Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: Jyoti Mulmani J., allowed the revision petition on grounds of failure to ascertain and understand the material propositions involved in the case.

The facts of the case are that the petitioner is a legally wedded wife of respondent and their marriage was solemnized on 28-02-2007 at Gayathri Mangalya Mandira, B.H. Road, Shimoga as per the Hindu Rites and Customs. They lived blissfully for some time however was constrained to leave apart from respondent after some time. Thereafter she filed a petition under Sections 18, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 which was thereby allowed and compensation granted. Aggrieved by which, appeal was preferred by both parties which was clubbed and the impugned order upheld. Later, a petition as filed under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which was dismissed as non-maintainable. Aggrieved by this order, present revision petition has been filed challenging the impugned order.

Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order suffers from serious infirmities and is liable to be set aside as the ground for rejection of the petition that the petitioner had filed petition under provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence act, 2005 and thus petitioners cannot file another petition under Section 125 CrPC is wholly unsuitable in law.

Counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned order has reached finality as petitioners have not preferred a further appeal before any other courts.

The Court observed that the petitioner filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.PC and not under Section 127 of the Code. There has been an error in the impugned order in not appreciating the distinction between the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act and Cr. PC as the petitioner is not seeking enhancement of maintenance.

The Court before disposing off the petition remanded the matter to reconsider the application filed by petitioner under Section 125 CrPC.

In view of the above, the impugned order was set aside.[D.A. Divya v. M. Yashwanth, R.P.F.C. No. 63 of 2016, decided on 02-11-2020]


 Arunima Bose, Editorial  Assistant has put this story together

Law made Easy

[Disclaimer: This note is for general information only. It is NOT to be substituted for legal advice or taken as legal advice. The publishers of the blog shall not be liable for any act or omission based on this note]

Introduction

The patriarchal setup has been deeply rooted in Indian society since time immemorial. It may be believed that this system laid the foundation stone for the abuse of women. Domestic violence affects women from every social background irrespective of their age, religion, caste, or class. It is a violent crime that not only affects a person and her children but also has wider implications for society. Although the root behind the crime is hard to decipher, certain reasons behind the violence can be traced to the stereotyping of gender roles, and the distribution of power.

The definition of violence has evolved over the years to an extent it not only includes physical forms of violence but also emotional, mental, financial, and other forms of cruelty. Thus, the term domestic violence includes acts which harm or endangers the health, safety, life, limb, or wellbeing (mental or physical) of the victim, or tends to do so, and includes causing: physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse, and economic abuse, perpetrated by any person who is or was in a domestic relationship with the victim.

Before the enactment of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”), the victim could approach the court under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860 which provides for ‘husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty’ wherein only a certain set of offence dealing with cruelty to married women was the only recourse. All other instances of domestic violence within the household had to be dealt with under the offences that the respective acts of violence constituted under the IPC without any regard to the gender of the victim.

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Meaning, Intent, and Objective

To minimize the cumbersome position of law, be it procedural or substantive, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted to protect the women from acts of domestic violence. The legislative intent was further emphasized by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755 wherein it was stated that the DV Act is enacted to provide a remedy in civil law for the protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society. Other legislations like CrPC, IPC, etc., where reliefs have been provided to women who are placed in vulnerable situations were also discussed.

The objective of the Act lays down “An Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”[1] The Madras High Court in Vandhana v. T. Srikanth, 2007 SCC Online Mad 553 in one of the early cases since the enactment of the DV Act, observed that the Act was formulated to implement Recommendation No. 12 of United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1989 and which was ratified by India in June, 1993. Interpretation of the DV Act should conform to international conventions and international instruments and norms. The Bombay High Court in the case of Ishpal Singh Kahai v. Ramanjeet Kahai, 2011 SCC Online Bom 412 reiterated that the object of the DV Act is to grant statutory protection to victims of violence in the domestic sector who had no proprietary rights. The Act provides for security and protection of a wife irrespective of her proprietary rights in her residence. It aims at protecting the wife against violence and at the prevention of recurrence of acts of violence.

Key Definitions under the Domestic Violence Act

  • Aggrieved Person

According to the definition provided under the DV Act in Section 2(a), an “aggreived person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. Therefore, any woman who is or has been in a domestic relationship is entitled to make a complaint invoking provisions of the Act.

