Delhi High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts


Delhi High Court: In a writ petition filed by an Additional District Judge for reimbursement of his treatment charges during Covid-19, the Single Judge Bench of Rekha Palli, J. directed the Government of NCT of Delhi to reimburse the remaining amount of Rs. 16,93,880 towards the cost of Covid-19 treatment incurred by an Additional District Judge during the pandemic.

Petitioner was posted as the Additional District Judge and had approached this Court, as respondents had refused to reimburse in full the expenses incurred by him for his medical treatment while he was admitted in the hospital (Respondent 5) on account of Covid-19.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner

Counsel for the petitioner states that the respondents do not dispute the fact that the petitioner was undergoing treatment for Covid-19 at the hospital and since there were no beds available in an empanelled hospital in the NCT of Delhi, the petitioner, due to his dropping levels of oxygen, had to be rushed to the nearest hospital (Respondent 5). Being in a helpless stage, the petitioner had no other option but to pay the entire amount of Rs. 24,02,380 to the hospital against the appropriate receipts.

Based on recommendations made by the Technical Standing Committee constituted by respondents, the hospital reimbursed only Rs. 7,08,500 and refused to pay the balance amount of Rs. 16,93,880 on the ground that this amount was charged by the hospital by ignoring the rates prescribed under the circular issued by the Government of NCT of Delhi, fixing the charges leviable for treatment of patients suffering from Covid-19.

Further, it was submitted that the petitioner cannot be penalized for the hospital charging amounts higher than what was prescribed by the Government of NCT of Delhi (Respondent 1) and if in case, the hospital had acted in violation of the circular, then it is for the Government of NCT of Delhi to act against the hospital and make recoveries, if any.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent

Counsel for the respondent submitted that the hospital should be directed to explain as to why it had not abided by the circular and should further, be directed to refund the excessive amounts charged from the petitioner which were way above the rates prescribed in the circular.

Analysis, Law, and Decision

The Court opined that the petitioner, who had spent his hard-earned savings, while undergoing treatment to save his life, cannot be told that, since the hospital had failed to abide by the circular issued by the Government of NCT of Delhi, he should seek refund from the said hospital which saved his life. The Court did not find it necessary to delve into the circular’s validity as in the present case, the petitioner was seeking reimbursement of the amount for the bona fide expenses incurred by him for his treatment at the hospital.

The Court relied on Sqn. Commander Randeep Kumar Rana v. Union of India, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 333, wherein the Division Bench while dealing with a case, where the hospital had charged over and above package rates, held that the employer was under an obligation to pay to the government employee, and could make appropriate recoveries in accordance with law, from the hospital which had overcharged him.

The Court held that the Government of NCT of Delhi had to reimburse the petitioner by paying him the differential amount of Rs. 16,93,880 and since this Court had bot expressed any opinion on the validity of the circular, therefore, it would be open for Government of NCT of Delhi to pursue its remedy as per law, against the hospital, including taking penal action, and recovery of any amount which it perceives had been charged in excess. Thus, the Court directed the Government to pay within four weeks the balance amount of Rs. 16,93,880 to the petitioner.

[Dinesh Kumar v. Govt (NCT of Delhi), W.P. (C) 15853 of 2022, decided on 22-11-2022]

Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Petitioner(s): Senior Advocate J.P. Sengh;

Advocate Ashim Shridhar;

Advocate Manhisha Mehta;

Advocate Niyati;

For the Respondent(s): Senior Counsel Avnish Ahlawat;

Advocate Laavanya Kaushik;

Advocate N.K. Singh;

Advocate Aliza Alam.

Bombay High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts


Bombay High Court : In an appeal filed against the judgment and award dated 20-11-2009 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mumbai awarding compensation of Rs. 48,38,543/- with interest @7.5% p.a. from the date of the application till final realization, seeking enhancement of the same vide present appeal, Anuja Prabhudessai J., held the claimant to be entitled for compensation of Rs. 64,86,714/- which is more than the amount claimed by the claimant i.e., Rs. 45,00,000/- and observed that it is obligatory for the Tribunal and Court to award ‘just compensation’, even if it is in the excess of the amount claimed.

