Supreme Court: In an appeal arising out of a dispute concerning incorporation of privately held land in a colony layout plan in Green Park Extension, New Delhi, a Division Bench of Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta*, JJ. allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment dated 24 April 2019 passed by the Delhi High Court in a letters patent appeal. The Court held that the High Court erred in travelling beyond the limited scope of adjudication in the de-reserved land layout plan dispute by entering into questions of title and public purpose, despite a final and binding civil court decree protecting the appellants’ possession. Emphasising that a mere entry in municipal records does not confer title and that de-reserved land cannot be retrospectively treated as earmarked for public purpose, the Court restored the order of the Single Judge directing the Municipal Corporation to consider the appellants’ application for incorporation of the plots in the layout plan within a stipulated period.
Background
The present appeal arises out of a dispute concerning a parcel of land admeasuring 1600 sq yards, situated in the erstwhile Village Yusuf Sarai Jat, now falling within Green Park Extension Colony, New Delhi. The subject land formed part of a larger tract owned by Urban Improvement Company (P) Ltd., a coloniser, which surrendered the same to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) along with a layout plan sanctioned on 3 September 1958, wherein the land was reserved for a High School. Subsequently, a revised layout plan was sanctioned, whereby the reservation for the High School was deleted on the ground that the area available was insufficient for establishing the same, the lands earmarked for primary school and park were, however, retained. The said dereservation was not challenged and attained finality.
Thereafter, the coloniser, vide registered sale deeds dated 18 June 1975, sold the subject land in parts to five purchasers. Upon alleged interference by the MCD, the purchasers instituted civil suits seeking permanent injunction, which came to be decreed on 1 October 1988, restraining the MCD from interfering with their possession except in accordance with due process of law. The appeals preferred by the MCD were dismissed as barred by limitation and the second appeals preferred before the High Court were also dismissed.
Subsequently, in the year 1994, the original purchasers transferred the subject land to subsequent purchasers, including the appellants herein. On further interference by the MCD, contempt petitions were filed, wherein the officials of the MCD tendered unconditional apology and the petitions were dismissed as withdrawn. In the year 1996, the subsequent purchasers applied for incorporation of their plots in the layout plan of the colony, however, the same was rejected by the Standing Committee of the MCD on 19 August 1998. A fresh application was preferred in 1999, which was approved by the Layout Scrutiny Committee, subject to clearance from the Delhi Development Authority, though no further action ensued. An application for sanction of building plan for a nursery school, submitted in 2006, also came to be rejected. In the interregnum, between 2006 and 2008, the appellants acquired interest in the subject land through gift deeds and sale deeds.
Thereafter, on the basis of entries in the immovable property register of the MCD and reports of its departments, the Layout Scrutiny Committee, vide order dated 19 May 2014, rejected the request for incorporation of the subject plots in the layout plan, which decision was upheld by the Standing Committee vide Resolution dated 17 July 2014. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred a writ petition before the High Court, which came to be allowed by the Single Judge, directing reconsideration of their application. However, the letters patent appeal preferred by the respondent was allowed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 24 April 2019, which is assailed in the present appeal.
Analysis of the de-reserved land layout plan dispute
The Supreme Court, upon consideration of the rival submissions and material on record, held that the decree of permanent injunction passed by the civil court on 1 October 1988, restraining the MCD from interfering with possession of the appellants’ predecessors except in accordance with due process of law, had attained finality, as the appeals preferred thereagainst were dismissed up to the High Court and were never challenged thereafter. The Court noted that the appellants and their predecessors had remained in peaceful possession of the subject land throughout and that the MCD had never asserted title over the land before any competent forum, save and except a stray entry in its property register, which by itself could not constitute proof of title. In this backdrop, the Court found that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in making observations which had the effect of unsettling the binding decree of the civil court and indirectly putting the title of the appellants in dispute.
The Court further held that the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench, namely, that the land ought to be retained for public purpose since it was originally earmarked for a High School in the layout plan, was wholly misconceived and unsupported by the record. It was observed that the subject land had been duly de-reserved as far back as 1969, and there was no material to indicate that it continued to retain the character of land reserved for public purpose thereafter. The Court emphasised that in the absence of any challenge to the de-reservation and in light of multiple registered conveyances through which the land changed hands, the finding of the Division Bench that the Corporation acted as a custodian of public interest over the land was perverse and untenable. It was also noted that the issue of title or public purpose had never been raised by the MCD in earlier proceedings, including the civil suits, and therefore, did not arise for consideration in the writ proceedings.
The Supreme Court underscored that the scope of the letters patent appeal before the Division Bench was limited to examining the correctness of the direction issued by the learned Single Judge, which merely required the Corporation to consider the appellants’ application for incorporation of the plots in the layout plan within a stipulated period. The Division Bench, by venturing into questions of title and public purpose, travelled beyond the permissible scope of adjudication. The Court found no infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge, particularly in view of the admission made by the MCD in earlier proceedings regarding the ownership and possession of the appellants’ predecessors.
Decision
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench dated 24 April 2019, and restored the order of the learned Single Judge. The respondent-Corporation was directed to consider the appellants’ application for incorporation of the subject plots in the layout plan of the colony within a period of 60 days by passing a reasoned and speaking order, uninfluenced by any observations made either by the Division Bench or in the present judgment.
Also Read: Entry in revenue records does not confer title over suit property: Tripura HC reiterates | SCC Times
[Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, SLP(Civil) No(s). 26487 of 2019, decided on 20-4-2026]
*Judgment authored by: Justice Sandeep Mehta