Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: Manish Pitale, J., expressed while addressing the present application that,

“Second marriage cannot come within the definition of domestic violence.”

By the instant application, applicants sought quashing of criminal proceedings filed by sole respondent under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Further, the applicants also prayed for setting aside the orders passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate.

Applicant 1 got married to the sole respondent and soon after the marriage, there was matrimonial discord between the two, because of which, applicant 1 filed a divorce proceeding on the ground of cruelty.

The divorce decree granted was confirmed upto the Supreme Court and the rejection of the application for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the respondent also stood confirmed.

Bench stated that the contentions raised on behalf of applicant 1 on ground of cruelty were accepted by all the Courts and hence the said findings attained finality.

Question for consideration:

  • Whether respondent is entitled to rely upon incidents pertaining to the same time period and relatable to the allegation and contentions raised to claim that she had suffered domestic violence at the hands of the applicants, as defined under the DV Act.
  • Whether the act of applicant 1 preforming a second marriage after the grant of divorce decree can be said to be an act of domestic violence under the provisions of the DV Act?
  • Whether the proceedings initiated by respondent under provisions of the DV Act can be said to be an abuse of process of law?

Analysis, Law and Decision

High Court stated that on perusal of Sections 12 to 23 of the D.V. Act, respondent has indeed raised the very issues and contentions that she had relied upon during the initial round of litigation pertaining to the divorce petition filed by applicant 1 and application or restitution of conjugal rights filed by respondent.

Hence, respondent cannot be permitted to reiterate the same by filing application under the provisions of the DV Act, 3 months after the Supreme Court dismissed her Special Leave Petition and confirmed the findings rendered by the Family Court and this Court on identical issues.

Second Marriage

 Court rejected the contention that the second marriage performed by applicant 1, after grant of divorce decree amounted to domestic violence.

Section 3 of the D.V. Act defines ‘domestic violence’ in an elaborate manner and it refers to physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse and economic abuse. This is in the context of a domestic relation shared between the aggrieved person and respondent.

Family Court granted divorce on the ground of cruelty cannot eb denied in the present matter.

Merely because applicant 1 performed second marriage cannot come within the definition of domestic violence under Section 3 of the D.V. Act.

The manner in which the proceedings were sought to be initiated under the provisions of DV Act was nothing but an abuse of process of law.

Court noted that the respondent appeared to be interested in initiating and continuing the proceedings as a tool of harassment against the applicants.

Prayers pertaining to monthly maintenance, compensation, residence order, etc., have all been made of the contentions raised in the earlier round of litigation.

In view of the above background, High Court held that continuance of the proceedings would amount to permitting abuse of the process of law, hence the same cannot be permitted. [Bhushan v. Nilesha Bhushan Deshmukh, Criminal Application (APL) No. 164 of 2017, decided on 9-08-2021]


Advocates before the Court:

S.A. Mohta, Advocate for applicants

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J., dismissed the petition and rejected the issuance of writ of habeas corpus by a husband seeking production of his wife.

The facts of the case are such that petitioner 2, wife of petitioner 1, left her matrimonial home sometime in the month of June, 2019 on account of some serious differences with her husband (Petitioner 1) and an application for restitution of conjugal rights was filed by the Petitioner 1 which stands pending before the court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Saharanpur.

Counsel for petitioners Mr Avinash Pandey submitted that sometime in the month of November, 2020 information was received by him suggesting that petitioner 2 was being detained at her parental home

Counsel for State submitted that petitioner 2 (wife) left her matrimonial home sometime in the month of June, 2019 on account of serious differences with her husband (petitioner 1), it is not a case of illegal and a writ of habeas corpus would not be entertainable.

The Court relied on Mohammad Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., 1964 AIR 1625 and Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate Darjeeling (1973) 2 SCC 674 wherein it was observed that the writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ and an extraordinary remedy. It is writ of right and not a writ of course and may be granted only on reasonable ground or probable cause.

The Court further observed that the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would be dependent on the jurisdictional fact where the applicant establishes a prima facie case that the detention is unlawful. It is only where the aforementioned jurisdictional fact is established that the applicant becomes entitled to the writ as of right.

The Court held “the petitioner no. 2 having left her matrimonial home on her own on account of a matrimonial discord, the present petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus at the behest of the petitioner no. 1 (husband) would not be entertainable.”[Mohd Ahmad v. State of UP, 2021 SCC OnLine All 542, decided on 05-08-2021]


Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has reported this brief.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: The Division Bench of S.S. Shinde and Manish Pitale, JJ., quashed proceedings initiated against the petitioner (daughter) by her mother under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

In the present matter, a daughter sought the quashing of proceedings initiated by her mother under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) claiming that she was facing the ire of her mother due to matrimonial discord between her mother and father.

Further, she added that she has been unnecessarily dragged into the said proceedings pending before the Magistrate Court which is resulting in a detrimental effect on her career as also her prospects of studying abroad.