The Court noted that the Claimant, a young man of 26 years of age is wheelchair bound for life as he had suffered multiple injuries in a motor vehicle accident leading to traumatic paraplegia.

The Court further noted that on perusal of the medical bills the claimant had incurred actual expenses towards medical, transport, physiotherapy and attendant charges to the tune of Rs. 13,77,915/- and is thus, entitled for reimbursement of the said amount of Rs. 13,77,915/- along with Rs. 6,000/- towards special diet while under treatment.

The Court further found the claimant, who is paralyzed from waist below would require attendant throughout his life and considering the attendant charges at Rs. 4,500/- per month and adopting multiplier of 17, the claimant was held entitled for compensation of Rs. 9,18,000/- towards attendant charges in future as against Rs. 50,000/- awarded by the Tribunal.

The Court held the claimant is entitled for total compensation of Rs. 10,50,000/- towards future medical treatment, physiotherapy charges and other miscellaneous expenses considering the Claimant will require physiotherapy for both the lower limbs and being paraplegic, is confined to bed and is prone to suffer from bladder and kidney infections, pulmonary embolism, deep vein thrombosis, etc. and likely to develop pressure ulcers and sleep on waterbed along with follow up treatment.

The Court further enhanced the compensation towards special diet to Rs. 3,50,000/- as against Rs. 10,000/- awarded by the Tribunal as it is well known that paraplegic patients need high protein and fiber diet, with multivitamin supplements along with a special diet to regulate their bowel movement.

The Court observed that the loss of earning capacity of the claimant is 100% and having failed to prove the actual income, the loss of future earning has to be assessed on the basis of the notional income. Thus, considering the age of the claimant, the notional income can be considered at Rs. 8,000/- per month i.e., Rs. 96,000/- per annum and adding 40% towards loss of future prospects, total amount would be Rs. 1,34,400/- per annum. Applying multiplier of 17 as opposed to 18 used by the Tribunal incorrectly, the claimant is entitled for Rs. 22,84,800/-.

The Court also opined that the claimant is a young man of 26 years of age, and is wheelchair bound for life. In addition to physical and mental suffering, his mobility impairment is likely to affect his conjugal relationship and shatter his hope to nurture children. In such circumstances, compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- awarded by the Tribunal towards pain and suffering and loss of amenities is enhanced to Rs. 5,00,000/- considering that he is unable to enjoy amenities of life, which he would have otherwise enjoyed but for the tragic accidental injuries.

Placing reliance on Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 274, the Court noted that there is no embargo in awarding compensation more than that claimed by the claimant, rather it is obligatory for the Tribunal and Court to award ‘just compensation’, even if it is in the excess of the amount claimed.

Thus, the Court held that the claimant is entitled for compensation of Rs. 64,86,714/- inclusive of no-fault liability and upon excluding an amount of Rs. 23,18,000/- in respect of future expenditure under different heads, the Claimant shall be entitled for interest on amount of Rs. 41,68,715/- @7.5% per annum from the date of the application till final realization.

The Court directed the Insurance Company to deposit the balance amount within a period of four weeks from the date of uploading of the order wherein 10% of the compensation deposited by the Insurance Company with proportionate interest accrued thereon be paid to the Appellant-claimant on payment of deficit court fees and the balance amount shall be invested in the name of the Appellant-claimant in any nationalized bank with liberty to withdraw quarterly interest accrued on the said amount.

[Yogesh Subhash Panchal v. Mohd. Hussain Malik, First Appeal No. 1700 of 2012, decided on 19-09-2022]

Advocates who appeared in this case:

Ms. Rina Kundu for the Appellant/Applicant in FA/1700/2012;

Ms. S.S. Dwivedi for the Appellant in FA/1361/2010 and;

for the Respondent in FA/1700/2012.

