Allahabad High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

   

Allahabad High Court: In a miscellaneous application filed against the order passed by the District Judge in a defective revision, being barred by time, Ajit Kumar, J. directed the appearance of the District Judge along with the original record of the case stating that the order sheet reflects that the District Judge is in the habit of committing impropriety in discharge of his judicial function.

Earlier, the Court had questioned how the case wasadvanced by two weeks to pass the order which was not reflected in the order sheet. It is a well settled law that unless and until Section 5 application is allowed, neither the appeal nor the revision can be held to be a competent one. Further, the same District Judge had earlier committed similar mistake by admitting one revision petition without condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and when the matter was filed before this Court under Article 227 and the report was summoned, the District Judge submitted a report that it had happened due to oversight.

The Court noted that it took lenient view in the matter and refrained from referring to the matter of judicial conduct on the administrative side. However, in the present case, the Court stayed the orders dated 12-10-2022 and 1-11-2022 passed by the District Judge.

The matter was then taken up on 28-11-2022, wherein the District Magistrate submitted that the said act was done in good faith with bona fide intention, only to ensure that Small Causes Court Revision (‘Revision’) should not get frustrated only due to the pendency of Section 5 application.

The Court, not doubting the bona fides of the District Judge, maintained the legal position of Section 5 stating that the Revision order was a defective for admitting without condoning the delay. The Court further emphasised on Order XLI Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) stating that in the event of a time barred appeal with a pending Section 5 application, the Court shall not stay the execution of the decree appealed against so long it does not hear the appeal under Rule 11.

The Court further said that there may be instances where the interest of justice may demand Court’s interference to avoid frustration of proceedings due to technicalities, however, in the present instance nothing restrained the District Judge from deciding Section 5 application.

While passing the order exercising the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 277 of the Constitution of India, with the direction to decide the Section 5 application on its own merits, the Court honorably discharged the District Judge from notice, expunging the previously made observations regarding his conduct

[Asheem Kumar Das v. Manish Viswas, Matters Under Article 227 No. – 10301 of 2022, decided on 21-11-2022]


*Apoorva Goel, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Delhi High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Prateek Jalan, J., expressed that,

For the purposes of an order under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the Court must come to the conclusion that the plaint is required to be rejected.

Present petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution for directing against an order passed by which Senior Civil Judge, rejected the application of the petitioner-defendants under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Plaintiffs filed the suit before the trial court and claimed to be the owners in possession of undivided shares. As against the petitioner, the plaintiffs’ principal claim was for a declaration against a sale deed executed by one M/s G.S. Kashyap and Sons (HUF) in favour of the petitioner 1 and as also an injunction against the petitioners from creating third-party interests in the said land.

Further, the plaintiffs also made three applications for an injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC.

On 12-12-2018, petitioners filed a written statement and made an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and by that application petitioners contended that the plaintiffs had filed no title documents in support of their claim of ownership and had only filed revenue records which were insufficient to establish title.

Trial Court rejected the petitioner’s application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.

Analysis, Law and Decision

High Court found no jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned order, so as to invite the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Well Settled Law

For the purposes of rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the Court is duty-bound to consider the contents of the plaint, and not to examine the sufficiency of the evidence or the defence put forth by the defendant.

The above position has been made clear by several Supreme Court decisions, including Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557, Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510 and Urvashiben v. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi, (2019) 13 SCC 372.

The Bench expressed that,

Trial Court has cogently analysed the grounds taken by the petitioners and come to a conclusion that they do not fall within the scope of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. I do not find any jurisdictional defect or perversity in the said order so as to attract the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 

Lastly, the High Court declined to entertain the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. [Capital Land Builders (P) Ltd v. Shiv Kumar Jindad,  2022 SCC OnLine Del 176, decided on 19-1-2022]


Advocates before the Court:

For the petitioners: Gyaneshwar Narayan, Advocate

For the respondents: None

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: Krishna S. Dixit, J. dismissed the petition being devoid of merits.

Background

The facts of the case are such that the property in question belongs to the ownership of the respondent-plaintiff–“Mutt” and the husband of the petitioner-defendant during his life had taken the same on lease vide registered lease deed for the purpose of erecting a building for a period of 99 years on a yearly rent of Rs. 50 and delayed payment of rent at a rate of 6% p.a. so that after the expiry of the tenure, the respondent-plaintiff shall put the same to the use of its pilgrims. The petitioner, however, remained in the arrears of rent for years, hence a legal notice was issued by the respondent-plaintiff terminating the lease for non payment of rents. The petitioner thereby replied that the office of the respondent Mutt declined to accept the tender of rental amount since 2009 stating that the land has vested in the State Government under the provisions of the Karnataka land Reforms Act, 1961. A suit was filed seeking an order for relieving her from forfeiture of the lease which was rejected. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner filed application in Form 7A seeking grant of the land under the provisions of the Karnataka land Reforms Act, 1961.

