Supreme Court: In an appeal filed by the convict against the order passed by the Allahabad High Court, which had upheld the convict’s conviction under Section 498A of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (‘DP Act, 1961’), the Division Bench of B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma*, JJ. expressed concern over the misuse of Sections 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act, 1961. The Court highlighted a growing trend where complainant-wives indiscriminately array aged parents, distant relatives, and married sisters living separately as accused in matrimonial disputes. The Bench observed that such practices undermine the credibility of the allegations and vitiate the very core intent of these protective legal provisions.
The Court further emphasised that the term “cruelty” under Section 498A IPC is often subject to misuse and cannot be established by general or vague allegations alone. It must be supported by specific instances detailing the time, date, and manner of the alleged cruelty. The Court remarked that invoking these penal provisions without providing clear, concrete instances significantly weakens the prosecution’s case and raises serious doubts about the credibility of the complainant’s version.
Given these considerations, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment passed by the High Court, and acquitted the convict of all charges under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act, 1961.
Background
The marriage between the convict and the complainant took place on 12-02-1997. The couple resided together for only 12 days. The complainant alleged that she was subjected to mental and physical harassment, dowry demands, and abuse by the convict and his family. She further claimed that she was expelled from the matrimonial home while pregnant and later suffered a miscarriage due to physical assault. Despite efforts at reconciliation, she filed a complaint on 20-12-1999.
The Trial Court convicted the convict under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, while acquitting him of charges under Sections 323 read with 34 and
Issue
Whether the High Court vide impugned order whilst exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, was correct in upholding the conviction of the convict under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 D.P. Act, 1961.
Analysis and Decision
The Court examined Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and noted that an act of ‘cruelty’ for the purposes of Section 498A corresponded to willful conduct of such a nature that it could cause danger to the life, limb, or health of the woman, this included both mental and physical health. It also encompassed harassment inflicted upon her with the intention of coercing her to meet unlawful demands or conform to unreasonable or impossible standards. Furthermore, the Court observed that a demand for dowry under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, referred to any demand made either directly or indirectly by the husband or his family members. The Court clarified that in order to meet the threshold for the offences under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the allegations could not be vague, ambiguous, or baseless.
The Court observed that, in the present case, the allegations made by the complainant were vague, omnibus, and lacking in material particulars necessary to meet the required threshold. Apart from asserting that the convict-husband had harassed her for dowry, the complainant had not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of such harassment. The allegations in the FIR and the depositions of the prosecution witnesses indicated that, on multiple occasions, the complainant was allegedly ousted from the matrimonial home and was kicked and punched in the presence of her father. She was also reportedly subjected to repeated torment over dowry demands, and, when unable to meet them, was allegedly physically assaulted by the convict and his family. However, the complainant failed to mention the specific time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged acts of harassment occurred. It was further alleged that the complainant had suffered a miscarriage after being pushed out of the house by the convict and his family. However, no medical record, certificate, or document from any hospital, medical institution, or nursery was produced to substantiate this allegation.
Upon carefully considering the record, the Court stated that, apart from the statements of the complainant and her father, there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations of harassment and acts of cruelty within the scope of Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act, 1961. For this reason, the Court found merit in the submission made by the convict and was of the considered view that there was no material on record to establish the allegations of hurt or miscarriage, nor of hurt and criminal intimidation under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 506 IPC, respectively. The Trial Court had rightly held that the evidence of the complainant was the only substantial testimony regarding injuries allegedly sustained by her due to physical assault by the accused persons. However, there had been no medical examination conducted by the complainant to prove that the miscarriage was a consequence of such assault.
The Court observed that the Trial Court had applied its judicial mind while acquitting the convict and his parents under Sections 323 read with 34 IPC and 506 IPC. However, it appeared that the conviction of the convict under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act, 1961, was based merely on the assumption that the allegations and depositions of the complainant, corroborated by her father, were true. While acknowledging the possibility of emotional or mental distress faced by the complainant, the Court emphasized that a cursory or plausible view cannot serve as conclusive proof of guilt under Sections 498A IPC and 4 of the DP Act. It cautioned against the risk of misuse of these provisions in matrimonial disputes. The Court also took note of the fact that the FIR dated 20-12-1999 was lodged after the convict had already filed a divorce petition on 06-02-1999 under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Considering this, along with the limited cohabitation period of about one year, the Court found the FIR to be lacking in genuineness.
The Court acknowledged that the High Court, while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, ought to have scrutinized the correctness of the Trial Court’s decision in light of the material on record, which revealed no incriminating evidence against the convict sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 498A IPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Although the Court did not accept the convict’s argument that the impugned order was passed in absentia, it affirmed that the High Court, within its revisionary powers, was fully competent to examine the sustainability of the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom. The Court remarked that had this been done, it could have spared the convict six additional years of litigation, which had already extended over two decades.
Furthermore, the Court expressed concern over the misuse of Sections 498A IPC and 3 and 4 of the
The Court emphasised that the term “cruelty” under Section 498A IPC is frequently subject to misuse and cannot be established merely by general allegations without specific instances. The tendency to invoke these penal provisions without reference to any definite date, time, or incident significantly undermines the prosecution’s case and raises serious doubts about the credibility of the complainant’s version. The Court underscored the importance of specificity in criminal complaints, as these form the basis for engaging the State’s criminal machinery.
It was further noted that the marriage between the convict and the complainant had already been dissolved, and the divorce decree had attained finality. In such circumstances, the Court observed that continuing prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgment passed by the High Court, which had upheld the convict’s conviction under Section 498A IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The convict was acquitted of all charges.
[Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, SLP(Crl) No.-002353-002354 — 2019, decided on 13-05-2025]
*Judgment Authored by: Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s): Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, AOR
For Respondent(s): Mr. Shaurya Sahay, AOR, Mr. Aditya Kumar, Adv. Ms. Ruchil Raj, Adv.
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