Kerala High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

   

Kerala High Court: In a case where a transgender person was declined participation in District Judo Competition, V.G. Arun, J., held that if the organisers have not made arrangements for participating transgenders, they have to allow the petitioner to participate in her chosen category.

On being denied participation in the District Level Judo competition, the petitioner, a transsexual person, whose chosen self-perceived gender identity is woman, had approached the Court with her grievances.

The petitioner underwent Sex Reassignment Surgery and claimed that the transition is complete. Being an active sports person, who had participated in various sports items like athletics, judo, wrestling, etc., she is desirous to participate in the District Level Judo competition being held by Kerala Judo Association and Kozhikode District Judo Association (respondents 3 and 4) on 30th and 31st of July, 2022.

However, when she attempted to submit her application for participation through online mode, she was informed that transgender persons will not be allowed to participate in the competition.

The petitioner submitted that even after undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery, she had actively participated in various sports events at the University level in the transgender category. Relying on the decision in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438, wherein the Supreme Court has recognised ‘transgender' as a Gender identity, she prayed that she be permitted to participate in her self-perceived gender category.

The petitioner contended that her self-perceived gender identity is woman and after having undergone the surgery, she has been on hormone therapy for almost 5 years.

The Court opined that a transgender person has an equal right to participate in competitions. Therefore, the Court held that in the absence of any category for participating transgender persons, the organisers have to permit the petitioner to participate in her chosen category.

Accordingly, respondents 3 and 4 were directed to accept the petitioner’s application and do the needful, if the time stipulated for submitting applications is not over. The Court added that if the application reaches respondents 3 and 4 within time, she shall be allowed to participate in the Championship provisionally and subject to the final outcome of this writ petition.

[Anamika v. State of Kerala, WP(C) No. 24571 of 2022, decided on 29-07-2022]


Advocates who appeared in this case :

Dhanuja M.S, Advocate, for the Petitioner;

Latha Anand, Advocate, for the Kerala Sports Council.


*Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Madras High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

   

Madras High Court: A Division Bench of Munishwar Nath Bhandari and N Mala JJ. dismissed the plea seeking direction to the State granting separate reservations for transgender persons for government jobs in view of the landmark judgment National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 wherein a Government Order has already been issued by the State to treat the transgender under the category of Most Backward Class ‘MBC' to enable themselves of the benefit of reservation in Government employment.

The present petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of Mandamus directing the State ‘respondents' to consider the representation of the President, Indian Transgender Initiative ‘petitioner' seeking reservation for the third gender in the Government jobs in reference to Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019.

State submitted that in the judgment National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438, a direction was given to the Central and State Governments to take steps to treat the transgender as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, and the Government of Tamil Nadu issued Government Order ‘GO Ms. No. 28' dated 06-04-2015, whereby the transgender were brought under the category of Most Backward Class under Sl No. 36C of Schedule VI in ‘GO Ms. No.85' dated 29-07-2008 for reservation of seats in educational institutions and appointments in the services of the State.

The Court thus observed that the transgender has already been brought under the category of Most Backward Classes and they are getting reservation.

The Court held “we find the present writ petition to be unnecessary, as the necessary Government Order has already been issued to treat the transgender under the category of Most Backward Class to enable them avail the benefit of reservation in Government employment.”

[P Sudha v. The Secretary, WP No. 16113 of 2022, decided on 29-06-2022]


Advocates who appeared in this case :

M. Madhu Prakash, Advocate, for the Petitioner;

R.Shunmugasundaram, P. Muthukumar, Alagu Gowtham and Shakeena, Advocates, for the Respondents 1 & 2.


*Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

SCC Part
Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 41 Rr. 4 & 33, Ss. 96, 100 and Or. 20 R. 18 — Partition suit — Appeal — Non-appealing plaintiffs: Some of plaintiffs whose claim was denied by trial court and who had not challenged same by way of appeal before first appellate court, held, are entitled to relief in second appeal. In a partition suit, all parties stand on the same pedestal and every party is a plaintiff as well as a defendant. Position of plaintiff and defendant can be interchangeable. Trial court could grant relief even to non-appealing plaintiffs and make an adverse order against all defendants and in favour of all plaintiffs. Merely because trial court had not granted relief in favour of some of plaintiffs, would not come in the way in High Court allowing their claim. [Azgar Barid v. Mazambi, (2022) 5 SCC 334]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Maintainability of writ petition — Proceedings under SARFAESI Act: If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable. [Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345]

Constitution of India — Arts. 32 and 226 — Issue as to legislative competence — Maintainability: Matter already standing determined by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. [M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2022) 5 SCC 291]

Constitution of India — Sch. VII List I Entry 84 and List II Entry 51: State Legislature, held, has no legislative competence to levy tax on waste liquor after distillation which is not suitable for human consumption. [State of Orissa v. Utkal Distilleries Ltd., (2022) 5 SCC 326]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 190(1)(b) r/w Ss. 173, 193 & 319 and Ss. 161 & 164 — Taking cognizance of offence on basis of police report — Protest petition: Even after process has been issued against some accused on one date, held, process can still be issued by the Magistrate against some other person against whom there is some material on record, but whose name is not included as accused in the charge-sheet. Lastly, Magistrate or court need not wait till stage of S. 319 CrPC to exercise such power. [Nahar Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 5 SCC 295]

Foreword to a book: A foreword to the book “Competition Law” by Cyril Shroff. Foreword to competition law by Cyril Shroff, (2022) 5 SCC (J-25)]

Foreword to a book: A foreword to the book “Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: An Introduction to the Writings by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, Foreword to Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: An Introduction to the Writings by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, (2022) 5 SCC (J-22)]

Foreword to a book: A foreword to the book “Transgenders and the Law” by Justice A.K. Sikri. Foreword to transgenders and the law by Justice A.K. Sikri, (2022) 5 SCC (J-28)]