The amount or period of time lived together by the petitioner and respondent is not necessary in terms of that the petitioner and respondent should live or have lived together for a particular period of time. Hence, application by lady, for maintenance, from a man with whom she shared a close relationship is maintainable, M. Palani v. Meenakshi, 2008 SCC Online Mad 150.

The Supreme Court had observed in one of the cases that judicial separation does not change the status of the wife as an “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) read with Section 12 and does not end the “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f). It stated that judicial separation is mere suspension of husband-wife relationship and not a complete severance of relationship as happens in divorce, Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury, (2016) 2 SCC 705.

  • Domestic Relationship

According to Section 2(f) of DV Act, “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons living in a shared household. Domestic relationship can be through marriage such as wives, daughters-in-law, sisters-in-law, widows and any other members of the family; or blood relationship such as mothers, sisters or daughters; and other domestic relationships including through adoption, live-in relationships, and women in bigamous relationship or victims of legally invalid marriages. The law addresses the concerns of women of all ages irrespective of their marital status. The definition of “domestic relationship” under the DV Act is exhaustive: when a definition clause is defined to “mean” such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive, Indra Sarmav. V.K.V Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755.

The Supreme Court further stated that the word domestic relationship means a relationship that has some inherent or essential characteristics of marriage though not a marriage that is legally recognized. Expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” cannot be construed in the abstract. It is to be taken in the context in which it appears and to be applied bearing in mind the purpose and object of DV Act as well as meaning of the expression “in the nature of marriage”, Indra Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755.

  • Shared Household

According to Section 2(s) of DV Act 2005, a shared household is where the aggrieved person or a woman lives in a domestic relationship, either singly, or along with the man against whom the complaint is filed. It may also imply a household where a woman has lived in a domestic relationship but has been thrown out. This may include all kinds of situations whether the household is owned by the respondent or it is rented accommodation. It also includes a house either owned jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or both may have jointly or singly, any rights, titles or interests. The DV Act recognizes a woman’s right to reside in a shared household. This means a woman cannot be thrown out of such a household except through the procedure established by the law. In case she is thrown out she can be brought back again after obtaining the order from the court. A woman to claim the protection of right in “shared household” has to establish (a) that the relationship with the opposite party is “domestic relationship”, and (b) that the house in respect of which she seeks to enforce the right is “shared household”. In Indian society, there are many situations in which a woman may not enter into her matrimonial home immediately after marriage. A woman might not live at the time of the institution of proceedings or might have lived together with the husband even for a single day in “shared household” should not be left remediless despite valid marriage. Narrow interpretation of “domestic relationship” and “shared household” would leave many a woman in distress without remedy. Hence the correct interpretation of aforesaid definition including the right to live in “shared household” would be that words “live” or “have at any point of time lived” would include within its purview “the right to live”, Vandhana v. T. Srikanth, 2007 SCC Online Mad 553.

This law does not alter the legality of ownership or transfer the ownership and a woman cannot claim that she owns a house; it only provides emergency relief to the victim in the sense that she cannot be thrown out of her house. For claiming ownership, a woman has to follow a separate legal procedure and has to file a separate application as per the provisions of laws whichever are applicable to her situation.

  • Domestic Violence

“Domestic violence” is a broad term that entails not only physical beating but also other forms of violence such as emotional violence, mental violence, sexual violence, financial violence and other forms of cruelty that may occur within a household. The definition provided in Section 3 of the DV Act includes the following as acts of domestic violence:

“Any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it—

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or

(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.”

The Section also defines the meaning of terms physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse. It further enunciates that the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration in order to determine whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under the said section.

Who can seek help or can claim reliefs under the Domestic Violence Act?

According to the provisions of this Act, any aggrieved woman who is in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to the act of domestic violence by the respondent can seek help. A woman can file a complaint against any adult male perpetrator who commits an act of violence. She can also file a complaint against any male or female relatives of the husband/ male partner (for example in a live-in relationship) who has perpetrated violence. The Supreme Court in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165 struck down adult male from the definition of “respondent” stating that it is not based on any intelligible differentia having rational nexus with object sought to be achieved. The Supreme Court also explained in the said case that the categories of persons against whom remedies under the DV Act are available include women and non-adults. Expression “respondent” in Section 2(q) or persons who can be treated as perpetrators of violence against women/against whom remedies under the DV Act are actionable cannot be restricted to expression “adult male person” in Section 2(q). Thus, remedies under the DV Act are available even against a female member and also against non-adults.