Patiala House Courts, Delhi
Case BriefsDistrict Court

Patiala House Courts, New Delhi: While addressing a case of medical negligence Prayank Nayak, MM-01, expressed that doctors can be summoned for negligence only if the negligence is gross or the doctors did not possess the requisite skill required for the treatment

Complainant sought summoning of accused namely Dr Ram Manohar Lohiya, Hospital, New Delhi, CMO, Dr Ram Manohar Lohiya, Hospital and Dr Dinesh, Dr Ram Manohar Lohiya Hospital for offence punishable under Sections 270, 272, 326, 336, 338 of Penal Code, 1860.

Victim was aged about 3 months when she developed fever, cough and bronco pneumonia for which she sought treatment at OPD of RML. She was administered antibiotics and infusion intravenously. It was alleged that due to faulty administration of injection in a rash and negligent manner, victim developed gangrene.

After her examination by several doctors, her right hand had to be amputated from the wrist down. Hence it was stated that due to the negligence, commissions, and illegal omission of RML Hospital and its doctors they were liable to be punished under Sections 269, 270, 326 and 338 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

Analysis, Law and Decision

Law on Medical Negligence and Criminal Liability

Court expressed that the law of the land on the above stated was summed up in the decision of Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1,

“…To prosecute a medical professional for negligence under criminal law it must be shown that the accused did something or failed to do something which in the given facts and circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do. The hazard taken by the accused doctor should be of such a nature that the injury which resulted was most likely imminent.”

 Delhi High Court in Hukam Chand v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4129, held that:

“6. Thus to proceed against a doctor the complainant is required to, even at the stage of summoning, prima facie show that the negligence is of such a kind that either the doctor was not processed of the requisite skills which he professed to possess or the negligence and recklessness was of a high degree which could be termed as gross.”

 Hence, Court expressed those doctors can be summoned for negligence only if the negligence is gross or the doctors did not possess the requisite skill required for the treatment.

However, in the present matter, there was nothing on record to show that the treating doctors were grossly negligent while treating the victim. Even the Committee of the doctors did not mention that there was any negligence on the part of the treating doctors.

In Delhi High Court’s decision of Dr A.K. Banerji v. State, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2322, while dealing with a criminal revision in a matter relating to medical negligence where the victim’s hand had to be amputated, held that since the Medical Council of India had opined that there was no negligence on the part of the treating doctor, summoning order of the magistrate for offence punishable under Section 338 IPC was liable to be set aside.

Bench held that since no sanction under Section 197 CrPC had been obtained, the doctors could not be summoned for the charges of medical negligence.

On finding no grounds for proceeding against the hospital and treating doctors arrayed as accused, the complaint was dismissed under Section 203 CrPC. [Gudia v. Dr Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, CC No. 18745 of 2016, decided on 12-10-2021]

Gauhati High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Gauhati High Court: The Division Bench of Songkhupchung Serto and S. Hukato Swu, JJ., directed the State government to verify whether the family has sufficient rooms and other facilities in the house where the infected person can be isolated before directing a person to stay under home isolation. The Bench stated,

“Taking into account the economic status of the people by and large it may be that only few privilege people who belong to higher economic strata may have the facilities for such isolation in their own homes.”

Issues before the Bench

On 05-05-2021, the instant PIL was taken up on Suo Moto and the Bench had directed the State to file an affidavit on the following 6 issues;

  1. A district wise list of number of infected persons as per category such as critical, serious, mild etc.
  2. Number of hospital beds category wise i.e. ventilator facilities with oxygen facilities etc. made available across the State/district
  3. Number of manpower made available district wise specially for treatment of Covid persons
  4. Contingency plans
  5. Availability of oxygen, medicine district wise
  6. How many persons have been given vaccine and what is the plan to reach everyone in the State.

