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Mitakshara Law| Daughter can claim right in father’s property only if he died before 1956 and has no sons: Chhattisgarh HC

Daughter's right in father's property

Disclaimer: This has been reported after the availability of the order of the Court and not on media reports so as to give an accurate report to our readers.

Chhattisgarh High Court: In a second appeal filed against the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the Civil Court’s decision wherein the appellant was denied a share in her late father’s property, the Single Judge Bench of Narendra Kumar Vyas, J., dismissed the appeal, holding that the parties were governed by the Hindu Mitakshara Law as the appellant’s father died before 1956. Hence, on his death, his self-acquired property would devolve entirely upon defendant 1’s father, who had rightly conveyed his rights over the suit property to the defendants.

Background

The appellant and father of defendant 1 were real siblings. The appellant claimed that the lands situated at Village Putputara were recorded in the name of her father and his brother (“suit property”), and they were jointly cultivating the land. She further claimed that after her father’s death, her brother, i.e., the father of defendant 1, in 2002, moved an application before the Nayab Tahsildar, Ambikapur, for partition of the property in favour of his daughter, defendant 1. Aggrieved, the appellant objected to the partition and sought mutation of her name in the records.

Furthermore, the appellant contended that the father of defendant 1 admitted that she was his sister, but she had no right to claim a share of the suit property after her marriage. The Tahsildar rejected the appellant’s mutation application. Thus, she filed a civil suit in 2005 for a declaration of title and partition of the suit land.

Defendant 1 denied the allegations, contending that a patta of the land, 6.85 acres, was received by the appellant’s father and his brother during the Sarguja Survey Settlement. It was also contended that the appellant had never possessed any part of the suit land, and after her father’s death, she did not have any title or right over the suit land, as her name was not recorded in the revenue records. Defendant 1 further claimed that his father inherited the suit property in succession as his grandfather died in 1950-51 and thereafter retained its possession. Lastly, defendant 1 contended that since his grandfather died in 1950-51, the parties were governed by succession provisions under the old Hindu Law.

The Civil Court dismissed the suit vide the impugned judgment, holding that since the appellant’s father died in 1950-51 before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘HSA 1956’), it would not apply to the appellant’s claim for the grant of a share in the suit property. Thus, the appellant was not entitled to inherit the property of her father.

Aggrieved, the appellant preferred a first Appeal before the Appellate Court, which rejected the appeal filed by the appellant. Hence, the present appeal.

Issues

  1. Whether the finding recorded by the Civil and Appellate Court that the appellant was entitled to the inherent ancestral property by ignoring the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 2005 (“HSA 2005”) was justified?

  2. Was the finding recorded by both the Courts below that the parties were not governed by HSA 1956 justified?

  3. Was the appellant entitled to inherit the suit property by way of succession if the partition had happened before 1956?

Analysis of Daughter’s right in father’s property under Mitakshara Law

At the outset, the Court stated that for the appellant to claim that she was entitled to inherit the suit property as per Section 6 of HSA 2005, she must first prove that the parties were governed by HSA 1956. In this regard, the Court stated that from the bare perusal of the pleadings, it was clear that the appellant had not pleaded the year when her father passed away to establish that partition was open to get benefits of HSA 1956 whereas defendant 1 specifically pleaded that the appellant’s father expired in 1950-51, thus his father was entitled to inherit the entire suit property. The appellant, despite a specific averment made by Defendant 1 to exclude the applicability of HSA 1956, did not amend her pleadings or rebut the claim.

The Court noted that though the appellant stated in her examination in chief that the parties were governed by HSA 1956, she did not lead any evidence to demonstrate the same. In 2008, the appellant’s witness admitted in the cross-examination that the appellant’s father had passed away 60 years ago, and at that time, he was 10 years old. He also admitted that he knew the appellant, who was 10-12 years older than him.

The Court further noted that defendant 1’s mother stated that at the time of the death of appellant’s father, the married daughter had no right over the property owned by the father. She also admitted that they followed the Hindu religion, but she was unaware whether the daughter was entitled to claim any right over the property owned by her father.

Noting the aforesaid, the Court remarked that undisputedly the appellant’s father passed away in 1950-51, much before the enactment of HSA 1956, thus the succession was under the Old Hindu Law and the parties would be governed by Mitakshara Law. In this regard, the Court placed reliance on Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur, (2020) 14 SCC 436.

Thus, the Court held that the Civil and Appellate Court recorded the correct finding that the appellant’s father passed away in 1950-51, before the enactment of HSA 1956; thus, it was not applicable.

Regarding the applicability of Mitakshara law, the Court referred to Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 (‘HLIA’) and remarked that a conjoint reading of Sections 1 and 2 with Section 3(b) and (c) of the HLIA made it evident that the statute intended only to rank certain heirs in the order of succession immediately after the father’s father, and not to limit any superior rights of other heirs. Section 2 also presupposes an existing line of descendants, and a father’s father and a father’s brother were already ranked in that line. Furthermore, it contained nothing regarding a daughter’s rights or about conferring on her the same status as a son. In this regard, the Court placed reliance on Arunachala Gounder v. Ponnusamy, (2022) 11 SCC 520.

Thus, the Court held that evidently, the purpose of the HLIA was not to modify the fundamental concepts of Shastric Hindu Law on inheritance. The only difference was that it recognized the chance of inheritance of a son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, sister, etc., in a different capacity from that which prevailed earlier.

Regarding the issue of how the property of a person governed by the Mitakshara Law of Inheritance would devolve before the commencement of HSA 1956, the Court reiterated that under Mitakshara Law, the daughter was not entitled to inherit her father’s property before the enactment of HSA 1956. Under the Mitakshara law, even the self-acquired property of a male devolves exclusively upon his male heir, and only in the absence of such male heir does it pass to other heirs.

Referring to Arunachala Gounder (supra) and Ghurpatari v. Sampati, 1975 SCC OnLine All 367, the Court stated that it was clear that Mitakshara Law of Inheritance applied to a person who died before 1956; thus, the wife or daughter of a Hindu male would inherit his property only if he died without a male child.

Thus, the Court held that when a Hindu governed by Mitakshara Law dies before 1956, his separate property would completely devolve upon his son; a female child could claim a right in such property only in the absence of a male child. The HLIA did not affect the son’s absolute right to inherit his father’s property; it merely enlarged the circle of heirs who could succeed in default of a male heir by introducing certain female heirs and the sister’s son.

Decision

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that, admittedly, the parties were governed by Hindu Mitakshara Law as the appellant’s father died before 1956. Hence, on his death, his self-acquired property would devolve entirely upon defendant 1’s father, who had rightly conveyed his rights over the suit property to the defendants. Thus, there was no illegality in mutating the suit property in the name of the defendants 1 and 2.

[Ragmania v. Jagmet, 2025 SCC OnLine Chh 10013, decided on 13-10-2025]


Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the appellant: Advocate Rahul Kumar Mishra

For the respondents: Advocate Divyanand Patel and Panel Lawyer Tarkeshwar Nande

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