Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: The Division Bench of Anjani Kumar Mishra and Prakash Padia, JJ., addressed a petition wherein, two major adults who were in a live-in relation sought protection from harassment for living together.

The facts in the instant case are that petitioner 1 is a major and is aged about 24 years and petitioner 2 is aged about 28 years.

Both the petitioners decided to be in a live-in relationship without any compulsion or coercion.

Though respondents 4 and 5 forcibly tried to solemnize petitioner 1’s marriage against her wishes and on knowing the said fact, petitioner 1 decided to live with Ajay Kumar with her own free will and without fear and pressure.

It has been added that both the petitioners have been happily living with each other but respondent 4 and 5 tried to harass them.

In view of the harassment, petitioner 1 had filed a complaint seeking protection, but no action has been taken till date. Further, it was argued the law laid down by the Supreme Court from time to time petitioners are legally entitled to Live-­in relationship without any fear or pressure more especially when they are major.

Since no action was taken by the police authorities, the present petition was filed.

Decision

In the Supreme Court decision of Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 475, it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral.

In order to provide a remedy in civil law for the protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having a relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc.

Few other legislations have been provided with respect to reliefs to women placed in certain vulnerable situations.

The issue in the instant matter had been already dealt with in the Supreme Court decision of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sharma, (2013) 15 SCC 755.

Apart from the Supreme Court decision, a long line of decisions has settled the law that:

where a boy and a girl are major and they are living with their free will, then, nobody including their parents has the authority to interfere with their living together.

Bench further opined that the petitioners are at liberty to live together and no person shall be permitted to interfere in their peaceful living.

Court further added that, in case any disturbance is caused in the peaceful living of the petitioners, the petitioners shall approach the Senior Superintendent of Police.[Kamini Devi v. State of U.P., Writ C No. 11108 of 2020, decided on 23-11-2020]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah*, JJ refused to interfere with the conviction of a man for sexually assaulting a mentally deficient woman.

“A person suffering from mental disorder or mental sickness deserves special care, love and affection. They are not to be exploited. In the present case, the accused has exploited the victim by taking disadvantage of her mental sickness/illness. Therefore, no interference of this Court against the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court convicting the accused is called for.”

Brief Background

In 2008, the 19-year-old prosecutrix, was sexually assaulted by the accused in the jugle where they both used to go to graze cattle. The accused threatened the prosecutrix not to disclose the incident to anyone and due to fear and due to forgetting the same and further due to mental weakness, she did not disclose about the incident to anyone including her mother. When she was medically examined, it was found that she was 31 weeks pregnant. After she gave birth to a female child, blood samples of the prosecutrix, the baby and the accused were taken for DNA test.  As per report, accused was the biological father of the female child.

The trial Court acquitted the accused mainly on the ground of delay in lodging the FIR and also on the ground that the prosecutrix was not mentally unsound to understand the consequences and what was happening.

However, the Himachal Pradesh High Court sentenced the accused to undergo seven years R.I. with fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further six months R.I. under Section 376 IPC and four years R.I. with fine   of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further three months R.I. under Section 506 IPC.

Analysis

On re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court

The Court held that in the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court is justified and, as such, has not committed any error in reversing the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court and convicting the accused for the offences under Sections 376 and 506 IPC. Being the first appellate Court, the High Court was justified in re-appreciating the entire evidence on record and the reasoning given by the learned trial Court.

On the mental condition of the prosecutrix

“Merely because the victim was in a position to do some household works cannot discard the medical evidence that the victim had mild mental retardation and she was not in a position to understand the good and bad aspect of sexual assault.”

Is language material for conducting IQ tests?

In   the   crossexamination, the Medical Expert specifically stated that the language is not material in the tests because these are independent of language. IQ of a person can be known on the basis of the questions, activities and the history of a patient. Therefore, even if there might be some contradictions with respect to language known by the victim, in that case also, it cannot be said to be the major contradictions to disbelieve the entire medical evidence on the mental status of the victim.

On the culpability of the accused

On evidence, it was established and proved that the victim was mentally retarded and her IQ was 62. Holding that the accused had taken disadvantage of the mental illness and low IQ of the victim, the Court noticed

“It is required to be appreciated coupled with the fact that the accused is found to be the biological father of the baby child delivered by the victim. Despite the above, in his 313 statement the case of the accused was of a total denial. It was never the case of the accused that it was a case of consent.”

Therefore, considering the evidence on record, the Court upheld the decision of the High Court wherein it was observed that case would fall under Section 375 IPC. Further, even as per clause fifthly of Section 375 IPC, “a man is said to commit rape”, if with her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.

On reduction of sentence

It was contended on behalf of the accused that he has already undergone four years RI out of seven years RI awarded to him and is married and has two children and therefore a lenient view may be taken. The Court rejected this contention and said

“…as such the High Court has also taken a very lenient view by imposing the minimum sentence of seven years RI.  It is required to be noted that it is a case of sexual assault on a victim whose IQ was 62 and was mentally retarded and that accused has taken undue advantage of the mental sickness/illness of the victim.”

[Chamal Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1229 OF 2017, decided on 03.12.2020]


*Justice MR Shah has penned this judgment

For Appellant: Advocate Radhika Gautam, learned Advocate has appeared for

For State: Advocate Sarthak Ghonkrokta

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Orissa High Court: Biswanath Rath J., allowed the petition in part and laid down comprehensive guidelines for the state to follow in like cases and interpreted the various provisions of The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 i.e. MTP Act, 1971; The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003, i.e. MTP Rules, 2003 and The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Regulations, 2003 i.e. MTP Regulations, 2003 (hereinafter referred) keeping in mind the intent of the legislation.

The background of the case is that a wife of a labourer found unnatural behaviour in her physically disabled and mentally retarded daughter and on close scrutiny and soliciting came to know that she has been raped pursuant to which an FIR has been registered against accused Sili Manjhi (as named by the victim daughter) under Sections 376(2)(1), 294 and 506 Penal Code, 1860. The victim on being medically tested by medical officers at the instance of police officials was not only found to be physically handicapped and mentally retarded but also pregnant of almost four months. The instant writ petition has been filed by a desperate mother seeking permission for terminating the pregnancy of the victim daughter who is unable to take care of herself properly due to mental and physical incapacity under the provisions of MTP Act, 1971; MTP Rules, 2003 and MTP Regulations, 2003.

Counsel for the petitioner S.C. Puspalaka, A.K. Tarai, T. Priyadarshini and T. Barik prayed to grant necessary direction to the competent authority as deem fit and proper and also for granting appropriate relief not only to the victim but also to all such who have also become victim in the process.