Observations and Decision

The Court observed that the text and content of Section 114 require bonafide on the part of the tenant who has been remaining in arrears of rent; if that is lacking, a tenant cannot be permitted to seek refuge under the umbrella of this provision; otherwise this provision runs the risk of being used as an instrument of unconscionability to defeat the accrued right of re-entry accruing to the landlord; in deciding whether there is bonafide facts and circumstances of the case need to be kept in view.

The Court analyses that in the case at hand, the petitioner lacks bonafide because she has filed the application seeking grant of the land under Section 77 A of the Karnataka land Reforms Act, 1961 as amended; nothing prevented her even then, from making payment of arrears of rent particularly when the rate of rent is apparently frugal, still the petitioner chose to remain in arrears having built a huge building. This clearly shows the incongruity on the part of the petitioner in somehow squatting on the property of the respondent without complying with the agreed covenants of tenancy.

The Court observed that it is true that Section 114 of T.P. Act gives right to apply for such a grant merely because a tenant can so apply, it cannot be readily inferred that his of act of remaining in arrears of rent n that found should be treated as bonafide an act contrary to law may still lack bona fide depending upon the circumstances of a case; for an act being bona fide, one has to show that it is done in good faith i.e. with honesty, sincerity and genuineness and without any element of culpability from this inarticulate premise.

The Court held “the writ petition being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed” [Velthoria Sequiera v. Sode Vadiraja Mutt, Writ petition No. 30053 of 2019, decided on 16-03-2021]


Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: Javed Iqbal Wani J., while dismissing the present petition, discusses the ambit and scope of Article 227 of the Constitution and the statutory restriction of filing written statement within a stipulated period as mentioned under Order VIII Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure.

Background

In the instant petition, Supervisory Jurisdiction of the present Court is invoked by the petitioner for quashing order dated 10-03-2016 (impugned order), passed by the Second Additional District and Sessions Judge, Jammu. In terms of impugned order, the right to file written statement of the defendant petitioner herein is closed by the Trial court after the court notices that the defendant has failed to deposit costs imposed upon him for setting aside ex-parte proceedings initiated by order dated 20-01-2016.

 Observations

On ambit and scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 227

Court considered the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Pati, (2010) 8 SCC 329, wherein the Court discussed the scope and ambit of Supervisory Jurisdiction, at length;

“(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.

 (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227.

(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority’.

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.

(i) High Court’s power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.

(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court’s power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court’s jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.

(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo moto.

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.

(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.

(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.

(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality

The Court further clarified the said premise, citing Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423, which overruled the decision in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675; “Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows: (i) Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; (ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.”

On application of Order VIII Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

The Court while making an observation over the applicability of Order VIII Rule 1, said, “(…) defendant indisputably has failed to file the written statement within the stipulated period of time prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 or proviso appended thereto, even  if it is assumed that the summons were served upon him on 11-03-2015 when he appeared before the Trial court notwithstanding the permission granted to the defendant to file the same in terms of order dated 20-01-2016 i.e. when his ex-parte proceedings were set aside by the Trial court. Since the defendant failed to file the written statement within the period prescribed under Order VIII CPC, the closure of right to file the same in terms of impugned order by the Trial court becomes irrelevant and insignificant.”

 Decision

Reiterating the scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the present petition along with the connected IAs. [Ghulam Mohd. v. Manzoor Ahmed,  2020 SCC OnLine J&K 607, decided on 21-11-2020]


Sakshi Shukla, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Jharkhand High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jharkhand High Court: Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

This is a case of respondents/plaintiff where a petition was filed on 01-02-2018 about some particular documents which could not have been filed at the time of presenting the plaint. On further, cross-examination of the document’s relevancy was assessed and it led the plaintiffs to file the petition where they requested leave from the trial court for marking those documents.

The petitioners had objected to the filed the petition on the grounds that no reason was given as to what held the plaintiffs from protecting the said documents along with the complaint. Another point of contention was that the petition was filed under the provision of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 instead of Order 7 Rule 14 (3) of The Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908. It was because the Trial Court had the power for granting such relief under the CPC. Hence, the petition should not have been allowed but as per Mr Rajeeva Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioners, the trial court allowed the petition without considering the facts. As a result of this the present writ petition was filed.