Respondent 1, Mother of the petitioner had filed an application against the husband under Sections 12,18, 19, 20 and 22 of the DV Act before the Metropolitan Magistrate. Respondent 1 had raised various grievances seeking protection order, monetary relief, residence order and order for grant of compensation.

Petitioner has plans to go abroad for further studies and for that in the application forms while seeking Visa a declaration was to be given regarding pendency of criminal cases against the applicant. But due to the pendency of said proceeding initiated under the DV Act by her mother are creating hurdles for the petitioner to successfully seek Visa.

In view of the above circumstances, present petition was filed to seek quashing of the said proceedings by her mother, insofar as she was concerned.

Analysis, Law and Decision

The intent of the DV Act is to ensure that a woman who faces abuse at the hands of her husband or a male partner has an avenue to raise her grievance against such person and also any relative of such person. Ordinarily, this would include the relatives on the side of the husband or male partner.

In the present matter, only at place of the application filed by respondent 1 under the DV Act before the Magistrate, allegation was made against the petitioner.

It is only at one place in paragraph (m) of the application that an allegation is made against the Petitioner that on the husband of Respondent No.1 (father of the Petitioner) instigating the Petitioner, she allegedly assaulted the Respondent No.1.

As per the material on record, petitioner continued to live with her father, and this was perhaps a reason why she added the petitioner as a party to the proceedings initiated under the DV Act.

Bench stated that it appeared that a single allegation made against the petitioner was an exaggeration and it had arisen out of anger of respondent 1 against the petitioner, as she continued to reside with her father, i.e. the husband of respondent 1.

“…bitterness in the matrimonial relationship between Respondent No.1 and her husband has spilled over to the children, particularly against the Petitioner”

Respondent 1 developed bitterness and anger, not only against her husband but her daughter.

Bench was surprised to note that petitioner’s own mother was hell-bent upon creating obstructions in her progress. This was evident from the affidavit filed by respondent 1, wherein it was stated that it is not necessary for the petitioner to go abroad for higher education and that the said ground was being raised only as an excuse to avoid legal proceedings initiated by respondent 1.

High Court opined that the said allegation raised against the petitioner was exaggerated and her anger and bitterness arose from the matrimonial discord with her husband leading to serious impediment in the progress of her own daughter.

“…allegations seem to be made in a fit of anger and they could be said to be improbable in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.”

Bench referred to the Supreme Court decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, with regard to exercising jurisdiction to quash the proceedings.

Following categories of cases by way of illustrations wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise are:

“(1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

 (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 

(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Observing the above-stated, and in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, Bench held that the allegations levelled by respondent 1 against the petitioner, borne out of the matrimonial discord with her husband, can be said to be inherently improbable and therefore, they fall in Category-5 laid down in the above-quoted portion of the Supreme Court decision.

High Court held that the present case was fit to exercise jurisdiction to quash the proceedings initiated by respondent 1 under the DV Act, insofar as they pertain to the petitioner. [Vanisha Vincent Rodrigues v. Jyoti Vincent Rodrigues, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 613, decided on 20-04-2021]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Central Information Commission (CIC): Neeraj Kumar Gupta (Information Commissioner) decide whether a legally wedded wife can seek the information regard to income tax returns of her husband under the Right to Information Act, 2005.

The instant application was filed before the CPIO, Income Tax Officer seeking the following information:

  1. “The copy of Form 16 issued by the company at Micro Focus Software Development, ‘LAUREL’, Block ‘D’, 65/2, Bagmane Techpark, C.V. Raman Nagar, Bengaluru for the year filed for 2016- 17, 2017-2018 & 2018-2019 of my husband Mr Suman Chatterjee.
  2. The relevant documents/papers relating to the Gross Annual Income of my husband Mr Suman Chatterjee.
  3. The relevant documents/papers relating to the Gross salary of my husband Mr Suman Chatterjee.”

The appellant filed the first appeal dated 11-01-2019 which was disposed of by the first appellate authority on 05-03-2019.

Thereafter, she filed a second appeal under Section 19(3) of the RTI Act before the Commission requesting to take appropriate legal action against the CPIO under Section 20 of the RTI Act, 2005 and also to direct him to provide the sought-for information.

Decision

Commission referred to the decision of Supreme Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. CIC, (2013) 1 SCC 212 with regard to the applicability of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005.

Legal Issue to be decided

Whether the appellant claiming to be the legally wedded wife of Mr Suman Chatterjee is entitled to seek details of his income tax returns i.e. Form 16?

In regard to the above question, Commission referred to the Delhi High Court decision in Vijay Prakash v. UOI,2009 SCC OnLine Del 1731, wherein it was clarified that in a private dispute between husband and wife, the basic protection afforded by virtue of exemption from disclosure enacted under Section 8(1)(j) cannot be lifted or disturbed unless the petitioner is able to justify how such disclosure would be in ‘public interest’.

