Op EdsOP. ED.

Introduction

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 came as a ray of hope amidst the deteriorating condition of the recovery mechanisms available to the creditors in the Indian market. Recovery rates had sunk to new lows, and the need to hit the refresh button to reset the entire system was paramount.

The intent behind any legislation can be truly brought from the Preamble, something that the entire text of the legislation follows. The Preamble of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code envisages it as an Act which will primarily look into the aspects of consolidation and updating of the numerous laws regarding insolvency and resolution of the same for corporate entities, partnership firms and individuals as well. It has to be carried out within strictly defined time-frames, so that the value of the assets is maximised. All of this is done to promote the entrepreneurial ventures and to equitably serve the interest of the various stakeholders.

In  Binani Industries Ltd. v. Bank of Baroda,[1] the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) held that:

  1. … The first order objective is “resolution”. The second order objective is “maximisation of value of assets of the ‘corporate debtor’ and the third order objective is promoting entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balancing the interests”. This order of objective is sacrosanct.[2]

The point that has to be kept in mind is that the Preamble explicitly mentions of the maximising of the value of the assets. Over the course of this article, an evaluation has been attempted regarding whether the provisions in the Code dealing with the aspect of the valuation of assets have stayed true to what was first mentioned in the Preamble of the Act.

The primary foundation towards the valuation of assets is laid down as soon as with the appointment of Valuer. Valuer stands for a registered valuer, who can be a resolution professional as well. They are tasked with putting a monetary value on the debtor’s properties, securities, other assets and liabilities as well.

However, our primary concern here is the aspect of valuation of assets. To understand this part of the liquidation process, it is essential to have a thorough understanding of how the value is to be estimated and certain other related concepts.

Valuation Standards

Under Section 247 of the Companies Act, 2013, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has notified Companies (Registered Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2017. The valuation standards are to be set up in accordance with Rule 18 of the aforementioned Rules. These standards are notified by the committee as constituted under Rule 19. As of now, the standards issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) in its 375th meeting are said to be in force in India.

This system of valuation speaks of valuation bases, approaches, scope of work, reporting, business valuation, intangible assets and financial instruments. These standards are aimed at bringing uniformity in the system, so as due to anarchy, one valuer is leaps and bounds ahead in giving a monetary value to the same asset as opposed to another valuer.

However, by establishing valuation standards, sometimes the motive of “value maximisation” takes a back seat as the valuation standards are not one dimensional in approach. They also take the interest of the buyer into account and are justified in doing so as well. But an argument can be made to make the entire standards lean in favour of the debtor, as the standards being followed are domestic in nature, and the domestic agency should prioritise the notion of keeping the standards in such a manner that they encourage the continuation in one form or the other to help the growing economy of the country.

Sale of Assets under the Code

The Act in itself does not shed much light upon how assets can be sold by the liquidator. However, to clarify the same, the Board, in Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, has laid down the manner in which the assets can be sold.

According to Regulation 32 of the above mentioned Regulations, the assets of a corporate debtor can be sold in various ways, such as on a standalone basis, in a slump sale, collectively as a set, in parcels, the corporate debtor as a going or the business of corporate debtor as a going concern.

Regulation 32-A further states that when in the opinion of the committee of creditors or the liquidator himself, it is beneficial for the corporate debtor to be sold as a going concern i.e. the sale as a going concern under Regulations 32(e) and (f) is only allowed if its allows value maximisation of the assets of the corporate debtor.

The Regulations provide with two methods in which the sale of assets can be carried about. The primary methods under Regulation 33 read with Schedule I is by the way of an open online bidding process. However, in special circumstances, such as in the case of perishable goods, the sale can be made by the way of a private sale as well, when it is understood that private sale will be more beneficial in realising the maximum value of the assets.

Apart from the legislative input, certain principles laid down by the judiciary are also safeguarding the interest of the buyers and sellers as well. In Gordhan Das Chuni Lal Dakuwala v. T. Sriman Kanthimathinatha Pillai[3], the Court held that when the property is sold by a private contract, then it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself that the price offered is the best that could be offered, because, the court is the custodian of the interest of the company.

In TCI Distribution Centres Ltd. v. Official Liquidator,[4] the Court held that the liquidator should not keep any information to himself, and shall convey any information he has regarding nature, description, extent of property, non-availability of title deeds, etc.

Asset Sale Report: A Mere Formality

Regulation 36 mandates that a liquidator has to prepare an asset sale report as a part of the progress reports. This regulation also spells out the contents of the asset sale report, however, the list is merely indicative, further details regarding the sale can be furnished in the report, what the liquidator feels may be of relevance.

The following details are a mandatory part of the asset sale report, as per the ambit of Regulation 36:

(a) the realised value;

(b) cost of realisation, if any;

(c) the manner and mode of sale;

(d) if the value realised is less than the value in the asset memorandum, the reasons for the same; and

(e) the person to whom the sale is made.[5]

However, the Code and the accompanying Regulations are silent on the purpose of this report. It might lead one to think that this report is a mere formality. Another reasonable presumption which can be drawn from the fact that it is to be enclosed with the progress report is that the function of this report is to make the entities concerned aware of the situation of the assets during the liquidation process.

Suggested Reforms

To achieve the elusive dream of “value maximisation”, the Code and the supplementary Regulations have laid down various provisions, such as the idea of private sale. Private sale has been allowed by the Code and the Regulations in certain cases. For example, in case the assets are of a perishable nature, or, the value of the assets will diminish with the passage of time, in such situation, a departure from the online bidding process, in the form of a private sale is allowed.

On a second look and on reading between the lines, one can easily infer that the kind of sale mentioned above is set to serve the primary purpose of “value maximisation”. Allowing the sale of the assets as a whole, or in parts, or even as a going concern is also based on the same narrative.

Hence, the Code has indeed made an effort to stick to the principle of “value maximisation”, as given in the Preamble. However, certain changes can be brought about in the legal framework of insolvency and bankruptcy in India to give a better justification to the aforementioned principle of the Preamble.

The idea of sale of assets is only introduced during the liquidation process. But during the resolution process, the interim resolution professional and the resolution professional are empowered to sell the assets of the company. But, the Code is silent on whether the sale is allowed as a part of the resolution plan. If it is explicitly laid down that the sale of assets can be made during the resolution stage, a better value can be attached to the assets, as, the fair value of the assets is generally more than the liquidation value. The value of the assets which are prone to perish or deteriorate over time can also be maximised.

During the sale of assets by the way of online bidding, an average of the value estimated by the registered valuers is taken as the base price. Instead of the average value, there is no harm in taking the base price as the fair value of the asset. This is due to the fact that there already are provisions which provide for reduction in base price in case the bidding process fails. Hence, starting from a higher base can actually fetch a higher price to the assets.

Also, if the non-disclosure of the highest bid is made the go-to format during an online bidding process, instead of it being used in exceptional circumstances, the uncertainity amongst the bidders can lead to a higher bid, and serve the principle of asset maximisation better.

Lastly, another reform which can have a positive impact on the aspiration of “value maximisation” is by introducing strict timelines with respect to Section 52 of the Code. Section 52 provides for a choice to the secured creditor as to either enforce his secured interest or to relinquish it and get his money’s worth through the liquidation process. The Code does not provide for the time within which this choice has to be made. It might happen that the asset on which the interest of the secured creditor lies is the kind that diminishes in value with the passage of time.

If the secured creditor informs of his choice to the liquidator weeks after the liquidation process has begun and by that time, a substantial value of the asset has evaporated, the Preamble of the Code will not be satisfied. Hence, the provision should be amended to include a strict timeline within which such choice is to be made, and also, a presumption that the creditor has relinquished his interest in case he fails to convey his choice.


†  IVth Year B.A. LLB (H) Student NUALS, Kochi, e-mail: puruv31@gmail.com.

[1]  2018 SCC Online NCLAT 521

[2]  Ibid

[3]  1920 SCC OnLine Mad 166

[4]  2009 SCC OnLine Mad 1481 : (20 09) 4 LW 681.

[5]  Regn. 36, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016.


Image credits: economictimes.com

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On 05.06.2020, the President of India promulgated the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 (“the Ordinance”)[1]. The Ordinance has been brought in to suspend the insolvency proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016[2] (“the Code”) for a period of 6 months. The Ordinance has inserted a new section under the code i.e. Section 10-A[3]. Section 10-A states that no application can be filed under Sections 7, 9 and  10 for a default committed on or after 25.03.2020 for a period of six months. It also provides that the same can be extended for another period of six months as and when notified at a later date.

