Case BriefsHigh Courts

Manipur High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of KH. Nobin Singh, J., dismissed an application filed for dismissal of Election Petition on the ground that it violates Section 100 of Representation of People Act, 1951 where grounds for declaration of election as void are given.

The applicant filed this application for dismissal of election petition filed by the respondent raising flaws in it. In the petition, the respondent contended that the applicant in his affidavit filed along with nomination paper had not given complete information. The applicant did not mention anything about the FIR filed against him. He also left many columns blank i.e. incomplete form and the Returning Officer could not have accepted the nomination. Whereas the applicant defended himself by stating that in one of the cases filed against him he had already been discharged. The allegation which the respondent had accused of were misconceived and unfounded which require strict proof. It was also submitted that RO of 4-Kshetrigao Assembly Constituency had accepted all nomination papers in the presence of respondent during which the respondent made no objection but now that he was not elected the same process had been put into scrutiny. The applicant opposed election petition on the ground that it does not contain material facts as required under Section 83(1)(a).

The High Court was of the view that Section 83(1)(a) which states that an election petition should contain material facts on which petitioner relies had been substantially complied with and election petition cannot be stopped at this stage. Therefore, the application was devoid of merit and was dismissed. [Nahakpam Indrajit Singh v. Md. Amin Shah,2018 SCC OnLine Mani 115, order dated 17-09-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Chhattisgarh High Court: An appeal filed challenging the decision of the District Judge whereby he dismissed appellant’s petition filed under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was dismissed by a Single Judge Bench comprising of Sharad Kumar Gupta, J.

Brief facts of the case were that the appellant-husband filed a divorce petition against the respondent-wife on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The said petition was dismissed by the learned District Judge holding that the grounds on which divorce was sought by the petitioner (appellant) were not proved. The appellant filed the instant appeal challenging the said decision contending that the trial court did not examine the evidence in proper perspective and reached a wrong conclusion.

For deciding the appeal, the Court referred to various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts and observed the essence of ‘desertion’- For the offence of desertion, two essential conditions must be there; (1) the factum of separation and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Two elements are essential as far as deserted spouse is concerned; (1) the absence of consent and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial house to form the necessary intention. Mere severance of relation or separation without desertion is not sufficient. Desertion is not walking out of the house but is withdrawing from home. Desertion consists in withdrawing not from a place but from a state of things.

In regard to ‘cruelty’, the Court observed that a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of HMA. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party.

The Court held that the appellant failed to prove any of the elements to establish desertion or cruelty on the part of the respondent. No cogent evidence was provided by the appellant that could establish the grounds for divorce as prayed for by the appellant in the divorce petition. Thus, the Court on dismissing the appeal held that the impugned judgment of the trial court which was challenged in this appeal does not suffer from any infirmity. [Sanjeev Kumar Kaushik v Mongra Bai, 2018 SCC OnLine Chh 480, dated 24-04-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Chhattisgarh High Court: The Single Judge Bench comprising of Arvind Singh Chandel, J., granted regular bail to an offender charged under Sections 366, 376(2) (n), 342/34 of the Penal Code.

The brief facts of the case are that the prosecutrix had lodged a complaint against the applicant who had forcibly asked her to marry him and later when the prosecutrix went to complain about the same, she was taken by her brother-in-law (co-accused) to a lodge where she stayed along with him where he committed rape with her and it continued. Later on, it was discovered on collection of some information that the applicant was already married.

The submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant states that the applicant was falsely implicated in the case as the prosecutrix was a consenting party in the present case and taking due reference through these submissions he has prayed for bail of the applicant.

Therefore, the Hon’ble High Court on taking due consideration from the facts and circumstances of the case along with the contention of the applicant’s counsel, observed that the prosecutrix being a major girl had on her own will stayed with the applicant at the lodge and the crux of the case is that she took 3 months to lodge the complaint against the same, Court concluded its order on the same by granting bail to the applicant as trial would take some time and till that time he is allowed to be released on bail. [Bandhan Jagte v. State of Chhattisgarh,  2018 SCC OnLine Chh 390; dated 05-04-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jammu And Kashmir High Court: The order passed by the Special Magistrate cancelling the interim bail granted to the petitioners-accused was set aside by a Single Judge Bench comprising of Janak Raj Kotwal, J.

The petitioners were booked under Sections 323, 341 and 354 of Ranbir Penal Code (RPC), 1989 along with Section 7(c) of the Protection of Civil Rights (PCR) Act, 1955. The petitioners applied for bail and the Special Judge by a detailed order admitted the petitioners to interim bail. Thereafter, considering the application moved by the victim of the alleged incident, the same Magistrate cancelled the bail already granted to the petitioners on the ground that they concealed the fact that they had moved an anticipatory bail application before the 1st Additional Sessions Judge which was dismissed as withdrawn; and also that the petitioners concealed the incorporation of special offence under the PCR Act in the FIR. Against this order of the Magistrate canceling the bail of the petitioners, they filed the instant petition.

The Court held it to be a well settled legal position that bail, interim or final, once granted, can be cancelled only if a case for cancellation is made out having regard to the factors, which are certainly other than those to be considered for the purpose of grant/refusal of bail. On considering the record, the Court found that there was no concealment of facts as alleged by the victim, stated hereinabove. The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349, wherein it was held that:

“…the ground for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the Court, on the basis of material placed on the record or the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail”.

Hence, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the order of the Magistrate canceling bail of the petitioners holding that the Magistrate fell in error of law in recalling the bail order on misconceived pleas of the victim. [Bushan Kumar v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine J&K 262, order dated 18-04-2018]

 

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In the matter relating to supply of the ‘grounds’ of detention to the detenue when the Court has passed the order of detention under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Court said that neither Section 3 of the Act use the term ‘grounds’ nor any other provision in the Act defines ‘grounds’. However, Section 3(3) deals with communication of the detention order and states that ‘grounds’ on which the order has been made shall be communicated to the detenue as soon as the order of detention is passed and fixes the time limit within which such detention order is to be passed. It is here the expression ‘grounds’ is used and it is for this reason that detailed grounds on which the detention order is passed are supplied to the detenue.

Explaining further, the Court said that these grounds are the ‘basic facts’ on which conclusions are founded and these are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars of these basic facts. There is only one purpose of the Act, namely, preventing smuggling and all other grounds, whether there are one or more would be relatable to the various activities of smuggling. Hence, different instances would be treated as different ‘grounds’ as they constitute basic facts making them essentially factual constituents of the ‘grounds’ and the further particulars which are given in respect of those instances are the subsidiary details.

In the present case, the High Court of Delhi had said that there various grounds which formed the basis of the detention order and even if the documents pertaining to one particular ground were not furnished, that ground could be ignored applying the principle of segregation of grounds enumerated in Section 5A of the Act and on remaining grounds the detention order was still sustainable. Agreeing with the view taken by the High Court, the bench of Dr. A.K. Sikri and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ said that once it is found that the detention order contains many grounds, even if one of them is to be rejected, principle of segregation contained in Section 5A gets attracted. [Gautam Jain v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 16, decided on 04.01.2017]