Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Securities Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai (SAT): The Coram of Justice Tarun Agarwala (Presiding Officer) and Justice M.T. Joshi (Judicial Member) and Meera Swarup (Technical Member) expressed that,

“A statute after its repeal is completely obliterated as it had never been enacted. The effect is to destroy all inchoate rights and all causes of action that may have arisen under the repealed statute.”

Factual Background

The appellant made an allotment of 76,50,000 equity shares on a preferential basis and applied to the Stock Exchange for listing of the said shares under the ICDR Regulations, 2018. Further, the NSE by the impugned order imposed a fine of Rs 5, 57, 168 on the ground that there was a delay of 23 days in applying for listing of the shares and consequently as per Regulation 108(2) of the ICDR Regulations, 2009 read with SEBI Circular, an issuer was required to make an application to the Exchange for listing of the shares within 20 days from the date of the allotment.

Similarly, the appellant made an allotment of 51,30,000 equity shares on a preferential basis and applied to the Exchange for listing of the said shares. NSE imposed a fine for making delayed applications by 19 days.

Analysis, Law and Decision

Tribunal observed that the 2009 Regulations were repealed on September 11, 2018, on which date the new Regulations of 2018 came into force. However, the Circular issued under the 2009 Regulations was not rescinded/repealed and continued to remain in force by virtue of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act.

“The consequences of repeal of a statue is very drastic.”

Coram stated that leaving aside the cases where proceedings were commenced, prosecuted and brought to finality before the repeal, no proceeding under the repealed statute could be commenced or continued after the repeal.

Further, elaborating the above, the Tribunal added that the repeal of a law takes effect from the date of repeal and the law repealed remains in operation for the period before its repeal without assistance of any saving clause for transactions past and closed.

“Saving clauses are introduced in the Acts/ Regulations which repeal others to safeguard rights which, but for saving, would be lost. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act also plays the role of a savings clause.”

In Tribunals’ opinion, the words “anything done” under the repealed Act will also preserve the continuance of Rules and Bye-Laws or circulars as held in State of Nagaland v. Ratan Singh, AIR 1967 SC 212.

Saving Clause

Once a statute is repealed, the consequence is that the subordinate legislation made under the statute ceases to have effect after the repeal of the statute. However, this can be avoided by insertion of a saving clause providing to the contrary in the absence of a savings clause, Section 24 of the General Clauses Act 1897, provides for the continuance of any appointment, notification, order, rule, bye-law etc. made or issued under the repealed statute in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted.

Additionally, the Tribunal stated that, the continuance of subordinate legislation under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act is subject to the qualification that it is not inconsistent with the provisions reenacted.

Hence, even though the Regulations 2009 had been repealed, the Circular of 2017 remained in force in view of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act and continued to remain in force.

Therefore, the listing application was required to be made before the stock exchange(s) within 20 days from the date of the issuance of the allotment.

Even though the impugned order refers to Regulation 108 of the 2009 Regulations by virtue of Clause 24 of the General Clauses Act would deem to apply to Regulation 104 of the 2018 Regulations.

The matter was concluded on finding no error in the imposition of fine made by the two stock exchanges. [Art Nirman Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SAT 73, decided on 8-4-2022]

Advocates before the Tribunal:

Ms. Natasha Dhruman Shah, Advocate for Appellants.

Mr. Pradeep Sancheti, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rashid Boatwalla, Mr. Aditya Vyas, Advocates for Respondent No. 1

Mr. Suraj Choudhary, Advocate with Mr. Mihir Mody, Mr. Arnav Misra, Mr. Mayur Jaisingh, Advocates i/b K. Ashar & Co. for Respondent No. 2

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: While adjudicating the issue as to whether promotion scheme implemented by office memorandum supersedes recruitment regulations, the Division Bench of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud* and A S Bopanna, JJ., held that regulations made under the statute have the force of law. The Bench expressed,

“The ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 had precedence over the Office Memorandum dated 29 October 2008 which implemented the DACP Scheme in respect of officers of the Central Health Service under the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.”