Government Contracts and Tenders — Formation of Government Contract — Modes of entering into a Government Contract — Public Auction/Tender — Award/Non-award of contract — Judicial review: Author of the tender document, reiterated, is taken to be the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements. Thus, if the interpretation of such author is manifestly in consonance with the language of the tender document or subserving the purchase of the tender, the Court would prefer to keep restraint. Further, the technical evaluation or comparison by the Court is impermissible. Thus, even if the interpretation given to the tender document by the person inviting offers is not as such acceptable to the constitutional court, that, by itself, would not be a reason for interfering with the interpretation given, so long as such interpretation is not arbitrary or whimsical. [Agmatel India (P) Ltd. v. Resoursys Telecom], (2022) 5 SCC 362]

Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006 — S. 16 — Noti. dt. 12-7-2010: Directions regarding adjudication of pending and new applications by Board i.e. post S. 16 coming into force, issued. [Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board v. Indraprastha Gas Ltd., (2022) 5 SCC 292]

Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006 — S. 16 r/w S. 17 — “Deemed authorisation” clause under S. 16 proviso — Scope of — Deemed authorisation: If one reads S. 16 proviso in isolation, the inference undoubtedly would be that every entity which had started laying and building pipelines and networks was the recipient of the deemed authorisation clause i.e. the provision sought to retrospectively regularise activities by all entities, however, such a plain and facial construction is unacceptable. Thus held, S. 16 proviso is not unqualified. The “deemed authorisation” clause is subject to other provisions of Ch. IV and S. 17 is one such provision under Ch. IV. Further, the scheme of S. 17 intrinsically classifies the two i.e. Central Government authorised entities, and others and the underlying basis for this statutory classification is that only entities which had been cleared or authorised by the Central Government prior to the coming into force of the Act were deemed to have authorisation under the Act, and therefore, had to furnish certain details. As with regard to the others i.e. entities not authorised by the Central Government, fresh applications were necessary which were to be assessed by the Board on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with uniform standards. [Adani Gas Ltd. v. Union of India, (2022) 5 SCC 210]

Service Law — Promotion — Criteria/Eligibility — Length of service/qualifying service — Time-bound promotion — Entitlement to: Services rendered by employee on work-charge basis may considered for computing 12 yrs of service for grant of time-bound promotion (TBP). [State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Antu Patil, (2022) 5 SCC 322]

Service Law — Promotion — Criteria/Eligibility — Qualification/Experience — Classification based on nature of experience — Validity of: Policy decision to provide incentive marks for specified work experience inside the State and not for such work experience from some other State due to work pattern peculiarities and socio-economic/geographical peculiarities of the State, held, not arbitrary. Courts should be slow in interfering with policy matters unless the policy is found to be palpably discriminatory and arbitrary. [Satya Dev Bhagaur v. State of Rajasthan, (2022) 5 SCC 314]

Service Law — Regularisation — Entitlement to regularization: In this case, respondents were appointed on contractual basis for period of 11 months (which was continued from time to time), on fixed salary for temporary project. Their employment was continued based on interim order of High Court. It was held that respondents were appointed on temporary unit which was not regular establishment and posts on which they were appointed and continued to work were not sanctioned posts. Hence, impugned judgment directing State to consider cases of respondents for regularisation sympathetically and if necessary, by creating supernumerary posts, held, unsustainable and without jurisdiction. [State of Gujarat v. R.J. Pathan, (2022) 5 SCC 394]

Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts in Domestic Arbitration: In this article, issue of territorial jurisdiction of courts in arbitrations in India has been discussed. Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts in Domestic Arbitration: The Saga of seat and venue continues by Arjun Krishnan and Ankur Singh, (2022) 5 SCC (J-1)]

Treatment of Personal guarantors under the Indian insolvency regime: This article seeks to delineate the position of personal guarantors under the Insolvency Code and to discuss the treatment of promoters as personal guarantees under the Indian insolvency regime in light of the judgment in Lalit Kumar Jain, (2021) 9 SCC 321 and other relevant decisions. General principles relating to the treatment of Personal guarantors under the Indian insolvency regime by Sriram Venkatavaradan and Saai Sudharsan Sathiyamoorthy, (2022) 5 SCC (J-8)]

Op EdsOP. ED.

Introduction: The brutality faced by the community

India in the 21st century claims to be striving for gender equality and gender neutrality, yet the judiciary still fails to acknowledge and take into consideration “gender neutrality” when it comes to crimes relating to sexual offences. Today, India not only legally recognises the two genders of male and female but has also taken the progressive step towards giving the transgenders a legal recognition and bestowing them with the same fundamental and constitutional rights as the other two genders.

In NALSA v. Union of India[1], the judiciary finally recognised the transgenders and gave them the position of the “third gender”. It is ironical, as the country which is progressive enough to recognise the third gender is still regressive enough to not have gender neutral criminal laws relating to sexual offences. These criminal laws do not even extend to the male gender; therefore, inclusion of the third gender is a far-fetched dream. Fortunately, the transgenders have at last attained constitutional equality. Constitutional equality can be defined as the equal status attained by persons under the Constitution of the country. In the Indian context, Article 14[2] provides for equality before law. No person shall be discriminated on the basis of sex.

Nonetheless, despite having the legal recognition as well as constitutional equality, the treatment of transgenders in the society as well as legally, due to the lack of laws, indicates a violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15[3] and 21[4] due to the lack of gender neutrality in laws relating to sexual offences.

Moving on, more often than not, we assume that human bodies are clearly either male or female and turn a blind eye to the violence suffered by those who violate the normative understanding of what it means to be a man and a woman[5]. We overlook the plight of the transgender community, which includes hijras and kothis in the Indian context and intersex, a condition in which one’s sexual organs are ambiguous[6]. However, with reformatory movements such as #MeToo and #MenToo, the country saw a rise in the awareness of and need for inclusivity in laws relating to sexual offences, which extended not only to the male gender but also to the third gender.

Furthermore, historically and mythologically, India has witnessed the existence of the transgender community and therefore it cannot be termed as a new or an alien concept. In fact, the Hijra community in India traces their origins to myths in the Ramayana and Mahabharata[7]. It is disappointing to see the lack of inclusivity in the criminal law.

In India, various studies have documented sexual and physical violence against transgender persons[8]. Transgenders have been a victim of sexual offences since ages and yet there is no law in place to help them get justice. These offences include sex trafficking, rape, sodomy, stalking, sexual harassment at workplace and otherwise and so on.