Bench noted that in the present matter, the appellant did not succeed in establishing the information sought was for a larger public purpose.

Commission decided that since the filing of income tax returns by an individual is not a public activity and rather it is in the nature of an obligation which a citizen owes to the State. The said information cannot be disclosed to the appellant in the absence of any larger public interest.

Further adding to the above analysis, Bench stated that according to Section 2(n) of the RTI Act, 2005 any person other than the citizen making a request for information can be termed as ‘third party’. Therefore, appellant being a person other than the RTI applicant surely comes within the definition of ‘third party’.

Bench did not find any public interest which outweighs the harm caused in its disclosure.

In light of several decisions of the Supreme Court and High Court, Commission opined that in the absence of any larger public interest in the matter, the appellant was not entitled to seek the details of the Income Tax returns filed by the third party, Mr Suman Chatterjee which is exempted under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005.

Another significant point to be noted was that the appellant sought the disclosure of at least the ‘gross annual income’ of her husband so that she could defend her matrimonial case. Considering the said marital discord between the husband and wife vis-à-vis her right of maintenance, Commission opined that the respondent should consider providing the numerical figures of the gross annual income of her husband.

In light of the above observations, appeal was disposed of. [Amrita Chatterjee v. CPIO, Income Tax Officer; 2021 SCC OnLine CIC 40; decided on 08-01-2021]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Anu Malhotra, J., dismissed the petition in view of the dispute being settled mutually.

The instant petition sought quashing of an FIR registered under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Penal Code, 1860 submitting to the effect that a settlement has since been arrived at between the parties.

State did not oppose the quashing of FIR which was apparently emanated due to a matrimonial discord which has been resolved by the dissolution of the marriage between the parties vide a decree of divorce through mutual consent under Section 13 B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Respondent 2 had stated that she arrived at the settlement with petitioners without any duress, pressure or coercion from any quarter, hence Court considered it appropriate to put a quietus to the litigation between the parties and for the maintenance of peace and harmony between the parties in view of the observations of the Supreme Court decision in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi, (2013) 4 SCC 58, wherein it was held that:

“… it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. They institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed….”

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, in view of the above, the Court directed for quashing of the FIR and disposed of the petition.[Harish Kumar v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1635, decided on 04-12-2020]


Advocates who appeared before the Court:

For the petitioners: Naveen Kumar Bansal, Advocate with petitioners in person.

For the Respondents: Sanjeev Sabharwal, APP for State with SI Maninder Maan Piyush Pahuja, Adv for R-2 with R-2 in person.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: Sandeep Sharma, J. dismissed the petition favoring the wife and allowing her prayer to transfer the application.

The facts of the case are that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized but they were unable to live together for long on account of certain differences pertaining to which husband filed petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act in Solan seeking dissolution of marriage pending in the Court of Additional District Judge (II), Solan, District Solan, H.P. Hence the instant petition was filed under Sections 22 and 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to transfer the proceedings from Solan, to the Court of District and Sessions Judge (Family Court) Shimla, H.P., on grounds of inconvenience, insufficiency of means, compulsive litigation and on the ground that the distance between Shimla and Solan is more than 50 KMs and it is difficult for her to attend the Court regularly.

The petitioner was represented by counsel Ravinder Singh Jaswal and the respondent was represented by counsel Rakesh Kumar Thakur.

On hearing the arguments of both sides the Court relied on the judgment titled Rajani Kishor Pardeshi v. Kishor Babulal Pardeshi, (2005) 12 SCC 237 observed that in a case seeking transfer of the case at the instance of the wife convenience of wife was the prime consideration.

In view of the above, the petition was allowed. [Poonam Sharma v. Prashant Bhardwaj, 2020 SCC OnLine HP 919 , decided on 08-07-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Sunil Gaur, J., allowed a petition filed by a husband seeking quashing of an FIR registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC.

Quashment was sought on the basis of Mediated Settlement dated 12-5-2017 reached between the parties. The wife, who was present and identified before the Court, submitted that the dispute between the parties had been amicably resolved vide the Mediated Settlement. She supported the present petition.

The husband and other petitioners were represented by Meenakshi Mohan and Kunal. Advocates. Izhar Ahmad appeared as Additional Public Prosecutor, while Harish Kumar Lodhi, Advocate appeared for the wife.

The High Court relied on Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the parameters for exercising the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the FIR/Criminal Complaint. After extensively quoting from Parbatbhai, the High Court observed, “since the subject matter of this FIR is offshoot of matrimonial discord, which now stands mutually and amicably settled between parties, therefore, continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.” Accordingly, the FIR and all proceedings emanating therefrom were directed to be quashed subject to costs of Rs 10,000 to deposited by petitioners with the Prime Minister’s  National Relief Fund. [Mukesh Rajput v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7087, decided on 08-02-2019]