The Ordinance was part of the Atamnirbhar package which was announced[4] by the Finance Minister on 17.05.2020 to provide relief to the companies who are on the verge of insolvency[5]. The Finance Minister had announced that the fresh insolvency filings period will be suspended for a period of one year. However, the Ordinance has only suspended the fresh insolvency filings for a period of six months. It may extend for another period of six months or for further period not extending beyond a period of one year from a date as and when notified by the Government.

There are various reasons which have been cited by the Government for the promulgation of the Ordinance which are as follows;

  • COVID-19 pandemic has impacted business, financial markets across the world including India and created uncertainty and stress for business beyond their control.
  • The nationwide lockdown since 25.04.2020 has added disruption to the normal business operations.
  • It is difficult to find adequate number of resolution applicants to rescue the corporate person
  • It is expedient to exclude the defaults arising on account of unprecedented situation.

The Ordinance has effectively provided a breather, at least for now, to the companies who may commit default on their debt obligation on or after 25.03.2020 till 25.09.2020. Interestingly since Section 9 is also suspended, many big retailers and small retailers who have committed default in the payment of rents and also defaulted in the payment obligations during  COVID-19 period of six months from 25.3.2020 are equally protected. It means that the fast track mechanism to recover the debts of financial creditors and operational creditors under the IBC, during the period of six months from 25.3.2020 has been given a decent burial.

With the new Ordinance in place, the suspension can also be extended for another period of six months i.e. till 25.03.2021. It is also clarified under the newly inserted Section 10-A that it will not apply to any default which occurred before 25.03.2020. Therefore, corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) can be initiated for any account which was declared a non-performing account (NPA) or a default committed before 25.03.2020.

Prima facie, there is an apparent conflict in the Ordinance. Section 10-A states that the proceedings cannot be filed for the default that occurred on or after 25.03.2020, for a period of six months. Ordinarily it could have meant that the insolvency proceedings for these defaults can be filed after the period of six months. However, the proviso to the section states that no application shall ever be filed for the default committed during this period of six months. This proviso is in the form an amnesty clause. It provides that the insolvency proceedings cannot ever be initiated against the company for the default that occurred during this period.

On one hand, the Ordinance is suspending the filing of the proceedings under Sections 7,   9 and 10 for a period of six months whereas on the other hand, it is stating that the same will remain suspended in perpetuity. If the intention of the Ordinance is to suspend the insolvency proceedings temporarily, then there is no requirement for providing the perpetual suspension in the proviso. It appears that there is no possible harmonious interpretation of the section and the proviso attached to it. A tweet[6] by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, regulator under the Code also stated that the default during COVID-19 shall not be the basis for initiation of Insolvency at any time. This intention runs counter to what is stated in the main section.  The Supreme Court in  J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers[7],  held that;

35. Indeed, in some cases, a proviso, may be an exception to the main provision though it cannot be inconsistent with what is expressed in the main provision and if it is so, it would be ultra vires of the main provision and struck down. As a general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso, it is proper to construe the provisions together without making either of them redundant or otiose. Even where the enacting part is clear, it is desirable to make an effort to give meaning to the proviso with a view to justify its necessity.”

(emphasis supplied)

The apparent conflict between the main section and the proviso is required to be resolved immediately to avoid any further confusion.

However, there can be a possible reason for providing the perpetual suspension. The Finance Minister also announced that  COVID-19 induced defaults will be kept outside the purview of the Code. The proviso to Section 10-A may be inserted for that purpose but the same nowhere refers to any COVID-19 induced default. Also, there is no definition provided under the Ordinance for any COVID-19 induced default. On the contrary, since the proviso has used the term “said default”, it is referring to the same defaults which are mentioned under Section 10-A. Therefore, the perpetual suspension of the default cannot be justified by any stretch of imagination.

It is also pertinent to mention that the Ordinance has also suspended fresh insolvency under Section 10 of the Code. Section 10 allowed for voluntary insolvency proceedings i.e. if a company is unable to meet its debt obligation then it can on its own file for insolvency. It is beyond any comprehension as to why force an insolvent company to continue its business. It will only lead to the reduction in the value of the company. The same will act as an impediment for the resolution of the same as a going concern.

The Ordinance has also amended Section 66 of the Code which provides right to the Resolution Professional (RP) to file an application for against any business of corporate debtor which is being carried with the intent to defraud the creditors. A new sub-section is being added to exempt the RP from filing any application under Section 66 for the defaults for which CIRP is being suspended under Section 10-A. This particular amendment was necessary as lot of changes in the loan structure of the corporate debtor will be done in order to mitigate the disruption caused by the pandemic which may change the priority of creditors under Section 53 of the Code.

The Ordinance has provided a much-needed relief to the companies. It has provided at least a period of six months to the companies to get back on their feet and continue fulfilling their repayment of debt obligations. The Ordinance has also taken into consideration the  interest of the financial institutions by not providing a blanket suspension of any proceedings to recover a debt, which was floated earlier. It needs to be seen how well the debtors would take this opportunity to streamline their businesses. Otherwise it will go the same way as the defaults committed in MUDRA loans. This small dose of help by the Government should not be misused by the defaulters. However, the apparent conflict between the main section and the proviso needs to be resolved on an immediate basis.


*Delhi based Advocate

** Student, National University of Study and Research in Law

[1] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 [No. 9 of 2020]

[2] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 

[3] Section 10-A, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020   

[4] Economic Times, FM provides Covid-19 relief, no fresh insolvency proceeding against MSMEs for 1 year

[5] Press Information Bureau, Finance Minister announces Government Reforms and Enablers across Seven Sectors under AatmaNirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan, 17.05.2020. Available at: https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1624661

[6] https://twitter.com/IBBIlive/status/1268932122519060480

[7] (1996) 6 SCC 665  

COVID 19Op EdsOP. ED.

The Finance Minister while addressing the media on several financial decisions and schemes undertaken by the Government for the benefit of the common masses due to the sudden outbreak of novel COVID-19, which has brought the entire country to a grinding halt, announced that the threshold limit for triggering a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the Insolvency Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) shall stand increased to INR 1 crore.

The Gazette Notification dated 24-03-2020 [MCA Notification S.O. 1205(E)] categorically states that, by virtue of the power conferred by Parliament on the Central Government, vide the proviso to Section 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, may, by notification, increase the amount of default to a maximum amount of INR 1 crore. However, the said notification does not have any clarification as to the cut-off date with respect to the effective date, or, in the alternative if the notification comes into force immediately then what happens to the pending matters where notices have been issued but the National Company Law Tribunal (“the Adjudicating Authority”) is yet to admit the same. There is lack of clarity with respect to the aforesaid scenario, which will be creating confusion and will result in an ouster of cases which could not have been taken up due to this pandemic. A noble cause will get buried in this act of haste which will result in loss of forum, class-based differential treatment and confusion in the minds of the mass which are all attributes to the test of arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this article, we have tried to test the viability of the Notification dated 24-03-2020 as it is and whether the lack of clarification will create more confusion than already existing, which will result in multifarious litigation.

While answering a policy decision, the first question that needs to be addressed is whether there is a power or is a colourable exercise of power or, a case of excessive delegation of powers?

The answer in this case is that, the power of the executive Government to increase the amount of default is beyond question, however, it should be examined on the bedrock and touchstone of reasonability and also whether it satisfies the test of objectivity for the purpose the  executive seeks to achieve through this notification.

For better understanding, Section 4 of the Code is reproduced:

“PART II

Insolvency Resolution and Liquidation for Corporate Persons

CHAPTER I

Preliminary & Definitions

4. Application of this Part.— (1) This Part shall apply to matters relating to the insolvency and liquidation of corporate debtors where the minimum amount of the default is one lakh rupees:

Provided that the Central Government may, by notification, specify the minimum amount of default of higher value which shall not be more than one crore rupees.

The proviso to the aforesaid section empowers the executive to increase the threshold limit up to INR 1 crore and the minimum amount for triggering is mentioned as INR 1 lakh.

While testing a policy decision on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution needs more scrutiny than otherwise as the scope for judicial review is very limited. We need to apply the settled parameters as laid down by the Supreme Court from time to time starting from Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar.[1]

The principles are the following:

  1. The policy decision should not be class based which is strictly forbidden.
  2. It should not be manifestly arbitrary causing confusion and prejudice so as to negate statutory rights as well fundamental rights.
  3. It should satisfy the object and the rationale test.

To understand the purpose of the executive in enacting the aforesaid Notification dated 24.03.2020, one needs to scrutinise the object with the purpose the notification seeks to achieve.

