Case BriefsForeign Courts

Supreme Court of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka: A Full Bench of Priyantha Jayawardena, PC, Murdu N.B. Fernando, PC, and S. Thurairaja, PC, JJ., allowed an application for special leave to appeal filed aggrieved by the order of the High Court.

The applicant-respondent-petitioner (workman) was employed as the Farm Manager of the respondent-appellant-respondent Company (employer). He had filed an application in the Labour Tribunal claiming compensation for the alleged unlawful termination of services and gratuity from the employer. The employer had stated that the termination was due to ‘frustration’ of the contract of employment as the farm in which the employer worked was closed down as it was not feasible to continue with its operations. After inquiry the Labour Tribunal had ordered compensation to the workman for the wrongful termination of employment. Being aggrieved, the employer had appealed the High Court where the appeal was allowed and order of the Labour Tribunal was set aside. Thus, the current appeal was filed by the workman. The Counsel for the employer, Viran Corea with Sarita de Fonseka had raised a Preliminary Objection stating that the workman had not complied with Rule 2 read with Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of 1990 and moved for a dismissal of the application in limine. They further contended that workman had filed, by way of motion several documents without assigning any reason for the delay and/or inability to have tendered the said documents along with the petition. Per Contra, the counsel for the workman, Ms. Kaushali Rubasinghe with Mr. Kushani Harischandra, submitted that in terms of Rule 2 read with Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, documents have to be annexed where the application contains allegations of fact which cannot be verified by reference to the judgment or Order in respect of which special leave to appeal is sought. It was submitted that no prejudice had been caused to the rights of the employer or the administration of justice due to the non-availability of those documents. Further, they contended that the application was taken up for support for the first time; no objection was raised on the maintainability of the application. However, the objection regarding non-compliance was raised only when the matter was taken up for support for the second time.

The Court while explaining Rule 2 read with Rule 6 specified that documents that are required to be annexed to an application for special leave to appeal, if allegations of facts referred to in such an application cannot be verified by reference to the judgment in respect of which special leave to appeal is sought. The Court further held that there was no provision requiring the filing of objections in an appeal. Hence, the statement of objections and the verifying affidavit filed by the workman before the High Court are not necessary to consider the instant application thus; said documents are not material documents to consider granting of special leave to appeal in the instant application. Preliminary Objection raised by the employer was overruled imposing costs.[Hiranya Surantha Wijesinghe v. Tenderlea Farms (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SL SC 7, decided on 17-09-2020]


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Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: Rajendra Kumar Mishra, J. disposed of the writ petition saying that the final decision regarding the petitioner’s claim rested with the respondent authorities.

A special leave application was filed on behalf of the appellant under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking leave to file an appeal against the judgment passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate wherein he had acquitted the respondent from the charges under Sections 323 and 420 of the Penal Code, 1860.

The mother of the appellant had filed a complaint case in the Court of SDJM., Sheohar at Sitamarhi. The mother of the appellant, aged about 85 years used to live with her son Daya Shankar Mishra (Appellant) and her other son, Ashutosh Mishra (Respondent) used to live separately. In absence of Daya Shankar Mishra, the respondent took her to Sheohar for treatment on 25-01-2008 and 28-01-2008, but in the garb of such treatment, he managed to take her thumb impression and signature on papers saying that her thumb impression and signature were required for her treatment. The respondent got the property transferred to his name by way of the thumb impression and signatures that he had obtained, and when he was questioned by the appellant he threatened her in return.

The learned ACJM, Sheohar at Sitamarhi acquitted the respondent on the grounds that the prosecution failed to prove the charges under Sections 323 and 420 of the Penal Code.

The Panchnama clearly indicated that the said plot of land was transferred in the name of the respondent and the trial Court committed an error in not considering the evidence.

The Court held that the Trial Court concluded that neither the complainant had filed any suit for cancellation of the sale deed nor any competent jurisdiction has declared the sale deed null and void and that the complainant had not denied giving the thumb impression and signature on the sale deed, rather, her claim was that her thumb impression and signature obtained on papers were converted into a sale deed. The Court instead failed to make an attempt to compare the thumb impression and signature of the sale deed with the signature and thumb impression of the register maintained in the office of Sub-Registrar. The Court found no reason to allow this Special Leave to Appeal.

In view of the above-noted facts, the instant application was dismissed accordingly.[Daya Shankar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 1429, decided on 08-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jharkhand High Court: Anil Kumar Choudhary, J. heard an interlocutory application filed under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 warranting a grant of special leave to present an acquittal appeal.