Counsel for the State submitted that as per the report dated 13-08-2020 given by a committee formed in terms of Regulation 3 of the MTP Regulations, 2003 it is found that the victim girl is mentally retarded and that she was pregnant for four months though at some places it is mentioned as 16 weeks. Due to conflict in the duration of pregnancy as per medical examination, a second report was conducted. According to the second report dated 05-09-2020, the pregnancy period was 24 weeks. Due to such a huge difference in results in the two reports in just about 23 days, a third examination was suggested to arrive at a just conclusion.

The third and final report suggested no possibility of termination of pregnancy as termination will endanger the life of mother.

After the final report, counsel for petitioner submitted that petitioner has a disastrous financial condition and cannot take care of both victim and her child involved unless she is provided with appropriate financial and medical support.

After perusing Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the MTP Act, 1971, Rule 5 of the MTP Rules, 2003 and Regulation 3 of MTP Regulation, 2003 it is to be stated that termination of pregnancy can be allowed, if the length of pregnancy exceeds 12 weeks but does not exceed 20 weeks but subject to however under the opinion of the two registered Medical practitioners on the issues prescribed therein and also taking care of the provisions at the Explanation ‘I’ therein. After perusal of the “Statement of Objects and Reasons” of MTP Act, 1971which states as under

 “3. There is thus avoidable wastage of the mother’s health, strength and sometimes, life. The proposed measure which seeks to liberalise certain existing provisions relating to termination of pregnancy has been conceived (1) as a health measure – when there is danger to the life or risk to physical or mental health of the woman; (2) on humanitarian grounds – such as when pregnancy arises from a sex crime like rape or intercourse with a lunatic woman, etc., and (3) eugenic grounds – where there is substantial risk that the child, if born, would suffer from deformities and diseases.”

 Hence it is amply clear that the legislative intent of the Act is to provide for termination of pregnancies in such cases on humanitarian grounds subject to the opinion of the committee of doctors. The Court also expressed its dismay and agony towards the public authorities due to negligence however unintentional and the resultant default in the two reports due to which delay happened, the cost of which will be borne by the victim.

The judgments relied on were Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn., (2009) 9 SCC 1 and Z v. State of Bihar, (2018) 11 SCC 572 excerpts of which are stated hereunder:

The legislative intention of the 1971 Act and the decision in Suchita Srivastava prominentaly emphasize on personal autonomy of a pregnant woman to terminate the pregnancy in terms of Section 3 of the Act. Recently, Parliament has passed the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 which has received the assent of the President on 7-4-2017.

 “ It has to be borne in mind that element of time is extremely significant in a case of pregnancy as every day matters and, therefore, the hospitals should be absolutely careful and treating physicians should be well advised to conduct themselves with accentuated sensitivity so that the rights of a woman are not hindered. The fundamental consent relating to bodily integrity, personal autonomy and sovereignty over her body have to be given requisite respect while taking the decision and the concept of consent by a guardian in the case of major should not be over-emphasised.”

Hence as per the medical reports submitted by the doctors, and the submissions made post that on behalf of the petitioners regarding taking care of the victim and its child, if financial help provided, the Court declining the relief of termination of pregnancy under the compelling reasons issued necessary direction to the State Government as a matter of future guideline involving case of this nature.

 Specific Guidelines issued for the case at hand (verbatim reproduced)

(A) Considering that the victim is suffering on account of rape committed on her and the suffering for which the authorities of the State are responsible, this Court directs the State of Odisha to pay as an immediate measure, by way of exgratia grant, a sum of Rs 5,00,000 (Rupees Five lakh) within seven days of receipt of copy of the judgment, to the victim to be kept in long term Fixed Deposit in any Nationalized Bank in the name of victim to be renewed from time to time with operation of such account by the mother of the victim. Annual interest on such Fixed Deposit will be credited to the passbook so maintained with authorization to the mother of the victim herein, to utilize the same towards her daughter’s expenditure till survival of the victim, whereafter the child will be entitled to this amount.

(B) Similarly a further sum of Rs 3,00,000 (Rupees Three lakh) in case of male child and in the event the victim gives birth to a girl child then looking to the suffering of the girl child throughout her life, for the peculiar circumstance involved herein, a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five lakh) to at least make sure that the girl child does not suffer throughout her life, amount as appropriate, shall also be released by way of ex-gratia grant in favour of child within at least ten days of such birth. Here also the amount will be kept in Fixed Deposit in any nationalized Bank by opening a Savings Bank Account in the name of the child. This Account will also be run in the name of minor child to be operated by the maternal Grandmother with scope for renewal of the Fixed Deposit from time to time at least till the child becomes major. Interest so yielded through the F.D. shall be accounted to the SB Account Passbook in the name of minor and to be operated by maternal grandmother only and utilized for the purpose of meeting expenditure on child. The child will ultimately be the owner of such amount once he/she becomes major.

(C) Amount granted by way of ex gratia under Item Nos.1 and 2 shall however be in addition to grant of any payment to the victim and the child on application of The Victim Compensation Scheme under the provisions of Section 357-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure decided by trial court or any other authority competent to do so.

(D) Considering the mental condition of the victim and financial condition of the family, utmost care of the victim is to be taken in continuation of her pregnancy. The best medical facility be made available so as to ensure proper care and supervision during the period of pregnancy as well as postnatal care with the supervision of Doctors in the S.C.B Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack with assistance of team of Doctors at the District Medical Level. Keeping in view the report dated 12.09.2020 the delivery of the victim shall take place only in the S.C.B. Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack.

(E) Looking to the mental retardness along with physical handicapness in the victim, there may be periodical check-up of the victim by a Psychiatric Expert and other related doctors required on requisition of the CDMO. The Superintendent, SCB Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack will ensure such assistance.

(F) The entire transport, medical and medicinal expenses including accommodation of the victim and her mother, if necessary during treatment, shall be the responsibility of the District Administration.

(G) The entire education of the child will be the responsibility of the State.

(H) In the event any grievance arises involving providing any other assistance to the victim and/or the child, it shall be open to the petitioner to first approach the Collector of the District on the basis of direction herein and in case of failure in responding to the genuine asking, it will be open to the victim’s mother and child on attaining his/her majority to approach the High Court of Orissa in filing appropriate application.

(I) Looking to the condition of victim, this Court also observes, the child to be born shall be given proper treatment and nutrition by the State and if any medical aid is necessary it shall also be provided to him/her by the State at least till the child is sufficiently grown up.