The Government, as an aid to provide boost to the micro, small & medium enterprises industrial sector (hereinafter referred to as the “MSME”) during this period of worldwide lock-down raised the threshold and ordered immediate implementation of the same. However, the intent although shown in the press conference does not find place in the notification, as the notification has raised the threshold limit en bloc irrespective of sectors and category. However, the possible justification which could be inferred from the press conference is that, unless the threshold is increased, the MSME sector might default in payments and the creditors may send the industries into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and subsequently into liquidation.

As an illustration, if an MSME industry causes default in payments, then the financial creditor or the operational creditor might drag the company to the National Company Law Tribunal under Section 7 or Section 9 of the Code.

The aforesaid object and reasoning seems plausible, if we look at it with the object to save medium and small-scale industries as they also feature as the backbone of the Indian industrial economy.

On the other hand, while backing the aforesaid object with the rationale; the intention of executive militates against the very object behind framing of the Code which are:

  • The small-scale industries and medium scale, workmen, employees, distributors who basically come within the framework of operational creditors do not have to run from pillar to post to recover their money.
  • Clear demarcation of financial creditors and operational creditors and their stakes along with disbursement procedure.
  • Faster resolution process and time bound court process.
  • Cost-effective.
  • Easy accessibility.

The recent notification, in the absence of any clarification with respect to the date of commencement or the “effective date” and also, with respect to the cases where demand notices have been sent under Section 8 of the Code by an operational creditor, the cases which have been filed but could not be taken up because of this pandemic coupled with the cases which are yet to be admitted.

The notification in the absence of any clarification will be creating problem for the Courts with respect to the application of the same, as going by prior experience, the matters are likely to be shown the door due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. It will create a void as well as havoc as to the transition or transfer of those matters.

For example, if a default had arisen in January 2019, it cannot be simply  shown the door under the Code of 2016 by giving the justification of a pandemic in March 2020 by virtue of this notification, as the limitation to trigger insolvency under this Code stays live for a period of 3 years from the date of default[2]. Normally, by applying the canons of statutory interpretation and by invoking Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, all amendments or notifications are prospective unless specified to be retrospective; for which the power must be delegated to the executive by the legislature in the statute itself. However, none of the provisions in the Code, delegate that power to the executive.

When we think about the application of the upgraded threshold limit on the fresh cases which have been filed but could not be taken up due to limited functioning of the Courts and also the cases where defaults range from 2018-till date and the demand notices have been issued, the doors of the National Company Law Tribunal are likely to be shut on their faces because without there being any clarificatory note, the notification has come into application and might impact such pending cases also. Hence, by necessary implication this notification could become retrospective which is not only illegal but also perverse because the Supreme Court in the judgment of S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India[3] while considering a retrospective notification under the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 had laid down the following: (SCC p. 746)

“18. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation.(See Keshavan Madhava Memon v. State of Bombay[4]). But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only ‘nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis’. In the words of Lord Blanesburgh,

“provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment.”

It is an accepted position that this notification is an executive act and not an amendment. Hence, this can be safely termed as a delegated piece of legislation. It is trite in law that a delegated piece of legislation cannot be made to be retrospective by the executive unless and until the statute gives the executive such power[5]. It is an accepted norm since the age of Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab[6] that, the executive can do such acts under a statute as far as permitted and as far as the power of the legislature extends.

Whenever the Government had decided on issues relating to raising the  pecuniary limit or enacting a separate law, which would cause loss of jurisdiction, the executive and the legislature in its wisdom on earlier occasions had taken care of such transition by issuing a clarification or by enacting a provision.

For example, when the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was enacted, cases were transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunals (CAT) vide Section 29 of the Act of 1985. Similar situation and enactment had taken place when the Company Law Board was abolished and the jurisdiction got transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal vide Section 466 of the Companies Act, 2013.

However, there is no such provision in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The amendment of March 2020[7] is also silent on this aspect. The notification is also silent on the aspect of pending cases or where demand notices have been issued within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 238-A of the Code, 2016, which is three years.

As a recent example, we would like to cite the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019  dated 28-12-2019 whereby vide Section 3 of the said Ordinance, the criteria for home-buyers for approaching the NCLT under Section 7 of the Code was amended and the criteria was modified to 10% or 100 home-buyers from the same real estate project. The proviso to such an amendment laid down that for pending applications which were yet to be admitted, they must be amended within 30 days.

The said proviso was taking away the right of the people which had already accrued and was made to operative retrospectively by giving a time period of 30 days to amend the petition. Such an exercise of power in the absence of a provision expressly granting such retrospective enactments was prima facie arbitrary and called for a scrutiny by the  Court.

The said provision was challenged by way of a writ petition before the Supreme Court of India, wherein the Supreme Court vide order dated 13-01-2020 was pleased to order status quo with respect to the petitions already filed[8]. The matter is sub judice before the Supreme Court and we shall await the decision of the Supreme Court on this aspect which will be critical to the analysis of delegated powers to the executive under the Code, 2016.

However, despite the pendency of the said writ petition and the Ordinance being subject-matter of challenge, the Government went ahead and passed the aforesaid Ordinance as an Amendment Act on 13.03.2020. The passage of the ordinance as an Amendment Act on 13.03.2020 by retaining the same provision which was stayed by the Supreme Court, nullifies the writ petition pending adjudication and the order of the Supreme Court. However, that is a separate matter to be examined by the Court.

The Notification dated 24.03.2020 does not have such a proviso also as that of the Amendment Act of 2020, which makes things worse, as in both the litigants and the Courts will be clueless with respect to its applicability and the effect it would have on the pending petitions which are yet to be admitted. Hence, on this aspect also, the notification fails to satisfy the test of objectivity.

Thereafter, coming to the question of class-based legislation, the Notification dated 24.03.2020, completely ignores many aspects, namely, as far as the workmen are concerned, they must now rely on the trade unions to initiate or trigger insolvency, but again small trade unions with limited number of members will not be able to match the threshold. The Government by this way has pushed them to the already pre-existing alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On the other hand, if there is no trade union then the option under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 fizzles out, even though both workmen and employees are covered under the definition of “operational creditors.” However, such remedy does not seem plausible for employees, as they cannot be a part of a trade union under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Hence, the employees who were in the process to approach the National Company Law Tribunal, now must take the alternate routes, as available under law even though they are time consuming and expensive.

Hence, here also it results in class-based distinction. For example, trade unions having a membership of over 200 will be able to achieve the threshold limit and other unions having a membership of 25 or 50 workmen cannot fulfil the threshold limit. The Trade Unions Act, 1926, however, prescribes the number of workmen required to register a trade union as seven. Hence, by default, there will be a sub-classification within a class; if a trade union is taken to be a class by itself.

Secondly, the small-scale distributors who supply goods, raw materials etc, but suffer from defaults in the hands of debtors, will have to fall back to the civil courts and file recovery suit or summary suit or a suit for specific performance, as the case may be.

The object of the Code to save the Indian economy from the backlash of bad debts and bringing the perpetrators to justice by tightening the noose of insolvency ends with this notification, as it will suit a particular class, which therefore turns out to be manifestly arbitrary.

For example, a small distributor of cotton yarn whose yearly billing with one manufacturer who takes supply of cotton yarn is around INR 20 lakhs, has to wait for 5 years from the date of default to reach the INR 1 crore mark but again will fail under the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 238-A of the Code, 2016 which says that the aggrieved must approach the court within 3 years of default, else it becomes time barred.

The Government prior to raising the threshold under the Code, had already issued an Office Memorandum dated 19.02.2020 with a clarificatory Office Memorandum dated 20.03.2020 covering the current situation of the country wide lockdown due to the pandemic under the “force majeure” clause (act of God) of the subsisting contracts.[9] Hence, the default on payments during this time could not have been considered as intentional defaults. The office memorandum could still be clarified further, saying, that the aforesaid force majeure clause shall apply to any transaction with effect from 19.2.2020 for a period of one year.

Neither the notification of increase of threshold under the Code, 2016 nor the office memorandums referred above have a retrospective effect whereby, the rights of the operational as well as the financial creditors which have accrued for the past one year or two years cannot suddenly be shut out by this action, which will result in manifest arbitrariness.

The ungazetted Notification dated 29.03.2020 published by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) with respect to the third amendment sought to be effected in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy  Board  of  India  (Insolvency  Resolution  Process  for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 vide Clause 40-C, is that, the period of lock-down as notified by the Government will not counted for the purposes of limitation or for the purposes of cause of action/defaults in payment. Therefore, the proposed Clause 40-C should have been enough to tackle the present situation rather than arbitrary action of the Executive by raising the threshold limit for triggering insolvency process, as it clearly says that the present period of lockdown shall not be counted for any purpose including defaults.