Such offences are committed from the childhood of transgender persons. 971 (44.7%) transgenders were reported facing 2811 incidents of violence i.e., an average of three incidents per person between April and October 2015[9]. The trans community has suffered immensely by being excluded from the definitions of sexual crimes. In research conducted in different parts of India by a Health Resource Center “Swasti”, it was found that four in ten transgender people experience some sought of sexual abuse before the age of 18 and the trauma continues past their childhood[10]. A study by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), India found out that 52% of the transgender community faced harassment by their school classmates and 15% from their teachers which resulted in their dropping out from school[11].

It is unfortunate as it is claimed that most sexual offences against transgenders take place when they go to the police seeking help. People’s Union for Civil Liberties — Karnataka studied the cases of human rights violation against transgender persons and the observations were staggering.

“Sexual violence is a constant, pervasive theme in all the narratives collected in our report. Along with subjection to physical violence such as beatings and threats of disfigurement with acid bulbs, the sexuality of the hijra also becomes a target of prurient curiosity, at the least, which leads to brutal violence, at the most. As the narratives indicate, the police constantly degrade hijras by asking them sexual questions, feel up their breasts, strip them, and in some cases rape them. With or without the element of physical violence, such actions constitute a violation of the integrity and privacy of the very sexual being of the person.[12]

Currently, any sexual offence committed by anyone irrespective of its severity, that does not fall under the definition of “rape” under Section 375[13], may be filed under Section 377[14] IPC which deals with “unnatural sex”. While this does help in accessing justice to a certain extent, it trivialises the gravity of the offence by not giving it the position of “rape” or the punishments imposed in respect of the same. When we take a look at other criminal law statutes such as the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH)[15] or the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956[16], there are no legal safeguards ensured for the transgenders, who happen to form the majority of victims in such cases.

Nonetheless, there is still a ray of hope as constant efforts are being made by various NGOs across India as well as the Law Commission Reports and Parliament in order to help the community attain equal status and prevent their exploitation. There also exists certain legislations, amendments and precedents passed in light of this which shall be discussed through this paper.

Analysing the position of law

Despite being centuries old, the criminal laws of the country have undergone many amendments and modifications throughout the decades to suit the needs of the changing society. For instance, after Nirbhaya case[17], the Penal Code, 1860[18] was amended in 2013 to widen the scope of hate crimes and sexual offences against women. So far, the Penal Code has been amended 77 times.

The debate on the need for inclusive laws has been going on for almost two decades now with many landmark judgments where the women have misused the pro-women laws or the men have been the victims of such situations. While, the trans community has been subjected to such violence from ages not many had raised their voice against the same until recently. The trans activism in India began around 1999 with the first pride march held in Kolkata. However, it was only after 2009 did the trans activism gain momentum after the landmark judgment delivered in Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi[19]. 12 years have passed since, and there has been no proposals to bring about gender inclusive law relating to sexual offences yet. One can look at a brief history of the dynamics between the trans community and the Indian legal system thereby walking through the developments made in light of the same while emphasising on the need of gender inclusivity.

I. History and development of laws relating to sexual offences and transgenders

The IPC does not provide for the definition of sexual offences and all sexual offences, except Section 377, are made gender-specific, that is, the victim is always deemed to be a woman while man is seen as the perpetrator[20]. Sexual offences can be defined as range of offences wherein the sexual sanctity and bodily integrity of an individual is interfered with or without his/her consent[21].

In India, criminal laws are heavily influenced by the mindset of the people in the society. The age-old patriarchy deeply rooted in the minds of the people has led to a situation where the man is always the perpetrator and can never be the victim by virtue of his gender.

This has led to the gender-specific rape laws and other laws relating to sexual offences such as the POSH Act, 2013 which is formulated for the protection of women in the workplace.

(a) Rape law in India

Rape law in India before the infamous Mathura rape case[22] was very narrow, regressive and discriminatory against women. For a very long time, the burden of proof in such case was upon the victim, but the same was shifted on the accused after the Mathura rape case[23]. Another demand was to hold in camera proceedings for rape trials and to maintain anonymity of the victim[24]. Accordingly, the rape law was amended to fulfil these recommendations and demands posed by the activists.

The Indian women’s movement has revolved around the agenda of reforms in rape law since the 1980s[25]. Women’s groups have for a long time struggled to broaden the definition of rape[26]. However, it was only after the 2013 amendment did the rape law in India become more accommodative to all forms of non-consensual sexual activity. Nonetheless, the law still lacked gender inclusivity and considered only the women as victims of rape except that of hate crimes. The 2013 amendment also recognised acid attack as a form of hate crime, and the laws pertaining to this was made gender neutral. However, transgenders were still excluded from the laws.

Nonetheless, there did exist legal safeguards for victims of sexual offences that did not fall under the definition of “rape” under Section 375. Such offences could be filed under Section 377 that defines “unnatural sexual offences”:

  1. Unnatural offences. — Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

     Explanation. — Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.[27]

While this provision could act as a legal safeguard, it was also very discriminatory in nature as this provision was transphobic in nature by defining certain consensual acts as “unnatural” merely because it did not fit into the normative acceptable definition of what constituted “natural”. What seems stranger and unfortunate is the fact that the same provision holds good for sexual offences even today, even after the decriminalisation of Section 377. This provision merges a male on male or female on female rape to voluntarily sexual activity between two consenting homosexuals, thereby indicating the regressive nature of this law.

(b) Position of transgenders under the law

Much before the 2018 judgment[28], the AIDS Bhedbhav Virodhi Andolan (ABVA) published a report in 1991[29] revealing the atrocities faced by the transgender community in the nature of sexual violence, exploitation, assault and extortion under the garb of Section 377 IPC recommending that the said law should be repealed[30]. A writ petition was filed in light of the same to declare Section 377 unconstitutional. However, the writ petition was quashed on the grounds of upholding legal morality, majoritarian morality and its declaration as ultra vires the Constitution would go against public morality, public order and decency[31].

Even though this petition was dismissed on technical grounds, it had already ignited the trans community to fight for their rights and demand for their legal safeguards against sexual offences. This activism went on to give rise to another case called Sudesh Jhaku v. K.C.J.[32], where the matter of gender neutrality was first discussed.

