Supreme Court: In a civil appeal by Union of India (‘appellant’) against the Allahabad High Court’s judgment and order, whereby, the appellant’s petition was dismissed, and the Central Administrative Tribunal’s (‘Tribunal’) judgment was allowed, wherein the respondent’s removal from the appointment to the post of Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants was held as unwarranted, the Division Bench of Bela M. Trivedi and Dipankar Datta, JJ. directed for the appointment of the respondent to the post of Postal Assistant for which he was selected.
Background
In the matter at hand, the Department of Posts (Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants) Recruitment Rules, 1990 (‘1990 Rules’) which outlined the educational qualifications required for the post of Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants for direct recruits as ‘10+2 standard or 12th class pass of recognised University/ Board of School Education/Board of Secondary Education’ were amended by the Department of Posts (Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants) Recruitment (Amendment) Rules 1991 (‘Amendment Rules’), and as a result of the amendment in the Schedule to the 1990 Rules, the candidates who had pursued their intermediate education in ‘vocational stream’ were excluded from being considered for the post of Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants.
The respondents were selected for the post after the selection process and merit list was generated, following which all of them were attached to the Kheri Post Office for 15 days pre-induction training starting from 15-03-1996 and the same was to be followed by a long-term training. However, the Chief Post Master General sent a letter to various Postmasters General that certificates issued by the Board of High School and Intermediate Education should be admitted unless ‘these are marked as vocational stream or vocational’. This resulted in holding back the respondents who were not sent for long-term training.
The Chief Post Master General’s letter was challenged before the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that “there was mention that the candidates who cleared the Intermediate (10+2) examination with ‘vocational subject’ would not be eligible, hence, all the applicants fulfilled educational qualification as published in the newspaper advertisement”. The High Court vide impugned judgment upheld the Tribunal’s decision, “that denial of appointment to the respondents based solely on such letter was unwarranted”. The appellant’s review petition before the High Court was also dismissed. Hence, the present appeal.
Decision
The Court noted that of all the respondents, only one respondent was left as the sole contesting party, as the other respondents were not interested in the service any longer.
The Court said that it is true that neither in the letter dated 17-04-1995 requisitioning names of eligible candidates from the Employment Exchange nor in the advertisement dated 12-06-1995 inviting applications from eligible candidates was it mentioned that the candidates clearing the requisite examination conducted by a recognized University or Board through vocational stream would stand excluded. However, referring to Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission, (2006) 9 SCC 507 and Ashish Kumar v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 55, the Court said that the law is well-settled that if qualifications mentioned in an advertisement inviting applications are at variance with statutorily prescribed qualifications, it is the latter that would prevail.
The Court noted that the Tribunal or the High Court did not advert to the certificate issued in favour of the respondent which enumerated the subjects which he read during his intermediate education and the Original Application, the Writ Petition and the Review Applications were decided by the Tribunal and the High Court without any reference to the Amendment Rules.
The Court said that normally, it is not the Court’s function to determine equivalence of two qualifications and/or to scrutinise a particular certificate and say that the holder thereof satisfies the eligibility criteria and, thus, is qualified for appointment. The Court stated that it is entirely the prerogative of the employer, after applications are received from interested candidates or names of registered candidates are sponsored by the Employment Exchanges for public employment, to decide whether any such candidate intending to participate in the selection process is eligible in terms of the statutorily prescribed rules for appointment and also as to whether he ought to be allowed to enter the zone of consideration. The Court only decided when evidence is produced before the Court which, without much argument or deep scrutiny, tilts the balance in favour of one party then the Court could decide either way based on acceptance of such evidence.