Factual Matrix

The Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) had appealed against the judgment of Karnataka High Court, wherein the High Court had Bench rejected ESIC’s petition against the order of Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) directing it to consider promotion of the contesting respondents – to the post of “Associate Professor” under the Dynamic Assured Career Progression (DACP) Scheme as opposed to ESIC’s recruitment regulations. The stand of the appellant was that the recruitment and promotion of its teaching staff are governed by the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation (Medical Teaching Faculty Posts) Recruitment Regulations 2015 not DACP.

The Central Government had issued the DACP Scheme through an Office Memorandum dated 29-10-2008 contemplating promotion as Associate Professor upon completion of two years of service in the post of Assistant Professor as an officer under the Ministry of Health and Family. After two years of service as Assistant Professor on 2 February 2017, the contesting respondents sought promotion under the DACP Scheme and instituted proceedings before the CAT, wherein the Tribunal held that the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 were not relevant for adjudication of the matter and directed the appellant to consider the contesting respondents for promotion under the DACP Scheme.

Findings of the Tribunal and the High Court

Upholding the findings of CAT, the High Court had dismissed the appeal on the ground that since the contesting respondents were recruited before the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 came into effect, they would get the benefit of the DACP Scheme. Further, the High Court opined that the DACP Scheme has statutory effect under Section 17 of the ESI Act and ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 had departed from the DACP Scheme without seeking prior approval of the Central Government.

Observations and Findings

The question before the Bench was with regard to interpretation of Section 17(2)(a) of the ESIC Act, 1948 and the applicability of the Office Memorandum dated 29-10-2008 against the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2008 and the subsequently issued ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015.

The ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2008 were issued by the ESIC in the exercise of its powers under Section 97(1) and Section 17(3) of the ESI Act, 1948. While Recruitment Regulations, 2008 embodied a requirement of four years’ service as Assistant Professor for promotion as an Associate Professor, the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 stipulated a requirement of five years’ service as Assistant Professor for promotion to the post of Associate Professor. The preamble of the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 noted that these regulations were to supersede the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2008 and were made with the approval of the Central Government.

Relying on the decision of Constitution Bench in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421, wherein it was held that in the event of a conflict between an executive instruction, an office memorandum in this case, and statutory regulations – the latter prevail, the Bench held that the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2008 and ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 had statutory effect by virtue of Section 97(3) of the ESI Act.

Similarly, in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1968) 1 SCR 111, it was held that, “Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed.”

Therefore, the Bench opined that on the dates when the contesting respondents joined the service of the appellant – 07-02-2014 till 26-06-2016 – their promotions were governed by the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2008 which mandated four years of qualifying service for promotion from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor. However, when the contesting respondents had completed two years of service, they were governed by the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 which came into effect on 5 July 2015 and mandated five years of qualifying service for promotion from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor. Thus, the Bench held that DACP Scheme facilitating promotion on the completion of two years of service was not applicable to the contesting respondents, when the regulations had a statutory effect that overrides the Office Memorandum dated 29-10-2008 which implemented the DACP Scheme.

On the contention that the advertisements indicated the applicability of the DACP Scheme before the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 were issued, the Bench held that a subsequent amendment to recruitment regulations would override the conditions prescribed in the advertisement.

Regarding the issue that concession of the Counsel for the appellant before the CAT would preclude the appellant from urging that the DACP Scheme was not applicable to the Teaching Cadre at the ESIC, the Bench remarked,

“While this Court expresses its disapproval at the lack of proper instructions being tendered to the Counsel of the appellant, there can be no estoppel against a statute or regulations having a statutory effect.”


In the backdrop of above, the Bench concluded that the CAT and the High Court failed to notice applicability of the ESIC Recruitment Regulations 2015 to the promotions of the Teaching Cadre in the appellant corporation. The advertisements for recruitment mentioning the DACP Scheme would have no effect since they were in contravention of the applicable recruitment regulations. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the impugned judgement and order was set aside.

