Allahabad High Court
Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: In an anticipatory bail application filed by the applicants for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 386, 120-B, 504, 506, 409, 34 of the Penal Code, 1860, Krishan Pahal, J. has held that that every judgement must be seen to its own context and facts and the precedents cannot be applied universally to every case. Hence, anticipatory bail was denied.

The applicants submitted that the present FIR has been instituted against them out of vengeance and the allegations in both the FIRs are in-verbatim of each other. Further, the present FIR is hit by Section 300 of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) as the applicants have been put to double jeopardy by the said FIR.

The applicants have placed reliance on the decision in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292, wherein, it has been laid down that the legal right of an aggrieved person to file counter case is permissible; further, it referred to the decision in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI, (2013) 6 SCC 348, wherein, it has been stated that the second FIR on same set of facts is barred and it is clearly violative of fundamental rights enshrined under Article 14, 20 & 21 of the Constitution of India; and, in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 , wherein, it has categorically been stated that the second FIR with respect to the same offence is barred.

The applicants have also relied upon the judgement of this Court in Suresh Babu v. State of U.P., Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application No. 3532 of 2022, wherein it has been stated that when the investigation is going on against a Government Servant and the proceedings under Section 82 of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) have been undertaken, the accused person is entitled for anticipatory bail.

Further, the informant has relied upon the judgement passed in Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 730, wherein it has been held that a proclaimed offender is not entitled to anticipatory bail as he has not cooperated with the investigation.

The Court viewed that the judgements of Upkar Singh (supra) and T.T. Antony (supra) cannot help the applicants, as the said judgements are not applicable to the present case, wherein it has been held that second FIR is not barred, although the said facts are different as they pertain to a cross-case. Further, the decision in Suresh Babu (supra) is also not applicable to the present case as the accused in the said case had no criminal history and was a government servant and, thus, he was granted anticipatory bail.

The Court observed that the decision in Lavesh (supra), holds good in the present case, as the applicants are proclaimed offenders as the proceeding under Sections 82 and 83 CrPC are almost complete, and they have criminal antecedents in many cases.

The Court referred to the ruling in Quinn v. Leathom, [1901] A.C. 495, wherein Lord Halsbury said that “a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” Thus, it was observed that every judgement must be seen to its own context and facts, and the precedents cannot be applied universally to every case. Hence, anticipatory bail was denied.

[Lakhan Singh v. State Of UP, 2022 SCC OnLine All 687, decided on 30.9.2022]

Advocates who appeared in this case:

Counsel for Applicant: Advocate P.K. Singh,

Advocate Vijay Kumar Mishra

Counsel for Opposite Party: Advocate Aman Kumar Dwivedi

Advocate Kamlesh Kumar Dwivedi

Advocate Manoj Kumar Singh

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Brijesh Sethi, J. dismissed a criminal writ petition challenging the order of the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption) whereby proceedings against the petitioner under Section 83 CrPC (attachment of property of person absconding) were initiated.

The petitioner was involved in a case under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Sections 120-B and 420 IPC. Pritish Sabharwal, Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the Sessions Judge had initiated proceedings under Section 83 against the petitioner and directed attachment of his movable and immovable property where the petitioner’s old wife and his daughter are residing. It was submitted that they would be evicted forcefully within 48 hours and they did not have other places to reside in. It was further submitted that the petitioner was not deliberately evading arrest; he has filed a writ petition for quashing of the FIR which was reserved for orders by the High court. Sanjay Lao, Additional Standing Counsel for the State, submitted that anticipatory bail filed by the petitioner was rejected by the Supreme Court and he is evading arrest.

The High Court noted that in the case against the petitioner under PC Act, he had moved an anticipatory bail which was first dismissed by the trial court, then by the High court, and finally by the Supreme Court. It was further noted that the petition for quashing of the FIR was filed approximately one month after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application by the Supreme Court. The Court was of the view that the petitioner, whose anticipatory bail was dismissed by the Supreme Court, ought to have surrendered himself before the Investigating Officer or the Court concerned.

The court found no grounds to quash the impugned order. It was held that the petition for the quashing of FIR would, no doubt be decided by the High Court in due course including the issue of its maintainability. However, the proceedings initiated by the IO under Section 83 CrPC could not have stayed at the initial stage. The IO was carrying out the proceedings as per law and no interference was required from the Court in that regard.

In such view of the matter, the instant criminal writ petition was dismissed. [Pawan Kamra v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10665, decided on 01-10-2019]