(i) In Sudesh Jhaku v. K.C. Jhaku

The issue of gender neutrality of sexual offences first arose in Sudesh Jhaku case in 1996[33] wherein the Delhi High Court insisted on the legislature to articulate gender neutral criminal law[34]. As a consequence of this judgment, the Supreme Court formulated issues that the Law Commission of India had to look into. This further led to the 172nd Law Commission Report[35].

(ii) 172nd Law Commission Report

The 172nd Law Commission Report of 2000 primarily dealt with the review of laws relating to sexual offences and recommended a lot of changes including gender neutrality. However, while an elaborate explanation for Sections 375 and 376[36] was given, the Report had very less to say about Section 377. Nonetheless, it recommended the deletion of this section under the following justification:

“In the light of the change effected by us in Section 375, we are of the opinion that Section 377 deserved to be deleted. After the changes effected by us in the preceding provision (Sections 375 to 376-E[37]), the only content left in Section 377 is having voluntary carnal intercourse with any animal, we may leave such person to their just deserts.[38]

While the deletion of Section 377 was recommended, not much was said about the gender neutrality aspects or the legal safeguards provided to the transgenders. However, the Report did not take shape until 2012, yet the trans community was able to witness the progress in the mindsets of the law-makers and this went on to give rise to another path-breaking judgment in Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi[39].

(iii) In Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi

The case of Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi[40] acted as a major pathbreaker for the transgender community. The Naz Foundation is a non-governmental organisation working on HIV/AIDS and sexual education and health since 1994[41]. The Foundation filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 377 and the matter was heard before the Delhi Hight Court. The Delhi High Court having recognised the growing awareness towards homosexuality and transgenderism decriminalised Section 377 if the said act took place between two consenting individuals. The instant reaction to the judgment was of extreme elation from the sexual minorities across the nation while religious leaders condemned it with equal passion[42]. This ray of hope soon diminished when an appeal against the Naz Foundation was filed before the Supreme Court. On the other hand, prior to this appeal, in the year 2012 a committee was formed to review the rape laws of the country after the heinous Nirbhaya rape case[43]. This Committee was the Verma Committee[44].

(iv) The Verma Committee

The Verma Committee for the very first time heard the hues and cries of the LGBTQA community for the need of gender inclusive laws relating to sexual offences. The community was given a chance to express the lack of inclusivity and legal safeguards in crimes relating to sexual offences.

The Committee recommended retention of the law on rape and in addition making sexual assault a gender-neutral offence, unlike the 172nd Report, by using term “person” instead of “woman” for the purposes of defining victim of rape and sexual assault and retaining the term “man” for the perpetrator and thereby bringing within its scope the transgender community[45].

While this seemed like a huge victory for the trans community, it was only short-lived as although the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013[46] took a very gender-neutral approach to rape law, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013[47] only implemented the recommendations made to make the rape laws more stringent by widening the definition of “rape”. It did not consider the aspect of gender neutrality and retained the gender-specific definitions of these sexual offences. Amidst all this, came another coup de grâce, with the much criticised judgment in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation[48].

(v) In Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation[49]

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in this case overruled the judgment of the lower court in Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi[50] and reinstated Section 377 in the year 2013. The Court held that the law laid down under Section 377 is constitutional and does not infringe the fundamental rights of the LGBTQA community[51]. The legally unsustainable rationale given by the Court was that firstly, the community constitutes a miniscule and negligible part of the population[52]; secondly, the Court cannot declare law ultra vires by relying on the decisions of foreign jurisdictions[53]. The Court further added that criminal law in a country is the reflection of the majoritarian public morality and the Indian society vehemently disapproved homosexuality[54]. While discarding the notions of privacy, the Court held that State interference in this case is justified on the ground of public health, safety and morality[55]. This move of the judiciary was heavily criticised and the trans community gained a lot of traction.

However, the Court did not completely rule out the probability of a reformation to Section 377. The judgment stated that “Notwithstanding this verdict, the competent legislature shall be free to consider the desirability and propriety of deleting Section 377 IPC from the statute book or amend the same as per the suggestion made by the Attorney General.[56]

The decision led to hue and cry and was also criticised for not being in conformity with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[57], to which India is a signatory. This is when the judiciary had to finally take a stance on the position of transgenders both socially as well as legally. This led to the case of NALSA v. Union of India.[58]

(vi) In NALSA v. Union of India

The judiciary took a stance and granted the legal recognition of a “third gender” to the trans community in NALSA v. Union of India[59] in the year 2014.  The Court held that “person” under Article 14 is not limited to mean a man and a woman but extends to include within its scope of hijras and transgender persons who are neither male nor female[60]. The judgment also highlighted on the lack of legal safeguards for the community by stating that:

  1. 62. … non-recognition of the identity of hijras/transgender persons denies them equal protection of law, thereby leaving them extremely vulnerable to harassment, violence and sexual assault in public spaces, at home and in jail, also by the police. Sexual assault, including molestation, rape, forced anal and oral sex, gang rape and stripping is being committed with impunity and there are reliable statistics and materials to support such activities.[61]

The decision directed affirmative action on part of the Central and the State Governments to ensure non-infringement of fundamental rights, public health and social welfare of the community in light of the Yogyakarta Principles[62]. This gave a sense of relief to the LGBTQA community as their human rights were upheld despite the fact that they are insignificant in number. However, the pragmatic reality remained unchanged despite the recognition[63], until 2018 in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.[64]

(vii) In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India

The Supreme Court in this case finally decriminalised Section 377 IPC. The law under Section 377 is gender neutral and includes sexual conducts of both heterosexuals and homosexuals; however, the burden of proof has often fallen on the latter only[65]. The Wolfenden Committee[66] in 1957 in its Report concluded that the purpose of criminal law is to preserve public decency and morality and furthered the thesis of J.S. Mill that argued private space must be free from State intervention[67]. This means that criminalising consensual homosexuality within the private space of two consenting, sound adults neither falls under the theoretical nor operational realm of criminal law and therefore must be decriminalised as it is a matter of privacy and private morality. Sexual orientation is an essential attribute of privacy. Discriminating against an individual on the basis of sexual orientation is deeply offensive to the dignity and self-worth of the individual.[68] The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime[69].