Home Isolation

Noticing the disturbing trend on the ever-increasing number of Covid-19 infected persons especially, in the rural areas, the Bench stated that during the first wave of pandemic the State Government had set up quarantine centers for isolation of Covid positive populace; even the villagers had set up such centers on their own, but no such facilities were made available in the second wave. Instead, home isolation for Covid positive persons had been put to practice by and large. However, said the Bench, taking into account the economic status of the people it may be that only few privilege people who belong to higher economic strata may have the facilities for such isolation in their own homes. Therefore, the Bench directed the government that before directing a person to stay under home isolation, the Surveillance teams constituted by the Government should first see/verify whether the family has sufficient rooms and other facilities in the house where the infected person can be isolated. The surveillance team was directed to stick a notice on the gate of the house stating that the inmate(s) of the house are under isolation to avoid visiting of people. The Surveillance team was also directed to ensure that none of the inmates of such house venture out till directed time and their medical and other needs should be met by the Government.

The Bench directed the State to designate places for isolation for those families who have no facilities for home isolation. It was further directed that the State shall maintain proper sanitization and high standard of hygiene at such centers and all medical needs of the patients should be met.

Covid Testing

Regarding Covid testing, the Bench stated that testing is very important in our fight with the pandemic. Unless people are tested, there is no way one can know whether they had been infected with the virus or not. Opining that the earlier the infected persons are identified further spread of the virus by such persons can be prevented, the Bench stated,

Since we are in the midst of the virus spreading far and wide even in the rural areas, we are of the view that fees should not be charged even from persons who come on their own for testing.

Observing the number of testing on daily basis in the state and noticing that RT-PCR testing facilities were available only at 3 places i.e. at Dimapur, Kohima and Tuensang, the Bench directed the State to ramp-up testing and explore feasibility of establishing testing facilities even at other strategic places.


On the issue of vaccination, the Bench observed that as per the affidavit so far 1,81,443 persons (45+ years of age inclusive of frontline and health workers) had been vaccinated as on 11-05-2021, and out of that 51,650 had been given 2nd dose. The Bench stated,

“In a State where the population is 22.8 lakhs the vaccination done so far is precious too little and it is still too far from the target. Therefore, while not belittling the efforts made by the State Government and all those who are working day and night, we are constraint to urge that the vaccine be made available at the earliest and vaccination drive also be done on war footing so that people of the State can be vaccinated at the earliest.”

Hence, the Bench directed the State to increase fixed days for vaccination in a week for the age group of 18 to 44 years to make the vaccine available to those who come forward at the earliest. Further, noticing the reluctance of people to take vaccine, the Bench directed the State to take appropriate steps in coordination with Doordarshan, All India Radio and other print and digital media to spread awareness so that any fear or reservation that is in the mind of the people would be removed and the vaccination drive would go on smoothly and the same is completed at the earliest.

Other Directions

Additionally, the Bench issued the following directions:

  1. State should make special arrangements to reach out to the aged and physically challenged persons with the vaccine.
  2. Noticing the CHC had no doctors inspite of demand of the people, the Bench directed State to do everything at their command and post east some Doctors at the CHC concerned and post the required number of Doctors and other man powers within a period of 5 days.
  3. The required equipments, medicines and other requirements should be made available in all the Government hospitals/PHCs/CHCs in the districts.
  4. On the issue of crematoriums charging exorbitantly high for burials for Covid affected bodies, the Bend directed the government to take the burden at least for those who cannot afford. The government was also directed to take appropriate action to keep a check on burial charges.

[Kohima v. State of Nagaland, In re.,  2021 SCC OnLine Gau 1170, order dated 24-05-2021]

Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief. 

Supreme Court of The United States
Case BriefsForeign Courts

Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS): A Full Judge Bench of Warren E. Burger, C.J. and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, William J. Brennan, Jr., William O. Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White, Potter Stewart and William H. Rehnquist, JJ. reversed a judgment appeal of the Idaho Supreme Court.

