Case BriefsSupreme Court (Constitution Benches)

Supreme Court: In a landmark ruling the 5-judge bench of Arun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, MR Shah, and Ravindra Bhat, JJ has unanimously held that the land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Land Acquisition Act, 2013).

The bench also held that under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014, the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013.

Giving elaborate explanation to the provision under Section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 2013, the Court, further, held,

  • In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.
  • The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid.

“in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.”

  • The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court.

“Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.”

  • In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1).
  • The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).
  • The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/ memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
  • The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.
  • Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land 319 acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.

Last year, Justice Arun Mishra, heading the Bench, had refused to recuse himself from hearing the case and had said,

“I would be committing a grave blunder by recusal in the circumstances, on the grounds prayed for, and posterity will not forgive me down the line for setting a bad precedent. It is only for the interest of the judiciary (which is supreme) and the system (which is nulli secundus) that has compelled me not to recuse.”

Justice Mishra’s recusal was sought on the ground that he was heading a Bench meant to re-examine a judgment that he had himself given in 2018 in in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412. 

He, however, said that if recusal is made, it would tantamount to giving room to unscrupulous litigant to have a Judge of their choice who can share the views which are to be canvassed by them. The plea cannot be termed anything other than Bench hunting, if it is said that until and unless the one which suits a litigant is found the matters are not to be argued.

[Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal Sharma, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 316, decided on 06.03.2020]

Chhattisgarh High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Chhattisgarh High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Goutam Bhaduri, J. allowed a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC by a senior citizen couple.

The petitioners, aged 89 and 77 years, were father and mother of Respondent 1. They invoked jurisdiction of the Court by moving an application under Section 24 of Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 for vacating the house by removing their son and daughter-in-law. A police complaint was filed alleging that the petitioners were subjected to torture, cruelty and misbehavior; they were isolated and cornered; made to live in captivity in their own house. The petitioners sought for help. The trial court dismissed the application on the ground that the eviction prayed for was of a civil nature, therefore, the application could not be entertained. The petitioners filed a revision before District and Sessions Judge which was also dismissed. Aggrieved thus, the petitioners were before the High Court.

The High Court referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act. It was noted that by virtue of Section 3, the Act has an overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other statute. In the instant case, the ownership of the house belonged solely to the petitioner. The Court perused Section 24 and noted that the object is to protect the senior citizens and the provision is intended to provide a preventive remedy which can be granted quickly. Finally, it was observed, the anxiety to stop the right of the abuse of senior citizen(s) is to be made effective, as otherwise, it would be a symbolic collapse of the legal system by not responding to the request or by adhering to the dummy mode by courts. Under the circumstances of the case, the interim application filed by the petitioners seeking eviction of respondents was allowed. District Magistrate was directed to evict the respondents within 30 days. The petition was, thus, allowed. [Pramod Ranjankar v. Arunashankar, 2018 SCC OnLine Chh 548, dated 18-07-2018]

Punjab and Haryana High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: A Division Bench comprising of M.M.S. Bedi and Anupinder Singh Grewal, JJ. allowed an application filed by the respondent-wife for maintenance pendente lite.

The appellant-husband had preferred an appeal against the dismissal of his divorce petition. The respondent-wife had filed the application under Section 24 of Hindu Marriage Act claiming maintenance pendent lite at the rate of Rs 20,000 per month. The appellant submitted that he was dismissed from the Army and was unemployed. Further, he had no source of income except what he got from the selling of milk.

The Court noted that there was no material to ascertain the income of the appellant and in such circumstances a bit of estimation was permissible. The appellant was an ex-army man and an able-bodied person. Even if he worked as an unskilled laborer, he was presumed to earn not less than Rs 15,000-20,000 per month. There was also one daughter born out of the wedlock. The Court held that the appellant cannot run away from his duty to maintain wife and daughter. In such circumstances, an amount of Rs 8,000 per month was found reasonable while awarding the maintenance pendente lite under Section 24. The application was thus allowed. [Jagdish Singh v. Sarabjit Kaur, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 881, dated 03-07-2018]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In interesting turn of events, the 3-judge bench of Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and Deepak Gupta, JJ disagreed with the decision rendered by another 3-judge bench of Arun Mishra, AK Goel and MM Shantanagoudar, JJ in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, 2018 SCC Online SC 100, which had on 08.02.2018, overturned the decision of another 3-judge bench of RM Lodha, Madan B. Lokur and Kurian Joseph, JJ in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183, in the issue relating to land acquisition.

Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi submitted before the Court that when a Bench of 3 learned Judges does not agree with the decision rendered by another Bench of 3 learned Judges, the appropriate course of action would be to refer the matter to a larger Bench. He also submitted that a Bench of 3 learned Judges cannot hold another decision rendered by a Bench of 3 learned Judges as per incuriam.

Noticing that some matters have already been decided on the basis of the Indore Development Authority decision and that similar matter were listed before the Supreme Court and various High Courts, the bench requested the concerned Benches dealing with similar matters to defer the hearing until a decision is rendered one way or the other on the issue whether the matter should be referred to larger Bench or not.

Making it clear that the hearing is not concluded on the issue whether the matter should at all be referred to a larger Bench or not, the bench directed:

“it would be appropriate if in the interim and pending a final decision on making a reference (if at all) to a larger Bench, the High Courts be requested not to deal with any cases relating to the interpretation of or concerning Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.”

The matter will now be heard on March 7, 2018. [State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 145, order dated 21.02.2018]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The Bench of Arun Mishra and Amitava Roy, JJ asked CJI to form a larger bench to decide the question as to whether by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, a land acquisition proceeding can lapse if the landowners refuse to accept compensation. As per Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the land acquisition proceedings will be deemed to be lapsed if the ‘compensation has not been paid’.

The Court was hearing the matter where landowners had refused to accept the compensation deposited by Indore Development Authority (IDA) in lieu of the land acquired for the purpose of development of rings roads. The Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that the proceedings had lapsed in view of the decisions of this Court in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 and Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2015) 3 SCC 353 on the ground that the compensation was not paid to the landowners and that the award was made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act.

IDA, hence, appealed before the Supreme Court and said:

“there was no lapse of proceedings in the instant case as compensation was offered but was not accepted by landowners. For their own refusal they cannot lay the blame at the door of the IDA.”

It was argued before the Court that in spite of not accepting the compensation deliberately and statements are made in the court by the landowners that they do not want to receive the compensation at any cost and they are agitating the matter time and again after having lost the matters and when proceedings are kept pending by interim orders by filing successive petitions, the provisions of section 24 of 2013 Act cannot be invoked by such landowners.

IDA also submitted before the Court that the object of the deposit under Section 31 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is to prevent unnecessary prolongation of the proceedings and accumulation of Collector’s liability for interest. When a party willfully refuses to receive payment by depositing the money in the court, the liability for interest will cease.

Considering the fact that many issues relating to lapse of proceedings under Section 24 of 2013 Act were not considered by the 3-judge bench in in Pune Municipal Corporation case, the bench referred the matter to a larger bench. [Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1426, decided on 07.12.2017]