Himachal Pradesh High Court: While deciding an appeal arising from alleged offences under the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), concerning the question whether interference was warranted with a judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court, a Single Judge Bench of Rakesh Kainthla, J., held that the acquittal did not suffer from any perversity. The Court found that the view taken by the trial court was reasonable and therefore declined to interfere with the judgment, also observing that the testimony of a chance witness must be relied upon only after exercising due care and caution.
Background
The informant and his brother, while closing their shop in the evening of 14 February 2009, were allegedly abused and assaulted by the accused persons, including their sister, using bricks, resulting in multiple injuries and a missing tooth. A daily diary entry was recorded on the same day, the injured were referred for medical examination, and an FIR was registered after receipt of medical opinion, and the accused were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323 and 325 read with Section 149 IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty.
The accused denied the allegations and tendered documents in evidence claiming that the witnesses were the informant’s relatives, and they made false statements against them because of a land dispute. The trial court held that the relationship between the parties was strained because of the land dispute and observed that there were other persons present in the shop who were not examined and that there was delay both in registering the FIR and sending it to the Magistrate. Eventually, the accused were acquitted, aggrieved by which the State preferred the present appeal.
The State asserted that the trial court discarded the statements of the prosecution witnesses without any cogent reasons despite in corroboration with the informant’s version. It was submitted that the discarded testimonies of two independent witnesses were duly corroborated by the statements of the medical officers. It was emphasised that enmity is a double-edged weapon and could not be used to discard the prosecution’s case. On the other hand, the accused’s counsel maintained that the trial court had rightly drawn an adverse inference keeping in mind that the FIR was sent belatedly to the Magistrate and stressed that the order must not be interfered with.
Analysis and Decision
The Court relied on Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433, wherein the Supreme Court laid down that:
… the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.
The Court observed that the trial court’s finding that the police should have registered the FIR on the same day and its registration on 17 February 2009 made the prosecution’s case suspect, could not be sustained. The Court noted that the dental surgeon had issued his opinion on 17 February 2009 at 11.30 a.m. stating that a fracture was detected, after which, the police registered the FIR at 4.45 p.m. The Court opined that if the police had only recorded an entry in the daily diary instead of registering the FIR, the informant could not be faulted.
The Court noted that the informant had admitted that his father had gifted 10 marla of land to one of the accused, and the informant’s sister and her family members were residing there, and the same was also corroborated by the informant’s brother. It was alleged that the accused had encroached on more than 10 biswa of the land. The informant’s medical examination revealed chronic destructive periodontitis, calculus, generalised gingival recession, and one missing tooth, whose socket was empty, but no corresponding soft tissue injury was present. The doctor opined that the teeth had been uprooted naturally, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. The medical evidence, informant’s admission and the witness’ statement also showed that the informant and the victim had consumed alcohol, and a consequent fall could also have resulted in the teeth injury.
The Court opined that the informant was desperate to secure the conviction because he alleged in his statement that the accused had bitten him which was an improvement because it was not mentioned in the FIR, and the medical officer had not noticed any bite marks. The informant’s brother had contradicted the informant’s statement regarding the assailants. Two witnesses passing by who stated to have seen the incident only named the brother-in-law of the informant but left the informant’s sister and another accused.
The Court observed that one of the eye witnesses was a chance witness whose presence was not properly explained as instead of taking bus he had opted for a walk, and reliance on such testimony required due care and caution as held in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418. The Court also referred to Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200, wherein it was observed that:
A chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. …Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed though a little more scrutiny may be required at times.
Noting many discrepancies, the Court opined that the prosecution witnesses’ statements were not credible and the trial court was right in doubting them and observed that the Court would not interfere with the trial court’s reasonable view even if another view was possible.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and directed the accused to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs 25,000 each with one surety each within 4 weeks, which would be effective for 6 months with stipulation that in the event of special leave petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the accused would appear before the Supreme Court.
[State of H.P. v. Rakesh Kumar, Cr. Appeal No. 290 of 2014, decided on 20-3-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellant: Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General.
For the Respondents: P.P. Chauhan, Advocate.
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