Exempted Authorities under Section 24 of the RTI Act: An in-Depth Analysis Across Jurisdictions

The Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act)¹ is a significant recognition of the citizen as the sovereign, making “public authorities” answerable to the citizens upon application in a mandated time-frame. It also requires proactive disclosure of key records and the computerisation of documents to promote transparency.

However, a select group of security and intelligence agencies are exempt from furnishing information under the RTI Act. This exclusion does not extend to allegations of corruption or human rights violations. In this article, we explore the Indian exemption framework, identify the agencies shielded from right to information (RTI) compliance, and compare India’s approach to freedom of information regimes like the Freedom of Information Act, 2002(FOIA) in the US and UK. But first, we need to examine why specific Indian agencies are excluded and what that means in practice.

Under Section 24(1)² of the RTI Act, and the Second Schedule³, certain Central Intelligence and Security Agencies are exempt from mandatory disclosure, except in cases involving allegations of corruption or human rights violations. These agencies include the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and its Technical Wing, the Aviation Research Bureau, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Enforcement Directorate (ED), the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), etc.

The rationale for exempting certain agencies under Section 24 and the Second Schedule⁴ of the RTI Act is to safeguard national security, sovereignty, intelligence operations, and law enforcement capabilities, areas where disclosure could compromise operational effectiveness or international relations.

However, these exemptions are not absolute. The first proviso of Section 24(1) of the RTI Act mandates that information pertaining to allegations of corruption or human rights violations within these bodies must be disclosed, subject to confirmation under Section 8(1)⁵ of the RTI Act, exemptions like endangering lives or affecting confidentiality. Additionally, the RTI Act’s public interest override under Section 8(2) allows even otherwise exempt information to be released if the broader public interest outweighs potential harm. This dual framework ensures that security concerns are protected while accountability for misconduct is upheld. This “corruption/human rights exception” is rooted in a Supreme Court directive, and as the Central Information Commission (CIC) has noted, the Supreme Court has held allegations of official corruption or human rights abuse cannot be shielded by secrecy. Thus, CIC decisions (e.g. Radha Raman Tiwari v. CPIO, CBI⁶) emphasise that an exemption under Section 24 of the RTI Act is not absolute when corruption or rights issues are at stake.

Rejection of RTI applications, whether on valid or questionable grounds, restricts a citizen’s access to information and justice, and must therefore be exercised with caution. In 2022-2023, public authorities received approximately 17,05,863 RTI requests, of which 67,615 were rejected under various provisions of the Act.⁷ Notably, Section 24 of the RTI Act was cited in 15.46% of these rejections to deny access to information.⁸ Courts are expected to scrutinise such cases carefully, especially to assess whether they fall within the two statutory exceptions to Section 24: allegations of corruption or human rights violations.

Although the RTI Act does not define either term, judicial interpretation has provided some guidance. In CBI v. Central Information Commission⁹, the Delhi High Court interpreted “human rights violations” by referencing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948¹⁰ and the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993¹¹, defining it to include rights related to life, liberty, equality and dignity. However, the exact scope of these exceptions, particularly for human rights violations, remains legally unsettled.¹²

In another case, Union of India v. Central Information Commission¹³ the Delhi High Court held that while the ED is generally exempt from the RTI Act under Section 24, it must disclose service-related information to its own employees when the request pertains to human rights, which broadly interpreted to include the right to promotion. The High Court ruled that denying access to such information could constitute a human rights violation. However, it restricted access to third-party promotion records, which are protected under Sections 8(1)(j) and 11¹⁴ of the RTI Act. The ED was directed to provide the employee’s own seniority and promotion-related documents.

While the Supreme Court upheld the relief granted by the Delhi High Court, it rejected the expansive reading of the human rights violation caveat in Section 24.¹⁵

The exemptions given to these 27 authorities, as provided under Schedule 2 of the RTI Act, in India are not one off. In the FOIA¹⁶ in the USA and UK, there are also authorities that are exempted from disclosing information. While there are some differences; unlike India’s listed agencies, the FOIA does not exempt named intelligence bodies by statute. Rather, the FOIA applies to all “federal agencies”¹⁷, essentially executive branch departments and independent agencies. By law, the FOIA does not cover Congress or the courts, and traditionally it has not applied to the President’s immediate office. The Congressional Research Service likewise observes “FOIA does not apply to Congress, the Federal Courts, or territorial governments.”