(J) Looking to the family of the victim runs on the sole income of the husband of the petitioner being a labourer, to see that the petitioner while maintaining her family will also be able to look after the victim and in future the child to take birth, this Court directs the District Collector to depute a competent officer to the residence of the petitioner to assess the capacity of subsistence in her and based on detailed assessment of their survivability, the Collector shall take decision on providing further assistance through any of the Central Scheme available for the purpose, if any, by completing the entire exercise within four weeks from the date of judgment.

(K) To protect the future of child and to see there is no mismanagement of fund provided both to the victim and the child by direction of this Court, this Court further directs that the Secretary, District Legal Services Authority shall have supervision on the spending by the mother against the account involving both the victim as well as the child so long as the victim survives and the child becomes major. The Secretary is also authorized, in the event he finds any irregularity in the spending of funds or mismanagement of funds involved by the mother, the petitioner herein, involving both the accounts, may seek leave of the High Court for any other mode of operation.

General Guidelines issued (verbatim reproduced)

(i) Once an incident of rape; be it on minor, minor and mentally retarded, minor and physically handicapped, unmarried major, married major, mentally retarded major and physically handicapped major is made to Police within eight weeks period, the Police and the C.D.M.O will take consent of the guardian-mother in case of minor, minor and mentally retarded, minor and physically handicapped as to whether they are interested to continue with pregnancy or interested in termination? In case of major and physically handicapped, consent of such victim and in case major but mentally retarded, consent of mother of such victim shall be taken within same time as to whether the victim should continue with pregnancy or interested in termination. This Court here clarifies, in case there is no interest shown for continuing with pregnancy, immediately after the 1st report of Committee the local Chief District Medical Officer should undertake the exercise of termination but in terms of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. In case interest for termination is not shown then-Police authority along with Chief District Medical Officer is to take care of both mother and child in womb involving pre-birth care and postbirth care for at least till a period of one year after birth takes place. Further, in case of an unmarried major and married major, procedure indicated hereinabove shall also be followed but however with consent of major girl. In case of termination of pregnancy, the C.D.M.O shall take DNA sample of child to ensure its handing over to Investigating Agency, so as to be forwarded to the concerned Court for requirement, if any, there in the criminal trial.

(ii) To maintain secrecy of her pregnancy and termination, the State will ensure, if necessary, to handover such mother to remain in custody of Woman Rehabilitation Centre until her delivery and convalescence.

(iii) In case victim and her mother wish to live in their own residence, they may do so but will be provided all medical help by the State Authority at the cost of the State.

(iv) In required cases, the State will also permit the girl’s mother to either live with her or regular visit to give moral and emotional support and all medical support will be extended by the State through such Institution.

(v) In case of involvement of child through physically handicapped and/or mentally retarded woman subject to medical assessment that such mother is unable to take care of the child born provided there is no elder member coming forward to take care of such child, keeping in view the welfare of the child he or she may be taken care under the Juvenile Justice care mechanism involving agency engaged for such purpose and for about at least 12 months such child will not be given in adoption. This is, however, if there is nobody in the family to take care of such child in course of time.

(vi) In the entire process, all concerned will ensure that secrecy of pregnancy, anonymity of the petitioner and the child to be born is maintained.

vii. In cases it shall equally be the responsibility of the applicant society to ensure that the child does not know about his/her mother and of course about the incident.

viii. There should be immediate grant of exgratia-cum compensation subject to the further grant of victim compensation involving the criminal trial.

(ix) Considering such incidence occurring for failure of Law and Order Authority in case of requirement of high level treatment of rape victim or the child born in such process, the victim and/or the child will be provided the highest level of treatment at the cost of the State including the attendants journey, accommodation and fooding cost, if any.

(x) Report of the Doctor or team of Doctor, as the case may be, obtained with all promptitude and any delay at the level of State Authority shall lead to fixation of accountability and responsibility against all such involved.

(xi) When a pregnant mother is required for examination by a Medical Board for the purpose of termination, it must include apart from Obstetrics and Gynecology also (i) Paediatrics, (ii) Psychiatry/Psyochology, (iii) Radiology/Sonography, (iv) from field of Medicine with inclusion of tests involving foetus also Mental Health Care Act, 2017.

(xii) Constitution and establishment as expeditiously as possible Medical Boards under the provisions of MTP Act, 1971, in each District to fasten examination and effective action involving such cases.

(xiii). District Level Committees to ensure that there are sufficient approved places in terms of Section 4(b) of the MTP Act, 1971 in each districts of the State of Odisha. Chief District Medical Officers involved undertake periodic instruction of such approved places following rule 6 of the MTP Rules, 2003 and take immediate measure to remove difficulties if any. State in its appropriate Departments will have the obligation to co-operate in such matters.

(xiv) If a woman reports with a pregnancy resulting from an assault, she is to be given the report of undergoing an abortion and protocols for the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act are to be followed. Further with preservation of products of conception (POC) be sent to proper custody as evidence and other required purpose under the direction of the Court of competent authority including DNA Test, if any.

(xv) There should also be strict following of User Handbook on Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

The copy of the judgment was also directed to be supplied to Secretary to Government in Health Department, Secretary to Government in Women & Child Care Department, Secretary to Government in Home Department, Chairperson of the State Women Commission, Director, Medical Education and Technology and Superintendents of all the three Premier Medical College & Hospital of the State and also to all the District Judges, who in turn shall bring the same to the notice of the Sessions Court(s) dealing with sexual offences, the Presiding Officer, POCSO Court, the Principal Magistrate of Juvenile Justice Board under its jurisdiction and to the Member Secretary of State Legal Services Authority for bringing it to the notice of the Chairman and the Secretary of District Legal Services Authority for their cooperation and coordination and its effective implementation.

In view of the above, the petition allowed in part and disposed off.[Runa Majhi v. State of Odisha, WP (C) No. 21947 of 2020, decided on 14-09-2020 ]


Arunima Bose, Editorial Assistant has put this story together

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: A Division Bench of S.V. Bhati and Bechu Kurian Thomas, JJ., addressed an issue pertaining to the following terms,

Total deprivation, through a partition deed and a release deed, of the property of a deaf and dumb sister forced her to approach the Court to restore her rights in her property and claim partition.

In the present matter, Court held that persons having physical infirmities like deafness or dumbness which seriously affect their cognitive functions can file a suit through “next friend”.

Mental infirmity in the context of Order 32 Rule 15 is not mental disorder, insanity or mental illness.

Facts

Mary, Leelamma, and Aani are sisters. Mary being the eldest and Aani the youngest. Leelamma, the second amongst the sisters, is a deaf and dumb person. She is also illiterate.

The eldest sister claimed to have brought up Leelamma under her care and custody, conducted her marriage, and that of her daughter too. Leelamma’s conjugal life with her husband did not last long as she came back along with her daughter to Mary’s care.

