).
22. International Court of Justice, Statute of ICJ, 1920, Art. 59.