The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously declared Section 377 IPC as unconstitutional to the extent it criminalises consensual sexual conduct between two adults in private, be it between homosexuals, heterosexuals, same sex or transgender sex[70], however, it continues to govern non-consensual sexual acts against adults, minors and acts of bestiality[71]. It stated that such consensual act is “natural” and cannot be termed against the “order of nature”.

After the legitimate recognition of the third gender through the NALSA[72] decision and other legal developments within the community, it was only fair to expect an enactment which would entail and protect the rights of transgenders. This led to the enactment of Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019[73].

(viii) Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019

The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2019[74] was first introduced and passed by the Lower House in the year 2016. However, the same was not passed by the Upper House, thereby the position of law coming to a standstill. Nonetheless, the Bill was reintroduced in the year 2019 and was passed by both the Houses along with presidential assent thereby making it an Act. While this Act was heavily criticised due to the lack of consultation from the representatives of the trans community, it also highlighted and brought into light some of the very common issues faced by the transgender, which had not yet been recognised.

The Act recognises the following offences against transgender persons: (i) forced or bonded labour (excluding compulsory government service for public purposes), (ii) denial of use of public places, (iii) removal from household, and village, (iv) physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic abuse. Penalties for these offences vary between six months to two years, and a fine[75].

While this Act did give some relief to the trans-activists as well as the community and stabilised the position of transgenders under the law of the land, India still has a long way to go in terms of inclusivity and protection of transgenders from sexual offences which shall be dealt with later on.

II. Need for inclusivity

While a lot has already been said about the position of law, there does remain a huge grey area wherein the sexual minority of the trans community is threatened. This is due to the lack of inclusivity. For the purpose of this study, the need for inclusive laws will be studied under three particular statutes i.e. (a) Penal Code, 1860 (b) Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956[76] (c) POSH Act, 2013.

(a) Position of transgenders under IPC

While a lot has already been discussed about the various recommendations of reports and committees as well as other amendments and judicial pronouncements, Section 377 is still not an adequate solution for the sexual predatory of transgenders. The same will be discussed below.

The purpose behind gender neutrality of sexual offences under the IPC is not to desexualise the offence but to incorporate a holistic understanding of the nature of the offence beyond the lens of gender[77]. While the decriminalisation of Section 377 only extended to consensual acts of homosexuality between two adults and retained the criminalisation of the other non-consensual acts coming under the ambit of “unnatural offences”, the position of law still remains dicey. Additionally, this Section is not wide enough to consider all forms of sexual harassment or assault as any offence filed under this provision would amount to sodomy. It does not cover other forms of sexual offences such as rape, voyeurism, stalking, trafficking among many more which the transgenders are subjected to day in and day out. It must also be noted that most of these offences are also not “unnatural” and hence do not come under the purview of this Section. This analogy is drawn from Justice Verma Committee Report of 2013[78] wherein distinct sexual offences were identified that could have been committed against women and not all sexual offences were included under the umbrella of rape[79].

Along with Section 377, other provisions relating to sexual offences such as Section 354 which deals with all other forms of sexual offences such as stalking, voyeurism, etc. must also be amended to replace the word “any woman” with “any person” so as to ensure the protection of transgenders, in particular the Hijra community who have faced a lot of oppression by not only the society but also the law enforcement agencies due to their gender as well as their economic status which has made them a prey to such acts.

Upon the decriminalisation of consensual sexual conduct between two persons, it becomes imperative to make the other non-consensual sexual conduct, transgender neutral with a separate provision to administer the same and not include all offences under the umbrella of “unnatural offences”. It is important to categorise the offence as it is without dilution of all offences against the transgender community under the umbrella of Section 377[80].

The insistence is on the amendment of the criminal law on sexual offences provided for under IPC and not enactment of a separate gender-neutral legislation for sexual offences which even though seems to be convenient, is not an ideal way[81] as the no new enactment of legislation would have the same gravity and impact as the Penal Code, 1860. Apart from the gender neutrality and transgender inclusiveness of the sexual offence provided for under the IPC, other law governing the criminal domain also have to be amended for holistic recognition of the substantial right of the LGBTQA community[82] such as the POSH Act, 2013.

(b) Position of transgenders under POSH Act, 2013

The need for an enactment to protect women at workplace from sexual harassment arose from the very famous case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan[83], where a woman was gang raped by 6 men in her workplace where she was volunteering. Unfortunately, there was no law to protect women from such horrific incidents in the workplace and the Vishaka Guidelines was followed throughout India until 2013, when a law was enacted for the same.

Now, as the name suggests, Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013[84], is gender specific and is only for the protection of women in workplace. However, it fails to take into consideration that men and transgenders can be victims of workplace sexual harassment too. To talk of transgenders in particular, this community is a sexual minority and is more prone to such assault and harassment than men, due to their gender and more than women due to the lack of laws protecting them.

With the legal recognition of the third gender and the enactment of Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, transgenders now have the freedom to work anywhere without any discrimination under the law. However, this does not mean that they would not be subjected to discrimination in the workplace due to the narrow societal and normative understanding of what constitutes “normal”. Transgenders are also subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace due to the male-predominant society that still does not accept the third gender as one of them, who are equally capable of working and earning.

The lack of gender neutrality in the POSH Act has been brought up many times. The reason given for the same by the 239th Parliamentary Standing Committee was that the majority of the victims of such incidents were women and hence it was a remedy provided under Article 15(4) of the Constitution which allows the Parliament to make any special provisions for the educationally or socially backward classes of citizens or SCs and STs. While this is nowhere a reasonable justification for the exclusion of men from the legislation, it certainly acts as a compelling argument to include transgenders in the Act due to their socially backward status. Transgenders have been able to come out of their closets and adapt to the normalcy of being a transgender only recently since all of the legal developments aforementioned. However, they still have a long way to go in order to attain the equal status of a male or a female in the eyes of the society. Therefore, this undoubtedly makes the community a socially backward one and hence they must be included in the Act going by the argument of the Parliament of making special provisions under Article 15(4).

Each person is entitled to right to life and right to live with dignity, and as such statutes that punish sexual offences cannot selectively protect one person[85]. The act of sexual harassment is a violation of a person’s human rights and well as the fundamental right to a dignified life. Therefore, making such crucial laws gender-specific only leads to a more blatant violation of such rights.

However, many companies in India today follow a gender-neutral system of sexual harassment policies such as Taj Group of Hotels and Godrej thereby protecting the safety of all their employees irrespective of their gender. One wishes to witness the same change in the POSH Act, 2013.

(c) Position of Transgenders under Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956

It is no news that transgenders are one of the most affected communities when it comes to sex trafficking. The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 was enacted with the sole purpose of preventing the trafficking of women and children. However, in the year 1986, due to the increasing number of people being trafficked for sexual exploitation an amendment was made to include not only male and female but also those who do not fall into either of the categories. This meant that male and transgenders became criminal subjects while the women became the victims. It failed to understand that transgenders also could become victims of human trafficking.
Furthermore, when the Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill, 2018[86] was proposed, it heavily affected the trans community as the Bill criminalised the acts of beggary as well as consensual sex work. It stated that anyone undergoing “hormone therapy” would be arrested under the grounds of trafficking.

One should understand, that back in 2016, when the trans community had just gained legal recognition, it was still very difficult specially for the downtrodden and the Hijra community to actually make a living out of the organised sector. Due to decades of abandonment, they were forced to indulge in sex work and beggary. However, the criminalisation of the same meant a huge setback for the community as the Government neither consulted the community nor did they provide any alternative skill development programmes to make such people self-sufficient and contribute to the organised sector. Adding on, it is also a known fact that most of the transgenders undergo hormone therapy for their sex change procedures. The duration of the same would pan over a year or two. Criminalising the same under trafficking is preposterous as well as regressive. While the Bill is proposed out of bona fide, it must also take into consideration the multiple stakeholders of the Bill and propose a law that would be viable to all the stakeholders, as justice to one set of people, should not come at the cost of the other.

Conclusion

While the laws in the three statutes appear regressive and preposterous, one must also consider that the concept of transgenderism is still in its nascent stages and it would take a lot of time and social reconditioning for the society to become more inclusive towards the third gender. Nonetheless, reformations are the need of the hour and one can see that a lot of initiative are being taken up to fast-track the process of gender neutrality in the laws.

In 2020, a public interest litigation (PIL) was filed before the Supreme Court to highlight on the lack of penal provisions to safeguard transgenders from sexual offences, event after 6 years of gaining legal recognition. The plea has been filed by Advocate Reepak Kansal and has made the ministries of law and justice, and social justice and empowerment as parties[87]. This PIL filed stated that “though the Supreme Court in 2014, had granted ‘recognition to the transgender/ third gender as “persons” falling under the ambit of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution’, still they do not have equal protection of law in relation to sexual offences.[88]” The petitioner is filing this petition with respect to equal protection of law to the third gender/transgender from the sexual assault/offences as there is no provision/section in the IPC which may protect the third gender from the sexual assault by male/female or another transgender therefore, an anti-discrimination laws are needed to safeguard the basic citizenship rights of transgender persons,[89] the plea said. The PIL also challenged the constitutional validity of Section 354-A[90] in order to examine its extent and scope. It stated that the provision excluded transgender victims of sexual harassment and that it was ultra vires of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution[91]. The same was heard by the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has sought reply from the Centre on the same matter. The stance of the Centre is yet to come on this matter.  Nonetheless, efforts are constantly being made to make the laws relating to sexual offences more inclusive and the same must be supported.

To sum it up, the law on rape as well as other sexual offences should have been made gender neutral as now the trans community, like women, belongs to the oppressed and vulnerable class prone to sexual violence and harassment owing to the societal power dynamics[92]. Right to seek protection from sexual assault is a right guaranteed by the Constitution and a crucial pillar to further gender justice and the same cannot be ignored[93]. The gender neutrality of sexual offences reflects a nuanced understanding of the nature and consequences of the sexual offences under the criminal law and recognising that women, men and the transgender community can be both victims and perpetrators of the crime[94].


BBA LLB (Hons.) 3rd year student at Faculty of Law, PES University, e-mail: charvidev01@gmail.com.

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[2] Art. 14, Constitution of India.

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[17] Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1.

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[19] 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1762.

[20] Philip N.S. Rumney, In Defence of Gender Neutrality within Rape, Seattle Journal for Social Justice (6-5-2017, 01.57 a.m.), <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol6/iss1/40/>.

[21] Philip N.S. Rumney, In Defence of Gender Neutrality within Rape, Seattle Journal for Social Justice (6-5-2017, 01.57 a.m.), <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol6/iss1/40/> at 485-487.

[22] Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 143

[23] Tukaram case, (1979) 2 SCC 143 .

[24] Tukaram case, (1979) 2 SCC 143 .

[25] Flavia Agnes, Law, Ideology and Female Sexuality: Gender Neutrality in Rape Law, 37 Economic and Political Weekly No. 9, 844 (2002).

[26] Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518 .

[27] S. 377, Penal Code, 1860.

[28] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1

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[30] AIDS Bhedbhav Virodhi Andolan, Less than Gay: A Citizens’ Report on the Status of Homosexuality in India, ABVA, (12-5-2019, 21.41 p.m.), <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwDlipuQ0I6ZMXVmNWk0ajdqWEU/edit>.

[31] Divya Aswani, Transgender Neutrality of Sexual Offences: An Aftermath of Decriminalization of Section 377, NLUD Journal, <http://14.139.58.147:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/307/1/40LLM18.pdf>.

[32] 1996 SCC OnLine Del 397 : 1998 Cri LJ 2428.

[33] 1996 SCC OnLine Del 397 : 1998 Cri LJ 2428.

[34] 1996 SCC OnLine Del 397 : 1998 Cri LJ 2428, para 29.

[35] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/1935iv62>.

[36] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/H3Z8GN57>.

[37] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/1h30GnSs>.

[38] Ministry of Law, Government of India, One Hundred and Seventy-Second Report on Review of Rape Laws, Law Commission of India (2000).

[39] 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1762.

[40] 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1762.

[41] <http://www.nazindia.org/about.htm>.

[42] Nirnimesh Kumar, Delhi High Court Strikes Down Section 377 of the IPC, The Hindu, 2-7-2009, New Delhi.

[43] Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1.

[44] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/Bq5pU80d>.

[45] Flavia Agnes, Law, Ideology and Female Sexuality: Gender Neutrality in Rape Law, Economic and Political Weekly (6-5-2019, 12.21 p.m.), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4411809>.

[46] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/MLv276UW >.

[47] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/YZ81TAt0>.

[48] (2014) 1 SCC 1.

[49] (2014) 1 SCC 1.

[50] 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1762.

[51] Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1.

[52] Suresh case, (2014) 1 SCC 1.

[53] Suresh case, (2014) 1 SCC 1.

[54] Rukmini Sen, Breaking Silences, Celebrating New Spaces: Mapping Elite Responses to the “Inclusive” Judgment, NUJS Law Review (13-5-2019, 10.19 a.m.), <http://nujslawreview.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/12/rukmini-sen.pdf>.

[55] Gautam Bhan, Challenging the Limits of Law: Queer Politics and Legal Reform in India in Because I Have a Voice: Queer Politics in India, 468 [Arvind Narrain and Bhan Gautam (eds.), 2005].

[56] Suresh case, (2014) 1 SCC 1.

[57] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19-12-1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 ILM 368 (1967), 999 UNTS 171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).

[58] (2014) 5 SCC 438.

[59] (2014) 5 SCC 438.

[60] (2014) 5 SCC 438,

[61] (2014) 5 SCC 438, 487.

[62] Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, International Commission of Jurists (15-5-2019, 17.11 p.m.), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/48244e602.html>.

[63] Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 143

[64] (2018) 10 SCC 1.

[65] Geetanjali Misra, Decriminalizing Homosexuality in India, Taylor and Francis Group (13-5-2019, 14.49 p.m.), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40647442>.

[66] Wolfenden Committee, Report on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, (Chairman: Sir John Wolfenden, 1957).

[67] H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, 88 Stanford University Press (1963).

[68] K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 809, para 126.

[69] Justice Kennedy, Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SCC OnLine US SC 73 :  156 L Ed 2d 508 : 539 US 558, para 18 (2003).

[70] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 791.

[71] (2018) 1 SCC 791, para 21

[72] (2014) 5 SCC 438.

[73] Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019.

[74] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/hyED4Wys>.

[75] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/87UM7Ym2>.

[76] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/ucPDKUb8>.

[77] Harshad Pathak, Beyond the Binary: Rethinking Gender Neutrality in Indian Rape Law, Cambridge University Press (3-5-2019, 17.55 p.m.), <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/asian-journal- of-comparative-law/article/beyond-the-binary-rethinking-gender-neutrality-in-indian-rape- law/9BC983FB009B7BBDEB78CED0BC5144C0>.

[78] The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, No. 13, Acts of Parliament, 2013.

[79] <http://www.nazindia.org/about.htm>.

[80] Sakshi Raje, Transgender: The Human Rights, Law Times Journal (11-5-2019, 10.51 a.m.), <http://lawtimesjournal.in/transgender-the-human-rights/>.

[81] (2014) 1 SCC 1.

[82] Animesh Sharma, Section 377: No Jurisprudential Basis, Economic and Political Weekly (14-5-2019, 14.33 p.m.), <https://www.epw.in/journal/2008/46/commentary/Section-377-no- jurisprudential-basis.html?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D7f2e2da6d0d55a917ff3ebc34c05b74e>.

[83] (1997) 6 SCC 241.

[84] Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.

[85] Beyond the Binary: Rethinking Gender Neutrality in Indian Rape Law, Asian Journal of Comparative Law, p. 376 (2016).

[86] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/27IkNY72>.

[87] SC Seeks Centre’s Reply on PIL for Equal Protection of Law to Transgenders in Sexual Offences, Indian Express, <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/oct/12/sc-seeks-centres-reply-on-pil-for-equal-protection-of-law-to-transgenders-in-sexual-offences-2209251.html>.

[88] SC Seeks Centre’s Reply on PIL for Equal Protection of Law to Transgenders in Sexual Offences, The Indian Express, <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/oct/12/sc-seeks-centres-reply-on-pil-for-equal-protection-of-law-to-transgenders-in-sexual-offences-2209251.html>.

[89] SC Seeks Centre’s Reply on PIL for Equal Protection of Law to Transgenders in Sexual Offences, The Indian Express, <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/oct/12/sc-seeks-centres-reply-on-pil-for-equal-protection-of-law-to-transgenders-in-sexual-offences-2209251.html>.

[90] <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/rKlU5i88>.

[91] Constitution of India <http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/Uei3bEDC>

[92] State Govt. v. Sheodayal Gurudayal, 1954 SCC OnLine MP 100 .

[93] Ministry of Law, Government of India, Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (Chairperson: Justice J.S. Verma, 2013).

[94] Philip N.S. Rumney, In Defence of Gender Neutrality within Rape, Seattle Journal for Social Justice (6-5-2019, 1.57 a.m.), <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol6/iss1/40/>.

Case BriefsCOVID 19High Courts

Rajasthan High Court: The Division Bench of Sangeet Lodha and Vinit Kumar Mathur, JJ., disposed off a petition with directions which was filed  seeking directions to the respondents to facilitate COVID-19 vaccination for transgenders of the State of Rajasthan.

Counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr Pushkar Taimni submitted that the Government of India had already issued guidelines for vaccination of transgenders, which were not being adhered to by the State Authorities.

The Court directed the State to look into the guidelines already issued by the Government of India vide order dated 20-05-2021and take appropriate steps for vaccination of the transgenders.[Sambhali Trust v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10663 of 2021, order dated: 07-09-2021]


Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: The Division Bench of Mohammad Rafiq, CJ and Vijay Kumar Shukla, J., decided in the matter of a petition which was filed n in the form of Public Interest Litigation by a Transgender, who is Social Worker and Paralegal Volunteer at Indore, for the welfare of the people of Transgender Community.

