Chhattisgarh High Court: In a writ petition filed by a former technician assailing the Appellate Authority’s order affirming his termination from service, the Single Judge Bench of Narendra Kumar Vyas, J., rejected the petition, holding that the petitioner was rightly punished with termination for being a habitual absentee.
Background
The petitioner had been working as a technician at the Bhilai Steel Plant (‘BSP’) since 1988. In 1994, he remained absent for 140 days without sanctioned leave from the BSP management; therefore, a departmental enquiry was conducted, and his services were terminated. Aggrieved, in 2003, he preferred an application under Section 31(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (‘the MPIR Act’) before the Labour Court alleging that the enquiry was conducted in violation of the principle of natural justice as no proper opportunity of hearing was given to him. He also contended that the punishment of termination from service was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and prayed for reinstatement with full back wages.
The Labour Court dismissed the petitioner’s application, holding that he remained absent from service for about 140 days without sanction of leave, which was a major misconduct as per the standing order of the BSP. Additionally, he challenged the termination in 2003, i.e., 8 years later, thus, it could be said that the petitioner was serious about his duty. Hence, the Labour Court held that the punishment was proportionate to the misconduct.
Aggrieved yet again, the petitioner filed a civil appeal before the Industrial Court. However, the Industrial Court rejected his appeal, holding that the petitioner’s permission was proportionate to his misconduct. The Industrial Court also reiterated that the application was barred by limitation as the application was preferred after 8 years of termination from service.
Hence, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.
Issues and Analysis
1. Were the Labour and Industrial Courts justified in dismissing the petitioner’s application as barred by limitation?
At the outset, the Court referred to Section 62 of the Chhattisgarh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (216;CIRA’) and Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘Limitation Act’). Upon perusal of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, the Court noted that there was no specific exclusion of the provisions of the said Act, and Sections 4 to 24 would apply to the present case. Further, Section 62 of the CIRA demonstrated that if the legislature intended to exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act, it could have said so in specific terms.
The Court stated that even otherwise, CIRA was a benevolent and beneficial statute; in the absence of a categorical and unequivocal mandate by the legislature, it would not be appropriate to state that a claim of an employee would be thrown overboard as he has not approached the Labour Court within the time frame. Thus, considering no specific exclusion of the Limitation Act, it applied to the proceedings before the Labour Court. In this regard, the Court referred to Mohammad Sagir v. Bharat Heavy Electricals 2004 SCC OnLine MP 65.
Thus, as per Section 29 of the Limitation Act and given that there was no specific exclusion of the Limitation Act, the Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in the proceedings under Section 62 of CIRA.
The Court noted that the petitioner had preferred the appeal before the management, which was pending; thus, it could not be held that the application was barred by limitation. Accordingly, the Court held that the Labour and Industrial Courts committed illegality in dismissing the application preferred by the petitioner due to delay and latches.
2. Was the punishment of termination imposed upon the petitioner for absenteeism proportionate to the misconduct?
The Court noted that evidently, the petitioner remained absent for 140 days without sanction. In his tenure of 8 years, the petitioner was punished on several occasions before the issuance of the termination order. Admittedly, the petitioner was punished for remaining absent without authorization by a warning in 1992, a reduction of pay without cumulative effect in 1993, and downgrading from L-4 to L-3 for three years in 1994. Thus, there was sufficient material for the BSP to conclude that the petitioner was a habitual absentee.
The Court stated that the petitioner had not even placed any evidence that he submitted a leave application, which was sanctioned, and unless the leave was sanctioned by the competent authority, it would remain unauthorized.
The Court stated that the record of the case established that the petitioner was a habitual absentee, and he remained absent for 140 days. Thus, the Court held that the punishment was proportionate to the misconduct committed by him. Even otherwise, it was a well-settled position of law that the imposition of punishment is a managerial function of the management, and unless the punishment is so shocking or touches the conscience of the Court, it should not be interfered with by the Court.
Thus, the Court held that the Labour and Industrial Courts committed illegality in holding the application preferred by the petitioner to be barred by limitation, but did not commit any illegality or irregularity in recording its finding that the petitioner remained absent for 140 days and had antecedents of remaining absent for which he had been punished on many occasions, hence, establishing that he was habitual of remaining absent from duty. Therefore, the punishment of removal from service imposed upon the petitioner was proportionate to the misconduct committed by him. The Court further held that the Labour and Industrial Courts did not err in rejecting the petitioner’s application for reinstatement.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the orders dismissing the petitioner’s reinstatement applications, holding that the same were legal and justified, and the petitioner was not entitled to any relief, though his application was not barred by limitation.
[M. Mohan Rao v. Bhilai Steel Plant, 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 6159, decided on 23-06-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the petitioner: Sudeep Johri
For the respondent: Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande
