Supreme Court: In a case relating to dishonour of cheques where it was alleged that the complaint was filed by the managing director in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the Company, the bench of Sanjay Kishan Kaul* and MM Sundresh, JJ has held that there could be a format where the Company’s name is described first, suing through the Managing Director but there cannot be a fundamental defect merely because the name of the Managing Director is stated first followed by the post held in the Company. It was further held that it would be too technical a view to take to defeat the complaint merely because the body of the complaint does not elaborate upon the authorisation.
The respondent had issued 8 cheques totalling to Rs.1,60,000/- in favour of Bell Marshall Telesystems Limited, however, all the cheques got dishonoured on account of “funds insufficient” after which legal notices were issued by the beneficiary under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The demand was, however not met within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice nor was any reply sent which resulted in the complaint being filed by the Company’s Managing Director Bhupesh Rathod before the Special Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai. The Company also filed an affidavit through its Managing Director, i.e., Bhupesh Rathod, stating that it had authorised to file a complaint case against the respondent. A copy of the Board Resolution was also presented.
The respondent took an objection that the complaint was filed in the personal capacity of Bhupesh Rathod and not on behalf of the Company. On the other hand it was contended by the appellant that the complaint was in the name of the Company and in the cause title of the complaint he had described himself as the Managing Director. The Company was a registered company under the Companies Act, 1956. On this, the respondent contended that it is only in the aforesaid title description that the complainant is described as the Managing Director of the Company but in the body of the complaint it is not so mentioned.
The Court took note of the facts that the description of the complainant with its full registered office address is given at the inception itself except that the Managing Director’s name appears first as acting on behalf of the Company. The affidavit and the cross-examination in respect of the same during trial supports the finding that the complaint had been filed by the Managing Director on behalf of the Company.
It, hence, noticed that the format itself cannot be said to be defective though it may not be perfect.
“The body of the complaint need not be required to contain anything more in view of what has been set out at the inception coupled with the copy of the Board Resolution. There is no reason to otherwise annex a copy of the Board Resolution if the complaint was not being filed by the appellant on behalf of the Company.”
It further explained that a Manager or a Managing Director ordinarily by the very nomenclature can be taken to be the person in-charge of the affairs Company for its day-to-day management and within the activity would certainly be calling the act of approaching the court either under civil law or criminal law for setting the trial in motion.
“It would be too technical a view to take to defeat the complaint merely because the body of the complaint does not elaborate upon the authorisation. The artificial person being the Company had to act through a person/official, which logically would include the Chairman or Managing Director. Only the existence of authorisation could be verified.”
The Court considered the governing principles in respect of a corporate entity which seeks to file the complaint, as laid down in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, (1998) 1 SCC 687, and said that,
“If a complaint was made in the name of the Company, it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court and the court looks upon the natural person for all practical purposes. It is in this context that observations were made that the body corporate is a de jure complainant while the human being is a de facto complainant to represent the former in the court proceedings. Thus, no Magistrate could insist that the particular person whose statement was taken on oath alone can continue to represent the Company till the end of the proceedings. Not only that, even if there was initially no authority the Company can at any stage rectify that defect by sending a competent person.”
Further, the Court noticed that the signatures on the cheques were not denied. Neither was it explained by way of an alternative story as to why the duly signed cheques were handed over to the Company. There was no plea of any fraud or misrepresentation.
“It does, thus, appear that faced with the aforesaid position, the respondent only sought to take a technical plea arising from the format of the complaint to evade his liability.”
The Court held that the complaint was properly instituted and also that the respondent failed to disclose why he did not meet the financial liability arising to a payee, who is a holder of a cheque in due course.
The Court was of the view that the respondent should be sentenced with imprisonment for a term of one year and with fine twice the amount of the cheque, i.e., Rs.3,20,000/-. However, since 15 years have elapsed since the complaint was filed, the Court directed if the respondent pays a further sum of Rs.1,60,000/- to the appellant, then the sentence would stand suspended.
[Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1031, decided on 10.11.2021]
*Judgment by: Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul