Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: In a plea seeking inquiry into the alleged anti-competitive practices of Ola and Uber of entering into price-fixing agreement, the 3-judge bench of RF Nariman*, KM Joseph, Krishna Murari, JJ has refused to interfere with the concurrent finding of CCI and NCLAT that Ola and Uber do not facilitate cartelization or anti-competitive practices between drivers, who are independent individuals, who act independently of each other, so as to attract the application of section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002.

Why was an inquiry sought?

An informant sought that the Competition Commission of India initiate an inquiry, under section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002, into the alleged anti-competitive conduct of ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. [Ola], and Uber India Systems Pvt. Ltd., Uber B.V. and Uber Technologies Inc. [Uber], alleging that they entered into price-fixing agreements in contravention of section 3(1) read with section 3(3)(a) of the Act, and engaged in resale price maintenance in contravention of section 3(1) 1 read with section 3(4)(e) of the Act. According to the Informant, Uber and Ola provide radio taxi services and essentially operate as platforms through mobile applications which allow riders and drivers, that is, two sides of the platform, to interact. Due to algorithmic pricing, neither are riders able to negotiate fares with individual drivers for rides that are booked through the apps, nor are the drivers able to offer any discounts. Thus, the pricing algorithm takes away the freedom of riders and drivers to choose the best price on the basis of competition, as both have to accept the price set by the pricing algorithm.

Further, despite the fact that the drivers are independent entities who are not employees or agents of Ola or Uber, the driver is bound to accept the trip fare reflected in the app at the end of the trip, without having any discretion insofar as the same is concerned. The drivers receive their share of the fare only after the deduction of a commission by Ola and Uber for the services offered to the rider.

What did the counsels say?

Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi, appearing on behalf of Uber, walked the Court through the concurrent findings of fact of the CCI and the NCLAT and said that every driver of a taxi cab, who uses the Ola or Uber app, can have several such apps including both Ola, Uber and the apps of some of their competitors, and can take private rides de hors these apps as well.

Advocate Rajshekhar Rao, appearing for Ola, agreed with Dr. Singhvi’s submissions on merit but questioned the locus standi of the informant, an “independent practitioner of law”. He, thus, prayed before the Supreme Court that “in such cases heavy costs should be imposed to deter such persons from approaching the CCI with frivolous and/or mala fide information, filed at the behest of competitors.”

Additional Solicitor General Balbir Singh, appearing on behalf of the CCI, however, stated that though he would support the CCI’s Order closing the case, he would also support the right of the Appellant to approach the CCI with information.

What did the Supreme Court say?

Informant’s locus standi

A reading of the provisions of Competition Act, 2002 and the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009 shows that “any person” may provide information to the CCI, which may then act upon it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The definition of “person” in section 2(l) of the Act is an inclusive one and is extremely wide, including individuals of all kinds and every artificial juridical person.

Section 19(1) of the Act originally provided for the “receipt of a complaint” from any person, consumer or their association, or trade association. This expression was then substituted with the expression “receipt of any information in such manner and” by the 2007 Amendment. This substitution is not without significance.

A complaint could be filed only from a person who was aggrieved by a particular action, information may be received from any person, obviously whether such person is or is not personally affected. This is for the reason that the proceedings under the Act are proceedings in rem which affect the public interest. That the CCI may inquire into any alleged contravention of the provisions of the Act on its own motion, is also laid down in section 19(1) of the Act.

“Even while exercising suo motu powers, the CCI may receive information from any person and not merely from a person who is aggrieved by the conduct that is alleged to have occurred. This also follows from a reading of section 35 of the Act, in which the earlier expression “complainant or defendant” has been substituted by the expression, “person or an enterprise,” setting out that the informant may appear either in person, or through one or more agents, before the CCI to present the information that he has gathered.”

However, Section 45 of the Act is a deterrent against persons who provide information to the CCI, mala fide or recklessly, inasmuch as false statements and omissions of material facts are punishable with a penalty which may extend to the hefty amount of rupees one crore, with the CCI being empowered to pass other such orders as it deems fit.

“This, and the judicious use of heavy costs being imposed when the information supplied is either frivolous or mala fide, can keep in check what is described as the growing tendency of persons being “set up” by rivals in the trade.”

The 2009 Regulations also do not require the informant to state how he is personally aggrieved by the contravention of the Act, but only requires a statement of facts and details of the alleged contravention to be set out in the information filed. Also, regulation 25 shows that public interest must be foremost in the consideration of the CCI when an application is made to it in writing that a person or enterprise has substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings, and such person may therefore be allowed to take part in the proceedings. Further,

“CCI must maintain confidentiality of the identity of an informant on a request made to it in writing, so that such informant be free from harassment by persons involved in contravening the Act.”

“Person aggrieved”

Since the CCI and the NCLAT deal with practices which have an adverse effect on competition in derogation of the interest of consumers, the Act vests powers in the CCI and enables it to act in rem, in public interest. Hence, a “person aggrieved” must, in the context of the Act, be understood widely and not be constructed narrowly.

Further, it is not without significance that the expressions used in sections 53B and 53T of the Act are “any person”, thereby signifying that all persons who bring to the CCI information of practices that are contrary to the provisions of the Act, could be said to be aggrieved by an adverse order of the CCI in case it refuses to act upon the information supplied. By way of contrast, section 53N(3) speaks of making payment to an applicant as compensation for the loss or damage caused to the applicant as a result of any contravention of the provisions of Chapter II of the Act, having been committed by an enterprise. By this sub-section, clearly, therefore, “any person” who makes an application for compensation, under sub-section (1) of section 53N of the Act, would refer only to persons who have suffered loss or damage, thereby, qualifying the expression “any person” as being a person who has suffered loss or damage.

It was, hence, noticed,

“when the CCI performs inquisitorial, as opposed to adjudicatory functions, the doors of approaching the CCI and the appellate authority, i.e., the NCLAT, must be kept wide open in public interest, so as to subserve the high public purpose of the Act.”

[Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission on India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1024, decided on 15.12.2020]

Business NewsNews

Government e Marketplace (GeM) and Competition Commission of India (CCI) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on 6th February 2019 to enable a fair and competitive environment in the e-Marketplace.  Chairman CCI, A.K. Gupta, CEO GeM, S. Radha Chauhan, Members of CCI, U.C. Nahta and Sangeeta Verma were present on the occasion along with officers of CCI and GeM.

Both CCI and GeM appreciate the importance of advanced analytical tools and processes for identification of malpractices like cartelization. In order to pool their knowledge of the public procurement domain for detection of Anti-competitive practices, the MoU has been signed.

GeM is a state-of-the-art national public procurement platform of Ministry of Commerce and Industries, that has used technology to remove entry barriers for bonafide sellers and has created a vibrant e-marketplace with a wide range of goods and services.

Competition Commission of India is a statutory body of the Government of India, responsible for enforcing the Competition Act, 2002 throughout India and to prevent activities that have an adverse effect on competition.

Source: PIB

Picture Credits: PIB

Ministry of Commerce & Industry

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Competition Commission of India (CCI): The Three-Member Bench comprising of Ashok Kumar Gupta, Chairperson and Augustine Peter and U.C. Nahta as members dismissed a case for anti-competitive practices for lack of merits.

This petition has been filed under Section 19 (1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 by informant against the opposite party alleging contravention of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act for controlling horse racing activity and imposing unfair and discriminatory conditions for getting results in their favour. It has been further alleged that the opposite party were either race horse owners and stud farm owners or breeders having a direct interest in the horse races and also betting activities were independently performed, profit of which went to the party which further explains their vested interest in the same.

The opposite party argued that the game/ sport of horse racing is primarily governed by the Bombay Race Course Licensing Act, 1912, Section 3 of which provides that “no horse race can be held save and except on a race course for which license for racing is granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” Also, any objections regarding any race event takes place under a close public vigil and there was no scope for foul play or mischief. With regard to the betting allegations, the case K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of T.N., (1996) 2 SCC 226 was quoted which clarified that betting for horse racing was legalized in India which was being performed after obtaining a license under the above act. Coming to the abuse of dominance under Section 4 it stated that it was involved in only 23% of the events.

