Himachal Pradesh High Court: In a case wherein a question arose that whether the Court could quash an FIR registered under Sections 363, 376, 212, 120-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO’) on the basis of compromise, the Division Bench of Tarlok Singh Chauhan* and Satyen Vaidya, JJ., opined that the child victim was low leading a happy and peaceful married life, therefore, allowing to continue the proceedings in such cases would result in disturbance of their happy family and ends of justice demanded the compromise to be allowed between the parties. The Court opined that such compromise was not a camouflage to escape punishment and the victim’s consent was voluntarily. Thus, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court opined that quashing the proceedings would promote justice for the victim and continuance of the proceedings would otherwise cause injustice and accordingly quashed the impugned FIR.
Background
In an instant case, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘CrPC’) in Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track POCSO Court (‘the Trial Court’) for quashing of FIR registered under Sections 363, 376, 212, 120B of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO on the ground that the family members of the petitioner and the child victim had settled the matter by solemnizing the marriage of the child victim with the petitioner on 09-03-2023 and thereafter, they had been residing together as a husband and wife in the matrimonial home.
The Trial Court held that the compromise of the child victim and the parents were inconsequential. Further, the role of the complainant had come to an end after putting the criminal machinery into motion by informing the police and in serious offences like the present one, the crime was always against the State and the private parties could not compromise the matter.
Thus, the reference was called upon by the Trial Court to resolve the question as to whether the present Court could quash an FIR for such offences on the basis of compromise.
Analysis, Law, and Decision
The Court relied on B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675; Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677; Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1; Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466; Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 13 SCC 635 and opined that in various cases the proceedings under Section 376 of IPC and also, POCSO had been quashed. The Court opined that the very purpose of inherent power given to the High Courts under Section 482 of the CrPC was of advancement of justice, the touchstone for exercising that power would be to secure the ends of justice and the ends of justice were higher than the ends of mere law. The Court opined that there could be no hard and fast line which constricted the power of High Courts to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC might lead to rigid or specious justice, which might lead to grave injustice.
The Court opined that though the High Courts should not normally interfere with the investigation or criminal proceedings involving sexual offences against women and children, on the ground of settlement but it could not completely foreclose in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of CrPC and Article 226 of the Constitution to quash such proceedings in extraordinary circumstances to do complete justice.
The Court relied on Vishnu v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 3357 and opined that while dealing with the petitions moved by the parents or guardians of the sexual assault victim to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground of compromise, the Court must consider that whether the allegations prima facie constituted the ingredients of the offence and whether the settlement was in the best interest of the minor victim and the continuation of the proceedings would adversely affect the mental, physical and emotional wellbeing of the victim.
The Court opined that in the present case, the accused had been charged for the offences punishable under Section 366, 376, 212 and 120B of the IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO, but the criminal prosecution was set into motion only because the victim was a child, otherwise she was in love with the petitioner. The Court opined that undisputedly, the petitioner was interested to solemnize the marriage with the child victim and had solemnized on 09-03-2023. In such circumstances, the Court could quash the FIR after being satisfied that the child victim and her family members had settled the dispute. The Court opined that the victim was married and was leading a peaceful life, therefore, allowing the case to continue would result in disturbance in their happy family life and also, ends of justice in such circumstances would demand that the parties should be allowed to compromise.
The Court opined that it must ensure that the marriage was not a camouflage to escape punishment and the consent given by the victim for compromise was voluntarily. After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court must be satisfied that quashing the proceedings would promote justice for the victim and continuance of it would cause injustice.
Therefore, the Court opined that once there was no dispute between the parties, then the law could not be so harsh to stand as a wall between the parties, as the law had to secure the future of the parties. In such circumstances, the continuation of the criminal proceedings would only cause an irreparable harassment and might even tarnish the reputation of the victim. The Court opined that the court proceedings could not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution and the power to do complete justice was the very essence of every judicial dispensation system.
The Court opined that any embargo in the shape of Section 320(9) of the CrPC or any other such curtailment could not whittle down the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC to do complete justice. Further, the Court opined that “the compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is finest hour of justice”.
The Court relied on Sahil v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2022 SCC OnLine HP 496 and Sakshi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine HP 7834 and opined that the child victim was low leading a happy and peaceful married life, therefore, allowing to continue the proceedings in such cases would result in disturbance of their happy family and ends of justice demanded the compromise to be allowed between the parties.
The Court opined that such compromise was not a camouflage to escape punishment and the victim’s consent was voluntarily. Thus, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court opined that quashing the proceedings would promote justice for the victim and continuance of the proceedings would otherwise cause injustice and accordingly quashed the impugned FIR.
[Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine HP 1625, decided on 08-12-2023]
*Judgment authored by- Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the Petitioner: Arun Sehgal, Advocate;
For the Respondents: I.N. Mehta, Y.W. Chauhan Sr. Addl. A.Gs. with Navlesh Verma, Sharmila Patial, Addl. A.G. and J. S. Guleria, Dy. A.G.
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