[The Employees’ State Insurance Corpn. v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 70, decided on 20-01-2022]

*Judgment by: Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud

Appearance by:

For the Appellant: Santhosh Krishnan, Advocate

For the Respondents: Yatindra Singh, Senior Advocate and Anand Sanjay M Nuli, Advocate

Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has put this report together 

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Calcutta High Court: A Division Bench of Soumen Sen and Saugata Bhattacharyya, JJ. allowed an appeal and set aside the order of a Single Judge Bench.

In the present case, the respondent-writ petitioners – a charitable and educational Society – challenged two notifications of the West Bengal Government wherein exercise of powers conferred under Section 1(5) of the Employees’ State Insurance Act were extended to educational institutions run by individuals, trusts, societies. The respondent-writ petitioners also paid certain sums to the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation in accordance with the notification.

Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the act was enacted by Parliament under Entry 23, 24 of List III of the 7th Schedule and the said Act was enacted with a social welfare objective in mind. Applicability of the Act, which is a beneficial legislation, has to be interpreted for the benefit of the employees of any given institution in cases of ambiguity, not including the institutions of the respondent-writ petitioners’ within the Act is contrary to the settled principle that interpretation of beneficial legislation should give effect to the intent of the legislator and the purpose of the Act, as has been held in Indian Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 589.

Counsel on behalf of the respondent writ petitioners submitted that Section 1(4) of the Act primarily applies to factories as through Amending Act. 29 of 1989 that it’s applicability to an ‘establishment’ other than factories was introduced. ‘Establishment’ must be understood in the context of Section 1(5) to mean a place where such activities are commercial, industrial, or agricultural in nature, educational institutions are not within the ambit of the act as education is a charitable activity, as held in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka,  (2002) 8 SCC 481, the expression “or otherwise” must receive ejusdem generis noscitur a sociis interpretation.

The Calcutta High Court held that rule of ejusdem generis operates only to give a rebuttable presumption that the words of the statute are restricted in application to a certain ‘genus’ of things because the statute is not able to exhaustively provide all the elements that would conceivably fall within that genus, cannot contradict legislative intent and must either give way to a purposive interpretation if such an interpretation is found to run contrary to the rule  In  Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Employees’ State Insurance Corpn., (2014) 9 SCC 657, it has been held that establishment includes an institution which is engaged in achieving certain public purpose (including education) and  Amendment Act 1989 tells us that the applicability to different kinds of establishments is meant to be wide and expansive rather than narrow or restricted, said act must be interpreted liberally as it has a welfare objective, and can be extended to include educational institutions. The Court explained that ‘education’ in even being welfare activity was not free from regulation relying on Justice Bhanumati’s separate opinion in  Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of M.P., (2016) 7 SCC 353, and such regulation could be extended to private educational institutions.

The Court allowed the appeal setting aside the Judgement of a Single Judge  Bench dated 13-09-2018. [Principal Secretary, Department of Labour v. Om Dayal Educational & Research Society, 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 5174, decided on 24-12-2019]

Op EdsOP. ED.

Keeping in mind the way in which world history has developed over the years, State sovereignty is an element which each State holds dearly. In the past, countries have defended acts of proclaiming war on others, and, invading territories, by stating that such acts were necessary for the protection of their sovereignty. Thus, in the international community of nations, it becomes important to see whether sovereignty stands vested in a single individual, for instance, a dictator such as Hitler, or is it held by a collective which is guided by the rule of law. The latter instance is one which is commonly found in present day democratic constitutions. Once that question is answered one must subsequently question the manner in which sovereignty is used to tackle an emergent situation. It is the argument of this paper that such exceptional situations can be dealt with by the sovereign within the established norms of particular Constitutions.