Allegation

Leelamma alleged that partition deed and the release deed were executed on account of fraud and undue influence exerted over the plaintiff and thus sought to set aside the documents.

Partition Deed

As per the partition deed, the properties left behind the mother were divided between the three sisters.

Defendant 1 was allotted A schedule comprising 60 cents, while B schedule comprising just 5 cents, was allotted to the share of both plaintiff and defendant 1. Youngest sister and defendant 2 recited in the document that she is relinquishing her share in the properties.

Mary, defendant 1 the absolute owner of the entire 65 cents property.

Fraud and Dishonesty

Plaintiff conveyed to her daughter through gestures that she had been taken to some place to give her signature and that her thumb impression was taken.

Plaintiff alleged that release deed was cerated by undue influence, fraudulently, dishonestly, and without her knowledge or consent.

Next Friend

Defendant 1 questioned the right of the next friend to file the suit and also denied the incapacity of the plaintiff as far as her ability to comprehend and do things by herself was concerned and also denied the allegation of fraud, cheating and undue influence exerted by the defendants over the plaintiff.

Analysis and Decision

Next Friend

Order 32 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deal with Suits by or Against Minors and Persons of Unsound Mind. Appointment of next friend for a person with an unsound mind.

Further, the said provision deals with persons of mental infirmity, who are, by the said reason, incapable of protecting their interests, except with the assistance of a next friend, when suing or being sued.

Mental Infirmity

Living as a deaf and dumb person, has a debilitating effect on the mental faculties of comprehension, thought, communication and even response. These faculties when affected will have an effect on the person’s capacity to protect his civil rights.

Fraud, Undue Influence or Coercion

There is no dispute with the proposition that the burden of proof in respect of the plea of fraud, undue influence or coercion is upon the person who alleges the same.

Valid Contract

Free consent, competency to contract, lawful consideration, lawful object and agreement not declared to be void, are the main ingredients for a valid contract. It is a consensual act and the parties are free to settle any terms as they please.

Whether consent for partition and for the release deed has been obtained by undue influence or fraud played by the defendants upon the plaintiff?

High Court observed that, taking care of one’s own sister is a gratuitous or magnanimous act for which it cannot be believed that the entire property will be given away.

Position of Dominance

In the present matter, the defendants failed to prove good faith in the transaction and the execution of release deed documents was proved to have been done exploiting the position of dominance in which defendant 1 wielded over the plaintiff.

Principle of Undue Influence

Hence Court being of firm view stated that the said transactions relating to the share right of the plaintiff are void on the principle of undue influence.

Court also observed that nowhere does the document recite as to why more than 95% of the property (62.5 cents out of a total of 65 cents) left behind by mother of the parties to the document has been allotted to the share of the defendant 1, while the plaintiff is left with a meagre 4% (2.5 cents). Even the 2.5 cents allotted to the plaintiff was released in favour of the defendant1, within a period of five days of execution of Ext.A1. Though the document mentions payment of Rs 2.5 lakhs as consideration for the said transaction, it has come out in evidence that no such payment was received by the plaintiff.

“Fraud in the present case is evident and it has been deployed to exploit a hapless lady of her properties.”

Fraud

Referring to Section 34 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 and the Rules made thereunder may be apposite in the present context and Court found that the failure to inform the Sub-Registrar about the deafness and dumbness of one of the parties to the document was a deft method in playing fraud.

Hence, defendant 1 is entitled to 2/3rd share in the plaint schedule property and held that defendant 2 is not entitled to any share. [Mary v. Leelamma, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 2491, decided on 30-06-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: M.G. Sewikar, J., denied bail to the applicant accused of deceiving the prosecutrix by giving false promise of marriage who submitted herself for sexual intercourse based on the misconception of facts.

The present application was filed for grant of anticipatory bail for offences registered under Sections 376, 417, 323, 504, 506 of the Penal Code, 1860.

Informant aged 20 years used to go for labour work at a poultry farm, where she got acquainted with the applicant and promised to marry her.

Applicant had sexual intercourse with the informant twice under the promise of marriage.

About 2 months before the filing of the FIR, the applicant called her and demanded sexual favour from the informant, but she denied on the pretext getting married. Applicant got enraged and beat her.

Later, the informant learnt that the applicant was already married.

Counsel for the applicant, R.S. Shinde and V.S. Badakh, APP for the State.

From the FIR filed, it is apparent that the prosecutrix gave consent for the sexual intercourse as the applicant promised to marry her. 

Question to be determined:

Whether the consent of the prosecutrix was a voluntary consent or it was a consent-based on the misconception of facts?

In case of rape under Section 376 of the Penal Code, more particularly, in cases where consent is obtained by giving false promise of marriage, it has to be ascertained whether the accused did not have the intention to marry the prosecutirx right from the inception.

For the above-stated aspect on the matter, the law was settled.

Section 90 of the Penal Code, 1860 talks about “Consent known to be given under fear or misconception” and the essential requirement for that is, the same must have been obtained under the misconception of fact and the accused must be aware that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception.

Court observes that, investigation papers do not reveal that the prosecutrix had the knowledge that the accused was a married man before submitting herself for sexual intercourse. If she had submitted herself for sexual intercourse with full knowledge that the applicant was a married man, the consent would not be vitiated.

In view of Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, a person cannot contract second marriage if his or her spouse is living.

In view of the above-stated provision, the applicant could not have legally married the prosecutrix during the subsistence of his marriage.

Further, the Court stated that the accused had knowledge that he would not be able to marry the prosecutrix as long as his marriage is subsisting. This fact clearly shows that the applicant had the intention to deceive the prosecutrix by giving false promise of marriage. Therefore, the consent given by the prosecutrix is vitiated because of the concealment of material fact by the accused from her.

Hence, in view of the above-stated facts, the applicant is not entitled to be released.[Siddharth Ramkrishna Chitte v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 864, decided on 26-06-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: Vinay Joshi, J., granted bail to the applicants who were accused of committing offence of unnatural sex without consent and outraging the modesty of a woman.

An FIR was lodged by a grown-up lady aged 41 years old against her husband and brother-in-law.

Allegations placed by the woman were that her husband i.e. Ravi time and again had unnatural sex with her against her consent. She also alleged that her brother-in-law i.e. applicant used to outrage her modesty and was demanding sexual favour.

Another crime was filed by the daughter of the applicant. The girl alleged against her uncle Ravi that while she was studying in 10th standard, he tried touching her inappropriately and outraged her modesty.

Applicants Counsel, S.P. Bhandarkar submitted that both the complaints are nothing but an outcome of matrimonial flued.

Unnatural Sex

Court noted that the marriage of strained couple sailed smoothly for 21 long years and has two children. After such a long time, the wife alleged unnatural sexual acts at the hands of her husband.