Regarding the stage of citing the ineligibility for not offering employment, the Court noted that in the present case, the appellant considered the respondent’s eligibility allowed him to take part in the various tests in connection with the selection process, interviewed him, placed his name quite high in the merit list, and thereafter sent him for 15 days pre-induction training. It was after a week that the letter dated 22-03-1996 was issued which resulted in the ouster of the respondent from the range of appointment. The Court said that if the appellant had declared the respondent as ineligible based on the appreciation of the respondent’s educational qualification at the threshold, the situation would have entirely been different, however, it was not at the threshold that the respondent was considered ineligible.
The Court said that no one has any legal right to claim public employment, a candidate has only a right to be considered in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court explained that once a candidate is declared ineligible to participate in the selection process at the threshold and if he still wishes to participate in the process perceiving that his candidature has been arbitrarily rejected, he can seek a remedy in accordance with law. However, the Court said that if the candidature is not rejected at the threshold and candidate is allowed to participate in the selection process and ultimately his name was there in the merit list, though such candidate has no indefeasible right to claim appointment, he does have a limited right of being accorded fair and non-discriminatory treatment. Further, the Court said that if a candidate has successfully crossed the selection process, he may not have a vested right of appointment but a reasonable expectation of being appointed having regard to his position in the merit list could arise. The Court also stated that the employer, if it is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, would have no authority to act in an arbitrary manner and throw the candidate out from the range of appointment, as distinguished from the zone of consideration, without reason and the employer-State, being bound by Article 14 of the Constitution, has an obligation to provide some justification by way of reason.
Further, the Court said that it was highly improper for the appellant to reject the candidature of the respondent outright in the absence of a proper appreciation of the certificate. The Court said that it is settled law that unfettered discretion, unaccountable approach and arbitrariness in State action are antithesis to Article 14 and, particularly when two views could possibly emerge looking at the certificate of educational qualification placed by the respondent, with both views not being wholly unworthy of acceptance, fairness in administrative procedure demanded that the appellant ought to have given reason, howsoever brief, as to why it preferred to consider the respondent to have succeeded in the relevant examination through ‘vocational stream’, thereby attracting ineligibility, without considering the effect of the remark ‘Regular’ at the foot of the certificate. The Court also said that it was not within the province of the appellant to scrutinise the respondent’s certificate with an approach of ‘one eye open, one eyed closed’ and declare that his intermediate education was in ‘vocational stream’, thereby, overlooking or ignoring that the self-same certificate bore the remark ‘Regular’, hence, showcasing that his exclusion was not on the basis of a valid and proper reason and was, decidedly, arbitrary.
Thus, the Court viewed that the respondent was discriminated against and arbitrarily deprived of the fruit of selection. The Court noted that it was the appellant’s carelessness in not producing the Amendment Rules and the gazette notification before the Tribunal leading to lis being prolonged for more than two decades. The Court also noted that the respondent had reached the age of 50 and hence, had crossed the maximum age for entry into public employment.
However, the Court gave certain directions to complete justice:
-
The respondent shall be offered appointment, initially on probation, by the appellant on a post of Postal Assistant (for which he was selected) within a month from date;
-
If no post is vacant, a supernumerary post shall be created;
-
Subject to satisfactory completion of the period of probation, the respondent shall be confirmed in service;
-
Should service rendered during probation be considered not satisfactory, the appellant will be entitled to proceed in accordance with law;
-
Having not actually worked, the respondent shall neither be entitled to arrears of salary nor shall he be entitled to claim seniority from the date of appointment of other candidates who participated in the recruitment process of 1995;
-
Since the respondent, if confirmed after successful period of probationary service, would have less than 10 years’ service to his credit and consequently would fall short of qualifying service for pension and other retiral benefits, the appellant shall treat him to have been notionally appointed on the date the last of the selected candidates was appointed pursuant to the process of 1995 only for the purpose of release of such benefits in accordance with law; and
-
In such case, his retiral benefits shall be computed based on the last pay drawn by him while in service.
-
These directions will not be applicable to any other respondent, other than the present respondent.
