Supreme Court: While considering the instant appeal revolving around application for condonation of delay of 425 days, the Division Bench of Aravind Kumar* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ., stated that it is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be condoned. However, if the cause shown is insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would not be condoned.
Background: The appellant was appointed to Indian Statistical Services in 1982 and after being promoted as Deputy Director (STS) on regular basis in 1987 came to be promoted as Joint Director (JAG) on ad hoc basis in 1992 and regularised in 1993. In light of the Supreme Court Judgment in Union of India v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, (1994) 5 SCC 450, the appellant along with others was reverted in 1996 to the post of Deputy Director and was again promoted to the post of Joint Director w.e.f. 08-06-2005.
The appellant was suspended followed by issuance of charge memorandum under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The charge against the appellant was that he had deserted his family consisting of his wife and two school going children in December 1985 and was residing separately along with another woman without judicial separation from his wife. The said charge sheet was issued based on the complaint lodged by his wife. During the pendency of inquiry by the Disciplinary Authority, the appellant’s wife withdrew her complaint on the ground that there was a misunderstanding. However, the enquiry officer proceeded with the inquiry and held the appellant guilty of desertion and consequently was dismissed from service in 2000.
Being aggrieved by the dismissal order, the appellant preferred an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) and the order of dismissal was quashed and the matter was remitted to the disciplinary authority. The appellant was reinstated in 2003 and a minor penalty of stoppage of one increment of pay for one year without cumulative effect was passed against the appellant in 2004.
The appellant, however, sought complete exoneration and filed a revision petition along with several representations (dt. 27-7-2015, 16-3-2016 and 17-3-2016) urging grant of promotion on par with his juniors who had already been promoted. The appellant attained the age of superannuation and retired from service with effect from 31-10-2016.
The appellant filed application in 2017 seeking direction to the respondent authorities to consider his representation and same came to be disposed of by the Tribunal vide Order dated 08-5-2017 directing the respondents to dispose of the representation dated 27-7-2015 within 90 days. The intimation/communication was forwarded to the appellant on 09-11-2017 informing that representation dated 27-07-2015 has been considered & rejected. He was further informed that his other representations were already disposed of and had been communicated to him in 2016 itself.
The appellant challenged the afore-stated communication dt. 9-11-2017 and the 2016 communication in O.A. No.3034 of 2018. This O.A. was said to have been withdrawn by the appellant’s counsel purportedly without his consent and knowledge on 10-8-2018. Appellant claimed that he came to know about the withdrawal of his application before the Tribunal only in the last week of August 2019 and immediately thereafter applied for certified copy of the order dated 10-8-2018 and filed another application in 2020 before the Tribunal along with Miscellaneous Application in 2019 for condoning the delay of 425 days in filing the 2020 application. The application for condonation of delay came to be rejected by the Tribunal order dt. 10-12-2020.
Aggrieved by the rejection, the appellant filed writ petition before the Delhi High Court; however, the High Court affirmed the order of the Tribunal. Hence, the appellant filed the instant appeal.
Court’s Assessment: Perusing the facts of the case, the Court noted the following-
Vis-a-vis the withdrawal of O.A. No. 3034 of 2018 by the appellant’s counsel, the Court noted that no memo duly signed by the appellant came to be filed for withdrawal of the application before the Tribunal.
Vis-a-vis the Tribunal’s rejection of application for condonation of delay, the Court opined that cause of the delay needs to be examined rather than the length of delay.
The Court observed that the Delhi High Court on the ground of penalty imposed being a minor penalty, refused to entertain the appellant’s writ petition or in other words confirmed the order impugned before the Tribunal on merits. The Court relied on Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara v. Labour Court, Bhilwara, (2009) 3 SCC 525, wherein it was opined that while deciding an application for condonation of delay the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case. “If negligence can be attributed to the appellant, then necessarily the delay which has not been condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court deserves to be accepted. However, if no fault can be laid at the doors of the appellant and cause shown is sufficient then we are of the considered view that both the Tribunal and the High Court were in error in not adopting a liberal approach or justice-oriented approach to condone the delay”.
The Court also relied on Municipal Council v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48, wherein the Court laid emphasis on considering the reasons for delay rather than passage of time.
Applying the afore-stated principles to the facts of the instant case, the Court stated that the appellant was able to explain the delay of 425 days in filing the 2020 application before the Tribunal. The Court further pointed out that the Delhi High Court proceeded to confirm the order of the Tribunal on the footing that penalty imposed on appellant is only a minor penalty namely withholding of one increment without cumulative effect, by completely ignoring the fact that in the earlier round of litigation it had been clearly held that punishment of dismissal imposed on the appellant was totally disproportionate to the alleged act.
The Court stated that in normal circumstances the matter would have been remitted to the Tribunal or High Court or the Disciplinary Authority; however, the Court noted that the appellant his 68 years old and there being no evidence whatsoever available on record to arrive at a conclusion that appellant is guilty of deserting his wife and child; and that the complainant herself had withdrawn the complaint made and she was not examined on behalf of the employer to prove the charge.
Hence, the Court decided that the findings of the enquiry officer cannot be sustained by any stretch of imagination as it is contrary to the facts and records on hand. Thus, the Court set aside the impugned orders and held that appellant is entitled for all consequential benefits flowing from the setting aside of the orders of penalty and respondents were directed to take steps in this regard expeditiously and at any rate within 3 months.
[Mool Chandra v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878, decided on 5-8-2024]
*Judgment delivered by Justice Aravind Kumar
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For appellant- Mr. Mukesh Kumar Gupta, Adv; Mr. Vardhman Kaushik, AOR; Mr. Shubham Dwivedi, Adv; Mr. Anand Singh, Adv.
For respondent: Dr. N. Visakamurthy, AOR