Richard Lynn Reed, a minor, had died intestate in Ada County, Idaho, on March 29, 1967. His adoptive parents, who had separated sometime prior to his death, were the parties to this appeal. Approximately seven months after his death, his mother, appellant Sally Reed, had filed a petition in the Probate Court of Ada County, seeking appointment as administratrix of her son’s estate. Prior to the date set for a hearing on the mother’s petition, appellee Cecil Reed, the father of the decedent, filed a competing petition seeking to have himself appointed administrator of the son’s estate. The probate court held a joint hearing and treated §§ 15–312 and 15–314 of the Idaho Code as the controlling statutes and read those sections as compelling a preference for Cecil Reed because he was a male.

Section 15–312 designated the persons who were entitled to administer the estate of one who dies intestate, Section listed 11 classes of persons who were so entitled and provided that one of the 11 classes so enumerated was ‘the father or mother’ of the person dying intestate. Under this section then appellant and appellee, being members of the same entitlement class, would seem to have been equally entitled to administer their son’s estate, Section 15–314, however, provided, that

‘of several persons claiming and equally entitled (under § 15–312) to administer, males must be preferred to females, and relatives of the whole to those of the helf blood.’

In issuing its order, the probate court implicitly recognized the equality of entitlement of the two applicants under § 15–312 and noted that neither of the applicants were under any legal disability; the court ruled, however, that appellee, being a male, was to be preferred to the female appellant ‘by reason of Section 15–314 of the Idaho Code.’ Aggrieved by which Sally Reed appealed and her appeal was treated by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho as a constitutional attack on § 15–314. In dealing with the attack, that court held that the challenged section violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was, therefore, void; the matter was ordered ‘returned to the Probate Court for its determination of which of the two parties’ was better qualified to administer the estate. This order was never carried out, however, Cecil Reed took a further appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, which reversed the District Court and reinstated the original order naming the father administrator of the estate. Subsequently, Sally Reed thereupon appealed for review by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

The Court concluded that the arbitrary preference established in favor of males by § 15–314 of the Idaho Code cannot stand in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no State deny the equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction.

The Court further stated that Section 15–314 is restricted in its operation to those situations where competing applications for letters of administration have been filed by both male and female members of the same entitlement class established by § 15–312. In such situations, § 15–314 provides that different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and applying this clause Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways. The Court quoted from the judgment of Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920),

 ‘A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’

While answering the question in the present case of whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the operation of §§ 15–312 and 15–314, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that its objective was to eliminate one area of controversy when two or more persons, equally entitled under § 15 312, seek letters of administration and thereby present the probate court ‘with the issue of which one should be named.’ The court also concluded that where such persons are not of the same sex, the elimination of females from consideration ‘is neither an illogical nor arbitrary method devised by the legislature to resolve an issue that would otherwise require a hearing as to the relative merits * * * of the two or more petitioning relatives * * *.’ 93 Idaho, at 514, 465 P.2d, at 638. The Court held that “To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.” Providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.[Sally M. REED v. Cecil R. REED,  1971 SCC OnLine US SC 174, decided on 22-11-1971]

Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case Briefs

Bombay High Court: K.R. Shriram, J. asked for responses from Central and State Government with regard to patients unable to get treatment in case of non-COVID situation.

Senior Advocate, A.Y. Sakhare, raised issues with regard to patients unable to get treatment in case of non-COVID-19 situation.

Bench for the stated issue, placed its view that the Central and State Government should also be concerned about the said issue and thus petitioner should address their communications with suggestions, to the Health Secretary of the State Government at Mantralaya and to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in the Central Government.

State and central government have been asked to submit an affidavit in response to the said matter.

Further the Bench also stated that,

“I would expect the concerned to take these petitions very serious and come with an effective solution in their affidavits.”

ASG — Anil Singh submitted that the issues in the present matter are also under consideration before the Supreme Court of India, thus only State Government and Corporate need o file a reply.

Matter listed on 30-04-2020. [Mehrwan Farshed v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 583, decided on 23-04-2020]

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC): Justice V.K. Jain (Presiding Member), while disposing of the present application with respect to negligence of doctors, noted a very significant point, that,

“A doctor writing a prescription advised by any doctor cannot be said to be negligent only on account of his writing such a prescription.”

In the present case husband of the complainant visited OP-2 (Dr Sandeep Agarwal) in Sahara Hospital, Lucknow. Later he was admitted there for a day; during his stay at the hospital his pathology tests were done and it was found that his serum creatinine was found to be excessive from what is to be in the range prescribed.

No investigations or treatment for monitoring and management of high creatinine which was found in his reports indicating kidney disease was advised to him during the time of discharge and nor was he asked to consult the Nephrologist for the said purpose. On being admitted again to the hospital, he was seen by OP-2 as well as OP-3 (Dr Muffazal Ahmed). OP-3 had informed the family of the deceased and the deceased as well of suffering from the end-stage renal disease for which he required dialysis.

Further, it was stated that the complainant was allegedly given iron injection during his stay at the hospital though such injection according to the complainant was contra indicated in case of a person suffering from kidney disease. He was also prescribed iron injection without checking his ferritin level.

Complainant also stated that medicine Metformin was advised to the deceased which was again contra indicated in his case. Medicine named Liofen was also prescribed to him which was also contra indicated in the deceased’s case.

In view of the above, complainant alleged negligence on the part of OPs in the deceased’s treatment. Complainant thus approached the Commission seeking compensation for damages.

The above complaint has been resisted by the opposite parties.

Case of OPs is that they thought that the serum creatinine level might have increased due to dehydration. The discharge summary, however, does not record any such assumption. Even if the opposite party / treating doctor was of the opinion that high creatinine level could be due to dehydration, the least expected from him was to note it down in the discharge summary and advise the patient to get his creatinine level checked regularly, since the said level would have come down in due course had the same been caused by dehydration. Considering the high level of creatinine the OP-2 ought to have suggested consultation by a nephrologist to confirm the cause of the increase in serum creatinine. Therefore, it would be difficult to say that the OP-2 was negligent in the treatment of the complainant, he had not given any treatment or advise to him for the monitoring, management and treatment of the high level of serum creatinine found nor having advised him to consult a Nephrologist during the course of his treatment.

It is to be noted that ‘Encicarb’ was advised to the deceased to be infused daily for two hours for two days after a detailed discussion.

Treating doctor should first get the TSAT and Ferritin level of the patient checked before initiating ESA therapy. Admittedly, ferritin and TSAT of the complainant were not got checked soon before 18.3.2014 when intravenous iron Encicarb was advised to him. His ferritin levels were last checked on 10.12.2013 and more than three months had already expired by the time iron injection encicarb was advised to him on 18.3.2014. In view of the guidelines issued by Indian Society of Nephrology advising the injection Encicarb on 18.3.2014, without checking TSAT and ferritin was an act of negligence on the part of the opposite party No.3.

Tribunal on noting the material submitted by the complainant and considering the facts and circumstances of the case found OP-2 and 3 to be negligent in the treatment of complainant who died during the pendency of the complaint. Since OP-2 and 3 were working with OP-1, the said opposite party is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of OPs 2 & 3.

The next question for consideration was with respect to the quantum of compensation. Though the complainants have claimed compensation running into crores of rupees, the facts, and circumstances of the case do not justify such a huge and fanciful compensation. The complainant was alive when this complaint was instituted and he died during the pendency of this complaint. There is no evidence to prove that the complainant died on account of the deficiency attributed to the opposite parties in his treatment. His creatinine level was pretty high even at the time it was checked in Sahara Hospital.

Thus, Complainant was entitled to an aggregate of Rs 30 lakhs. [Gyan Mishra v. Sahara India medical Institute Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine NCDRC 333, decided on 07-11-2019]