Protection Officer

Under Section 8 of the DV Act, the Protection Officer is appointed by the State Government as per the provisions of the law. The Protection Officer acts as a facilitator between the aggrieved woman and the court. The Protection Officer aids the aggrieved woman in filing of complaints, and application before the Magistrate to obtain the necessary relief and also assists to obtain medical aid, legal aid, counselling, safe shelter and other required assistance.

Duties of Protection Officer

Section 9 of the DV Act lays down the duties of the Protection Officer as follows:

“(a) to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of his functions under this Act;

(b) to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, upon receipt of a complaint of domestic violence and forward copies thereof to the police officer in charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction domestic violence is alleged to have been committed and to the service providers in that area;

(c) to make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed to the Magistrate, if the aggrieved person so desires, claiming relief for issuance of a protection order;

(d) to ensure that the aggrieved person is provided legal aid under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and make available free of cost the prescribed form in which a complaint is to be made;

(e) to maintain a list of all service providers providing legal aid or counselling, shelter homes and medical facilities in a local area within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate;

(f) to make available a safe shelter home, if the aggrieved person so requires and forward a copy of his report of having lodged the aggrieved person in a shelter home to the police station and the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area where the shelter home is situated;

(g) to get the aggrieved person medically examined, if she has sustained bodily injuries and forward a copy of the medical report to the police station and the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area where the domestic violence is alleged to have been taken place;

(h) to ensure that the order for monetary relief under Section 20 is complied with and executed, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);

(i) to perform such other duties as may be prescribed.”

Service Providers

A victim of domestic violence may require various services such as shelter home or safe accommodation, medical aid, child care, legal aid services and other community services. According to Section 10(1) of DV Act, the Service Providers are the NGOs, Companies or voluntary organizations working in the field of domestic violence and are registered under the laws of the State. Service Providers are duty bound to provide assistance and support to women facing domestic violence. A woman can go to a registered Service Provider to make a complaint under the DV Act. The duty of the service provider, as provided under Section 6 of the DV Act, upon receipt of request should be to provide shelter to the aggrieved person in the shelter home.

Filing a Complaint of Domestic Violence

An aggrieved woman, in order to file a complaint for domestic violence may:

  • Approach the police station and register the complaint, or
  • File a complaint to a Protection Officer or Service Provider, or
  • Directly approach the Magistrate.

The duties of the police officers, Protection officer, Service Provider, or the Magistrate is laid down under Section 5 of the Act. It states that, upon receipt of complaint they shall inform the aggrieved person—

“(a) of her right to make an application for obtaining a relief by way of a protection order, an order for monetary relief, a custody order, a residence order, a compensation order or more than one such order under this Act;

(b) of the availability of services of service providers;

(c) of the availability of services of the Protection Officers;

(d) of her right to free legal services under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 ;

(e) of her right to file a complaint under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code , wherever relevant”

The Supreme Court emphasised that the Police has to look into the complaint made under the DV Act seriously and it cannot submit a report that no case is made out without proper verification, investigation, enquiry not only from members of family but also from neighbours, friends and others, Santosh Bakshi v. State of Punjab, (2014) 13 SCC 25.

Which Court can decide the case

Section 27 of the DV Act provides that a first class magistrate or metropolitan court shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under the DV Act and to try offences under the Act within the local limits of which

(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or

(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or

(c) the cause of action has arisen.

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that petition under DV Act can be filed in a court where “person aggrieved” permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed, Shyamlal Devda v. Parimala, (2020) 3 SCC 14.

Reliefs available under the Domestic Violence Act

The remedies available under the DV Act as provided from Section 18 to 23 for the aggrieved person are as follows:

The Magistrate after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and if satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place may pass a protection order and prohibit the respondent from

(a) committing any act of domestic violence;

(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;

(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;

(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;

(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;

(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;

(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.

The Magistrate may pass a residence order

  1. a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;

(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;

(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;

(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same;

(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or

(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require.