Applicants herein were accused of entering into the complainant’s house to threaten her to withdraw the case instituted by her, during which they had abused her in a filthy language, and on her refusal to do so, they assaulted her and broke the lock of her shop taking away all the articles from it. The complainant had examined four witnesses in support of its case, whereby CW 1 and CW 2 were held not to be eye-witnesses to the occurrence and the CW 3 and CW 4 were not named in the column for witnesses, however, were introduced by the complainant at a later stage. The complaint had no mention of the presence of CW 4 at the place of occurrence, nor had the witnesses, at the stage of enquiry, stated her presence at the place of occurrence. CW 3, who was also the daughter of the complainant provided that the accused persons had misbehaved with the complainant and asked her to withdraw her case. She specifically stated that Akhilesh Pandey, who had been convicted, pointed a gun at the complainant, got the lock broken, and Rajesh Pandey, one of the private respondent, had called a truck and took away the articles of CW 3 and her mother, the complainant. The Chief Judicial Magistrate held that CW 3 and CW 4 had not stated anything about the two private respondents of this appeal, as required under Section 323 (punishment for voluntarily causing hurt) and Section 504 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace) of the Penal Code, 1860 and as CW 1 and CW 2 were not eyewitnesses, he acquitted the two private respondents of this appeal and convicted Akhilesh Pandey.

The counsel for the appellant, while seeking the grant of special leave under Section 378(4) of CrPC submitted that the learned court had not considered the fact that CW 3 had specifically stated for the misbehavior of all the three persons with the complainant-CW 4, and that the subsequent paragraphs of her statement had specifically stated that Akhilesh Pandey had committed the offences. The trial court should have taken into consideration her earlier submission where she provided for the presence of other accused at the place of occurrence.  It was then submitted that her submission regarding the presence of the two private respondents at the place of occurrence, deemed that she had stated about the two private respondents of this appeal to have committed the offence for which their co-accused had been convicted, thereby they could also have been convicted.

The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned CJM had considered the fact that the witnesses had not specifically stated about the involvement of the private respondents of this appeal, hence, rightly acquitted them. It was further submitted that in a criminal case, unless a witness had specifically stated something against the accused in his deposition, the inference could not be drawn from his statement made in earlier paragraph of the deposition to bring forth the charges against the accused facing the trial, thereby requesting a refusal to the grant of special leave for presenting the acquittal appeal

The High Court opined that as the CW 3 had not specifically stated for the private respondents to cause hurt to the complainant or intentionally insult the complainant thereby giving provocation to her to break the public peace, there was no apparent illegality or gross error in the impugned judgment. Therefore the interlocutory application being without any merit was rejected and the acquittal appeal was accordingly dismissed.[Ila Rani Sahai v. State of Jharkhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 770, decided on 16-05-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Jharkhand High Court: Anil Kumar Choudhary, J. dismissed an interlocutory application praying for grant of special leave under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against a judgment passed by Judicial Magistrate, Deoghar on the grounds of discrepancy in evidence and absence of perversity in the judgment.  

The appellant-complainant alleged that her husband (private respondent 2), after the birth of their daughter, physically and mentally tortured her to extract a sum of Rs 2,00,000 as dowry despite receiving Rs 7,50,000 at the time of their marriage. It was further alleged that he threw hot water at the appellant-complainant, after which she was treated at a hospital. The assault allegedly extended to the forceful acquirement of pieces of jewellery worth Rs 85,000. Witnesses were examined from both sides.  The complainant witnesses (hereinafter, CW) claimed that matrimonial disputes arose after two years of marriage. However, none could provide any specific date, day or year with regard to claims of assault nor could they provide medical records for treatment at the hospitals after the assault. Furthermore, there were contradictions in the testimony of CW 4. The defence witnesses, however, unanimously claimed that the appellant-complainant was rude and disliked staying in her paternal house.  Taking into account the testimonies, evidence and noting the contradiction in complainant’s testimony and the complaint, the trial court acquitted private respondent 2. Wife filed an appeal against this order of acquittal.

The complainant-appellant was represented by  Khalida Haya Rashmi who submitted a three-fold argument. Firstly, the court failed to study evidence, facts, and circumstances in its entirety such as that of dismissal of private respondent 2’s petition to dissolve the marriage by a family court. Secondly, the judgment by the trial court was perverse inasmuch as it failed to recognize appellant-complainant’s attempts to restitute her family life which caused a delay in filing of the case. Lastly, the discrepancy in evidence was a minor one, hence, cannot be solely relied upon to rule. The defense represented by the Public Prosecutor concurred with the observation of the trial court on the discrepancy in evidence and inordinate delay in lodging of FIR. Further, it was submitted that the lack of evidence for the offence in the present case was the right ground for acquittal.                                               

The Court concurred with the defense’s contentions holding that discrepancy in testimony and evidences do not clearly demarcate any specificity with regard to the duration or manner of cruelty. Further, relying on Rupali Devi v. State of U.P, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 493 where it was held that “Even if the acts of physical cruelty committed in the matrimonial house may have ceased and such acts do not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt that the mental trauma and the psychological distress caused by the acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled that wife to leave the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents would continue to persist at the parental home’. 

Thus, the Court dismissed the contention of ignoring discrepancy in evidence. Also, the Court holds that since no proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act were brought about, therefore, no such proceedings can be referred to as precedents. The Court found no illegality or perversity as claimed against the trial court Judgment; rather, termed it as reasonable and plausible. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. [Meena Devi v. State of Jharkhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 769, decided on 13-06-2019]