Kerala High Court: In an appeal dealing with whether the prohibition in Section 22(1), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) against strikes in a bank is confined only to “workman” or extends to “any person employed”, and correlatively, whether a strike call by a trade union can trigger conciliation by the Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC), the Division Bench of Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari* and Syam Kumar V.M., JJ., held that Section 22(1), ID Act operates independently of the definition of “industrial dispute” and restrictions under Section 22, ID Act are applicable to bank employees, if the bank is a notified public utility service (PUS). The Court further held that a strike call by a trade union can trigger conciliation proceedings and during its pendency, the strike cannot be acted upon.
Background
The appellant (Bank) was a banking company with a pan-India presence and a large workforce across managerial and non-managerial cadres, while the respondent (Trade Union) was a registered trade union representing officer cadre. RLC issued notices restraining the Trade Union from proceeding with a call for strike or abstention from work in relation to employees or officers employed with the Bank and called upon the Trade Union to participate in conciliation proceedings instituted under Section 22, ID Act.
Accepting the Trade Union’s assertion that its members were not “workman” under Section 2(s), ID Act, the Single Judge quashed the notices holding that RLC lacked jurisdiction to initiate conciliation proceedings under the ID Act. The Single Judge observed that officers holding higher ranks in the Bank were not “workman” as defined under the ID Act, and clarified that for an “industrial dispute” to exist, there must be a relationship of employer and workman between the parties, without which conciliation proceedings under Section 22, ID Act could not be triggered. It was also held that no “industrial dispute” as defined by Section 2(k), ID Act could arise in the absence of “workman”.
On appeal, the Bank contended that the definition of “strike” in Section 2(q), ID Act uses “a body of persons employed in any industry”, an expression of wider amplitude than “workman,” meaning thereby that the regulation of strikes could not be confined only to workmen and excluded in respect of officers. Therefore, when the strike notice was issued on behalf of the Trade Union, recourse to Section 22, ID Act was justified. It was further urged that Section 22 is a special provision to address the menace of strikes and lockouts in a PUS, and that no person employed in a PUS shall go on strike in breach of contract. It was submitted that Section 24(1), ID Act declares strikes or lockouts illegal if commenced or continued in contravention of Section 22, ID Act, irrespective of the “workman” status of the employee. Earlier participation of the Trade Union in conciliation proceedings initiated in similar circumstances was highlighted to argue that the Trade Union was conscious of its status and the applicability of Section 22, ID Act to its proposed calls for strike or abstention from work.
On the other hand, the Trade Union maintained that its members were not “workman” and therefore, an “industrial dispute” could not arise in the absence of a dispute between an employer and workmen. It was submitted that any earlier participation in conciliation or undertakings did not involve an adjudication of the applicability of Sections 22 and 23, ID Act. The Trade Union asserted its rights under Article 19(1)(c) and pointed to service conditions contained in settlement agreements and Officers’ Service Rules, contending that the ID Act was inapplicable to the Trade Union. It was also argued that the appointment of a Conciliation Officer and the institution of conciliation proceedings are intended solely for the settlement of “industrial disputes”.
Analysis and Decision
The Court noted that the Ministry of Labour and Employment issued a Gazette Notification dated 5 June 2023 under the ID Act, notifying services engaged in the banking industry as a PUS for the purposes of the ID Act. The Court emphasised that the banking sector constitutes a PUS indispensable to the Indian economy and it cannot be gainsaid that the employees and workmen form the backbone of this sector and provide the foundation upon which it progresses.
The Court opined that Chapter V of the ID Act contains independent and standalone provisions dealing with prohibition of strikes and lockouts. Section 22(1), ID Act employs the expression “no person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike in breach of contract”, which is a conscious broader choice than “workman”. The Court distinguished between Sections 22 and 23, ID Act and clarified that while Section 23 specifically restrains workmen from resorting to strikes and lockouts, Section 22 imposes a broader statutory embargo applicable to any person employed in a PUS.