[Union of India v. Uzair Imran, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1308, Decided on: 11-10-2023]
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Supreme Court: In a civil appeal by Union of India (‘appellant’) against the Allahabad High Court’s judgment and order, whereby, the appellant’s petition was dismissed, and the Central Administrative Tribunal’s (‘Tribunal’) judgment was allowed, wherein the respondent’s removal from the appointment to the post of Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants was held as unwarranted, the Division Bench of Bela M. Trivedi and Dipankar Datta, JJ. directed for the appointment of the respondent to the post of Postal Assistant for which he was selected.
Background
In the matter at hand, the Department of Posts (Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants) Recruitment Rules, 1990 (‘1990 Rules’) which outlined the educational qualifications required for the post of Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants for direct recruits as ‘10+2 standard or 12th class pass of recognised University/ Board of School Education/Board of Secondary Education’ were amended by the Department of Posts (Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants) Recruitment (Amendment) Rules 1991 (‘Amendment Rules’), and as a result of the amendment in the Schedule to the 1990 Rules, the candidates who had pursued their intermediate education in ‘vocational stream’ were excluded from being considered for the post of Postal Assistants and Sorting Assistants.
The respondents were selected for the post after the selection process and merit list was generated, following which all of them were attached to the Kheri Post Office for 15 days pre-induction training starting from 15-03-1996 and the same was to be followed by a long-term training. However, the Chief Post Master General sent a letter to various Postmasters General that certificates issued by the Board of High School and Intermediate Education should be admitted unless ‘these are marked as vocational stream or vocational’. This resulted in holding back the respondents who were not sent for long-term training.
The Chief Post Master General’s letter was challenged before the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that “there was mention that the candidates who cleared the Intermediate (10+2) examination with ‘vocational subject’ would not be eligible, hence, all the applicants fulfilled educational qualification as published in the newspaper advertisement”. The High Court vide impugned judgment upheld the Tribunal’s decision, “that denial of appointment to the respondents based solely on such letter was unwarranted”. The appellant’s review petition before the High Court was also dismissed. Hence, the present appeal.
Decision
The Court noted that of all the respondents, only one respondent was left as the sole contesting party, as the other respondents were not interested in the service any longer.
The Court said that it is true that neither in the letter dated 17-04-1995 requisitioning names of eligible candidates from the Employment Exchange nor in the advertisement dated 12-06-1995 inviting applications from eligible candidates was it mentioned that the candidates clearing the requisite examination conducted by a recognized University or Board through vocational stream would stand excluded. However, referring to Malik Mazhar Sultan v. U.P. Public Service Commission, (2006) 9 SCC 507 and Ashish Kumar v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 55, the Court said that the law is well-settled that if qualifications mentioned in an advertisement inviting applications are at variance with statutorily prescribed qualifications, it is the latter that would prevail.
The Court noted that the Tribunal or the High Court did not advert to the certificate issued in favour of the respondent which enumerated the subjects which he read during his intermediate education and the Original Application, the Writ Petition and the Review Applications were decided by the Tribunal and the High Court without any reference to the Amendment Rules.
The Court said that normally, it is not the Court’s function to determine equivalence of two qualifications and/or to scrutinise a particular certificate and say that the holder thereof satisfies the eligibility criteria and, thus, is qualified for appointment. The Court stated that it is entirely the prerogative of the employer, after applications are received from interested candidates or names of registered candidates are sponsored by the Employment Exchanges for public employment, to decide whether any such candidate intending to participate in the selection process is eligible in terms of the statutorily prescribed rules for appointment and also as to whether he ought to be allowed to enter the zone of consideration. The Court only decided when evidence is produced before the Court which, without much argument or deep scrutiny, tilts the balance in favour of one party then the Court could decide either way based on acceptance of such evidence.