The Commission observed that not only were the allegations vague and without substance but the informant also has not been able to demonstrate as to how the allegations attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Act and accordingly there was no case of contravention. [Habib Rajmohamad Patel v. Royal Western (India) Turf Club Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine CCI 3, order dated 15-01-2019]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Competition Commission of India (CCI): The Bench comprising of Sudhir Mital, Chairperson and Augustine Peter, U.C. Nahta and G.P. Mittal, Members, while addressing information being filed under Section 19(1)(a) for contravention of provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, found no prima facie case made out.

In the present matter the factual matrix of the case stands out in the following manner, the Informant has alleged OP-Timex Group India Ltd. of indulging in anti-competitive conduct/practices. Informant was responsible for selling OP’s wrist watches on e-commerce platforms. The following were the allegations placed against the OP:

  • OP is indulging in Resale Price Maintenance with its distributors in contravention of Section 3 (4)(e) of the Competition Act, 2002.
  • OP discriminated the Informant against other e-commerce players by limiting the market for distribution of the OP and in violation of Sections 3(3)(a), 3(3)(b) and 3(3)(c) of the Competition Act, 2002.
  • OP instructed its retailers/service centres against providing after-sale services to the wrist watches being sold by the Informant, which resulted in the deprivation of consumer service in contravention of Section 3(4)(d) of the Act.
  • OP has also been alleged to file a frivolous suit against Informant saying that OP is engaged in manufacturing of counterfeit wrist watches of the OP.
  • Agreements entered between the OP and its dealers/distributors created an appreciable adverse effect on competition in contravention of Sections 4 and 3 of the Act.

The Commission on perusal of the allegations been placed upon and conducting an exhaustive hearing with multiple dates for the same and going through in-depth proceedings by patiently taking up the contentions of both the parties and explaining its own stance on the allegations, Commission found no contravention of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 and ordered the matter to be closed under Section 26 (2) of the Act. [Counfreedise v. Timex Group India Ltd.,2018 SCC OnLine CCI 67, Order dated 14-08-2018]

Tribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Competition Commission of India (CCI): While rejecting a complaint filed by a retired Wing Commander alleging that Director General of Health Services (DGHS) was abusing its dominance for empanelment of private hospitals for purpose of healthcare and medical services to Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) beneficiaries in Delhi-NCR region, CIC dismissed the allegations of anti-competitive practices against DGHS, Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), Quality Council of India and National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers (NABH). It was submitted in the complaint that an office memorandum was issued by DGHS for fresh empanelment of private hospitals and revision of package rates applicable under Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) in Delhi wherein it prescribed different rates of reimbursement to the private hospitals based on their accreditation with NABH. The complainant contended that the said office memorandum does not spell out any rationale or logic behind the different rates of payment for treatment of a disease or medical condition as there is no relationship between NABH accreditation and efficacy of treatment offered by a hospital. It was also alleged that such a categorization of hospitals is based on wrong presumption of efficacy of NABH accreditation without any scientific basis and DGHS has colluded with the other Opposite Parties to give benefit to a selected few hospitals having NABH accreditation and reimburse them with payments at higher rates compared to other hospitals without NABH accreditation. CIC observed that “For applicability of the provisions of Section 4, the entity or entities in question must be an enterprise in terms of section 2 (h) of the Act. In the instant case the allegations of the Informant primarily against DGHS which is working under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India. The activities being performed by DGHS cannot be covered in the definition of ‘enterprise’ because it is not directly engaged in any economic and commercial activities. Its role is limited to control and regulate the health care system in the country”. While holding that no prima facie case is made out against the opposite parties CIC rejected the contentions of complainant and held, “The different rates prescribed by DGHS for NABH accredited hospitals cannot be considered as anti-competitive in any manner, rather it would act as an incentive to non-accredited hospitals to secure such accreditation and provide quality health care services, which will ultimately benefit the patients.” (Dr. Biswanath Prasad Singh v. Director General of Health Services, Case No. 20 of 2014, decided on June 23, 2014)

To read the full judgment, refer to SCCOnLine