The Court emphasised that a strike or lockout cannot be resorted to, declared, or commenced by any person without fulfilling the pre-requisites prescribed under Sections 22(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), and (1)(d), ID Act. The Court opined that Section 22(1)(d), ID Act cannot dictate the interpretation of Section 22(1), ID Act, which is the principal or charging provision and clarified that the focus is on the conduct of the strike, not the status of the person i.e. whether he is a workman or non-workman.
The Court relied on T.K. Rangarajan v. Govt. of T.N., (2003) 6 SCC 581, wherein it was observed that the right to strike cannot be considered a fundamental right and even the most liberal interpretation of Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution does not confer upon trade unions a guaranteed right to collective bargaining or to strike. The Court opined that strikes affect the social fabric, particularly when many employees participate en masse, bringing administration to a standstill. Employees who go on strike thereby commit misconduct of the highest order by jeopardising the peaceful functioning and operation of public sector organisations, which renders such activity unconstitutional.
The Court also relied on All India Bank Employees’ Assn. v. National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), (1962) 32 Comp Cas 414, wherein it was held that the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution can always be imposed by statute, particularly when such restrictions are enacted in the interest of the general public. Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution cannot be interpreted to encompass a right to go on strike, whether as part of collective bargaining or otherwise.
The Court observed that Single Judge misunderstood the statutory scheme and consequently, gave an erroneous reasoning. The Court also opined that the Single Judge proceeded on an incomplete and improper understanding of Workmen v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 4, and clarified that the judgment did not concern the interpretation of Section 22, ID Act, rather it held that the expression “any person” must be interpreted differently from “workman”.
The Court held that the rigors of Section 22(1), ID Act and the statutory prohibition contained therein would apply squarely to the Trade Union and opined that there was no basis for the inference that managerial or supervisory employees of higher ranks or cadres were excluded from the provisions of the ID Act. The Court further opined that the restrictions imposed under Section 22, ID Act are designed to protect the interests of the public and ensure the smooth operation of a PUS, as it provides services of immense public importance, and permitting strikes or lockouts in such services would have unforeseeable repercussions on the public and the citizenry at large.
The Court observed that the impugned judgment was based on misconstruction of the provisions of Chapter V of the ID Act, particularly the definitions of “strike” and “PUS” read with Section 22(1), ID Act. The Court explained that it is the “call for strike” per se that may trigger the initiation of conciliation proceedings, either at the behest of the RLC or the employer and that “strike” is different from “industrial dispute”, and therefore, the moment the employer receives intimation that the employees are proposing to go on strike against the establishment, he is competent to register and initiate appropriate proceedings before RLC and trigger conciliation proceedings.
The Court opined that the findings that conciliation proceedings cannot be initiated without an industrial dispute, and that an industrial dispute can only arise at the behest of workmen, were based on an incomplete reading of Chapter V of the ID Act. The Court observed that even a call for strike, if communicated to the employer, entitles him to trigger conciliation proceedings.
The Court emphasised that conciliation proceedings do not undermine the employees’ ability to raise grievances, rather, they facilitate resolution by bringing the employer and employee to the same negotiating table. They can appropriately be treated as a “safety valve mechanism”, whereby any person employed in a PUS must follow a prescribed procedure before resorting to strike action or patiently pursue conciliation proceedings.
Consequently, the Court, while allowing the writ appeal, set aside the Single Judge’s order, holding that in a PUS, the law safeguards the public first – no strike or lockout can trump the larger interest of the nation.
[Federal Bank Ltd. v. Federal Bank Officers Assn., WA No. 1363 of 2025, decided on 27-2-2026]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant: C.U. Singh (SR), Benny P Thomas (SR), Abel Tom Benny, D. Prem Kamath, Tom Thomas (Kakkuzhiyil), Advocates.
For the Respondents: P. Chidambaram (Sr), P. Ramakrishnan, P.R. Ajith Kumar, CGC
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