Telangana High Court: In a writ petition challenging the extension of Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalayas (KGBVs) bunker beds tender, the central issue was whether extension of public tender by executing supplementary agreements after expiry of the original 120-day period was permissible. A Single Judge Bench of Surepalli Nanda, J., held that supplementary agreements can extend public tenders, particularly when the delay arises from the authority’s own approval process. The Court dismissed the writ petition as devoid of merit and observed that the petitioners lacked locus standi and being non-participants in the tender, they could not challenge a concluded contract.
Background
The petitioners filed a writ petition seeking a declaration that the action of the respondent authorities in issuing a letter dated 1 December 2025 and entering into agreement with certain private respondents relating to the tender for supply, commissioning, and installation of approximately 45000 bunker beds in KGBVs was illegal and arbitrary.
The petitioners contended that the original tender required completion of supply within 120 days from the initial agreement dated 29 May 2025, but no supplies were made, and instead of retendering, a supplementary agreement dated 29 November 2025 was executed, granting an additional 120 days, which contravened the original tender conditions and deprived the petitioners of an opportunity to participate. They asserted that the reasons cited by the respondents for delay such as pending colour codes, price enquiries, and space verification, were unjustified. They further alleged favouritism and violation of the tender conditions, undermining fair competition. They also pointed out irregularities in pricing and post-agreement negotiations, contending that the supplementary agreements were contrary to the tender terms, the Central Vigilance Commission Guidelines and the General Financial Rules, that allow renegotiation only in exceptional cases where few suppliers were available.
On the other hand, Respondents 1 to 3 (official respondents) contended that the petitioners had no locus to challenge the supplementary agreements or the tender process, as they had not participated in the tender and therefore could not be aggrieved. They submitted that the petitioners were challenging only the supplementary agreements while the initial agreements and the award of tender itself were not under challenge. They also emphasised that the tender terms expressly allowed extension of time and quantity variation.
Further, Respondents 6 to 8 (private respondents) contended that there was no delay on their part, and the primary delay was caused by Respondent 2’s three-month delay in approving the colour codes and logo. They relied on Clause 25 and 26 of the tender, stating that the tendering authority had the power to extend time when delay was attributable to it. They also argued that the eligibility requirement of seven years applied to the bidder, and since Respondents 6 and 7 were authorised suppliers of Respondent 8 established in 1960, the requirement stood satisfied.
Analysis and Decision
On the first plea that supplementary agreements could not have been executed beyond the 120-day period, the Court noted that the counter affidavit of the official respondents explained that the extension was necessitated due to the enquiry conducted, reports sought from TGEWIDC, and letters regarding space and colour codes. The Court observed that the communication dated 24 May 2025 seeking approval of colour codes and the subsequent approval dated 25 November 2025 indicated a three-month delay on the part of Respondent 2 and held that there was no delay attributable to the private respondents.
The Court relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, wherein it was observed that judicial review in tender matters is limited because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract, and the Government must have freedom of contract, and opined that there was no unreasonableness, bias, mala fide or arbitrariness on the part of the official respondents. The Court also referred to Welspun Specialty Solutions Ltd. v. ONGC, (2022) 2 SCC 382, and highlighted that Clause 25 and 26 of the tender document empowered the tendering authority to extend time and levy liquidated damages, and therefore, time was not the essence of the contract.
On the second plea regarding eligibility criteria and the seven-year requirement, the Court observed that Clause 16(I) permitted a bidder or OEM to bid for tender and that in the case of the bidder being an agency or dealer, the turnover of the OEM and dealer could both be considered. The Court opined that thus the participation of multiple dealers of the same OEM was expressly permitted, and hence the private respondents’ pleas were untenable. The Court further observed that since the petitioners were not parties to the supplementary agreements and did not even challenge the initial agreements, they lacked the locus to challenge the supplementary agreements.
The Court relied on Frontline (NCR) Business Solutions (P) Ltd. v. Lalit Narayan Mithila University, 2025 SCC OnLine Pat 2991, wherein it was observed that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is primarily preventive and not curative in matters relating to tenders. It is by now trite law that once the tender process has culminated into a concluded contract, no writ would lie to annul the same, except in cases where the action of the State or its instrumentalities is shown to be vitiated by mala fides, arbitrariness, or violation of statutory or constitutional provisions.
The Court noted that the petitioner had approached the Court only after the declaration of the financial results and the contract was already executed and opined that any interference at this juncture would not only unsettle a concluded contract but also cause administrative chaos and financial loss to the public exchequer. The Court observed that since the petitioners had not participated in the tender pursuant to the tender notification, they lacked locus to challenge the tender process as only participants could make grievances regarding tender terms.
The Court also noted that the pleas of favouritism and exorbitant profits were unsupported by material. The Court further observed that the tender documents contained a clear quantity variation clause and the right to extend time and levy liquidated damages, thereby negating allegations of irregular pricing.
The Court also referred to Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818, and Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489, to emphasise that the tendering authority is the best judge of its requirements and reiterated that courts must interfere only to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or perversity.
Ultimately, the Court held that all the pleas raised by the petitioners were untenable and observed that the petitioners were not entitled to the relief prayed for and while dismissing the writ petition as devoid of merit, vacated the interim orders granted by the Court on 11 December 2025.
[Telangana Small Scale Industries Steel & Wooden Furniture Manufacturers Assn. v. State of Telangana, WRIT PETITION No.38140 OF 2025, decided on 22-1-2026]
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners: D. Prakash Reddy, Senior Designated Counsel representing M. Pranav, Counsel.
For the Respondents: T. Rajinikant Reddy, Additional Advocate General, B. Kavita Yadav, Standing Counsel, B. Chandrasen Reddy, Senior Designated Counsel representing B. Vamshidhar Reddy, Counsel.