Though it is alleged that since inception, the husband was prone to seek unnatural sex, however, after a long gap of 21 years the matter has been reported to the police.

Bench cited the Supreme Court decision in the case of Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI, (2018) 10 SCC 1, wherein it was held that,

“Unnatural consensual sexual acts of adults in private are de-criminalized.”

Non-Consensual

In light of the above-stated decision, the offence would only be attracted if it was done without the consent of the adult.

In the present matter, it has been unfolded that the allegation was running for a period of 20 years, but, the complaint had been lodged thereafter. No medical evidence to support the allegations was placed in the complaint.

Court noted that both the FIRs were simultaneously filed, which speaks for itself.

In view of the above, both the applicants made out a case for grant of pre-arrest bail and Court disposed of the criminal applications. [Rajendra Ramkrushna Malve v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 863, decided on 11-08-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: Bharati Dangre, J., while addressing a bail application made the following observation:

There cannot be a straight jacket formula as to how a woman will react to an act of outrage by a male, since all women are borne into different circumstances in life, go through different things and faces, experience and react differently and necessarily each woman would turn out to be different from the other.

Applicant sought release on bail for being charged with offences under Sections 376, 354-A and 354-B of Penal Code, 1860.

Advocates who appeared in the present matter:

Dr Abhinav Chandrachud with Ms Khushboo Pathak and Mr Wasi Sayyed i/b Mr Prem Pandey for the Applicant.

Mr Ajay Patil, A.P.P. for the State.

Mr Satyam Nimbalkar for the intervener.

Forceful Sexual Intercourse

Complainant was acquainted with the present applicant aged 24 years since past 8 years. Complainant along with her friends went for an overnight Diwali party and somewhere past midnight she went to a bedroom to take rest and went off to sleep. Around 4,30 she was awakened with a feeling and found that someone was forcing himself upon her.

Complainant found that it Applicant who was forcing himself upon her and trying to have sexual intercourse with her by penetrating his penis into her vagina. At this juncture, the Complainant used all possible force to push him away and she was successful in thwarting the sexual overtures by the applicant.

Later, complainant went to find her friends which she couldn’t hence she returned back to the same room where, on not finding the applicant she went off to sleep, but yet again the applicant tried to repeat the same act to which complainant scolded him and left the room.

Distressed Mental Condition

Due to above stated incident, complainant went through mental trauma and was frightened. She narrated the whole episode to her mother and went to a psychiatrist, further she discussed the whole matter with her family and approached the Kondwa Police Station.

Offences were registered under Sections 376, 354 and 354-A of the Penal code, 1860.

Decision

In complainant’s statement, she stated that on applicant trying to establish physical contact with her she raised an alarm to which none of her friends responded, Court was astonished to the said statement.

Another point which seemed incomprehensible was the fact that she did not report the incident to anyone on the same day though she was amidst of the friends and went for an outing. The photographs placed on record would lead to an impression of her being cheerful in the company of the accused and one other friend.

Considering the material placed on record, Court was of the prima facie view that it does not constitute a reasonable ground for believing that the applicant is guilty of the offence charged.

The statements of two witnesses to the effect that the Applicant and the victim were found sleeping in the same room on the same bed will have to be put to test in a trial and this evidence will have to be appreciated cumulatively.

Further the Bench added that,

“…concept of consent of the victim or as to at what stage the consent was revoked and the act of physical indulgence was attempted to be restrained is a matter of trial.”

Court also quoted Warren Buffet,

“If a lady says No, she means may be” or in the expression of Rich Santos for Marie Claire – “Most of us guys have been there; the night ends, we invite the girls come home with us. When a girl says no, we launch into our second and third attempts. Sadly, these attempts are filled with incentives such as promise of guitar playing, of ‘fabulas chicken tenders at the dinner by my place’ or even promises: ‘I will definitely call on the next day’ etc; I have taken girls home after long discussions, changing Nos to Yeses”

above are the old hat tricks and the issue as to whether the girl really consented freely for a physical indulgence with her is to be searched by applying the new standards of modern life and the present social scenario.

On granting bail to the applicant, Court stated that,

Balancing deprivation of his liberty against the possibility of the trial being commencing and concluding in the immediate times is far beyond reality, particularly in the light of the huge galloping pendency which the judicial system would be staring at, at the end of the Covid pandemic. Incarceration of a young boy for an indefinite period would be antithesis to the concept of liberty.

Hence, applicant was granted bail with stringent conditions. [Jitin Mothukiri v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 821 , decided on 21-07-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: Sandeep K. Shinde, J., granted bail to a person accused for alleged offence of committing rape repeatedly, which turned out to be consensual on perusal of statement by the victim to the medical officer.

Petition was filed with regard to enlargement on bail for the alleged offences punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act.

Victim in the present case was 17 yeas and 8 months old at the time of the incident.

Bench on perusal of the final report found that victim had informed the medical officer that she has sexual contact for multiple times with the applicant voluntarily.

Further it appeared that till her pregnancy she did not disclose the incident of alleged sexual assault.

Victim alleged that applicant had promised to marry her and therefore she had succumbed to his desires. Court had made efforts to settle the marriage of victim with the applicant, but on interviewing her she flatly denied to marry the applicant.

Thus in the above stated circumstances, Court concluded that it would be unreasonable to hold that victim did not possess mental capacity to actively understand the nature and consequences of the act as to which she had consented.

“Her statement to Medical Officer also reinforces the fact that she was in love with the applicant and voluntarily submitted to the physical desires of the applicant.”

Hence, applicant is directed to be released on bail with certain conditions.[Manish R. Mishra v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 778 , decided on 13-07-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: P.B. Suresh Kumar, J., addressed a matter in which a 59 year old man was accused of raping a minor girl and the issue that has been dealt primarily in the matter is with regard to consent in the context of rape.

Conviction and Sentence of the appellant were challenged in the present appeal.

What is the accusation?

Accused had committed rape on a minor girl aged 14 years belonging to Scheduled Caste and impregnated her on various days.

Offences alleged were punishable under Section 376 of Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Decision of the lower Court

Court below on perusal of the record found that the accused had sexual intercourse with the victim girl and impregnated her.

Although the Court found that the prosecution did not prove the age of the victim girl and failed to establish that the case is one that falls under the sixth description in the definition of ‘rape’ in terms of Section 375 of the IPC as it stood then, it held that in the absence of any case for the accused that the sexual intercourse he had with the victim girl was consensual, the accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC.

Point formulated for decision

Whether the prosecution established that the sexual intercourse between the victim girl and accused was without her consent?

