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Rajasthan High Court: In a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging a chain of administrative orders that resulted in his dismissal from service as a Constable in the Police Department, a Single Judge Bench of Farjand Ali, J., held that the Preliminary Enquiry could not be made the sole basis for a finding of guilt or for determining the quantum of punishment.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the order of dismissal. Further, the Court remanded the matter to the Inspector General of Police to conduct a fresh review within three months and directed the petitioner’s immediate reinstatement.
Background
In September 2008, the petitioner began his service as a Constable. Thereafter, in May 2015, he was issued a charge-sheet alleging serious misconduct during his training period in 2009-2010. It was alleged that he, along with one canteen contractor, fraudulently demanded Rs. 1,30,000 from the contractor’s son promising to secure his appointment as a Constable and an advance of Rs. 50,000 was received, deposited partly in his bank account and partly in his cousin’s account
A departmental enquiry was conducted after the petitioner’s reply was found to be unsatisfactory. Thereafter, guilt against the petitioner was established, and the Disciplinary Authority imposed a minor penalty of stopping two annual grade increments with cumulative effect.
However, in September 2017, upon the petitioner’s appeal, the Appellate Authority observed that the punishment was inadequate given the severity of the charge and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the penalty. In compliance with the same, the penalty was enhanced to stoppage of four annual grade increments with cumulative effect in November 2017.
Subsequently, the Inspector General of Police, acting as the Reviewing Authority, alleged that the Disciplinary Authority’s previous orders were non-speaking and not based on reasonable ground and in May 2018, passed the final and operative order setting aside the previous penalties and imposing the extreme punishment of dismissal from service. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner approached the High Court.
Analysis and Decision
The Court stated that while it acknowledges the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters, interference becomes necessary when the administrative action suffers from patent perversity, illegality, or gross violation of the principles governing departmental enquiries.
Considering the fundamental reliance placed upon the Preliminary Enquiry Report throughout the proceedings by the Reviewing Authority which resulted in the final penalty of dismissal, the Court stated that it constituted a primary flaw apparent on the face of the record. The Court reiterated that it is a trite proposition of service jurisprudence that the purpose of a Preliminary Enquiry is only to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists to warrant a detailed investigation or a regular departmental enquiry under Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 (‘CCA Rules’). Once the formal enquiry is initiated, the charges must be proved by the prosecution through legally admissible evidence led during the regular proceedings.
The Court further stated that the prosecution’s entire case collapsed during the regular enquiry as the key witnesses, the canteen owner and his son, unequivocally stated that the transaction was merely a loan for domestic purposes, which was subsequently repaid. They explicitly refuted the core allegation that the petitioner had coaxed them with a promise of securing employment in the police force. Therefore, relying on statements recorded during the Preliminary Enquiry, while ignoring the clear testimony and retraction provided by these prosecution witnesses in the formal inquiry, amounted to condemnation based on no legal evidence, rendering the finding of guilt unsustainable. Thus, material of preliminary enquiry could not be made the sole basis of punishment when such material did not come on record during the regular enquiry.
The Court noted that the Reviewing Authority proceeded on the flawed premise that the Disciplinary Authority’s order was a non-speaking order and lacked reasonable grounds despite the order being a detailed document of 27 pages wherein the evidence was clearly appreciated, and every material fact was considered. However, there was no merit in petitioner’s challenge to the exercise of review power by the Inspector General of Police under Rule 32 of the CCA Rules.
Further, considering the failure on the part of the Reviewing Authority to apply its mind independently to the record, the Court stated that it raised serious doubt regarding the objectivity and fairness of the process. The Court stated that “The power to review must be exercised judiciously, not capriciously or with a pre-determined goal to ensure awarding a particular punishment.” The power to review must be exercised judiciously, not capriciously or with a pre-determined goal to ensure the awarding of a particular punishment. Such an action amounted to an arbitrary exercise of discretion, threby violating Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Court viewed that while exercising review jurisdiction, the Reviewing Authority was expected to mention the factual or legal error in the order of Disciplinary Authority before taking cognizance and issuance of review notice to the employee. Further, although the conclusion of the criminal court is not binding on the disciplinary authority, the underlying factual finding, that the allegation of inducement for recruitment was unsupported by evidence and that the transaction was essentially a loan, could not be entirely disregarded, especially when the prosecution’s own witnesses contradicted the official narrative in the departmental enquiry.
The Court viewed that although the standards of proof in criminal trials and departmental enquiries differed as the former required proof beyond reasonable doubt and the latter proceeding on the preponderance of probabilities, the investigative stage in criminal law, is guided by a probability-based threshold similar to that governing departmental proceedings. The Court noted that the police had investigated the very allegations forming the basis of the departmental action and had categorically found them to be false, resulting in the submission of a negative Final Report, duly accepted by the Judicial Magistrate. The Reviewing Authority’s disregard of the evidence on record, the hostile witnesses, and the findings of the police investigation amounted to an error apparent on the face of the record, as the Reviewing Authority could not substitute his opinion contrary to the material available.
The Court viewed that considering these serious procedural and evidentiary lapses, the dismissal order, along with the appellate order that led to an erroneous remand, could not be sustained in law. The Court held that the punishment of dismissal, which gravely affected the petitioner’s right to livelihood, was wholly disproportionate given the fragile factual basis of the charge.
Thus, the Court allowed the petition in part by quashing and setting aside the orders from September 2017 and May 2018, consequently setting aside November 2017 order which enhanced the punishment on remand. Further, the Court directed that the matter be remanded to the Inspector General of Police to undertake a fresh review and pass a fresh order of punishment, if deemed appropriate within three months and stated that such reconsideration should be confined strictly to the material brought on record during the regular disciplinary proceedings and should also consider the findings of the Investigating Officer in the connected FIR.
The Court stated that “Preliminary Enquiry cannot be made the sole basis for a finding of guilt or for determining the quantum of punishment” and further directed that the petitioner to be reinstated to service immediately. The intervening period from the date of dismissal until reinstatement would be treated as duty for the limited purpose of continuity of service, while the question of back wages would depend on the outcome of the fresh penalty order, if any, passed by the Reviewing Authority.
[Shankar Ram v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 981 of 2019, decided on 4-12-2025]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner: Vivek Firoda, Jairam Saran and Nikhil Bishnoi
For the Respondent: Raj Singh Bhati and Ritu Raj Singh Bhati
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