The proviso clause for the section states that no order shall be passed under clause (b) against any person who is a woman.

The High Court of Madras opined that the Act contemplates two types of reliefs viz. (a) right to reside in shared household; and (b) right to seek residence orders under Section 19 of the Act—Section 19(1) of the Act empowers Magistrate to pass variety of residence order. Shared household would come into picture only when relief is sought in terms of Sections 19(1)(a) to (e) of the Act. Aggrieved woman can seek orders to enable her to continue to reside in shared household or protection order to enable her to reside in shared household, then property, which is subject-matter, should be shared household. Aggrieved woman can seek relief of alternate accommodation in terms of Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and in such case concept of shared household would not be attracted. Expression “shared household” occurring in Section 19(1)(f) of the Act is just for purpose of enabling aggrieved woman to seek alternative accommodation, which would be on par with shared household that she enjoyed at some point of time, M. Muruganandam v. M. Megala, 2010 SCC Online Mad 6012.

Under Section 20 of DV Act, an order for monetary relief can be passed by the court in case a woman has incurred expenditure as a result of violence. This may include expenses incurred by a woman on obtaining medical treatment, any loss of earnings, damage to property, etc. The aggrieved person can also claim for maintenance from her male partner.

The Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but is not limited to,—

(a) the loss of earnings;

(b) the medical expenses;

(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and

(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force.

It has also been provided in the section that the monetary relief provided should be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. In case there is a failure in part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the monetary order, the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent.

The Magistrate may grant temporary custody of the children to the aggrieved woman or any person making an application on her behalf. This is to prevent a woman from being separated from her children, which itself is an abusive situation. Section 21 also states that the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent. However, the Magistrate may refuse such visit to such child or children, if it feels that any visit to the child or children by the respondent may be harmful.

The Magistrate may on an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent.

  • Magistrate’s power to grant interim and ex parte orders (Section 23)

Section 23 gives power to the Magistrate to pass such interim order as he deems just and proper and also if the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 21 or, as the case may be, Section 22 against the respondent.

Conclusion

Although the major objective of this law, being to protect the women against domestic violence has been secured, certain portions of the law still remains to be developed. This law provides civil remedies to the victims of domestic violence. Before enactment of this law, in order to seek any civil remedies such as divorce, custody of children, injunctions in any form or maintenance, a woman only had the option of taking recourse to the civil courts. Therefore, the DV Act has certainly brought about the required and necessary change in the system.

Although the Act provides exhaustive remedies to counter the issue of domestic violence certain terms and its interpretation needs to develop. The Act falls short in providing any relief to the male members in the community who are subjected to domestic violence, being one of the areas where the law falls short. However, it also needs to be considered that no crime can be abolished from the society completely, it is only with stringent reforms and mechanism that it can be curbed.


[1] Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005


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Op EdsOP. ED.

Let’s have a look at the Most-Viewed Blog Posts of the SCC Online Blog in the Year 2019:

“Over the years there have been many important changes in the way cheques are issued/bounced/dealt with. Commercial globalisation has resulted in giving a big boost to our country. With the rapid increase in commerce and trade, use of cheque also increased and so did the cheque bouncing disputes.[1] The object of Sections 138-142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881  is to promote the efficacy of banking operations and to ensure credibility in transacting business through cheques.[2]”

Section 498-A was introduced in the year 1983 to protect married women from being subjected to cruelty by the husband or his relatives. A punishment extending to 3 years and fine has been prescribed. The expression “cruelty” has been defined in wide terms so as to include inflicting physical or mental harm to the body or health of the woman and indulging in acts of harassment with a view to coerce her or her relations to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. Harassment for dowry falls within the sweep of latter limb of the section. Creating a situation driving the woman to commit suicide is also one of the ingredients of “cruelty”.

  • Economically Weaker Section (EWS) | Reservation For EWSs In Direct Recruitment in Civil Posts And Services In Government of India

  • Adultery [S. 497 IPC and S. 198(2) CrPC]

    The word “adultery” derives its origin from the French word “avoutre”, which has evolved from the Latin verb “adulterium” which means “to corrupt”[1]. The dictionary meaning of adultery is that a married man commits adultery if he has sex with a woman with whom he has not entered into wedlock.

    Under Indian law, Section 497 IPC  makes adultery a criminal offence, and prescribes a punishment of imprisonment upto five years and fine. The offence of adultery under Section 497 is very limited in scope as compared to the misconduct of adultery as understood in divorce proceedings. The offence is committed only by a man who had sexual intercourse with the wife of another man without the latter’s consent or connivance. The wife is not punishable for being an adulteress, or even as an abettor of the offence[2]. Section 198 CrPC deals with a “person aggrieved”. Sub-section (2) treats the husband of the woman as deemed to be aggrieved by an offence committed under Section 497 IPC and in the absence of husband, some person who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed, with the permission of the court. It does not consider the wife of the adulterer as an aggrieved person.

    Section 497 IPC and Section 198(2) CrPC together constitute a legislative packet to deal with the offence of adultery[3]which have been held unconstitutional and struck down by the Supreme Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1676.

  • Maintenance – Wife

“Maintenance” is an amount payable by the husband to his wife who is unable to maintain herself either during the subsistence of marriage or upon separation or divorce. Various laws governing maintenance are as follows:

for Hindus – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956

for Muslims – Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

for Parsis – Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936

for Christians – Divorce Act, 1869

secular laws – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Special Marriage Act,1954.

  • Live-In Relationship and Indian Judiciary

    It is being truly said that the only thing which is constant in this world is change. Indian society has observed a drastic change in its living pattern in the past few years. People are slowly and gradually opening their minds towards the idea of pre-marital sex and live-in relationships. However, this change has been continuously under criticism and highly discussed as such concepts lack legality and acceptance by society. Unlike marriage, in live-in relationships, couples are not married to each other but live together under the same roof that resembles a relation like marriage. In other words, we can say it is a cohabitation. In India, only those relations between a man and a woman is considered to be legitimate where marriage has taken place between the two based on existing marriage laws otherwise all other sort of relationships are deemed to be illegitimate.

    The reason behind people choosing to have a live-in relationship is to check the compatibility between couples before getting legally married. It also exempts partners from the chaos of family drama and lengthy court procedures in case the couple decides to break-up. Whatever the reason, it is very evident that in a conventional society like ours, where the institution of marriage is considered to be “sacred” an increasing number of couples choose to have a live-in relationship, even as a perpetual plan, over marriage. In such circumstances, many legal and social issues have arisen which have become the topic of debate. With time many incidents have been reported and seen where partners in live-in relationships or a child born out of such relationship have remained vulnerable for the very simple reason that such relationships have been kept outside the realm of law. There has been gross misuse by the partners in live-in relationships since they do not have any duties and responsibilities to perform. This article seeks to analyse the judicial response to the concept of live-in relationships so far. It also talks about the rights available to live-in partners in India and also, what is the status of children born out of such relationships.

  • Bom HC | Order of Maintenance under DV Act set aside in absence of any act of Domestic Violence committed by Husband

  • Maintenance – Children and Parents

In India, beneficial provisions for maintenance of children and parents are provided under various Acts. Objective of such provisions is to achieve a social purpose and to prevent vagrancy and destitution and to provide simple, inexpensive and speedy mechanism for providing support and maintenance to children and parents.

“the limited interest or Hindu Woman’s Estate [acquired under Section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right Property Act] shall be held by the widow as full owner in terms of provisions of Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

“Section 23 of the DV Act does not provide a substantive right to parties but is a provision which empowers the trial court to pass an order granting interim maintenance in a petition filed under Section 12 of the DV Act. Merely because the trial court has not exercised the power under Section 23 of the DV Act, when a substantive petition under Section 12 of DV Act was filed and chose to pass an order only when a separate application under Section 23 of the DV Act was filed, does not mean that a Magistrate does not have the power to pass an order with effect from the date of filing of the substantive petition under Section 12.”


† Legal Editor, EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court at Goa: C.V. Bhadang, J., allowed a petition filed by the husband and quashed trial court’s order whereby it had partly allowed the wifes’ application filed under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

The wife, along with her minor son, filed a domestic violence petition against the husband. By its order, the trial court partly granted the application in terms of Section 20 directing the husband to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs 5,000. Subsequently, the wife appealed to the additional sessions judge who partly allowed the appeal by enhancing the maintenance to Rs 7,000. Aggrieved, thereby the husband filed the revision petition.

Agha Iftikhar, Advocate for the husband submitted that there was no finding of any act of domestic violence being committed by the petitioner against the wife. It was further submitted that such a finding was a sine qua non for the trial court to grant any relief under the Act. On the other hand, A.D. Bhobe, Advocate appearing for the wife fairly did not dispute the above-said submission.

The High Court took note of the submissions made by the husband that he shall continue to pay Rs 5,000 per month for a limited period for the wife and minor son. Resultantly, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned order. However, it was left open for the wife to take recourse to any other remedy as may be available under law. The husband was directed to pay a monthly sum of Rs 5,000 for a period of six months. [Vijayanand Dattaram Naik v. Vishranti Vijayanand Naik, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 314, dated 13-02-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: The Bench of Sanjeev Sachdeva, J. ordered mother-in-law of the petitioner to provide her an alternate accommodation and compensation under provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Petitioner and her husband lived together in the property which is subject matter in this case. In 2012, the husband left the matrimonial house and the respondent (mother-in-law) directed the petitioner to leave the house. She is alleged to have filed a suit for permanent injunction after which the litigation story began. After several litigations, the Metropolitan Magistrate passed a residence order in favour of the petitioner. It was alleged that the order was not complied with and moreover the mother-in-law sold the subject property to a third party while the matter was still pending adjudication before the court.

Rajeev Ranjan Pandey, Advocate submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondent was liable to be prosecuted for breach of court orders.

The High Court referred to Sections 12, 19, 20 and 31 of the DV Act. It was noted that the subject property was sold for Rs 3,40,00,000. It was also noted that there was no order restraining the mother-in-law from selling the property and as such she could not be penalised under Section 31 which prescribe punishment for breach of court orders. In such a situation, the Court balanced the corresponding rights of the parties by directing the mother-in-law to provide an alternate accommodation in a property similar in nature in the same locality. Interim compensation of Rs 75,000 was also directed to be paid while pendency of proceedings Section 20 before the trial court. Furthermore, 1/6th of the sale consideration received was directed to be deposited with the trial court. The petition was disposed of in such terms. [Shachi Mahajan v. Santosh Mahajan, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6418, dated 10-01-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Mukta Gupta, J. dismissed a criminal writ petition filed by the husband praying quashing of FIR under Section 498-A IPC and complaint under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act).

The grounds for seeking quashing of the FIR and the complaint was that they were registered to wreak vengeance and were beyond the period of limitation as the parties separated in 2014. It is pertinent to note that the wife had filed a complaint before CAW Cell in 2015 where a settlement was arrived at between the parties at pre-litigation mediation. However, it was not fully acted upon and even after an application the earlier complaint could not be revived. Thus, the filed fresh complaint in 2018.

The High Court was of the view that the FIR was within the period of limitation. Relying on Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, (1993) 3 SCC 4 and Asha Ahuja v. Rajesh Ahuja, 2003 SCC OnLine Del 316, the Court held that Section 468 CrPC which deals with “bar to taking cognizance after lapse of period of limitation” is to be read with Section 473 which provides for “extension of period of limitation in certain cases”. Further relying on Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas, (1999) 4 SCC 690, it was held that is a continuing offence and each occasion of “cruelty” is a new starting point of limitation. As far as a complaint under Section 12 DV Act is concerned, it was noted that it related to the grant of maintenance for the wife and minor child. It was held that “not providing maintenance is a continuous cause of action and even if for three years the wife did not claim maintenance for herself or for the child, the same would not debar her from seeking maintenance under Section 12 DV Act and the complaint thereon cannot be dismissed being barred by limitation”. In such view of the matter, the petition was dismissed. [Anthony Jose v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12956, decided on 05-12-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. dismissed a criminal revision petition that was filed against the order of the Sessions Judge wherein he reversed the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate granting maintenance to the petitioner under Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

The petitioner was married to the respondent and they had school going children. She alleged that the respondent and his mother treated her and the minor children with cruelty. She submitted that the children were studying in a public school and their expenses were high. The respondent was a government doctor earning Rs 1.5 lakhs per month. Taking note of such factual details,  the Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the respondent to pay Rs 30,000 per month to the petitioner by way of interim allowance. On appeal, the said order was reversed by the Sessions Judge vide the order under challenge herein.

The High Court perused the record and observed that the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the order without recording any prima facie finding qua alleged instances of maltreatment to the petitioner and the children, by the respondent and his mother. The Court held that in a case of domestic violence, in order to seek the relief of interim maintenance under Section 23 of the Act, a prima facie case qua maltreatment and existence of instances of domestic violence was required to be made out which was not done in this case. Moreover, the Sessions Court did not close the right of the petitioner to claim interim maintenance rather remanded the matter to the trial court for disposal under the law. The High Court did not find any fault with the order impugned. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. [Ashmin Kashmiri v. Pushkar Kashmiri,2018 SCC OnLine HP 841, dated 04-07-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Anand Byrareddy, J. allowed a criminal petition filed by a Muslim male holding that he was entitled to invoke the provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 (DV Act).

The petition was filed under Section 482 CrPC by the petitioner, a male. Being aggrieved by certain acts of his wife and her family, the petitioner invoked the provisions of DV Act. Learned City Civil and Sessions Judge was not impressed by the action brought on behalf of the petitioner as in his opinion, the Act was heavily loaded in favor of women and it does not contemplate any male member being aggrieved by domestic violence. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court.

In order to settle the issue, the High Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Hiralal P. Harsora v.  Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165, wherein the Hon’ble Court had struck down a part of Section 2(a) of DV Act holding it to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and the phrase ‘adult male’ as appearing in Section 2(q) stood deleted. The High Court observed that if the said sub-section is read after deletion of the expression ‘adult male’, it would appear that any aggrieved person, in terms of DV Act, whether male or female, is entitled to invoke provisions of the Act. Having stated thus, the High Court held that petitioner’s complaint could not have been trashed merely on the ground that the Act does not contemplate provisions for men. The petition was accordingly allowed. [Mohd. Zakir v. Shabana, Crl. Petition No. 2351 of 2017, dated 18.04.2018]

Update: By an order dated 28.04.2018, Byrareddy J. withdrew the above-mentioned order and restored the petition to the file.

The order reads as – “Notwithstanding Section 362 of Cr.P.C., the order rendered by this Court earlier on 18.04.2018 is found to be patently erroneous and therefore the order is withdrawn. The petition is restored to file and the registry is directed not to web host the order passed earlier and to take note of the fact that the order is withdrawn.” [Mohd. Zakir v. Shabana, Crl. Petition No. 2351 of 2017, dated 28-04-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Bharati H. Dangre, J., addressed a Writ Petition filed addressing the order of the Family Court in regard to the payment of maintenance to the wife under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 without considering the essence of Section 20 and Section 12 of the said Act in reference to the person being “Aggrieved Person” in the Act.

The petitioner-husband has submitted that the respondent-wife after taking away the children from their joint custody invoked Section 34, 37(2), 38 and 39 of the Specific Relief Act along with this she had prayed for a restrained order against the husband for their son Aryaman. Further, the respondent- wife under Section 20 of the said Act had preferred an application for monetary relief of Rs. 5 Lakhs per month as she was entitled for a maintenance of that much amount by taking into consideration her lifestyle and the earning capacity of the husband. For the said reasons and the filed application, order of the family court came into respondent’s favour by granting maintenance of Rs. 2 lakhs per month and primarily the reason for this order was the earning capacity of the petitioner-husband.

However, it has been contended in the present petition, by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, the trial court has passed an erroneous order as they have ignored the essence of Section 12 in which such an appeal is preferred. The said S.12 focuses on the term “aggrieved person”, which clearly has been ignored in the present application filed by the respondent-wife as no pleading attributing to domestic violence has been stated which brings to no relief be granted in reference to the said Act. It has also been claimed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the point where the petitioner’s company was under the process of liquidation and the petitioner had already resigned from his services and he was still continuing to cater the expenses of his daughter and son was not taken into relevance at all.

Therefore, by taking into consideration all the stated facts and circumstances of the case, the high court by duly taking into consideration the point of petitioner’s earning capacity and his company being under the process of liquidation, partly allowed the petition on the basis that the family court’s approach has been grossly erroneous and it needs to be reconsidered on the matter of grant of maintenance. [Prakash Kumar Singhee v. Amrapali Singhee, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1197, dated 04-05-2018]