Karnataka High Court: In a civil writ petition filed by X Corp., challenging the constitutional validity of Sahyog Portal, for declaring that Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (‘IT Act’) and not Section 79(3)(b) confer authority to issue information blocking orders under the IT Act and that Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (‘2021 Rules’) is ultra vires the IT Act or unconstitutional, a Single-Judge Bench of M. Nagaprasanna, J., held that the Sahyog Portal is not an instrument of censorship but a mere facilitation mechanism, and Rule 3(1)(d) is neither ultra vires nor arbitrary, as the Constitution permits reasonable regulation and cannot be permitted to be corroded in the guise of freedom of speech and expression. The Court further noted that the law must maintain a delicate balance to walk a tight rope between the perils of unregulated expression and the dangers of unrestrained censorship.
Background
The petitioner, X Corp. (formerly known as Twitter), a US-based social media company with an office in Bengaluru, filed the present petition seeking:
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A declaration that Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act does not permit the issuance of information blocking orders which can only be issued under Section 69A of the IT Act.
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A declaration that Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 is unconstitutional or, in the alternative, that it does not independently authorize the issuance of information blocking orders.
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A declaration that the censorship portal, referred to as the Sahyog Portal, is unconstitutional.
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To quash several notifications issued by various government ministries that authorize different officials to issue takedown notices for ‘unlawful content/information’ under Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d).
Analysis and Decision
Issue 1: Whether the march of human civilization — from the days of yore to the present digital age — has ever witnessed information and communication in an unregulated state; or whether regulation has been its constant companion across epochs?
The Court noted that throughout history the development of information and communication has always been subject to regulation. While communication is a harbinger of freedom, it is also a subject of order, and nations worldwide have implemented regulatory frameworks to guide, safeguard, and balance the forces unleashed by these technological revolutions. The internet is a great amplifier of voices, but it has also become an echo chamber of discord, as misinformation, incitement and instability has found unbridled passage.
Therefore, it concluded that information and communication, from the days of yore to the present, have never existed in a completely unregulated state.
Issue 2: Whether the regimes of regulation that prevailed in earlier times continue to subsist, both in the local context of our polity and in the global order of nations?
The Court noted that from the press of the colonial era to the digital platforms today, there has always existed a framework of law to temper liberty with responsibility, freedom with accountability. The Court observed that X Corp. is seeking to take refuge under the banner of unbridled freedom, the record however, reveals that even in its home land i.e., America, the spread of information has never been free from the tempering hand of law and notwithstanding the same, it is wanting to cry foul of the regulatory regime in this country. The Court observed that no nation has left the flow of information wholly unregulated.
Issue 3: Whether the right to free speech, as enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, is an unbridled entitlement, or whether it stands hedged by the canopy of reasonable restrictions as embodied in Article 19(2)?
The Court noted that free speech is a natural right, but no right is absolute. Article 19(2) has been amended to allow reasonable restrictions. The Court recounted the historical context of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which was introduced following the decision in the case of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 436, to insert the words “in the interest of” and elaborate on the term “public order”. The Court referenced a plethora of judgments the Supreme Court interpreting Article 19(2) to conclude that free speech can be curtailed.
The Court analysed the position pre and post the Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1. The Court noted that the larger benches of the Supreme Court, pre-Shreya Singhal recognised the right of reasonable restrictions upon free speech and expression. Post-Shreya Singhal, the benches of larger strength or even equal strength thought it fit to curb the developing menace.
The Court answered the issue holding that free speech, as obtained under Article 19(1)(a) cannot be unbridled, uncanalized and a free fall, it is hedged, regulated, and restricted by reasonable restrictions as found in Article 19(2).
Issue 4: Whether the jurisprudential edifice of the United States of America can be transplanted, without reservation or adaptation, into the soil of Indian constitutional thought?
The Court noted that the decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 was based upon the judgment of American Supreme Court in Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al v. American Civil Liberties Union et al, 1997 SCC OnLine US SC 82, therefore, it was necessary to examine the judgments rendered by the benches of larger strength, as to whether American Jurisprudence or doctrines can be transplanted to Indian Jurisprudence.
The Court examined the various decisions of the Supreme Court like Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, 1959 SCC OnLine SC 14, and Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, (1970) 3 SCC 746, and pointed out that American doctrine cannot be imported under our Constitution, because the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute rights. The First Amendment to the US Constitution is almost absolute in its terms and there is nothing in the American Constitution corresponding to clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. Therefore, the framework of our Constitution is different from that of the Constitution of the United States of America.
The Court concluded that the wholesale importation of American doctrines, particularly in the realm of free speech, cannot be the touchstone for interpreting the provisions of the Indian Constitution.
Issue 5: Whether there has been a discernible shift in American judicial philosophy in the aftermath of the celebrated decision in RENO v. ACLU, and if so, to what effect upon comparative jurisprudence?
The Court noted that due to the internet growing to proportions unimaginably vast, there was a shift in American judicial philosophy and the reasoning in Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al v. American Civil Liberties Union et al, 1997 SCC OnLine US SC 82, lost its steam as a binding compass and was treated as a vintage decision, a pronouncement rendered in an era when internets’ reach, was abysmally modest.
The Court observed that any shift in American judicial philosophy was of no consequence to Indian jurisprudence, as the guiding precedent is the decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
Issue 6: What were the Rules that fell for consideration before this Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, and whether, in the contemporary context the Rules now occupying the field are materially distinct, thus demanding a fresh interpretative lens?
The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, interpreted Sections 66A, 69A and 79 of the IT Act, the Blocking Rules, 2009 and the IT Rules, 2011. Sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act and the Blocking Rules, 2009, were held to be constitutionally valid, under the challenge to the constitutional validity, they remain the same even today. The Court noted that IT Rules, 2011 were superseded by IT Rules 2021. The Court observed that the present petition challenges the Constitutional validity of certain provisions of the IT Rules, 2021. The Court perused the Rule 3(4) of the IT Rules, 2011 which were interpreted in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 and the present Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021 promulgated post Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1. The new Rules mandate due diligence by an intermediary. There are certain conditions imposed for compliance with the direction to remove the objectionable content on the platform. The reasons for directing such removal traces its origin to Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
Therefore, the Court answered the issue holding that the Rules that fell for consideration has undergone a change, a complete change, in comparison to the superseded Rules, which fell for consideration in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
Issue 7: (vii) Whether the present challenge to the Rules, or their constitutionality, is vitiated by alleged vagueness, or whether the Rules withstand the test of clarity and definiteness in law?
The Court noted that as per the amended Rule 3(1)(d) of IT Rules 2021, the intermediaries should not host, store or publish any unlawful information that would affect public order, decency or morality, etc. Further, Section 79 is a safe harbour provision with certain conditions. If an intermediary fails to remove content deemed unlawful by a court or government order, it loses the protection of this safe harbour. The Court reasoned that the term unlawful in both Section 79 and Rule 3(1)(d) is not vague, as it is qualified by ‘under any law for the time being in force’, referring to clearly defined laws. Rule 3(1)(d) ensures intermediaries comply with their obligations under Section 79. The Court observed that while it is impossible to define everything with mathematical precision, this cannot be an excuse for vague expressions or a reason to challenge a law’s validity. The legislative schemes can use general words and the meaning of such words can be determined through judicial construction. Rule 3(1)(d) is neither vague nor arbitrary. The rule, in tandem with Section 79, ensures due diligence by intermediaries. The Court observed that platforms cannot disclaim responsibility for content, as their algorithms, which are under their control, determine a post’s popularity. The Court was startled by the fact that X Corp. did not want to undertake due diligence.
Therefore, the Court held that Rule 3(1)(d) of IT Rules 2021 read with Section 79 is neither ultra vires nor arbitrary and challenge to both stand repelled.
Issue 8: Whether the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution are to be regarded as essentially citizen-centric, or whether they extend in their sweep to all persons?