On the other hand, Reserve Bank of India, vide press statement dated 27.03.2020 granted a three-month moratorium to all term loans, outstanding as on 01.03.2020 from payment of equated monthly instalments (EMIs), which would cover the working capital loans, cash credit/overdraft loans, housing loans, etc. It has further been clarified that this moratorium will not affect the classification of the assets which are under hypothecation or mortgage.

On the legal aspect, we should examine the aforesaid Notification dated 24.03.2020 on the touchstone of Article 14 and see whether the notification passes the muster for the test of manifest arbitrariness as laid down by the  Supreme Court recently in the judgment of Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Union of India[10]. The test of “manifest arbitrariness” involves a determination as to whether something is done capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle by the legislature. Particularly, while applying this doctrine to a piece of legislation, the Court must examine whether that legislation is unfair, unreasonable, discriminatory, non-transparent, capricious, biased with favoritism or nepotism, and not in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment.

Now, the aforesaid notification of increase of threshold is unreasonable and discriminatory qua financial creditors and operational creditors as financial creditors as a class gets to stay within framework and there is a sub-classification with the class of operational creditors wherein small and medium scale players lose out while on the contrary, the habitual defaulters who are within the definition of small scale industries to medium scale industries stand to benefit. Next, on the issue of equitable treatment, the notification as explained above creates a sub-class within the class of financial as well as operational creditors which the legislature in its wisdom chose not to do.

It is trite in law that there cannot be a sub-class within a class. Operational creditors taken as a class cannot be further segregated on the pre-emption that the defaults below INR 1 crore are suddenly not worth adjudicating under the IBC regime.

While the action of the executive may look fantastic at first brush, the same is definitely not backed up by reasons while the settled law is that class specific legislation is not supported by jurisprudence and we have settled precedents under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Further, the Government has issued a press statement specifying that they are contemplating suspension of the operation of Sections 7 to 10 of the Code, 2016 which provide for the mechanism for petitions by the Financial Creditors (Section 7) and by the operational creditors (under Sections 8 and 9 of IBC, 2016). The aforesaid notification of increase of threshold amount has already made the operation of Sections 7 to 9 of IBC, 2016, redundant as it will suit only a handful of big businessman/corporate houses, which fall within the ambit of operational creditors and big financial institutions who fall within the ambit of financial creditors. It will also suit home-buyers who have invested in big projects of worth more than a crore, while the small scale home buyers whose flats are worth INR 40-50 lakhs stand to lose out.

While Section 4 of IBC, 2016 gives the Government a prerogative to issue policy directions, but those policy directions must not be manifestly arbitrary and cannot result in sub-classification which ultimately runs contrary to the object and purpose of the legislature and of the statute itself.[11]

However, the notification for the reasons mentioned above if at all is put to test, in our opinion will have slim chances of getting approved, as it fails to stand on legs and pass the muster of manifest arbitrariness.

Going by the logic of the executive that is to safeguard the small scale and medium scale industries from getting doomed under the present scenario, militates against itself considering the invocation of force majeure clause which includes the present scenario and the moratorium announced by Reserve Bank of India for a period of three months. Therefore, the defaulter of less than INR 1 crore shall stand to benefit from all the three notifications while the small scale/medium scale companies stands to huge pecuniary loss who cannot resort to any remedy for realisation of its debts/losses. The statement issued by RBI  and the force majeure clause would have saved the defaulters for 3-6 months, whereas by this notification, the perpetual defaulters are saved from the rigours of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 for eternity.

CONCLUSION

As it is said, an act of haste is not always advisable and good. The proper act of the Government should be to come out with a proper clarification of the notification as to its applicability with a proper provision dealing with pending matters.

In the alternative, the Government can altogether withdraw the notification and issue a notification as indicated by suspending Sections 7 to 10 of IBC, 2016 for a period of 6 months, as it will support the cause as intended by the Government through its Notification dated 19.2.2020 (force majeure) and the press statement issued by Reserve Bank of India on 27.03.2020.

If the aforesaid is not done, in all probability the noble cause might face difficulty if challenged before a court of law.


*This article has been co-authored by Mr Wasim Beg, Partner; L&L Partners Litigation, New Delhi and;

**Mr Swarnendu Chatterjee, Advocate-On-Record, Supreme Court of India and Senior Associate, L&L Partners, Litigation, New Delhi.

[1] (1955) 1 SCR 1045

[2] Section 238-A, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the Limitation Act, 1963.

[3] (2006) 2 SCC 740

[4] 1951 SCR 228

[5] Director General of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports, (2016) 2 SCC 226

[6] (1955) 2 SCR 225 .

[7] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020

[8] Manish Kumar v. Union of India, WP (Civil) No. 26 of 2020, order dated 13.01.2020

[9] OM No. 283/18/2020 and OM No. F/18/4/2020-PPD, Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure.

[10] 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1520.

[11] Rashbihari Panda v. Union of India, (1969) 1 SCC 414


Image Credits: ETRealty.com

Op EdsOP. ED.

Introduction

On 24-03-2020, the Government of India (‘the Government’) released a Notification[1] in exercise of its powers under Section 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) wherein the minimum amount of default for the initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) is increased multifold from the previously existing threshold of Rupees one lakh to Rupees one crore .The notification has effectually amended Section 4 of the IBC which earlier stood as follows:

4. (1) This Part shall apply to matters relating to the insolvency and liquidation of corporate debtors where the minimum amount of the default is one lakh rupees:

Provided that the Central Government may, by notification, specify the minimum amount of default of higher value which shall not be more than one crore rupees.”

Henceforth, the minimum amount of default under the IBC will now be one crore rupees by the implication of the above mentioned notification.

Notification and its intricacies

It is noteworthy, that the Hon’ble Finance Minister, Mrs Nirmala Sitharaman indicated that the notification forms part of the several important relief measures taken by the Government because of COVID-19 outbreak[2]. The Government stated that the threshold is being increased to protect the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (‘MSME’) that are facing the threat of insolvency in the wake of this outbreak. However, the subsequently released Gazette Notification reflects no such objective.

More so, there have been reports[3], in the media that the Government is mulling plans to ramp up the threshold for initiating CIRP under IBC. The 3rd Annual Insolvency Law Committee Report[4] which was released on 20-02-2020 also recommends increasing the threshold from the existing Rupees one lakh to Rupees fifty lakhs. The primary reason which was put forth by the Committee to increase the threshold was to reduce the pressure upon the judicial infrastructure i.e. the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’).

Ramifications on the stakeholders

The nature of the notification calls for a threefold analysis that would categorically concern all the stakeholders, namely, NCLT, companies, and the creditors.

Firstly, the move may be welcomed if we adopt the perspective that the change in the threshold would substantially reduce the number of cases before the NCLT and will effectively increase the efficiency of the Tribunal in speedy disposal of the matters as time is of the essence in the IBC proceedings[5]. Also, it is pertinent to mention that initially NCLT was established to deal with company law matters. However, with the introduction of the IBC, the forum now seems to be dominated by proceedings related to it and therefore it is functioning far beyond its capacity[6].

Be that as it may, altering the threshold never appeared to be the only viable alternative for addressing the issue of burden upon NCLTs. The same could be improved by providing better infrastructures, expediting and increasing the appointment of members, and increasing the number of Benches of the NCLTs rather than increasing the threshold under IBC.

Secondly, while the change in the IBC is hailed by the Government as a supportive measure for the MSME, the same may attack it  back with greater intensity. The operational creditors of corporate debtors in most of the cases are companies themselves. Ergo, they become susceptible to becoming prospective corporate debtors if their existing dues are not recovered due to the increased threshold. The amendment, therefore, will run counter to the objectives of the IBC.

Thirdly, the entities that are affected most are the operational creditors. The operational debt is more often than not, low in figures and unsecured at the same time[7]. Therefore, the operational creditors would largely be barred to proceed under the IBC and will have to resort to the previously setup mechanisms of debt recovery which were time taking and ineffective. Such mechanisms may further be stalled by way of moratorium if a CIRP is initiated against the corporate debtor by virtue of an application filed by any other creditor. The Supreme Court in Committee of Creditors, Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta[8], has emphasised the role of operational creditors. In such circumstances, eliminating them from the scope and protection of the IBC without any requisite consultation and reasoning in that regard is not appreciable.

Also, the notification would have a detrimental effect on the cases of employees and workmen, who are allowed to make an application to the NCLTs in  cases of default[9]. But now the threshold stands modified at Rupees one crore, a large segment of employees would have no option for recovery other than going through the tedious and elongated court processes.

Possible alternative solution

Rather than altering the threshold for every class of creditors, the Government could have provided different thresholds for financial and operational creditors respectively. The said practice also has the approval of the judiciary[10], as the Supreme Court unequivocally held that there is an ”intelligible differentia” in the classification of financial and operational creditors.