Regarding the stage of citing the ineligibility for not offering employment, the Court noted that in the present case, the appellant considered the respondent’s eligibility allowed him to take part in the various tests in connection with the selection process, interviewed him, placed his name quite high in the merit list, and thereafter sent him for 15 days pre-induction training. It was after a week that the letter dated 22-03-1996 was issued which resulted in the ouster of the respondent from the range of appointment. The Court said that if the appellant had declared the respondent as ineligible based on the appreciation of the respondent’s educational qualification at the threshold, the situation would have entirely been different, however, it was not at the threshold that the respondent was considered ineligible.
The Court said that no one has any legal right to claim public employment, a candidate has only a right to be considered in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court explained that once a candidate is declared ineligible to participate in the selection process at the threshold and if he still wishes to participate in the process perceiving that his candidature has been arbitrarily rejected, he can seek a remedy in accordance with law. However, the Court said that if the candidature is not rejected at the threshold and candidate is allowed to participate in the selection process and ultimately his name was there in the merit list, though such candidate has no indefeasible right to claim appointment, he does have a limited right of being accorded fair and non-discriminatory treatment. Further, the Court said that if a candidate has successfully crossed the selection process, he may not have a vested right of appointment but a reasonable expectation of being appointed having regard to his position in the merit list could arise. The Court also stated that the employer, if it is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, would have no authority to act in an arbitrary manner and throw the candidate out from the range of appointment, as distinguished from the zone of consideration, without reason and the employer-State, being bound by Article 14 of the Constitution, has an obligation to provide some justification by way of reason.
Further, the Court said that it was highly improper for the appellant to reject the candidature of the respondent outright in the absence of a proper appreciation of the certificate. The Court said that it is settled law that unfettered discretion, unaccountable approach and arbitrariness in State action are antithesis to Article 14 and, particularly when two views could possibly emerge looking at the certificate of educational qualification placed by the respondent, with both views not being wholly unworthy of acceptance, fairness in administrative procedure demanded that the appellant ought to have given reason, howsoever brief, as to why it preferred to consider the respondent to have succeeded in the relevant examination through ‘vocational stream’, thereby attracting ineligibility, without considering the effect of the remark ‘Regular’ at the foot of the certificate. The Court also said that it was not within the province of the appellant to scrutinise the respondent’s certificate with an approach of ‘one eye open, one eyed closed’ and declare that his intermediate education was in ‘vocational stream’, thereby, overlooking or ignoring that the self-same certificate bore the remark ‘Regular’, hence, showcasing that his exclusion was not on the basis of a valid and proper reason and was, decidedly, arbitrary.
Thus, the Court viewed that the respondent was discriminated against and arbitrarily deprived of the fruit of selection. The Court noted that it was the appellant’s carelessness in not producing the Amendment Rules and the gazette notification before the Tribunal leading to lis being prolonged for more than two decades. The Court also noted that the respondent had reached the age of 50 and hence, had crossed the maximum age for entry into public employment.
However, the Court gave certain directions to complete justice:
-
The respondent shall be offered appointment, initially on probation, by the appellant on a post of Postal Assistant (for which he was selected) within a month from date;
-
If no post is vacant, a supernumerary post shall be created;
-
Subject to satisfactory completion of the period of probation, the respondent shall be confirmed in service;
-
Should service rendered during probation be considered not satisfactory, the appellant will be entitled to proceed in accordance with law;
-
Having not actually worked, the respondent shall neither be entitled to arrears of salary nor shall he be entitled to claim seniority from the date of appointment of other candidates who participated in the recruitment process of 1995;
-
Since the respondent, if confirmed after successful period of probationary service, would have less than 10 years’ service to his credit and consequently would fall short of qualifying service for pension and other retiral benefits, the appellant shall treat him to have been notionally appointed on the date the last of the selected candidates was appointed pursuant to the process of 1995 only for the purpose of release of such benefits in accordance with law; and
-
In such case, his retiral benefits shall be computed based on the last pay drawn by him while in service.
-
These directions will not be applicable to any other respondent, other than the present respondent.
[Union of India v. Uzair Imran, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1308, Decided on: 11-10-2023]
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