Court noted that the present case was decided prior to the introduction of Section 114A of the Evidence Act.

Victim Girl’s deposition

While she was watching television, the accused sent his granddaughter away to a shop, closed the door of the house, pulled her to the adjacent room, made her lie down in a cot, removed her clothes and inserted his genital organ into her vagina after removing his clothes.

Understanding the concept of consent in the context of rape

Mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non- resistance, or passive giving in, when volitional faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated by duress, cannot be deemed to be ‘consent’ as understood in law and the consent, on the part of a woman as a defence to an allegation of rape, requires voluntary participation, not only after the exercise of intelligence, based on the knowledge, of the significance and moral quality of the act, but after having freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent.

Sexual assaults including rape are crimes of gender inequality.

Court added to its conclusion that, in a country like ours committed to gender equality, only sexual intercourse which are welcomed could be construed as not violative of the rights of the victim, and accepted as consensual.

Accused was a fatherly figure to the victim girl, leaving apart the age factor there is was doubt with the class in which she was studying during the relevant period. She used to go the accused’s place for watching television and taking advantage of the situation accused had made sexual advances to her.

Accused’s case was only that the admitted conduct of the victim girl in going to the house of the accused as when desired by him subsequently would indicate that the latter instances of sexual intercourse were consensual.

Thus, Court in view of the above concluded that in a situation as was in the present matter, conduct on the part of the victim girl in surrendering before the accused as and when desired by him cannot be said to be unusual or abnormal and such surrender can never be construed as consensual acts of sexual intercourse. [Thankappan P.K. v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 2587 , decided on 29-06-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Division Bench of Manmohan and Sangita Dhingra Sehgal, JJ., dismissed a criminal leave petition filed by the State against the order of the trial court whereby it had acquitted the respondent who was accused of raping the prosecutrix (victim).

The respondent was accused of committing rape on the prosecutrix. The trial court, however, acquitted the respondent concluding that from circumstances of the case, it could not be deduced conclusively that the victim was taken away by the accused by deceitful means and that the sexual relations between them were forcible. Aggrieved thereby, the State filed the instant petition.

Aashaa Tiwari, APP, appeared for the State. It was the case of the prosecution that respondent-accused established physical relationship with the prosecutrix on the false pretext of marriage.

It was noted by the High Court that the prosecutrix had admitted that she and the respondent had known each other for more than one year and they had physical relations prior to the present complaint being filed by her. It was also found that the prosecutrix had voluntarily accompanied the respondent and the allegation that the physical relations were made without her consent was not correct.

Relying on Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1073, the High Court observed: “…to establish whether “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established namely that the prosecution proves beyond doubt that the Respondent-accused had established sexual relations with the Prosecutrix on the basis of a false promise of marriage given in bad faith with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. Further, the false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the Prosecutrix’s decision to engage in the sexual act.”

In the instant case, the Court also noted that the neighbours of the respondent-accused had stated that the prosecutrix and the respondent-accused had moved an application before the local SDM for registration of their marriage. Consequently, the Court was of the view that the condition precedent of the physical relationship having been established on the false pretext of marriage was not made out.

In such view of the matter, the High Court found no warrant to interfere with the order of the trial court. Accordingly, the criminal leave petition filed by the State was dismissed. [State v. Ramji Ram, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 316, decided on 20-01-2020]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: A Division Bench of Hemant Kumar Srivastava and Prabhat Kumar Singh, JJ. rejected a letters patent appeal on the admission stage itself to be allowed to solemnize the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage and found it being having no merits to stand.

In the instant case, the appellant married his second wife during the lifetime of his first wife. When a departmental proceeding was initiated against him, he produced forged documents. Further, he was dismissed from service. Consequently, he challenged it. Later not only his appeal against the dismissal order but also its further revision against it was also dismissed by a Single Judge Bench.

The counsel for the appellant, Arun Kumar pled that the appellant solemnized his second marriage with Sunita Upadhayay (second wife) with the permission and consent of his first wife which the Disciplinary Authority and the Single Judge Bench failed to take into consideration.

The respondent’s counsel, Manoj Kumar Singh contended that the aforesaid authorities had considered all the aspects of the matter. Moreover the appellant was also charged for forgery.

In view of the above, the Court opined that the Single Judge Bench had discussed the case in detail and passed the impugned judgment. It observed that even if the first wife consented to the appellant’s marriage, it gave no right to the appellant to solemnize his second marriage. Moreover, the appellant failed to prove any violation of natural justice or any violation of rules. Further, the said factual aspect could not be looked into this Letters Patent Appeal. In view thereof, the appeal was dismissed.[Binod Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 2363, dated on 02-12-2019]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In an appeal against the verdict of Gujarat High Court that quashed the criminal proceedings against a man accused for sexually assaulting and blackmailing his employee, the 3-judge bench of UU Lalit, Indu Malhotra and R. Subhash Reddy, JJ has set aside the verdict and held that the High Court has got carried away by the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the parties, and recorded a finding that the physical relationship of the appellant with the respondent was consensual.

The Court said,

“where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped, and such woman states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent.”

The Court was hearing the case where the respondent had taken inappropriate pictures of the appellant while she was asleep. He had gone to visit the appellant when she was unwell. Taking advantage of the situation, he started blackmailing her to make viral her pictures and to terminate her employment. He then started committing rape on her. When she resigned from the job, he contacted her fiancé and told him is not of good character, she had physical relationship with him and with other boys. When the fiancé refused to meet him, he sent a cover to his residence containing her nude/inappropriate pictures. The parties later entered into a written agreement wherein it was agreed that the dispute between the parties is settled and that the respondent has allegedly paid a huge amount to the appellant.

The Court noticed that whether the respondent by clicking inappropriate pictures of the appellant has blackmailed her or not, and further whether he has continued to interfere by calling appellant’s fiancé or not are the matters for investigation. It, hence, held that the High Court should not have made a roving inquiry while considering the application filed under Section 482 CrPC.

Holding that the High Court has got carried away by the agreement/settlement arrived at, between the parties, and recorded a finding that the physical relationship of the appellant with the respondent was consensual, the Court said,

“When it is the allegation of the appellant, that such document itself is obtained under threat and coercion, it is a matter to be investigated.”

[Miss XYZ v. State of Gujarat, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1619 OF 2019, decided on 25.10.2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Applicant filed an application under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code which was contemplated by Dinesh Kumar Singh, J. where the prayer was to quash the Charges under certain Sections of Penal Code, 1860.

