Supreme Court: In a significant judgment reinforcing the rights of divorced Muslim women, the bench of Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ has held that the interpretation of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 must be done, keeping at the forefront equality, dignity, autonomy and the lived experiences of women where particularly in smaller towns and rural areas, inherent patriarchal discrimination is still the order of the day.
The Court observed that the object of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act is to secure the dignity and financial protection of a Muslim women post her divorce which aligns with the rights of a women under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Background of the Case
In the case at hand, the parties were married on 28-08- 2005 but differences arose shortly thereafter. The appellant (the wife) left the matrimonial home in May 2009 and eventually, the marriage ended in divorce on 13-12- 2011. The appellant sought the return of gifts, gold ornaments, and other properties given at the time of marriage, claiming a total of Rs. 17,67,980. She approached the courts under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act as well as Sections 125 and 498A of the CrPC/IPC.
The case passed through multiple rounds in the lower courts. The Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate partly allowed the appellant’s claim, granting Rs. 8 lakhs and 30 bhories of gold. Subsequent appeals and revisions were filed, and eventually, the Calcutta High Court allowed the respondent’s petition, relying on statements of the appellant’s father that the gifts had been given to the husband, not the wife.
Supreme Court Analysis
The main question before the Supreme Court was whether gifts and properties given at the time of marriage to the daughter or bridegroom can be reclaimed by the divorced wife under the 1986 Act.
The Court observed that Section 3(1) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act deals with mehr/dower and/or other properties given to a woman at the time of her marriage- clearing the way for the woman to set up a claim against her husband in the above situations, or claim back from her husband properties given, as the case may be.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the High Court, wherein the High Court had refused to return the amount and gold to the appellant, relying on an apparent contradiction between the statements of the marriage registrar (Kazi) and the father of the appellant. While the Kazi had stated in his evidence that the entry recording the amount and gold being given to the husband was erroneously done so and it should have been that the said amount(s) were only given without specifying, to whom, the father of the appellant, on the other hand, stated that he had given the amount(s) in question to the respondent (i.e. the husband). The High Court gave more weight to the father’s statement because he was directly responsible for giving the gifts.
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the High Court lost sight of is the end result of the proceedings in which the said statement of the father was given, namely, the proceedings under Section 498A–IPC and Section(s) 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, wherein, despite such a direct statement by the father of the appellant the Trial Court acquitted the respondent and the said judgment had attained finality.
The Court, hence, held that the evidentiary value of that statement cannot be said to be either equal to or greater than the statement of the marriage registrar. It is also worth noting that the High Court had recorded that the statement regarding writing and overwriting in the entry in the marriage register was supported by documentary proof. Hence, the Court held that in such case, mere allegation as to his conduct being suspicious on account of overwriting in the marriage register was not sufficient to discard his testimony.
The Supreme Court also noted while it is a settled rule that the Supreme Court under its plenary, Article 136 jurisdiction does not interfere with the findings of the High Court simply because there are two views possible, the case at hand, did not fall under this exception as the High Court missed the purposive construction goalpost and instead proceeded to adjudicate the matter purely as a civil dispute.
Underscoring the importance of purposive interpretation of laws to uphold social justice, the Court observed that,
“The Constitution of India prescribes an aspiration for all, i.e. equality which is, obviously, yet to be achieved. Courts, in doing their bit to this end must ground their reasoning in social justice adjudication.”
The Court, hence, allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court order. The respondent was directed to pay the amount to the appellant. Payment was directed to be made via bank transfer within three working days, with a compliance affidavit to be filed within six weeks. The Court also made clear that non-compliance would attract 9% interest per annum.
[Rousanara Begum v. SK Salahuddin, SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) Diary No(s).60854/2024, decided on 02-12-2025]
*Judgment Authored by Justice Sanjay Karol
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s): Mr. Syed Mehdi Imam, AOR Mr. Mohd Parvez Dabas, Adv. Mr. Uzmi Jamil Husain, Adv. Mr. Tabrez Ahmad, Adv. Ms. Pooja Kumari, Adv. Mr. S Prasada Rao, Adv.
For Respondent(s): Ms. Kumud Lata Das, Adv. Mr. Sukesh Ghosh, Adv. Ms. Sadhana Sandhu, AOR Ms. Pooja Rathore, Adv. Mr. Siddhant N. Das, Adv. Mr. Kunal Mimani, AOR Ms. Shraddha Chirania, Adv
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