Madras High Court: While considering a reference arising from conflicting Division Bench rulings, the threeJudge Bench of S.M. Subramaniam*, D. Bharatha Chakravarthy and C. Kumarappan, JJ., held that resignation, even on medical grounds, results in forfeiture of past service under Rule 23 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 (‘Rules of 1978’). The Court clarified that resignation cannot be equated with voluntary retirement, and medical grounds do not alter the legal consequences of resignation.
Background:
The matter arose from petitions filed by employees who had resigned from service citing medical grounds but later sought pensionary benefits. The petitioners contended that their resignation should be treated as voluntary retirement, entitling them to pension. They argued that resignation due to ill health ought to be considered differently, as the employees were compelled to leave service, and denial of pension in such cases would amount to injustice. They relied on earlier Division Bench decisions which had taken divergent views on the matter.
On the other hand, the respondents contended that Rule 23 of the Rules of 1978 clearly stipulates forfeiture of service upon resignation, and medical grounds cannot be read into the provision. They pointed out that specific provisions such as Rule 36 of the Rules of 1978 already exist to address cases of incapacity due to health, and therefore resignation cannot be reinterpreted to include medical reasons. The respondents emphasised that resignation is a unilateral act, and once tendered, it results in forfeiture of past service unless it is for the purpose of taking up another government appointment with proper permission.
Analysis and Decision:
The Court emphasised that Rule 23 of the Rules of 1978 deals with forfeiture of service on resignation, and the only exception is when resignation is tendered with proper permission to take up another government appointment. The Court noted that the Rule is silent on resignation due to ill health, and a plain and literal reading makes it clear that medical grounds are not a component of this provision. The Court observed that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, no new words or legislative meaning can be added to it.
The Court highlighted that the mischief rule cannot be applied in the present case in hand since specific provisions like Rule 36 of the Rules of 1978 already exist to deal with medical incapacity. The Court reaffirmed that unnecessary addition or subtraction of words must be avoided when the actual plain language clearly delivers the intent of the legislature and makes the provision workable.
The Court referred to Independent Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. Hindustan National Gas & Industries Ltd. (Resolution Professional), (2025) 5 SCC 209, while dealing with the Literal Rule of interpretation, wherein it was held that Courts, when confronted with clear statutory language, derive the meaning from the words used by the legislature and should avoid the assumption that the legislature, by inserting the proviso, using certain words at certain places and/or not using particular words at all, committed a mistake.
The Court further noted the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement, quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in LIC v. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479, which held that service jurisprudence, recognising the concept of “resignation” and “retirement” as different, and in the same regulations these expressions being used in different connotations, left no manner of doubt that the benefit could not be extended, especially as resignation was one of the disqualifications for seeking pensionary benefits under the Regulations.
The Court highlighted that the resignation of an employee entails forfeiture of service, and a clear distinction can be drawn between resignation and voluntary retirement, as both are disparate in terms of their operation and consequence, and therefore unlikely to hold an equivalent character. Based on the application of the literal rule of interpretation, the Court emphasised that it is clear that resignation on medical grounds cannot be touted to be different from a resignation under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1978, which in ordinary reading entails forfeiture of service, as resignation means forfeiture of past service and the Rule cannot be tampered with in the absence of any ambiguity.
The Court held that there are separate and distinct provisions available under the Pension Rules for medical grounds, and that Rule 56(3) of the Fundamental Rules deals exclusively with voluntary retirement. Hence, a new ground cannot be constructed by courts, nor can they legislate a provision.
Finally, the Court concluded that resignation under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1978 entails forfeiture of past service, even if on medical grounds, and that the grounds on which resignation is sought are immaterial, as resignation shall only mean forfeiture of past service.
[D. Kaliyamoorthy v. State of T. N., WP No. 39583 of 2015, decided on 03-02-2026]
*Judgment authored by: Justice S.M. Subramaniam
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners: S. Nagashyla
For the Respondents: K.H. Ravikumar Government Advocate