Mr M. Jalisur, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has referred to the provision of Order 7 Rule 14 (3) of the CPC in defence to order dated 06-03-2018. It was further submitted by the counsel that the writ petition has no merit on the ground that the trial court had granted liberty to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the plaintiff. The respondents had filed an interlocutory application for vacating the stay on the order granted by the court by issuing a notice to the respondent on 10-07-2018.

The High Court after considering all the legalities and referring to the provisions of Order 7 Rule 14 (3) of the CPC deemed it fit and fair that the power to grant relief, taking into consideration the relevancy of the documents.

In the following case, the petition has been filed by the plaintiff under Section 5 of Limitation Act rather than Order 7 Rule 14 (3) of the CPC. The court relied on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of India in P.K. Palanisamy v. N. Arumugham, (2009) 9 SCC 173 where it was held that mentioning of the wrong provision or not mentioning that provision will not make the order invalid, if the court and/or statutory authority have the requisite jurisdiction  therefore.

Another question taken into consideration is the question of prejudice. The court on the following question held that in terms of the provision of Order 7 Rule 14 (3) of the CPC give liberty of cross-examining the witnesses to the petitioner.

Thus, as per the Supervisory jurisdiction in Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court was not mistaken in warranting any interference by the court. Therefore, the writ petition failed and Interim Order dated 10-07-2018 was vacated. [Jay Shankar Yadav v. Bhola Yadav, 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 1509, decided on 07-11-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: Vinay Kumar Shukla, J., upheld the decision of the Railway Claims Tribunal by dismissing a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality and validity of an order by the Railway Claims Tribunal.

The petitioner had filed a claim petition under Section 16 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 for grant of compensation on the death of her deceased husband who died in a train accident. The petitioner, through an amendment application, wished to change of place of the accident itself and also the train number without any plausible reason. The respondent argued that if the amendment was allowed after the filing of the written statement, it would change the entire nature of the claim. Since the petitioners had already sought five adjournments in the matter, the case was fixed for evidence.

The Court did not find any illegality in the impugned order which rejected the application for amendment. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jai Singh v. MCD, (2010) 9 SCC 385 and further stated that “it is settled law that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to correct all errors of subordinate Courts within its limitation. It can be exercised where the order is passed in grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of the fundamental principle of law and justice”.

The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied –

(i) the error is manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law; and

(ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, the instant petition is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed.[Narmada Bai v. Union of India, MP-4024-2019, decided on 16-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: The petitioners invoked Article 227 of the Constitution before the Bench of Sheel Nagu, J., seeking a decree of declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of agricultural land, where they suffered dismissal of application under Order 13 Rule 1 & 2 of Civil Procedure Code by the trial Court as well as the appellate court.

It was submitted that despite prima facie case being in favour of plaintiffs due to the fact that revenue record showed the plaintiffs being in possession of land in question, the Courts below were found to have gravely erred in law in holding otherwise. It was found by the order of Trial Court that there was no documentary evidence available on record demonstrating that plaintiff had the possession of the suit property at the time of institution of suit. Court found it evident that plaintiffs failed to show a prima facie case in their favour thus, no need to look upon the aspects of the balance of convenience and irreparable loss was warranted before the trial court and appellate forum.

High Court was of the view that if the plaintiff raises a fair question as to the existence of the legal rights claimed by him then a temporary injunction can be granted after a prima facie case is established. In view of the aforementioned, the exercise of discretion by trial and appellate Court were not showing any jurisdictional error. As the view taken by trial and appellate court should not have been taken in the given facts and circumstances and merely because a different view was possible was not a good ground to interfere in the limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, this petition was dismissed. [Ram Singh Rawat v. State of M.P., 2019 SCC OnLine MP 409, dated 28-02-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: An application filed before a Bench of Sheel Nagu, J., by petitioner for grant of permit for the corridor route, i.e. Narsinghgarh to Barai via specified places was dismissed by respondent, i.e. Secretary, State Transport Authority. Hence, petitioner filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution invoking supervisory jurisdiction.

It was found that petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy of approaching the State Transport Appellate Authority at Gwalior. Petitioner had referred to the case of Waheed Khan v. Transport Department, WP No. 7703 of 2018, and submitted that there are no disputed questions of fact involved and since the order of the Secretary, STA, Gwalior is passed in violation of the statutory provision, the High Court can interfere.

High Court was of the view that the right interpretation of the Gazette is through the attending facts and circumstances of this case and the question to be decided which in the considered opinion of the Court involves disputed questions of fact, cannot be gone into under the writ jurisdiction. Since the statutory remedy was available the Court refused to exercise its writ jurisdiction and relegated the matter to the State Transport Appellate Authority at Gwalior. [Harish Kumar v. State of M.P., 2019 SCC OnLine MP 198, dated 24-01-2019]

Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: A Bench of Sanjeev Kumar, J. dismissed a petition filed against the order of a Subordinate Civil Judge where the application of the petitioner seeking leave of the court to file additional pleas (replica) was cancelled.