Counsel for the petitioner, Ms Shanno Shagufta Khan contended that there were approximately 1000 Transgenders living in Indore and most of them did not have any source to earn their livelihood and suffer from starvation. The court was further informed that there were two types of Transgender. While type-I transgender lived in ‘Dera’, who earn their livelihood by ‘Toli Badhai’ and were financially stable, but the type-II transgenders were those who live in their houses and earn their livelihood by doing little chores, they are not financially stable and are in dire need of assistance from the Government.

It was further contended that in Sandhya Sandeep Kumar Ghavri v. State of M.P., WP-7613-2020 (PIL) certain directions were sought to be issued to the respondents-State Government to provide 25 kg ‘Ration’ and cash assistance of Rs.5000/- per month to the transgenders in the State of Madhya Pradesh for at least six months and thereafter regularly provide them support to make their both ends meet for survival, however, petitioner contended that most of the transgenders did not have transgender card, specially those who were newly added to the list, and due to non-availability of transgender card, they were not in a position to get their ‘Aadhar’ Card and ‘Ration’ Card prepared. It was further contended that as against the promise of providing 5 kg food grains every month, currently only 4 kg food grains was being given to the transgender, out of which also 2 kg Bajra is provided, which is highly insufficient for their survival.

The Court gathered that most of the transgenders face difficulty not only because they do not have transgender identity card, but even the ‘Ration’ Cards were also not issued in their names. It was also been demonstrated that owing to non-availability of ‘Ration’ Card, the transgenders community were not in a position to get their ‘Aadhar’ Card issued.

The Court while taking in regard the situation faced by the community directed the Member Secretary, M.P. State Legal Service Authority to provide assistance to all such transgenders across the State by getting a survey conducted through Paralegal Volunteers and help them in getting their Identity Cards/Transgender Cards, ‘Ration’ Cards and ‘Aadhar’ Cards prepared. The respondents-State is directed to place on record the relevant material showing other benefits which are being provided to the transgender community in the State of Madhya Pradesh under any other scheme of the Central Government/State Government.[Noori v. State of M.P., WP-10027 of 2021, decided on 16-08-2021]


Suchita Shukla, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Uttarakhand High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: A division bench comprising of Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J. and Rajiv Sharma, ACJ., directed the state to implement schemes for the welfare of transgenders.

Petitioners who are transgender were facing interference in their area of operation to which they have sought protection with respect to life and liberty. Hence the Court took judicial notice of the matter as it revolved around right to life by providing a dignified life to the petitioners owing to the miseries faced by them in order to bring them at par with other people in the society by paving their way to the mainstream.

The Supreme Court, in the case of National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 has held the word “person” in Article 14 of the Constitution of India was not restricted to male and female and it includes even Hijras/Transgender persons who were also entitled to equal protection of laws and equality in all spheres. They were entitled to benefits as Socially and Educationally Backward class citizens including reservation in public employment. Gender identity was part of the right to dignity as well as personal autonomy and self-expression and thus declared that Hijras, Eunuchs be treated as the third gender giving them a legal recognition.

It was stated that the State Government, till date, has not implemented the directions issued by the Supreme Court. It was also brought to the Court’s notice that the State of Odisha has framed a scheme for Promotion of Transgender Equality & Justice. The scheme speaks of medical assistance to the parents of transgenders.

In the light of the facts and the issues stated the Court gave the following directions:

  • State Government shall provide reservation in admission in educational institutions and for public appointments along with social welfare schemes for the betterment of transgenders by framing the same.
  • Frame a scheme of housing for transgenders by giving suitable accommodation.
  • Provide financial assistance to the parents of transgenders with scholarship to transgenders up to post-graduate level.
  • Constitute a welfare board with representation given to transgenders in the board.
  • Provide free medical access to transgenders in all the hospitals.
  • Transgenders shall have free access to public institutions, public places.
  • Provide separate toilets in every public utility buildings.
  • Frame law/scheme to ensure that no transgender is separated from the parents/guardians and family
  • Criminal cases shall be registered against the persons who forcibly remove transgender from their parents/guardians and family.
  • All the transgenders in the State were ordered to be registered by the District Magistrates to recognize them as such.
  • There shall not be any discrimination against transgenders qua employment or occupation. Also, They should not be treated unfairly and have an absolute right, as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to maintain privacy and to live with dignity.

Accordingly, the writ was disposed of. [Rano v State of Uttarakhand, WP (Crl.) No. 1794 of 2018, order dated 28-09-2018]

High Courts

Allahabad High Court: Delivering a praiseworthy decision in the direction of upliftment of transgenders, the Division Bench of D.Y Chandrachud, C.J. and Shri Narayan Shukla, J., held that, although Section 13 of the National Food Security Act, 2013 has not specifically incorporated a provision that includes a transgender as the head of the family, this however should not be read as an exclusion of the transgender to apply for a ration card. In the Form prescribed by the State Government under the NFS Act, 2013, where Serial No. 12 of the Form specifically requires the applicant to mention the gender under the category of “male/female/other”, wherein “other” clearly refers to a transgender, therefore duly entitling them to avail food security. The Bench further observed that the object and purpose of Section 13 was mainly to promote women empowerment, however in the light of the guidelines laid down in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438, the Parliament may consider to incorporate a situation in Section 13 where a transgender is the head of the family.

The present PIL filed by Ashish Kumar Misra raised 2 major questions of importance; firstly relating to the validity of the provisions of Section 13 of the NFS Act on the ground that the statutory provision while recognizing the eldest woman member as the head of the household does not contemplate a situation where there may be no woman in the family and secondly the issue of availability of food security to transgenders.

Deliberating over the first issue, the Court observed that by enacting Section 13 the Parliament recognized the roles and responsibilities which are discharged by women, and their role has been conferred a statutory status and recognition by providing that the eldest woman, above the age of eighteen in a household, shall be regarded as the head of the household. Also Section 13(2) of the NFS Act already envisages a situation raised by the petitioner. Upon the second issue, the Court observed that the form prescribed by the State Government, duly takes into account the concerns of the transgender population by recognizing their entitlement to seek access to food security and to avail of the status of the head of a household. Ashish Kumar Misra v. Bharat Sarkar, 2015 SCC OnLine All 1053 decided on 15.04.2015