It has become commonplace that most of the Constitutions of the post-war period contain a set of provisions which restrict the scope of arbitrariness in the manner in which the executive functions. While such provisions exist, the key question that scholars like Carl Schmitt raise is whether these provisions, which generally bind the State in its ordinary working, are sufficient to guide the State in an emergent situation as well — are these statutory safeguards that are commonplace in a large number of Constitutions, sufficient to enable the State to promptly defend the rights of individuals at times of crises. Carl Schmitt, believes to the contrary he argues that it is impossible for a sovereign to only follow statutes to provide for every emergency. Hence, Schmitt believes that owing to the very nature of the situation, in the absence of any guidance, the State would have to resort to actions it deems fit to combat emergencies and such actions may not be in the best interest of the citizens of the State.

Carl Schmitt is of the opinion that it is the sovereign who alone “decides on the exception”.[1] Schmitt argues that an exception always exists and simply because there is a legitimate statute, it cannot be taken on face value that such a statute would suffice as a source of direction to combat the emergent situation. Schmitt further strengthens his argument by stating that in the aftermath of an exception, the legal order of the State is suspended and thus, it is only the State that remains in the complete absence of legal norms. Hence, it is his argument that such a situation proves that the State remains superior to legal norms. However, this supposition is based on the fact that the State stands superior to the law it enforces in almost all circumstances. By extension, this argument points to the fact that the head of the State himself is the sole authority in the State, that is, the sovereign and any application of law is purely for his convenience. This cannot be accepted. I am of the firm opinion that for the State to exist and its administration to be run, law has to exist, that is, the State must be administered on the basis of rule of law and not rule of an individual. It is thus pertinent to answer the question as to whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws.[2] The only way a State can exist without conflict is by the application of law and further, it can never be superior to law since the Government gets its legitimacy from the law itself. Compliance with the constitutional safeguards should always be of utmost importance.[3]

Moreover, Thomas Hobbes, refers to the social contract theory and states that owing to the state of nature, the reasonable man would enter into a contract with a particular individual who in turn would work to create a sustainable society in which all could live.[4] To this, I would further add that authority should not vest in an individual, rather, a group of individuals who would discuss and deliberate and hence would create law for the continuation of the contract. Hence, from this instance, it becomes clear that law is superior to the State, hence, it cannot be argued that the State exists without any law since that would mean complete violation of the social contract.

Schmitt further provides that the ultimate guidance a statute can provide is only that of stating who can exercise emergency powers. Based on the statutory guidance, the sovereign must search the best manner in which the threat can be eliminated. This argument put forward by Schmitt can be agreeable to the extent that the sovereign’s aim should be to minimise the threat of an emergent situation on the existence of the State. However, the manner in which he proposes to do so cannot be acceptable, particularly in the post-war world. Surprisingly, it is seen that both Hobbes as well as Carl Schmitt argue on similar lines, that is, removal of constraints, however, while Hobbes argues that all authority should be exercised by a single individual[5], the Schmittian argument states that all constraints particularly affecting the ability of the sovereign to respond to aggression must be relaxed.

Such an act would inevitably challenge international peace. The provisions of a statute cannot simply be relaxed on the grounds of administrative convenience since that would lead to blatant abuse of power. It appears that Schmitt preferred a dictatorship as against a liberal constitutional set-up. His support for Nazi Germany seems apparent from this argument. Interestingly, Schmitt questioned Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution[6] as to whether the provision was a valid one. One can agree with Schmitt that Article 48 indeed granted excessive rights to the President of the Reich to proclaim an emergency and insofar as sovereignty was concerned the reading of the article would lead to the conclusion that the Weimar Constitution recognised the President as the sovereign. What must be emphasised upon is the fact that the only check on the powers of the President, that is, the Reichstag, had to simply be informed of such a proclamation[7].

