Supreme Court: In an appeal challenging the setting aside of conviction and sentence under Section 376 IPC and other provisions of the SC/ST Act, on ground of inconsistencies in the prosecution’s story, the Division Bench of Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ., stated that a truthful witness may make honest mistakes or omit immaterial details, and such normal variation should not result in wholesale rejection of evidence. However, when omissions or contradictions relate to material facts that form the foundation of the prosecution version, they assume significance and may create reasonable doubt. The Court reiterated that minor or trivial inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses do not by themselves make the evidence unreliable.
“When it comes to inconsistencies and omissions in testimonies, which is one of the primary grounds on which the reasoning of the High Court rests, it is well recognised that human perception, memory and narration are imperfect.”
The Court also flagged general indifference displayed by courts below in not following the mandate on non-disclosure of rape victims’ identities. Thus, to ensure strict compliance with the mandate on non-disclosure of rape victims’ identities, the Court further directed that a copy of this judgment be sent to all High Courts to ensure that in all matters dated before the passing of the judgment in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703, which mandated the non-disclosure of the rape victim’s identity, the proscription in Section 228-A IPC is followed strictly. “Although it has been the long-standing position in law, it is not being followed”.
Background
The facts that gave rise to the present dispute pertain to the sexual assault of a minor girl (victim) by the neighbour’s son. The young victim described the excruciating incident to her parents and then to the police. An FIR was lodged; a medical examination was conducted. Her bloodied clothes were handed over to the authorities concerned. A charge-sheet was filed under Sections 376 and 201, Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and Section 3(xii), Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act).
It took testimonies of 16 prosecution witnesses for the trial court to convict the accused under Section 376 IPC and for the offence under the SC/ST Act; however, he was acquitted under Section 201 IPC. The trial court had placed its reliance on the testimony of the victim and corroborated it with the testimonies of other witnesses, pointing out that together, they pointed to the guilt of the accused.
The trial Court’s verdict was reversed by Himachal Pradesh High Court, pointing out major contradictions in the witness testimonies that the trial court purportedly ignored. The High Court highlighted serious improbabilities in the prosecution version, which suggested that the prosecutrix had apparently gone to a house that was about 8 kilometres away. The High Court also questioned how the victim could have had to travel approximately 16 kilometres in two hours, which appeared highly improbable. it was further noted that the quarrels between the families of the accused and the victim were a regular feature, and one such quarrel took placeon the very same day as the alleged incident. Further, there were differences regarding how and when the incident was reported, who went where before lodging the FIR, and whether the maternal uncle came to the house or met them on the road. These inconsistencies were considered significant by the High Court. Although the medical evidence indicated that the prosecutrix had been exposed to a sexual act, the Court held that medical opinion alone could not be treated as substantive evidence. In light of the inconsistencies and the surrounding circumstances, the medical evidence was held to be insufficient to sustain the conviction.
The State impugned the judgment of the High Court in the present appeal.
Court’s Analysis
Anonymity of Rape Victims
At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the legislature had introduced a provision into IPC seeking to protect the identity of the victim of the offence under Section 376 IPC, in the aftermath of the Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 143, as far back as 1983. The 1983 amendments marked the beginning of a victim-centred orientation in Indian criminal law, as the Court reporting and media coverage could expose survivors to social stigma, ostracism, and lifelong reputational harm. Protections such as in-camera trials, evidentiary presumptions, and anonymity were designed to reduce the barriers and fears that previously discouraged reporting and effective prosecution of sexual offences.
However, the Court grimly noted that the intent of this amendment was disturbingly missed during the proceedings in the instant case. “The name of the victim was treated like that of any other witness and was freely used throughout the record, which must be deprecated in the strongest terms.” The Court stated that non-compliance with this provision had been noticed earlier as well.
Minor Inconsistency in Testimonies
The Court noted that the principles qua appreciation of the testimony of child witnesses were formulated in the State of Rajasthan v. Chatra, (2025) 8 SCC 613, and State of H.P. v. Manga Singh, (2019) 16 SCC 759. The Court observed that the impugned judgment’s foundational reasoning relates to inconsistencies and omissions in testimonies; however, it is well recognised that human perception, memory and narration are imperfect. The Court referred to State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) 1 SCC 505, and Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241,pointing out that minor inconsistencies or trivial discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses do not by themselves make the evidence unreliable.
The Court referred to State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752, wherein normal discrepancies arising from errors of observation or memory and material discrepancies that go to the core of the case, were distinguished. Therein the Court had held that only material discrepancies going to the core of the case, undermines the prosecution in a substantial manner.
Appreciation of Evidence and Application of Legal Principles
Applying the principles laid down by the aforestated precedents on the facts of the present case, the Court observed that the prosecutrix had positively identified the accused and had unequivocally stated that he forced himself upon her; not even a shred of doubt could be created by cross-examination on these two most essential points. Neither testimony of the mother nor the father, which supported the version of the prosecutrix, could be credibly questioned. The discrepancy that appeared, pertained to the alleged quarrel between the families of the prosecutrix and the accusedt. The Court noted that the major improbability noticed by the impugned judgment was that the prosecutrix had travelled 16 kilometres within two hours may not be possible. However, the Court highlighted that it is still an uncontroverted reality that the factum of sexual assault had not been disturbed.
“In proving the occurrence of an offence within a particular time frame, the Court does not look for mathematical precision. For the purposes of argument, even if the alleged time frame is extended by an hour, the possibility of the occurrence of the offence is still not shaken.”
Rejection of Medical Evidence
The Court examined the rejection of concrete medical evidence on the grounds of the improbability of travelling 16 kilometres. The Court stated that it is well-established that medical evidence is an expert opinion and corroborative in nature; the medical evidence may be ignored only when it contravenes other credible evidence, particularly ocular evidence; however, that was not the issue in the present case. The Court noted that the medical evidence expressly corroborated that the victim was sexually assaulted and that she had already identified and attributed the act to the accused; the same was not challenged or questioned by the process of law. In light of the aforesaid facts, the Court refused to ignore or reject the medical evidence and witness testimonies based on some alleged improbability of time.
Conclusion
The Court held that on the evidence of the prosecutrix alone, the offence stood established; the evidence of others only added further credence to the statement of the victim. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and acquittal of the accusedt.
[State of H.P. v. Hukum Chand, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 462]
*Judgment authored by Justice Sanjay Karol
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the appellant: N/A
For the respondent: N/A