Supreme Court: While considering an appeal wherein the Court had to deliberate that whether a tribal woman (or her legal heirs) would be entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property or not; the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol* and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ., opined that, unless otherwise prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property only exacerbates gender discrimination, which the law should ensure to weed out.
Therefore, in keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court held that in the instant case, since the Plaintiffs were D’s (Tribal woman heir) legal heirs, they are entitled to their equal share in the property of their maternal grandfather
Background and Legal Trajectory:
The appellant (Plaintiffs) are the legal heirs of D, a woman belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. They sought partition of a property belonging to their maternal grandfather BG. Their mother was one of the six children of BG, and the Plaintiffs stated that their mother is entitled to an equal share in the scheduled property. The cause of action arose in October 1992 when Defendents 6 to 16 refused to make a partition.
The Plaintiffs approached the Trial Court seeking a declaration of title and partition of the suit property; however, their suit was dismissed. The First Appellate Court in 2009 concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that the mother of the Plaintiffs had no right in the property of her father. It was held that no evidence had been led to show that children of a tribal woman heir are also entitled to property.
The matter reached the Chhattisgarh High Court as it involved a substantial question of law. The High Court considering the findings of the Trial Court qua the argument of custom, held that the same was in consonance with the judgments of the Supreme Court in Salekh Chand v. Satya Gupta, (2008) 13 SCC 119; Ratanlal v. Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka, (2018) 11 SCC 119 and Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya, (2019) 16 SCC 1. the High Court held that the Plaintiffs had failed to establish their right over such property by way of custom, showing that a tribal woman heir is also entitled thereto. The High Court further held that since the Plaintiffs could not bring any evidence to show that that they had adopted Hindu traditions, the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court had rightly rejected this contention.
Aggrieved with the High Court’s verdict, the Plaintiffs appealed before the Supreme Court.
Court’s Assessment:
Considering the primary issue about a Tribal Woman’s and her legal heirs’ entitlement to equal share in ancestral property, the Court firstly observed that, “One would think that in this day and age, where great strides have been made in realizing the constitutional goal of equality, this Court would not need to intervene for equality between the successors of a common ancestor and the same should be a given, irrespective of their biological differences, but it is not so”.
At the outset, the Court clarified that the question of the parties having adopted Hindu customs and way of life is no longer in play. The Court further pointed out that Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 unequivocally excludes Scheduled Tribes from its application.
Thereafter, the Court had to consider the application of custom. It was stated that for the application of a custom to be shown, it must be proved; however, the Courts below proceeded with an assumption in mind that the Plaintiffs did not prove the same and the Supreme Court thus opined that this assumption was misplaced.
The Court explained the Courts below assumed there to be an exclusionary custom in a place where the daughters would not be entitled to any inheritance and expected the appellant-plaintiffs to prove otherwise. The Court opined that an alternate scenario was also possible where inclusion could have been presumed and the Defendants then could have been asked to show that tribal women were not entitled to inherit property. “This patriarchal predisposition appears to be an inference from Hindu law, which has no place in the present case”.
Pointing out that neither any particular law of a community nor custom could be brought into application by either side, the Court proceeded to examine the Plaintiffs’ argument concerning principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. It was pointed out that principles of justice, equity etc., finds statutory recognition in Section 6 of the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875.
The Court noted that the High Court via the impugned judgment had held that since the 1875 law has been repealed in March 2018, thus the 1875 law was inapplicable; the Supreme Court opined that this stance taken by the High Court was mistaken, especially in the light of the Savings Clause which clearly stated that no right having been accrued prior to the repeal of the Act shall be affected thereby.
Since the parties to the instant case are neither governed by Hindu nor Muslim laws and, therefore, would be covered by Section 6 of the 1875 Act. So, the right having been accrued in favour of the Plaintiffs’ mother upon the death of her father, which was approximately 30 years before the filing of the plaint became crystallized and would not be affected by the fact that the Act was no longer in the statute book. The 1875 Act, therefore, necessarily had to be applied by the High Court.
Considering the principles of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’, the Court explained that these principles can be applied only when there is a void or, in absence of any law governing that aspect. Since no custom to the effect that a tribal woman is entitled to the property could be shown, the application thereof would be consistent with this position. The Court further stated that this open-ended principle must be applied contextually.
The Court pointed out that in the instant case, a tribal woman or her successors would be denied a right to property based on the absence of a positive assertion to such inheritance in custom, if the views of the lower Court are upheld. However, customs too, like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of their right.
The Court further found that there was a question of Article 14 of the Constitution involved in the instant case. The Court emphasised that there appeared to be no rational nexus or reasonable classification for only males to be granted succession over the property of their forebears and not women, especially where no prohibition to such effect can be shown to be prevalent as per law. Article 15(1) of the Constitution mandates that the State shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This, along with Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the Constitution in ensuring that there is no discrimination against women. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that most commendable step was taken under the Hindu Law by way of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which made daughters the coparceners in joint family property.
Coming onto the facts of the case, the Court pointed out that even though no such custom of tribal woman succession could be established by the Plaintiffs, but nonetheless it was also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case, denying D her share in her father’s property, when the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin.
Hence, with the afore-stated assessment, the Court set aside the decisions of the Trial Court, First Appellate Court and the High Court.
[Ram Charan v. Sukhram, Civil Appeal No. 9537 of 2025, decided on 17-7-2025]
*Judgment by Justice Sanjay Karol
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For Petitioner(s): Mr. Padmesh Mishra, Adv. Ms. Vastvikta Bhardwaj, Adv. Mr. Nikunj Goyal, Adv. Mr. Aditya, Adv. Mr. Vijant, Adv. Ms. Neelam Singh, AOR
For Respondent(s): Mr. Bipin Bihari Singh, Adv. Mr. Ashok Anand, AOR Mr. Anand Singh, Adv. Mr. Aakash Kakade, Adv. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Singh, Adv. Mr. Sumeer Sodhi, AOR