The wording of Article 48 led to it being grossly misused. One such instance of its misuse could be the manner in which Hitler became Chancellor. The provision invariably allowed the President of the Reich to rule as a dictator from time to time. It was this lacuna in the Constitution that allowed the President of the Reich to appoint Hitler as Chancellor at a time when the Reichstag could not appoint a Chancellor by consensus.[8] Thus, such a provision of the Weimar Constitution became one of the factors that led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic. A similar provision exists in the Indian Constitution. Article 352 of the Indian Constitution[9], provides for the procedure to be followed in the instance wherein the President is convinced that an emergency must be proclaimed. Checks were placed on the power of the President, as Article 352(3) specifically provided that the President can only proclaim an emergency based solely on the decision of the Union Cabinet. Further, a proclamation so issued is required to be mandatorily laid before Parliament which has the power to act as a check on the powers of the executive — Parliament has the right to approve the proclamation so passed.[10]

Comparing both the provisions, it can be said that there exists a strict check on the powers of the Indian executive insofar as a proclamation is concerned. Such a check was virtually absent in the corresponding provision in the Weimar Constitution. Hence this is a clear instance wherein a dilution of the provision led to blatant misuse. Thus, Schmitt’s insistence that all limitations on the authority of the sovereign to deal with emergencies be removed cannot be accepted.

The Schmittian challenge thus remains as to whether the sovereign, whoever it may be, can take adequate measures to suppress an emergency and at the same time remain faithful to the requirement of legality. To counter the challenge posed, most point towards the situation created in the aftermath of the terror attacks in America, particularly, 9/11. The attack even with a Schmittian understanding, can be considered an exception. Knowing the incidents that occurred, one can argue that the State was able to maintain relative calm in the time period immediately after the incident.

Some scholars such as Oren Gross while wholly disagreeing with Schmitt, do admit that there may be certain instances wherein public officials such as bureaucrats would have to look for solutions outside the law for a more efficient response. However, while admitting this fact, scholars who believe in the virtues of extra legal measures also state that the creation of ex-post political and legal checks would certainly deter officials from relying on those measures since in most cases, such extra-legal measures would be brought into statutes as amendments.[11]

Also, while answering the Schmittian challenge, it must also be emphasised that the judiciary also acts as a check on the powers of the sovereign. David Dyzenhaus emphasised on the role of the courts in preserving legality during an emergency. This intervention by the courts in purely administrative actions would seriously threaten the principle of separation of powers — nevertheless, suitable modifications can be made insofar as the creation of checks and balances is concerned. Further, in contemporary times, specialised courts such as Administrative Tribunals have been set up primarily to ensure that the executive does not act arbitrarily.[12]

In this regard, the Supreme Court of India has also ensured that actions of the executive such as a proclamation of emergency do not go unchecked. Hence, the Court stated that while it cannot question the adequacy of facts that led the executive to proclaim emergency, nevertheless, if the satisfaction of the President is deemed to have been on irrelevant grounds, then the Court has complete jurisdiction to examine the proclamation.[13] Likewise, the same set of guidelines have also been laid down by the Supreme Court of India for proclamations of emergency under Article 356 of the Constitution of India.[14]

It must be noted, however, that the abovementioned facts and possibilities can only work as long as these institutions are matured and have been functioning efficiently over a period of time. Victor Ramraj points to the fact that there is a clear difference in the ways in which developed nations act in exceptional circumstances as against newly formed States — Ramraj points to the fact that such emergent situations are experienced differently by different nations and further, there exists a clear difference between preserving legality and establishing legality.[15] Stating instances of the constitutional development of countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, he states that the Schmittian challenge must be further seen based on the constitutional development of nations. While in Thailand, the exception, that is the emergency, has outlived the norm, that is, the Constitution, Malaysia has developed under a perpetual state of emergency — the Malaysian example is a rather interesting instance wherein, even though the proclamation of emergency has not been lifted, there appears to exist an unwillingness to change the current scenario, since even under a proclamation of emergency, there continues to exist a rule of law state. Hence, one may only imagine Schmitt’s response to such a situation wherein the State itself was created in a state of emergency and further, that it has normalised such a situation —  preserving the legality.