Also, as the purpose of the amendment is to protect the companies from the economic slowdown due to the outbreak of COVID-19, the Government could have increased the threshold for a company having a relatively low annual turnover. It could have also prescribed similar qualifications as provided under the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 for the classification of enterprises[11].

Alternatively, if the objective of the Government was to protect the MSME, it could have simply notified a different threshold for MSME as it has already done in the case of the particular type of creditors like the creditors of real estate companies[12].

Conclusion

The notification, as discussed above, is a significant change under the IBC regime. More so, there are ongoing proceedings wherein the amount of default is less than Rupees one crore  and therefore, the notification requires a clarification concerning pending applications for initiation of a CIRP. Moreover, the amendment can unsettle the scheme and object of the Code which was to promote entrepreneurship and availability of credit in the commercial fora. There is also no clarity as to the duration of operation of the notification. While the Government has stated that it’s a temporary measure[13], the same was not reflected in the Amendment Notification and thus it is yet to be seen if it gets rolled back in future or gains permanence.


*Akshay Sharma and Kunwar Surya Pratap, 5th and 3rd year law students respectively at National University of Study & Research in Law, Ranchi.

[1]. Notification No. REGD. NO. D. L – 33004/99, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, The Gazette of India, 24-3-2020. Source: <https://www.ibbi.gov.in/uploads/legalframwork/48bf32150f5d6b30477b74f652964edc.pdf>

[2]  Govt raises default threshold to Rs 1 crore for invoking insolvency proceedings against firms, Economic Times, 24-3-2020. Source:https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/govt-raises-default-threshold-to-rs-1-cr-for-invoking-insolvency-proceedings-against-firms/articleshow/74796076.cms?from=mdr

[3] Govt. ramps up capacity of NCLT Benches to boost decision-making, Business Standard, 16-3-2020.

Source:<https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/govt-ramps-up-capacity-of-the-nclt-benches-to-boost-decision-making-120031601566_1.html>

[4]  3rd  Report of The Insolvency Law Committee, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, 20-2-2020. Source: http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/ICLReport_05032020.pdf>

[5] Surendra Trading Co. v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Co. Ltd., (2017) 16 SCC 143.

[6] Gavel to the block: An overburdened NCLT is a drag on the new Bankruptcy Code, Economic Times, 12-2-2019. Source: <https://prime.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/67951567/corporate-governance/gavel-to-the-block-an-overburdened-nclt-is-a-drag-on-the-new-bankruptcy-code>

[7] Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17, para 50.

[8] 2019 SCC Online SC 1478.

[9] Sections 5(21) & 9, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

[10] Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 73.

[11] S. 7, The Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

[12] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, Ministry of Law and Justice, The Gazette of India, 28-12-2019. Source:<https://www.ibbi.gov.in/uploads/legalframwork/d6b171ec9b9ea5c54f7423bc36f92977.pdf>

[13] IBC: Increase in threshold to trigger insolvency may not be a temporary measure, Experts say, Payaswini Upadhyay, BloombergQuint, 24-3-2020. Source: <https://www.bloombergquint.com/law-and-policy/ibc-increase-in-threshold-to-trigger-insolvency-may-not-be-a-temporary-measure-experts-say>

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal: Justice S.K Singh (Chairperson), while hearing a petition regarding the dispute relating to the procedures to be followed by the telecom companies for obtaining the Unified License (UL), ordered in the favour of the petitioner, Aircel Ltd.

The issue in the present case arose when the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), Ministry of Communications, perpetually rejected the application of the petitioner for migration of its Cellular Mobile Telephone Service (CMTS) license to Unified License (UL) without properly considering the application of the petitioner.

The petitioner had filed for Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. By virtue of the provisions of IBC, a Resolution Professional (RP) was appointed and he was supposed to take over the charge of the debtor company so as to preserve the value of the property of the debtor company and manage its operation, suspending all the powers of the Directors of the petitioner company.

Under the broad guidelines laid down by the DoT for obtaining UL, Para 8 of which required the applicant company was required to submit an application which should be certified by the Company Secretary and authorized directors of the company. The petitioner company applied for the license with the respondents where the team of the appointed RP of the company had authorized the director of the petitioner company, Sandeep Vats, to be the authorised signatory.

The counsel for the respondents, Apoorv Kurup justified the decision of the respondents to reject the migration application of the petitioner company twice on the grounds of misrepresentation of the authorised signatory and non- compliance with the full procedure at the time of making the application on both the occasions.

The counsel for the petitioners, Salman Khurshid, contended that the power of attorney was transferred to Mr Vats by the team of the authorised RP and an email intimating the DoT was sent accordingly and hence the procedure was met with. Reliance was placed on the case of United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660  where it was held the even in the absence of an earlier Resolution of Board of Directors authorizing a person to sign the pleadings by an officer can be later ratified by a corporation later.

The Appellate Tribunal accepted the arguments of the petitioner and hence declared the order passed by the DoT on two previous occasions as bad in law and set it aside accordingly on the grounds of peculiar approach of the respondent in passing the orders.

The petition was allowed and the Tribunal held that the CTMS licence of the petitioner should be migrated to UL as a temporary arrangement till it is considered and made permanent by the DoT. [Aircel Ltd. v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine TDSAT 1, decided on 10-01-2020]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of RF Nariman, Sanjiv Khanna and Surya Kant, JJ has held the Amendment Act to Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 made pursuant to a report prepared by the Insolvency Law Committee dated 26th March, 2018 does not infringe Articles 14, 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6), or 300-A of the Constitution of India.

The amendments so made deem allottees of real estate projects to be “financial creditors” so that they may trigger the Code, under Section 7 thereof, against the real estate developer. In addition, being financial creditors, they are entitled to be represented in the Committee of Creditors by authorised representatives.

HOMEBUYERS AS FINANCIAL CREDITORS

The Amendment was challenged on ground that the treatment of allottees as financial creditors violates two facets of Article 14. One, that the amendment is discriminatory inasmuch as it treats unequals equally, and equals unequally, having no intelligible differentia; and two, that there is no nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by the Code.

On this the Court said that like other financial creditors, be they banks and financial institutions, or other individuals, all persons who have advanced monies to the corporate debtor should have the right to be on the Committee of Creditors.

“True, allottees are unsecured creditors, but they have a vital interest in amounts that are advanced for completion of the project, maybe to the extent of 100% of the project being funded by them alone.”

The Court further said that given the fact that allottees may not be a homogenous group, yet there are only two ways in which they can vote on the Committee of Creditors – either to approve or to disapprove of a proposed resolution plan.

“Sub-section (3A) goes a long way to ironing out any creases that may have been felt in the working of Section 25A in that the authorised representative now casts his vote on behalf of all financial creditors that he represents. If a decision taken by a vote of more than 50% of the voting share of the financial creditors that he represents is that a particular plan be either 145 accepted or rejected, it is clear that the minority of those who vote, and all others, will now be bound by this decision.”

DEEMING PROVISION

The Court noticed that although a deeming provision is to deem what is not there in reality, thereby requiring the subject matter to be treated as if it were real, yet several authorities and judgments show that a deeming fiction can also be used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain. It held,

“the deeming fiction that is used by the explanation is to put beyond doubt the fact that allottees are to be regarded as financial creditors within the enacting part contained in Section 5(8)(f) of the Code.”

EXPLANATION ADDED TO SECTION 5(8)(f)

The Court further noticed that an explanation does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original Section. But if it does, effect must be given to the legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that the legislature has named a provision as an explanation. It, hence, held,

“the explanation was added by the Amendment Act only to clarify doubts that had arisen as to whether home buyers/allottees were subsumed within Section 5(8)(f). The explanation added to Section 5(8)(f) of the Code by the Amendment Act does not in fact enlarge the scope of the original Section as home buyers/allottees would be subsumed within Section 5(8)(f) as it originally stood.”

RULING

  • The Amendment Act to Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 made pursuant to a report prepared by the Insolvency Law Committee dated 26th March, 2018 does not infringe Articles 14, 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6), or 300-A of the Constitution of India.
  • The RERA is to be read harmoniously with the Code, as amended by the Amendment Act. It is only in the event of conflict that the Code will prevail over the RERA. Remedies that are given to allottees of flats/apartments are therefore concurrent remedies, such allottees of flats/apartments being in a position to avail of remedies under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, RERA as well as the triggering of the Code.
  • Section 5(8)(f) as it originally appeared in the Code being a residuary provision, always subsumed within it allottees of flats/apartments. The explanation together with the deeming fiction added by the Amendment Act is only clarificatory of this position in law.

[Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1005, decided on 09.08.2019]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Holding that the trade union represents its members who are workers, to whom dues may be owed by the employer, which are certainly debts owed for services rendered by each individual workman, who are collectively represented by the trade union, the bench of RF Nariman and Vineet Saran, JJ said,

“to state that for each workman there will be a separate cause of action, a separate claim, and a separate date of default would ignore the fact that a joint petition could be filed under Rule 6 read with Form 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016, with authority from several workmen to one of them to file such petition on behalf of all.”

The Court was deciding the question whether a trade union could be said to be an operational creditor for the purpose of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

The Court noticed that a trade union is certainly an entity established under a statute – namely, the Trade Unions Act, and would therefore fall within the definition of “person” under Sections 3(23) of the Code. This being so, it is clear that an “operational debt”, meaning a claim in respect of employment, could certainly be made by a person duly authorised to make such claim on behalf of a workman. Rule 6, Form 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016 also recognises the fact that claims may be made not only in an individual capacity, but also conjointly.

It was further noticed that a registered trade union recognised by Section 8 of the Trade Unions Act, makes it clear that it can sue and be sued as a body corporate under Section 13 of that Act. Equally, the general fund of the trade union, which inter alia is from collections from workmen who are its members, can certainly be spent on the conduct of disputes involving a member or members thereof or for the prosecution of a legal proceeding to which the trade union is a party, and which is undertaken for the purpose of protecting the rights arising out of the relation of its members with their employer, which would include wages and other sums due from the employer to workmen.

The Court, hence, said,

“Looked at from any angle, there is no doubt that a registered trade union which is formed for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and their employer can maintain a petition as an operational creditor on behalf of its members. We must never forget that procedure is the handmaid of justice and is meant to serve justice.”

[JK Jute Mill Mazdoor Morcha v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 619, decided on 30.04.2019]

Call For PapersLaw School News

Chanakya National Law University is organizing a One-Day UGC Sponsored National Seminar on “INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE: A PARADIGM SHIFT” which focuses on creating a nation-wide conversation providing an opportunity to students, academicians, law professionals and all other stakeholders to put forward their research and share their knowledge on wide range of topics relating to Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and related subjects.
The purpose of the Seminar is to provoke discussion and debate on a range of topics and including subjects like Bankruptcy for Corporate, Insolvency Professional, traditional knowledge protection, amongst others. The agenda is
kept deliberately broad and the discussions are intended to be accessible to a general audience. The Seminar program offers high-level content relevant not only to students pursuing law or any other academic degree but also to young innovators from different fields; advocates, policy advisors, academicians, judicial officers and a range of government and non-government organizations to engage in a dialogue on Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
Through this initiative, we want our students and faculty to develop a broader perspective of their responsibility to
society and to give them an opportunity to listen to experiences, researches and findings of our esteemed panel of speakers, guests, academicians as well as students.
The Seminar will also provide a unique opportunity for lawyers and associated professional members in the region to exchange insights, explore current policy and practice issues, and exposure to a professional network of colleagues with shared interests and expertise.
We cordially invite articles, case notes and research papers on the theme from all academicians, researchers, advocates, social activists and students pursuing law or any other academic degree. Interested participants may submit their abstracts and full papers for the Seminar on the following e-mail ID: ibc.cnlu2019@gmail.com
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For more details, refer IBC Seminar Brochure
Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The Bench of RF Nariman and Navin Sinha, JJ, yet again dealing with an issue relating to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, held that members of the erstwhile Board of Directors, being vitally interested in resolution plans that may be discussed at meetings of the committee of creditors, must be given a copy of such plans as part of “documents” that have to be furnished along with the notice of such committee of creditor (CoC) meetings.

The Court was hearing the appeal arising out of an Appellate Tribunal’s judgment rejecting the appellant’s prayer for directions to the resolution professional to provide all relevant documents including the insolvency resolution plans in question to members of the suspended Board of Directors of the corporate debtor in each case so that they may meaningfully participate in meetings held by the CoC.

Holding that the expression “documents” is a wide expression which would certainly include resolution plans, the Bench said:

“every participant is entitled to a notice of every meeting of the committee of creditors. Such notice of meeting must contain an agenda of the meeting, together with the copies of all documents relevant for matters to be discussed and the issues to be voted upon at the meeting vide Regulation 21(3)(iii). Obviously, resolution plans are “matters to be discussed” at such meetings, and the erstwhile Board of Directors are “participants” who will discuss these issues.”

The Court also noticed that under Regulation 38(1)(a), a resolution plan shall include a statement as to how it has dealt with the interest of all stakeholders, and under sub-clause 3(a), a resolution plan shall demonstrate that it addresses the cause of default. It, hence, said:

“This Regulation also, therefore, recognizes the vital interest of the erstwhile Board of Directors in a resolution plan together with the cause of default. It is here that the erstwhile directors can represent to the committee of creditors that the cause of default is not due to the erstwhile management, but due to other factors which may be beyond their control, which have led to non-payment of the debt.”

The Court also rejected the contention that a director simplicitor would have the right to get documents as against a director who is a financial creditor. It explained:

“The proviso to Section 21(2) clarifies that a director who is also a financial creditor who is a related party of the corporate debtor shall not have any right of representation, participation, or voting in a meeting of the committee of creditors. Directors, simplicitor, are not the subject matter of the proviso to Section 21(2), but only directors who are related parties of the corporate debtor. It is only such persons who do not have any right of representation, participation, or voting in a meeting of the committee of creditors.”

The Court, hence, directed that the appellants be given copies of all resolution plans submitted to the CoC within a period of two weeks.

[Vijay Kumar Jain v. Standard Chartered Bank, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 103, decided on 31.01.2019]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench: This Bench comprising Mr V.P. Singh and Mr Ravikumar Duraisamy as members dismissed a petition filed under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP), holding that the same had been filed on wrong facts by giving false information.

Petitioner approached the respondent to render certain services at its manufacturing plant in Tamil Nadu, for which it made an advance payment of Rs 44, 00,000. However, despite repeated reminders, respondent failed in the scheduled delivery. Petitioner, vide a legal notice, called upon the respondent to return advance payment and also compensate it for the financial loss suffered. Thus, the present petition was filed for initiation of against the respondent.

Petitioner submitted particulars of claim, records of respondent’s bank account, bank certificate and demand notice. Respondent filed counter affidavit highlighting irregularities in the instant petition. It was also submitted that delay was on account of the modification instructions given by the employees of petitioner and that the petitioner was not really interested in getting his work done but only interested in making a claim against respondent.

The Tribunal opined that Operational Debt as defined under Section 5(21) of the Act means “a claim in respect of the provision of goods or services including employment or debt in respect of the repayment of dues arising under any law.” Refund of advance money was not in connection with the goods/services including employment or a debt in respect of repayment of dues.

Further, the petitioner ought to have crystallized the damages then only, it could have claimed the amount of compensation. The alleged compensation amount had not even been quantified by the petitioner. Since petitioner’s claim had not been adjudicated by any competent authority in law, hence, it could not be described as operational debt.

In view of the above, it was held that petition had been filed with an ulterior motive to get insolvency petition admitted. Thus, the petition was dismissed imposing a cost of Rs 10 lakhs on the petitioner.[TATA Chemicals Ltd. v. Raj Process Equipments and Systems (P) Ltd., CP 21/I&BP/NCLT/MAH/2018, Order dated 30-11-2018]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The bench of RF Nariman and Navin Sinha, JJ has, in a landmark verdict, upheld the validity of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in it’s entirety as the provisions contained therin pass the constitutional muster.

Noticing that in the working of the Code, the flow of financial resource to the commercial sector in India has increased exponentially as a result of financial debts being repaid, the bench said:

“The defaulter‘s paradise is lost. In its place, the economy‘s rightful position has been regained.”

Object of the Code

The primary focus of the legislation is to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by protecting the corporate debtor from its own management and from a corporate death by liquidation. The Code is thus a beneficial legislation which puts the corporate debtor back on its feet, not being a mere recovery legislation for creditors. The interests of the corporate debtor have, therefore, been bifurcated and separated from that of its promoters / those who are in management.

Classification between ‘Financial Creditor’ and ‘Operational Creditor’, if discriminatory

The Court elaborated on the distinction between the two and held that:

“preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern, while ensuring maximum recovery for all creditors being the objective of the Code, financial creditors are clearly different from operational creditors and therefore, there is obviously an intelligible differentia between the two which has a direct relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Code.”

Below are the differences between ‘Financial Creditor’ and ‘Operational Creditor’ as elaborated by the Court:

Financial Creditor

Operational Creditor

most financial creditors, particularly banks and financial institutions, are secured creditors

most operational creditors are unsecured, payments for goods and services as well as payments to workers not being secured by mortgaged documents and the like

financial creditors generally lend finance on a term loan or for working capital that enables the corporate debtor to either set up and/or operate its business

contracts with operational creditors are relatable to supply of goods and services in the operation of business.

 

financial contracts generally involve large sums of money

operational contracts have dues whose quantum is generally less.

 

financial creditors have specified repayment schedules, and defaults entitle financial creditors to recall a loan in totality

Contracts with operational creditors do not have any such stipulations.

financial creditors are, from the very beginning, involved with assessing the viability of the corporate debtor. They can, and therefore do, engage in restructuring of the loan as well as reorganization of the corporate debtor‘s business when there is financial stress

operational creditors do not and cannot do any of these things

Validity of Section 29A providing ineligibility of a person to be resolution applicant

“If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch”

A person who is unable to service its own debt beyond the grace period, is unfit to be eligible to become a resolution applicant. This policy cannot be found fault with.

Section 53 dealing with distribution of assets not discriminatory

The reason for differentiating between financial debts, which are secured, and operational debts, which are unsecured, is in the relative importance of the two types of debts when it comes to the object sought to be achieved by the Insolvency Code. Repayment of financial debts infuses capital into the economy inasmuch as banks and financial institutions are able, with the money that has been paid back, to further lend such money to other entrepreneurs for their businesses. This rationale creates an intelligible differentia between financial debts and operational debts, which are unsecured, which is directly related to the object sought to be achieved by the Code.

Constitution of Circuit Benches of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT)

The Court noticed that since the NCLAT, as an appellate court, has a seat only at New Delhi, it has rendered the remedy inefficacious inasmuch as persons would have to travel from Tamil Nadu, Calcutta, and Bombay to New Delhi, whereas earlier, they could have approached the respective High Courts in their States. It, hence, directed the Union of India to set up Circuit Benches of the NCLAT within a period of 6 months from the date of the order.

Conclusion

Noticing that the Insolvency Code is a legislation which deals with economic matters and, in the larger sense, deals with the economy of the country as a whole, the bench said:

“The experiment contained in the Code, judged by the generality of its provisions and not by so called crudities and inequities that have been pointed out by the petitioners, passes constitutional muster. To stay experimentation in things economic is a grave responsibility, and denial of the right to experiment is fraught with serious consequences to the nation.”

[Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Lmt. V. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 73, decided on 25.01.2019]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT): A two-member bench comprising of Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya, Chairperson and Justice Bansi Lal Bhat, Member (Judicial) dismissed an appeal filed by the Corporate Debtor against the initiation of Insolvency Resolution Process.

The Financial Creditor had granted a loan of Rs 1.02 crores to the Corporate Debtor which they were unable to repay. The Financial Creditor took recourse to arbitration and an award was passed favouring the Financial Creditor. The Corporate Debtor failed to comply with the award. Consequently, the Financial Creditor triggered the Insolvency Resolution Process. The appellant – a shareholder of Corporate Debtor – assailed the initiation of the process on the ground that there was an internal dispute among the directors which was pending adjudication under Section 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 before National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi.

The Appellate Tribunal perused the entire scheme of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code regarding the Insolvency Resolution Process. It was observed that internal dispute among directors of the Corporate Debtors does not construe a valid defence to triggering of the process. Furthermore, it could not be defeated by taking resort to pendency of matter before the NCLT under Companies Act. The Code is a special law having an overriding effect on any other law as mandated by Section 238. The factum of default and non-compliance with arbitral award was not disputed by the Corporate Debtor; and thus, the Financial Creditor was well within its right to initiate the process. The appeal was held to be frivilous and costs amounting to Rs 1 lakh were imposed. The appeal was, thus, dismissed. [Jagmohan Bajaj v. Shivam Fragrances (P) Ltd.,2018 SCC OnLine NCLAT 413, dated 14-08-2018]

Conference/Seminars/LecturesLaw School News

Introduction: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code though provides for faster and definitive resolution to deal with distressed or failed businesses compare to erstwhile Sick Industrial and Companies Act, 1985 and the Companies Act, 1956 (now stands repealed), it does not address potential tax issues that may arise as a result of resolution plan*. (Rekha Bagry, Neelu Jalan, ‘Insolvency and the Tax Conundrum’, Tax Guru)  In other words, the transactions undertaken as a part of the resolution process under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could result in taxes, and it may derange the deal financials, thus making the resolution process less efficient and effective. (Vishal Agarwal, Yashesh Asher, Sohail Manjiramani, ‘The Insolvency Code: Will Tax be a Problem’).

To know and understand these intricacies and bring ease to business, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA in collaboration with Vaish Associates Advocates has organised Seminar on Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Tax Implications upon Insolvency on July 28, 2018.

Resource Person: Ms. Kavita Jha, Partner, Vaish Associates, Advocates

Ms. Kavita Jha is a senior member of the Tax Group and has and has been associated with the Firm since 2003 when she moved her practice from the High Court of Calcutta to the High Court of Delhi. She has also been an Advocate-on-Record in the Supreme Court of India since June 2007 and specializes in tax litigation: income tax, VAT and sales tax as well as criminal law and arbitration.

Ms. Kavita has been an empanelled Advocate before the Supreme Court for the Union of India, the State of Maharashtra and other government agencies, in which capacity she has handled a multitude of tax, civil and criminal matters. She has also handled arbitration matters for various joint ventures and domestic companies in the energy and infrastructure sectors. She has also successfully facilitated dispute resolution through conciliation for other clients. Ms. Jha has also been appointed as Sole Arbitrator by Justice Dr. S. Muralidhar of the Delhi High Court in a dispute arising out of a property development agreement.

Ms. Kavita has participated in various legal seminars, workshops/seminars, conferences and lectures of national and inter-national repute on, inter alia, International Tax – International Fiscal Association, Arbitration and Alternate Dispute Resolution, Adoption law, Muslim Personal Law and Refugee Law. She has also been visiting Faculty in IMT, Ghaziabad for Corporate and Business Law in Calcutta and Delhi as well as honorary visiting Faculty in Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA.

Date & Time July 28, 2018: 09:00am – 12:00 noon

Venue: Seminar Hall, Third Floor, Academic Block, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA

Contact Persons:

Dr. Meenakshi Kaul, Assistant Professor & Head, Training & Placement

Mr. Siddharth Kanojia, Assistant Professor & Head – Placement, Training and Placement

Ms. Pallavi Mishra, Assistant Professor & Head – Internship, Training and Placement

Email: hr@symlaw.edu.in

Amendments to existing lawsLegislation Updates

The President gave his assent on 06-06-2018, to promulgate the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018.

The Ordinance provides significant relief to home buyers by recognizing their status as financial creditors. This would give them due representation in the Committee of Creditors and make them an integral part of the decision making process. It will also enable home buyers to invoke Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 against errant developers. Another major beneficiary would be Micro, Small and Medium Sector Enterprises (MSME), which form the backbone of the Indian economy as the biggest employer, next only to the agriculture sector. Recognizing the importance of MSME Sector in terms of employment generation and economic growth, the Ordinance empowers the Government to provide them with a special dispensation under the Code. The immediate benefit it provides is that, it does not disqualify the promoter to bid for his enterprise undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) provided he is not a willful defaulter and does not attract other disqualifications not related to default. It also empowers the Central Government to allow further exemptions or modifications with respect to the MSME sector, if required, in public interest.

In order to protect the sanctity of the CIRP, the Ordinance lays down a strict procedure if an applicant wants to withdraw a case after its admission under IBC 2016.  Henceforth, such withdrawal would be permissible only with the approval of the Committee of Creditors with 90 percent of the voting share.  Furthermore, such withdrawal will only be permissible before publication of notice inviting Expressions of Interest (EoI).  In other words, there can be no withdrawal once the commercial process of EoIs and bids commences. Separately, the Regulations will bring in further clarity by laying down mandatory timelines, processes and procedures for corporate insolvency resolution process.  Some of the specific issues that would be addressed include non-entertainment of late bids, no negotiation with the late bidders and a well laid down procedure for maximizing value  of assets.

With a view to encouraging resolution as opposed to liquidation, the voting threshold has been brought down to 66 percent from 75 % for all major decisions such as approval of resolution plan, extension of CIRP period, etc.  Further, in order to facilitate the corporate debtor to continue as a going concern during the CIRP, the voting threshold for routine decisions has been reduced to 51 %.

The Ordinance also provides for a mechanism to allow participation of security holders, deposit holders and all other classes of financial creditors that exceed a certain number, in meetings of the Committee of Creditors, through the authorized representation.