Rather than exempt agencies wholesale, US FOIA specifies categories of information exempt from disclosure. There are nine statutory exemptions (e.g. classified defence, personal privacy, law enforcement records) covering the complete range from national security to trade secrets. Intelligence and security agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), etc. are subject to the FOIA, however, they routinely invoke Exemption 1 (classified) or Exemption 3 (statutorily protected) to withhold data. For instance, Exemption 1 shields “national defence or foreign relations” information, which effectively covers most intelligence files. Additionally, Congress has special “exclusion” clauses:5 USC §552(c) allows agencies like the CIA and NSA to temporarily exclude certain records from the FOIA processing.¹⁸

US law does not contain explicit “anti-corruption” override like India. Instead, allegations of misconduct by an agency are treated like any other law enforcement matter. A requester can seek records of an FBI or CIA investigation under the FOIA, but the agency will apply the law enforcement exemption (7) or privacy provisions; there is no blanket duty to disclose corruption claims. Whistleblower and Inspector General channels exist outside the FOIA for many agencies. In practice, the FOIA requesters do uncover official wrongdoing (often via redacted releases), but purely legal battles hinge on exemptions rather than a statutory mandate to expose corruption.

US FOIA provides a detailed appeal and review process. After an initial denial, the requester can file an administrative appeal within the agency. Agencies must resolve appeals (90 days standard) and advise about judicial review. If the appeal is denied, the requester may sue in Federal Court; courts review the FOIA de novo, often requiring federal agencies to demonstrate justification for withholding. The FOIA Improvement Act, 2007¹⁹ created the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) as a non-judicial reviewer/ombudsman. OGIS can mediate the FOIA disputes as an alternative to litigation.²⁰

On the other hand, UK FOIA²¹ explicitly exempts the security and intelligence services. Section 23²² of the Freedom of Information Act, 2000 provides an absolute exemption for information “supplied by or relating to” listed security bodies. By statute, these “security bodies” include the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and designated law enforcement agencies. Thus, UK intelligence agencies are not subject to the FOIA in practice.

Section 24 protects national security. Any information “subject to the duty to confirm or deny” holding it can be withheld if its disclosure would damage national security. Unlike the RTI Act’s agency carve-outs, Section 24²³ is content-based i.e. it may cover any public authority’s records, not just security service data, whenever national defence/foreign relations are at stake. Crucially, Section 24 does allow a public interest test. In contrast, Section 23 is absolute. Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) guidance notes that when an FOIA request touches on Section 23 bodies, only Section 23 or Section 24 can be cited — they cannot both apply to the same piece of information.

There is no specific UK “corruption exception” either. However, since Section 24 is qualified, a public interest argument can be made to release national security-related information (for example, if it reveals illegal government acts). Indeed, courts have emphasised transparency as a general principle, but any decision must balance this against harm. No leading UK case compels disclosure of wrongdoing under Section 24 specifically, but requesters often invoke the public interest in exposing malfeasance. In practice, Section 23 provides no public interest override: information “relating to” the security services is absolutely exempt, regardless of context.

However, there is a concern that Section 24 list seems more exhaustive than could be considered reasonable. In the consideration of the RTI Bill in 2004, the Member of Parliament states that the intended exemptions under Section 24 cover “security and intelligence organisations”.²⁴ Certain authorities, such as the ED and the CBI exercise significant investigative powers that directly impact the lives, reputations, and liberties of individuals in India, and are not squarely intelligence or security organisations — but law enforcement organisations. While the ED was always a part of the Section-Schedule list in the RTI Act, CBI was added to the list by Notification in 2011, without any reasoning provide for such an inclusion.²⁵

In a democracy that values transparency and accountability, it is essential that there exists a statutory mechanism through which citizens can seek limited but meaningful scrutiny of their functioning, particularly in instances of alleged procedural lapses, arbitrary action, or botched investigations. While the need to protect sensitive information is undeniable, a stringent exemption undermines public trust and weakens institutional accountability. A calibrated framework, one that balances national security concerns with the citizen’s right to information, would better serve the constitutional principles of transparency, fairness and due process.