The applicant was charged under Sections 366, 376, 328, 506, 406 of IPC, in which the Chief Judicial Magistrate had taken cognizance. Santosh Yadav, counsel for the applicant argued that the accused was falsely implicated by the respondent-complainant who was the mother of the victim, the main reason cited by the counsel behind such baseless complaint was alleged desire to the victim to marry applicant. The counsel submitted the statements of the complainant and highlighted that she had stated that ‘she suspected the involvement of accused in the instant case.’ Another issue highlighted was alleged kidnapping by the accused-applicant, it was submitted that the victim was never abducted as she herself went to the police station to register the complaint. The attention of the Court was also drawn towards the other statement of the victim, recorded under Section 161 of CrPC. where the allegation of rape had been made upon the accused applicant who after committing rape had given assurance to marry her and subsequently when she asked to marry he committed assault and refused to marry.  In addition to these aforementioned evidences the applicant submitted an injury report, where it was stated that no marks to injury were found on the victim. Lastly, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that many facts were ignored by the Investigating Officer and the charge-sheet had been submitted in a routine manner, which was nothing but an abuse of the process of Court and in the interest of justice, the charge sheet deserved to be quashed.

Bhaiya Ghanshyam Singh, Advocate General for the state, had vehemently opposed the prayer for quashing of the charge- sheet and had stated that the evidence which was collected by the Investigating Officer cannot be looked into in this Application under Section 482 CrPC as the same will be required during the trial. It was submitted that High Court had no jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence of the proceedings under Section 482 of CrPC. “because whether there are contradictions or/and inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses is essentially an issue relating to appreciation of evidence and the same can be gone into by the Judicial Magistrate during trial when the entire evidence is adduced by the parties.”

The Court held that the Investigating Officer had recorded the statements of as many as five witnesses have submitted the charge-sheet. It further opined that “the truthfulness of the statements of the witnesses cannot be scrutinized in Application under Section 482 CrPC” The Court relied upon the Judgment in Anurag Singh v. Chhatisgarh, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509, where the Supreme Court had held that ‘position of law, was apparent that whether accused wanted to marry the victim right from very beginning or not and whether consent given by victim for sexual intercourse was a free-consent or not, was a subject matter of evidence, which is only possible to be decided after trial.’

Hence, the prayer for quashing the FIR was refused and the application was dismissed.[Kamal Pal v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 3539, decided on 25-09-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: R. Narayana Pisharadi, J. allowed the petition filed by the husband and directed the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class to stop all the proceedings against him under Section 376 of the Penal Code, 1860.

In the present case, the petitioner and the first respondent were in love with each other and petitioner had promised to marry her. Respondent had sexual intercourse with the petitioner on the basis of the promise of marriage. When the petitioner took her to the house of his relatives, they threatened her. Apprehending that they would harm her she escaped and reported the matter to police and charges under Section 376 of Penal Code, 1860 were set against him. After a short time span, both petitioner and respondent solemnized their marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Petitioner sought to set aside the proceedings against him by invoking power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The main question to be considered by the Court was whether the marriage between the accused and the victim can be considered as a sufficient ground to quash the prosecution proceedings against the petitioner.

The respondent submitted that she had no grievance against the petitioner and no objection in setting aside the proceeding against him. In the affidavit filed by the respondent she had stated that she was forced to sign the first information statement at the instance of her mother and other relatives and that she had no intention to implicate the petitioner in a case of rape.

The Court placed relevance on Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509 where the principle was laid that if it was found that from the inception the accused had promised the prosecutrix to marry her without any intention to marry and the consent for sexual intercourse was based on such promise then such consent could be said to be obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of IPC. It was also acknowledged that consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC and it must be carefully examined that whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim or had made a false promise of marriage only to satisfy his lust.

It was noted that in the present case, the petitioner had no fraudulent intention in promising marriage to the respondent. The promise made by him was not a false promise made only with the intention to satisfy his lust. This was evident from the fact that he married the victim lady within a short period after the incident.

Considering all the facts and circumstances it was a fit case for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, and proceedings against petitioner were set aside.[Denu P. Thampi v. X, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1639, decided on 27-05-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: The Bench of Sanjay Kumar Gupta, J. allowed a petition seeking protection, filed by a couple who performed inter-caste marriage.

The petitioners out of their free will and consent executed a marriage agreement duly attested by notary. They also married as per Hindu rites and customs at Arya Samaj Janipur, Jammu. As per the affidavit filed by them, it was evident that they were major at the time they solemnized the marriage. Father of the girl (Respondent 5) was vehemently opposed to their marriage; and he harassed and threatened to kill them. This led the petitioners to restrict their movement and being aggrieved, they filed the instant petition.

The Court relied on Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368 to hold that right to marry a person of one’s choice is an integral aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was further placed on Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 475, wherein the Apex Court directed that the administration/police authorities throughout the country will see to it that if any boy or girl who is a major undergoes inter-caste or inter religious marriage with a woman or man who is a major, the couple are not harassed by any one nor subjected to threats or acts of violence, anyone who gives such threats or harasses or commits acts of violence either himself or at his instigation, is taken to task by instituting criminal proceedings by the police against such persons and further stern action is taken against such persons as provided by law”.

In view of the above, this petition was allowed and official respondent’s 1 to 4 were directed to ensure adequate protection of lives and liberty of the petitioners.[Simran Choudhary v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 2019 SCC OnLine J&K 404, Order dated 01-05-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: The Division Bench of Hrishikesh Roy and A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar. JJ. dismissed a writ appeal filed by landlord against an order dispensing with the requirement of his consent, for renewal of his tenant’s trade licence.

A partnership firm (tenant) – Vijaya Jyothi Traders ­– had filed an application before the Thrissur Municipal Corporation for a D&O (Dangerous & Offensive) licence. The Corporation refused to consider this application on the ground that the application was not supported by landlord’s (appellant herein) consent which was the mandate under Sections 492(3) and 492(4) of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994.

In a petition filed by the managing partner of the firm (respondent herein), it was averred that averred that since there were some disputes between him and the appellant-landlord, therefore obtaining consent letter from the landlord must not be insisted for consideration of the renewal of the licence. Learned Single judge allowed the petition and directed the Corporation to consider the subject application without insisting for consent from the appellant-landlord. Aggrieved thereby, the instant writ appeal was filed.

The Court noted that the learned Single Judge had taken note of pending suits between the landlord and tenant and had also provided an opportunity of hearing to both the parties. It relied on the judgment in Sudhakaran v. Corporation of Trivandrum, (2016) 14 SCC 263 where the Apex Court while deciding the on renewal of trade licence, stated that a tenant could not be deprived of running a lawful business merely because the landlord withheld his consent. A valid tenancy has implied the authority of the landlord for the legitimate use of the premises by the tenant.