In conclusion, while Schmitt’s theory of the exception and the handling of this exception by the sovereign would appear valid in the World War II scenario wherein sovereign nations were only just developing constitutional theories; his theories would be taken rather differently in contemporary times wherein a majority of the nations have entrenched legal provisions which guide the executive in dealing with any emergent situation. In the present day context, uncontrollable powers are not given to any individual, whether it be a head of State. All constitutional provisions necessarily provide for consultations insofar as decisions of national security are concerned — hence, the Schmittian argument in favour of dilution of controlling provisions would run contrary to the rule of law argument. Moreover, several scholars have contrasted Schmitt’s theory with modern day examples, such as those of 9/11. The exception so discussed by Schmitt could be possible in the wake of a non-existent judiciary and a shut legislature. However, in the present day scenario of a well-defined separation of powers with a functional system of checks and balances, legality can be preserved. Thus, while all arguments stand contradicted, the only argument that tends to support his arguments is the reaction of nascent constitutional orders to emergent situations surely, they would look beyond their constitutional systems to manage the crisis, however, as long as they are assisted by mature democracies, such regimes would not turn into dictatorships.

†  Fourth-Year student, 5-year BA LLB programme,  Jindal Global Law School, e-mail:

[1]  Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, edited by Thomas McCarthy, published by MIT press, p. 5.

[2] Aristotle, Politics, translated by Benjamin Jowett (1999), Book III, p. 75, available at (

[3]  Jeremy Waldron, Rule of Law, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), last viewed on 19-1-2019 (

[4]  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, published by the University of Adelaide, Ch. VI, last seen on 19-1-2019.

[5]  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, published by the University of Adelaide, last seen on 19-1-2019.

[6]  Weimar Constitution, 1919-1933.

[7]  Art. 48, Weimar Constitution, (1919-1933).

[8] Art. 48, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, last seen on 19-1-2019, available at (

[9]  Art. 352, Constitution of India.

[10]  Art. 352(4), Constitution of India.

[11]  Victor V. Ramraj, Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring the Limits of Legality, 2010, published by Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-26.

[12]  Id., p. 26.

[13]  Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625, para 99.

[14]  S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

[15] Victor V. Ramraj, Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring the Limits of Legality, 2010, published by Cambridge University Press, pp. 54-55.

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: A Division Bench comprising of Sanjay Karol, Acting CJ and Ajay Mohan Goel, J. dismissed a batch of applications filed for condonation of delay in filing revision petitions under Section 48(1) of Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act 2005, beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein.

All the revision petitions were time-barred by as much as two years beyond the period of limitation prescribed in the section. The moot question involved in all the petitions was whether the Court can entertain an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing a revision petition under Section 48(1) of H.P. Value Added Tax Act. Section 48 provides that ‘any person aggrieved by an order made by the tribunal under Section 45(2) or Section 46(3), may, within 90 days of the communication of such order, apply to the High Court for revision thereof…’. It was contended by the Senior Counsel opposing the application that the application filed under Section 5 was per se not maintainable and the same was liable to be dismissed outrightly. Whereas, Senior Additional Advocate General argued that such application was maintainable and the Court had the power to condone delay.

While settling the issue at hand, the High Court observed that the language of Section 48 is unambiguous and categorical. Further, there is no provision in the Statute from which it could be inferred that a time-barred revision petition can be preferred before the High Court and if the High Court is satisfied, it can condone the delay in filing the same. The High Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra,(1974) 2 SCC 133, wherein the Hon’ble Court held, “where a Statute is a complete code in itself, meaning thereby that it is a substantive as well as procedural code, then the application of Limitation Act has to be seen from the scope of application of the Statute and not the Limitation Act.” Based on such principle, the High Court held that H.P. Value Added Tax was code in itself as it was both a substantive and procedural law and no provision therein, made the provisions of Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings originating under the former Act. Therefore, the Court held that it had no inherent power to condone the delay in entertaining the revision petitions filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Act itself. [State of H.P v.  Tritronics India (P) Ltd.,2018 SCC OnLine HP 757, dated 18-06-2018]