The facts of the case are that a suit was filed by the petitioner for Permanent and Mandatory Injunction restraining the respondent from raising any construction illegally and unauthorizedly to the prejudice of the rights of the petitioner which was pending adjudication before the Subordinate Civil Judge. Respondent then filed his written statement in which he clearly refuted the contents of the plaint. The petitioner with a view to file additional pleading moved an application before the trial court for submitting additional pleadings (replica). The trial court did not find any substance in the application and rejected the same. The ground that was given for rejection was that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any new facts which had come in the written statement and which needed to be refuted or explained.

The Court held that no case was made out for the exercise of the power of superintendence of the Court vested by virtue of Section 104 of the J&K Constitution. The order fell in the realm of discretionary order and unless the discretion was demonstrated to have been exercised with material irregularity, and in ignorance of the settled legal principles it could not be made the subject matter of interference in supervisory jurisdiction. The Petition was thus dismissed. [Abdul Rashid Chalak v. State of J&K, 2018 SCC OnLine J&K 1039, decided on 24-12-2018]

Kerala High Court
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Kerala High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. while hearing an original petition in a debt recovery matter ruled that where a Tribunal exercises its jurisdiction over more than one State, then the High Court in the State where the first court is located has supervisory jurisdiction over the said Tribunal.

In a recovery proceeding filed by the respondent bank, petitioner purchased a secured asset brought for sale by the bank. Defaulting borrowers filed an application before Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Ernakulam which set aside the sale in favour of petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, bank filed an appeal before Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), Chennai wherein the petitioner pleaded that he had parted with his money and purchased the property on bank officials’ assurance. But since the property was now entangled in legal proceedings, he did not wish to contest the proceedings and wanted his money back with interest and damages. In this backdrop, the present petition was filed seeking a direction to DRAT, Chennai for early disposal of the appeal.

The respondent bank raised an objection as to maintainability of the petition in view of territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the question for Court’s consideration was as to whether it could assume supervisory jurisdiction over DRAT, Chennai.

Relying on the dictum of Apex Court in Ambica Industries v. CCE, (2007) 6 SCC 769 it was held that when the High Court exercises its jurisdiction over a Tribunal extending its jurisdiction over more than one State, then the High Court in the State where the first court is located would be the proper forum. In the instant case, the primary forum was DRT, Ernakulam and as such the High Court could eminently exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over DRAT, Chennai.

The petition was allowed directing DRAT to dispose of the appeal within three months.[Thomas Chacko v. Bank of India,2018 SCC OnLine Ker 4915, decided on 01-11-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: A Single judge bench comprising of H.G. Ramesh, J. while hearing a civil writ petition against an interlocutory order of the trial court in a suit pending between petitioner and respondent, held that the supervisory jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 227 can be exercised only if the inferior court has not proceeded within its jurisdiction.

In the instant case, in a suit pending between petitioner and respondent, the trial court passed an interlocutory order allowing the respondent/ plaintiff to produce certain documents through secondary evidence. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner/ defendant preferred the present writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court.

The Court examined the law with respect to jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and relied on the judgment of  Apex court in Raj Kumar Bhatia v Subhash Chander Bhatia, (2018) 2 SCC 87 to hold that supervisory jurisdiction conferred on High Court under Article 227 is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction.

Having regard to facts of the case, the court declined to entertain the instant writ petition. However, liberty was granted to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order before the Appellate Court as provided under Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. [Karnataka Neeravari Nigam Limited v. Shankar Construction Company, WP (C) No. 46389 of 2015, decided on 05-10-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Court recently dismissed a revision petition assailing the order of Addl. District Judge noting that in supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, over subordinate Courts, the scope of judicial review is very limited and narrow. The order assailed by the petitioner was a consented order and the counsel on behalf of the petitioner could not point out any error apparent on the face of record in the impugned orders so as to justify interference by the Court.

The Bench of Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J. observed that the supervisory jurisdiction of a High Court involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. At the same time, he cautioned its use stating that this power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal and therefore, it must be restricted to grave derelictions of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice.

The court further referred to various Apex Court judgments stating the same and relied on the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim,  (1983) 4 SCC 566 in which the Supreme Court observed that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority,” and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, or anything that is much less than an error of law. Accordingly, the petition stood dismissed for the reason that there was no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record in the assailed orders. [Brij Kishor Trivedi v. Kanpur Development Authority Thru Secy,  2017 SCC OnLine All 2513, decided on 5.12.2017]