The existing Section 29 (A) of the IBC, 2016 has also been fine-tuned to exempt pure play financial entities from being disqualified on account of NPA.  Similarly, a resolution application holding an NPA by virtue of acquiring  it  in the past under the IBC, 2016, has been provided with a three-year cooling-off period, from the date of such acquisition.  In other words, such NPA shall not disqualify the resolution application during the currency of the three-year grace period.

Taking into account the wide range of disqualifications contained in Section 29 (A) of the Code, the Ordinance provides that the Resolution Applicant shall submit an affidavit certifying its eligibility to bid.  This places the primary onus on the resolution applicant to certify its eligibility.

The Ordinance provides for a minimum one-year grace period for the successful resolution applicant to fulfill various statutory obligations required under different laws.  This would go a long way in enabling the new management to successfully implement the resolution plan.

The other changes brought about by the Ordinance include non-applicability of moratorium period to enforcement of guarantee; introducing the requirement of special resolution for corporate debtors  to themselves trigger insolvency resolution under the Code; liberalizing terms and conditions of interim finance to facilitate financing of corporate debtor during CIRP period; and giving the IBBI a specific development role along with  powers to levy fee in respect of services rendered.

The above mentioned changes are expected to further strengthen the Insolvency Resolution Framework in the country and produce better outcomes in terms ofresolution as opposed to liquidation, time taken, cost incurred and recovery rate.

[Press Release no. 1534497]

Ministry of Corporate Affairs

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT): The NCLAT heard an appeal against the order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench (“NCLT”) regarding time period allotted for completing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and certain observations made by the NCLT against the Resolution Professional (“RP”).

With regard to the expire of the time limit for the CIRP proceedings, the NCLAT referred to a recent decision of its own in Quinn Logistics India Pvt. Ltd. v. Mack Soft Tech Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine NCLAT 474 where the NCLAT held:

“[I]t is always open to the Adjudicating Authority/Appellate Tribunal to ‘exclude certain period’ for the purpose of counting the total period of 270 days if the facts and circumstances justify exclusion.

10. For example, for following good grounds and unforeseen circumstances, the intervening period can be excluded for counting of the total period of 270 days of resolution process:

(i)- (ii)                     *                         *                                     *

(iii) The period between the date of order of admission/moratorium is passed and the actual date on which the ‘Resolution Professional’ takes charge for completing the corporate insolvency resolution process.

(iv) – (vi)                *                          *                                   *

However, after exclusion of the period, if further period is allowed the total number of days cannot exceed 270 days which is the maximum time limit prescribed under the Code.”

In the present case, the case was admitted for CIRP on 16.08.2017, and the RP assumed charge on 14.09.2017, that is 30 days. Therefore the NCLAT directed the NCLT, Mumbai Bench to exclude the said period of 30 days from the limit set to complete the CIRP proceedings and modified the impugned order to that extent. [Velamur Varadan Anand v. Union Bank of India,2018 SCC OnLine NCLAT 258, decided on 16-05-2018]

Legislation UpdatesRules & Regulations

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) is a modern economic legislation. Section 240 of the Code empowers the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) to make regulations subject to the conditions that the regulations: (a) carry out the provisions of the Code, (b) are consistent with the Code and the rules made thereunder; (c) are made by a notification published in the official gazette; and (d) are laid, as soon as possible, before each House of Parliament for 30 days.

The IBBI has evolved a transparent and consultative process to make regulations. It has been endeavour of the IBBI to effectively engage stakeholders in the regulation making process. The process generally starts with a working group making draft regulations. The IBBI puts these draft regulations out in public domain seeking comments thereon. It holds a few round tables to discuss draft regulations with the stakeholders. It takes advice of its Advisory Committee. The process culminates with the Governing Board of the IBBI finalising regulations and the IBBI notifies them. This process endeavours to factor in ground reality, secures ownership of regulations, imparts democratic legitimacy and makes regulations robust and precise, relevant to the time and for the purpose.

Public consultation enables collective choice and hence plays an important role in evolution of regulatory framework. The participation of the public, particularly the stakeholders and the regulated, in the regulatory process ensures that the regulations are informed by the legitimate needs of those interested in and affected by regulations.

Given the importance of subordinate legislations for the processes under the Code, it is essential that the IBBI has a structured, robust mechanism, which includes effective engagement with the stakeholders, for making regulations. In fact, Section 196(1)(s) of the Code requires the IBBI to specify mechanisms for issuing regulations, including the conduct of public consultation processes, before notification of regulations.

In sync with this philosophy and the statutory requirement, the IBBI proposes to make regulations to govern the process of making regulations and consulting the public. The IBBI invites comments from public, including the stakeholders and the regulated, on the draft Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Mechanism for Issuing Regulations), Regulations, 2018 which is annexed to this press release and also available at www.ibbi.gov.in. A cost benefit analysis of the draft regulations is appended at the end of the draft regulations. The comments may be e-mailed at feedback@ibbi.gov.in by 31st March, 2018, with subject line “Mechanism for Issuing Regulations”.

Ministry of Corporate Affairs

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal: Canara Bank, the appellant-financial creditor, challenged the impugned order passed by National Company Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench whereby while admitting the application preferred by Appellant under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 passed an order of moratorium thereby prohibiting the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings except before the High Courts and Supreme Court of India, against the Corporate Debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, Tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority.

The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the Adjudicating Authority cannot exclude any court from the purview of moratorium for the purpose of recovery of amount or execution of any judgment or decree, including the proceeding, if any, pending before the High Courts and Supreme Court of India against a ‘corporate debtor’. NCLAT while adjudicating the matter opined that Section 14 relates to ‘Moratorium’ which the Adjudicating Authority is required to declare at the time of admission of the application for ‘corporate insolvency resolution The NCLAT stated that,

“from Section 14(1) (a), it was clear that institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order by any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority come within the purview of ‘moratorium’ and that the said provision specifically did not exclude any Court, including the Hon’ble High Courts or Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.”

The NCLAT, dismissing the appeal, and further clarifying the impugned order passed by Tribunal relating to ‘moratorium’ held in clear terms that,

“The Hon’ble Supreme Court has power under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and Hon’ble High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India which power cannot be curtailed by any provision of an Act or a Court. In view of the aforesaid provision of law, we make it clear that ‘moratorium’ will not affect any suit or case pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India or where an order is passed under Article 136 of Constitution of India. ‘Moratorium’ will also not affect the power of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India. However, so far as suit, if filed before any High Court under original jurisdiction which is a money suit or suit for recovery, against the ‘corporate debtor’ such suit cannot proceed after declaration of ‘moratorium’, under Section 14 of the I&B Code.”

 [Canara Bank v. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited, 2017 SCC OnLine NCLAT 255, decided on 14.9.2017]

 

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Dealing with the question relating to applicability of the Maharashtra Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions Act), 1958 vis-a-vis the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016, the bench of RF Nariman and SK Kaul, JJ held that the State law is repugnant to the Parliamentary enactment as under the said State law, the moratorium imposed under Section 4 of the Maharashtra Act directly clashes with the moratorium to be issued under Sections 13 and 14 of the Code.

Explaining the scheme of both the Laws, the Court said that the moment initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process takes place, a moratorium is announced by the adjudicating authority vide Sections 13 and 14 of the Code, by which institution of suits and pending proceedings etc. cannot be proceeded with. This continues until the approval of a resolution plan under Section 31 of the said Code. In the interim, an interim resolution professional is appointed under Section 16 to manage the affairs of corporate debtors under Section 17 of the Code.

It was further explained that whereas the moratorium imposed under the Maharashtra Act is discretionary and may relate to one or more of the matters contained in Section 4(1), the moratorium imposed under the Code relates to all matters listed in Section 14 and follows as a matter of course. Hence, unless the Maharashtra Act is out of the way, the Parliamentary enactment will be hindered and obstructed in such a manner that it will not be possible to go ahead with the insolvency resolution process outlined in the Code. Further, the non-obstante clause contained in Section 4 of the Maharashtra Act cannot possibly be held to apply to the Central enactment, inasmuch as a matter of constitutional law, the later Central enactment being repugnant to the earlier State enactment by virtue of Article 254 (1), would operate to render the Maharashtra Act void vis-à-vis action taken under the later Central enactment

It was, hence, held that by giving effect to the State law, the aforesaid plan or scheme which may be adopted under the Parliamentary statute will directly be hindered and/or obstructed to that extent in that the management of the relief undertaking, which, if taken over by the State Government, would directly impede or come in the way of the taking over of the management of the corporate body by the interim resolution professional. Hence, the Code would prevail against the Maharashtra Act in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 238 of the Code. [Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1025, decided on 31.08.2017]