Disclaimer: This has been reported after the availability of the order of the Court and not on media reports so as to give an accurate report to our readers.
Allahabad High Court: In a habeas corpus writ petition filed by a man detained under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (“PITNDPS Act), the Division Bench of Siddharth and Vinai Kumar Dwivedi, JJ., allowed the petition, holding that the petitioner was detained without grounds and a reasoned order, i.e., the impugned orders were passed mechanically without application of mind.
Also Read: Top NDPS Judgments of 2025: Bail, Detention, Evidence & Procedural Safeguards
Background
The petitioner was detained vide detention order dated 8 August 2025 under Section 3(1), NDPS Act, to prevent him from engaging in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in the future. Thereafter, vide order dated 6 November 2025, the detention was confirmed by the PITNDPS Division, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, and the accused was directed to be detained for a year.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present petition against the two orders, contending that he had not been informed of the grounds of detention, in violation of Section 3(3), “PITNDPS Act and Article 22(5) of the Constitution. He further contended that he had not been provided with the documents relied upon by the authorities.
Also Read: Himachal Pradesh HC quashes PITNDPS detention order citing authority’s non-application of mind
Analysis
At the outset, the Court referred to Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of Nagaland, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 502, wherein the Supreme Court considered the scheme of the NDPS Act and held that the NDPS Act mandates that the grounds of detention be informed to the detenue as soon as possible after detention, but not later than 5 days and 15 days in exceptional circumstances. Section 6 specifically records that where a person has been detained pursuant to an order of detention under Section 3(1), which has been made on two or more grounds, such order shall be deemed to have been made separately on each ground. This indicates that the order of detention must be accompanied by the “grounds of detention” made by the detaining authority itself.
Further, the Court relied upon Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128, wherein it was held that the detention orders can be passed against detenues in jail, provided the officers passing such orders can justify the detention with reference to the material on record and can also justify that the detenues will indulge in similar activities, if set at liberty. Based on these decisions, the Court stated that no such “satisfaction” was recorded by the detaining officers in this case.
The Court also referred to Union of India v. Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342, wherein it was held that the detaining authority should apply its mind and show awareness of the “grounds of detention”. The detaining authority must be reasonably satisfied based on cogent material that there is a likelihood of detenue detainee indulging in such activities on being released from jail. The “reasons to believe” should be based on reliable material and the real possibility of detenue misusing his liberty in case of release from jail.
Referring to the aforementioned judgments, the Court held that the impugned orders were self-explanatory and clearly showed that they were passed without application of mind and without reference to any of the “grounds of detention” of the petitioner.
“Such a state of affairs is deplorable and needs to be redressed at the earliest by the Union Government in the larger interest of the criminal justice delivery system.”
The Court stated that if the impugned orders were considered in light of the settled legal principle laid down in Mortuza (supra), the orders passed against the petitioner cannot be sustained. The Court remarked that the respondent authorities had paid mere lip service to the mandatory requirements of law. They mechanically mentioned that they were satisfied that the petitioner was required to be detained to prevent him from engaging in illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Such “satisfaction” is required to have been spelt out after application of mind by reference to separate grounds of detention made by the detaining authority, which was not done.
“None of the impugned orders show any application of mind and no ‘grounds of detention’ have been recorded therein.”
The Court reiterated that an order passed by a public servant should stand on its own legs. Any pleadings in support of the impugned order cannot cure the defect in the order.
Thus, the Court held that the conduct of the respondent authorities was highly arbitrary and illegal as they exercised their powers in violation of Articles 14, 21, and 22 of the Constitution. The Court also remarked, “Despite being public servants, their conduct reflects scant respect for the law of the land, the dereliction of duty on their part, which can be considered to be misconduct in service on their part, since they have failed to perform their duties in accordance with law.”
Accordingly, the Court quashed the impugned orders and directed the petitioner to be free. Regarding the respondent authorities, the Court allowed the employer to take suitable action.
“We find that this state of affairs is continuing for long despite the number of orders passed by the courts quashing such illegal and non-speaking orders passed by detaining authorities.”
[Amit Singh v. Union of India, Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 128 of 2026, decided on 15-4-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the petitioner: Vinay Saran, Ajay Mishra, Shri Krishna Mishra
For the respondent: A.S.G.I., G.A., Shiv Kumar Pal