In view of the above, the Court upheld the impugned judgment. [C.S. Babu v. C. Vijayan, 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 5783, Order dated 14-12-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu and Kashmir High Court: The Bench of Gita Mittal, CJ and Tashi Rabstan, J. dismissed the application filed to assail the decision passed by the Trial Court wherein the respondent was acquitted of the charges under Sections 376, 363 and 344 of the RPC for wrongfully restraining and raping the prosecutrix for several days.

The facts of the case are that an application was moved by the father of the prosecutrix alleging that his daughter referred to as the ‘prosecutrix’ was kidnapped by someone on 3-12-2015 and that she could not be traced. The prosecutrix was alleged to have been recovered on 15-12-2015 from a bus stand. The respondent was arrested in the matter based on the statement made by the prosecutrix. The case came before the Trial Court wherein it was held that the prosecutrix was aged between 18 to 20 years on the date of the offence and not a minor and hence the aspect of kidnapping from the custody of the lawful guardian, as was envisaged under Section 363 of the RPC, was not made out. The Trail Court thus acquitted the respondent of the first charge.  The second charge which was laid against the respondent was a commission of offences under Section 344 of the RPC with regard to the unlawful confinement of the prosecutrix for ten or more days and under Section 376 RPC for having raped her during this period. The Trial Court considered the entire evidence and found that the prosecutrix was in active contact of the respondent from September, 2015 and that she voluntarily left her home in his company to go with him on  3-12-2015 with her documents. Marriage was the solemnized. The applicant was acquitted since consent was shown.

The Court dismissed the appeal upholding the settled law that the appellate Court will not lightly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. [State v. Rajinder Paul Singh, 2019 SCC OnLine J&K 77, Order dated 30-01-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: The Bench of S.C. Gupte, J. while addressing an arbitration petition challenging the award passed by a sole arbitrator, noted the points of evidence asserted by the sole arbitrator and dismissed the petition.

In the present petition, the crux of the issue involved an agreement for manufacturing of the petitioner’s liquor products. The particular agreement was between the petitioner (who was the respondent to the reference) and the respondent (who was the claimant before the arbitral forum) inter alia engaging services of respondent for manufacture, on a priority basis of various liquor products of the petitioner in the State of Maharashtra.

Respondent stated in his points of contentions that in a meeting held between the representatives of the parties, it was agreed that bottling charges would be increased by Rs 10 per case. Claimant had sent out an e-mail with a letter requesting the petitioner to confirm the minutes of the meeting held for which no response from the petitioner was received. Further, it was stated that though respondent did not receive any written communication from the petitioner, respondent, with consent from the petitioner, went on adjusting from jointly operated account payments towards bottling charges at the rate of Rs 40 per case.

Petitioner in his behalf placed that, a sum of Rs 40,46,165.87 was due and payable by the petitioner to the respondent after the payments adjusted. Further, for the said amount, it was agreed between the petitioner and the respondent that the petitioner would pay the same in four installments which never got fulfilled.

A legal notice was sent to the petitioner regarding the above stated and thereafter present reference was filed.

Learned sole arbitrator while giving its award held that the petitioner had failed to pay the agreed amount and as a result, awarded a sum of Rs 64,08,685.82, comprising of the principal amount as stated above along with interest. The said award has been challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

While concluding the decision, the bench stated that the oral agreement was consistently acted upon by the parties for a long period of time. “Whatever view the Court may take of an oral modification clause generally or in the particular case we are concerned with, the mandate of challenge to the court under Section 34 of the Act is to see whether the view taken by the arbitrator, even if it be on a question of law or its application to the facts of the case, is a possible view or view which a fair and judiciously minded person could well take.” Therefore, the view taken by the arbitrator could well be said to be a possible view and supported by evidence. The view must pass muster under Section 34 of the Act.

Thus, the challenge to the impugned award had no merit and the petition was accordingly dismissed. [John Distilleries (P) Ltd. v. Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 67, dated 14-01-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: A Single Judge Bench of Rajbir Sehrawat, J., dismissed the three petitions which were addressed together involving similar facts but involvement of different cheques and different complaints/proceedings thereunder.

Facts of the case were that petitioner was required to pay certain amount as a result of a settlement between the parties. For the same, petitioner had issued cheque which was dishonoured by the bank and further proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 was carried out resulting into the filing of complaint by respondent. During the pendency of the complaint, the petitioner filed applications for compounding of offences. On refusal to compound the offence by the complainant, the trial court had dismissed the applications. This petition challenged the trial court’s order and prayed for quashing of complaint and summoning order.

The issue before the High Court was to see if the application filed by the petitioner for compounding of the offence under Section 138 could be allowed without complainant’s consent.

The High Court was of the view that the requirement of consent of complainant as a basic ingredient for compounding of offences cannot be dispensed with. Thus, the trial court was right in rejecting the application for compounding of offences on the ground that complainant had not consented for the same. In respect to the prayer of quashing of complaint and summoning order, Court found no factual or legal basis to grant the same. [Anant Tools (Unit No.II) (P) Ltd v. Anant Tools (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 1723, decided on 20-09-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Calcutta High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Rajasekhar Mantha, J. allowed an appeal filed by the appellant against of the order of the trial court whereby he was convicted under Section 376 IPC.

The prosecution case was that the appellant had committed rape on the prosecutrix on the false pretext of marrying her. It was alleged that after the first occasion of sexual intercourse, the appellant promised to marry the prosecutrix to which she consented. Thereafter, as admitted by the prosecutrix, they remained in a love affair for 1 and half years where they cohabitated regularly. The prosecutrix had intercourse with the appellant on various occasions of her own free will. 15 days prior the complaint, they also tried to fly away but were caught by the mother of the prosecutrix. It was proved that the prosecutrix became pregnant and gave birth to appellant’s child. It was alleged that the appellant finally refused to marry her. Thus, the complaint was filed and the appellant was convicted as aforementioned.

The High Court perused the record and found that after the mother of the prosecutrix came to know about the affair on the night when the appellant and prosecutrix attempted to flee, she talked to appellant’s father. His father, however, refused to give consent to their marriage. The Court observed that the trial court ignored the fact that the prosecutrix continued to have sexual intercourse with the appellant of her own free will. It was never proved that the appellant, on the first occasion, did not intend to marry her. It was only the father of appellant who refused to accept her as the daughter-in-law. Consent of the prosecutrix for voluntary sexual intercourse, in this case, was obtained neither by fraud nor on a misconception of facts. Holding thus, the High Court set aside the order of the trial court and acquitted the appellant. The appeal was, thus, allowed. [Kalam Sk. v. State of W.B.,2018 SCC OnLine Cal 6548, decided on 20-09-2018]