The Court observed that X Corp. is not a Company incorporated under any of the laws of the nation, nor does it have a face in the nation. It is a faceless Company, with not even a legally established office anywhere in the nation. Article 19 of the Constitution undoubtedly gives its protective umbrella only to citizens. Fundamental rights obtained under Article 19 are citizen centric and not person centric. Even otherwise, a foreign company, standing under the umbrella of Article 14, cannot raise a challenge which in effect would lead to interpretation of Article 19, or drawing support even from Article 19 of the Constitution.
Further, ventilating statutory rights or grievances concerning the statute, seeking to challenge the statutes of the nation, on the foundation of Article 19, cannot be countenanced. A Company which is faceless in India, cannot based on baseless allegations, come forward and challenge the laws of the nation. X Corp, being faceless in the nation, operating as an intermediary, cannot challenge any of the statutes of the nation under the umbrage of Article 19. Its presence is not there. It cannot raise a challenge to the statutes regulating social media. If it wants to operate in the nation, it must abide by the laws, as simple as that.
The Court held that X Corp., an artificial juristic entity, had the status of an intermediary as defined under the IT Act, 2000 and nothing beyond it. It is neither a citizen of the country nor a natural person who can be permitted to sue on the protective umbrella of Article 19. It is for the individual citizens of the country, the right under Article 19 is provided.
Issue 9: Whether the Sahyog Portal, envisaged under the Information Technology Act, is ultra vires the parent enactment, or whether it stands as a legitimate instrument in aid of statutory purpose?
The Court observed that the Sahyog Portal was not a censorship portal but rather a legitimate facilitation mechanism intended to streamline communication between authorized agencies and intermediaries. The justification for the portal was found acceptable, as it addresses practical difficulties such as unreliable contact information and duplicate notices, thereby ensuring efficiency and traceability. Crucially, the binding power to issue blocking directions remains exclusively with Section 69A of the IT Act and the 2009 Blocking Rules. By improving communication and compliance, the very meaning of the word ‘Sahyog’ (cooperation), the portal acted as an administrative channel, or digital post office, and was therefore held to be free from any vice of unconstitutionality.
Further, the Court rejected X Corp.’s contention that Nodal Officers act based on their personal whim or fancy. The appointment of Nodal Officers is rooted in statute, emanating from the Blocking Rules, 2009, and subsequent office memoranda, which reference the intermediary’s compliance obligation under Section 79(3)(b). The Court noted that take-down notices issued by these officers mentioned specific violations of already established laws, such as the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, confirming their actions are not arbitrary but are in consonance with law. The intermediary is mandated to obey these take-down orders for unlawful information, as the element of control is always available with the platform via its algorithms, and the platform cannot absolve itself of responsibility.
Issue 10: In the contemporary digital milieu, where algorithms increasingly shape the flow of information, its autonomy eclipse the guiding hand of human agency – myth or reality?
The Court rejected the notion of algorithms as neutral systems. It noted that they are extensions of human judgment encoded in a mathematical form, reflecting the human hand at every stage from design to coding. Since algorithms dictate which, content including unlawful information was to be amplified, the platform cannot escape the hand of law by claiming a lack of human intervention. Therefore, the Court noted that legal systems must demand transparency, explainability and human responsibility to ensure that power, whether human or digital, must remain accountable and does not erode fundamental rights.
Issue 11: Whether the menace of social media needs to be curbed and regulated?
The Court observed that the content on social media needs to be regulated, and its regulation is a must, more so, in the cases of offences against women, failing which, the right to dignity of a citizen is railroaded.
In light of the afore-stated discussion, the Court rejected the petition of X Corp.
[X Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 7405 of 2025, decided on 24-09-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner: K.G. Raghavan, Senior Advocate a/w Manu P. Kulkarni, Advocates
For the Respondents: Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India a/w Kanu Agrawal, Gaurang Bhushan, Aman Mehta; K. Arvind Kamath, Addl. Solicitor General of India a/w M. N. Kumar, CGSPC; Aditya Sondhi, Sr. Advocate a/w Apar Gupta, Malavika Prasad, Spoorthi Cotha, A. S. Vishwajith and Naibedya Dash, Advocates for the Intervening Applicants