Supreme Court: While considering a criminal appeal challenging the setting aside of the Respondents’ convictions under Sections 376(2) of Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 4 & 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 by Patna High Court, the Division Bench of Sanjay Kumar and Satish Chandra Sharma*, JJ., set aside the High Court’s decision and restored the Respondents’ conviction and sentence as given by the Trial Court, while pointing out that, in the present case, a fairly consistent and creditworthy case of the prosecution was discarded on basis of misapplication of procedure. The Court further pointed out that the victims often find themselves in conflict with the procedural intricacies of the laws in place. Despite the importance of procedural sanctity, it is always a matter of utter failure for the system when a culprit, that too of a heinous sexual offence, manages to walk free by entangling the victim in misapplication of procedural rules, without the knowledge of the victim and without any control of the victim.
“Procedure is not supposed to control justice”.
The Court further shed light on the misunderstanding of the principle of beyond reasonable doubt, stating that underlying foundation of the principle is that no innocent should face punishment for a crime that he has not done; however, a flipside of the same is that at times, owing to a misapplication of this principle, actual culprits manage to find their way out of the clutches of law.
“Every instance of acquittal of an actual culprit revolt against the sense of security of the society and acts as a blot on the criminal justice system”.
Background and Legal Trajectory:
In 2016, a few months after Holi, the victim, the appellant’s daughter, started feeling unwell. The victim was to a Zila Mahila Chikitsalaya in her native place in Ballia, Uttar Pradesh for treatment on 1-7-2016. Therein it was discovered that to be 3 months pregnant. Upon questioning, she disclosed that she was raped by the respondents about 3-4 months ago sometime after Holi. Thereafter, the appellant lodged a complaint at PS Piro, District Bhojpur, Bihar on 02-07-2016, which culminated into FIR and Investigation commenced and chargesheet was filed in the Court concerned.
Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhojpur at Ara found the Respondents 1 and 2 guilty for the commission of offences under Sections 376(2) of Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 4 & 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. For the commission of the offence under Section 376 IPC, the Respondents 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 50,000 each. For the commission of the offence under Section 6 of POCSO Act, the Respondents 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 25,000 each. For the commission of the offence under Section 4 of POCSO Act, the Respondents 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 7 years along with a fine of Rs. 10,000 each. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.
The High Court upon examination of the evidence however concluded that the prosecution did not succeed in proving the case against the Respondents 1 and 2. The High Court emphasized that in addition to the procedural infirmities that resulted from the non-compliance of Section 223 CrPC, there were major inconsistencies in the deposition of prosecution witnesses. However, the High Court however clarified that the conviction was not set aside solely due to procedural lapses.
Aggrieved by Patna High Court’ decision, the appellant knocked the doors of the Supreme Court. Counsel for the appellant argued that the ground regarding non-compliance of Section 223 CrPC was never taken by the Respondents 1 and 2 and the High Court examined the same on its own. The appellant further contended that all the requisite medical evidence were duly proved, and the Respondents were given sufficient opportunity to participate and defend themselves during the trial.
Per contra, the Respondents contended that the investigation was carried out in a completely casual and negligent manner and the same caused prejudice to Respondents 1 and 2. It was further submitted that the Trial Court conducted a joint trial of the Respondents 1 and 2 in utter violation of Section 223 CrPC and without fulfilment of the conditions contemplated thereunder.
Court’s Assessment:
Perusing the matter, the Court had to consider that whether the High Court committed a grave error in acquitting the Respondents and whether the High Court erred in its finding that the trial was carried out in violation of Section 223 CrPC and non-adherence to the same had caused prejudice to Respondents 1 and 2.
The Court began its assessment by scrutinising the prosecution evidence and the discrepancies pointed out by the High Court. The Court noted that statement of the victim recorded by the police, statement recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC and the deposition recorded in the Court, were fairly consistent. There appeared to be no variance insofar as the material aspects of the offence.
On the question of the victim’s age at the time of the incident, the Court noted that there were slight variations in the age of the victim at the relevant point of time, as discernible from the oral and documentary evidence. However, the Court pointed out that age of the victim appeared to be within the range of 12-13 years at the relevant point of time. Furthermore, age of the victim was not challenged during cross-examination of the relevant witnesses, and their testimonies largely remained unrebutted, thereby meaning that Respondents 1 and 2 had no claim that she was not a minor at the relevant point. “Thus, it could not be stated that the Trial Court had not determined the minority of the victim. It was done and, in our opinion, rightly so, on the basis of the unrebutted oral and documentary evidence”. The Court further pointed out that the Respondents did not raise any doubts over the minority of the victim or led any evidence. The Court thus found that the High Court erred in raising a doubt where none existed, even inter-se the parties to the case. The Court opined that once the minority of the victim was beyond doubt, the special protection of POCSO Act ought not to have been diluted by raising a fictious doubt regarding the precise age of the victim.
“In rural regions, discrepancies in the educational and identification documents are not unknown and, in such circumstances, the Courts must be sensitive to the ground realities of the society, so as to ensure that the intent of the law is not suppressed and protections created by the legislature reach the intended persons in their right spirit”.
On the doubts related to date and time of the incident, the Court pointed out that the medical report corroborated the time frame stated by the victim. The Court further observed that victim was scared to report the incident to anyone as she was threatened by the Respondents 1 and 2 and probably, if not for the pregnancy and deterioration of health, she would not have reported either. Therefore, the inability of the victim, a minor girl, to recollect the precise time and date of the offence was completely natural. The Court further found that the High Court fell in a grave error by failing to acknowledge the evidence on record vis-a-vis proof of pregnancy and abortion.
Analysing the impugned judgment, the Court found that the High Court gave undue emphasis on the afore-stated aspects. The Court said that a foremost principle of appreciation of evidence is that natural variations, errors and inconsistencies are not to be elevated to the standard of a reasonable doubt or to hold that the prosecution has failed. There is nothing like perfect evidence in a Court and in fact, perfection is often suggestive of tutoring and manufacturing of evidence. The availability of evidence as well as the quality of evidence are not open to judgment on any pre-determined parameters. Therefore, the Courts must be alive to the state of affairs on the ground and in that backdrop, it must examine whether the inconsistencies and gaps have been properly explained or not. The Court thus found that in the present case, there has been no inconsistency as the prosecution witnesses have invariably deposed in support of the version put across by the victim.
The Court however agreed on the aspect that that better investigation could have been conducted in the present matter on certain aspects. For instance, the accused persons ought to have been tested for DNA analysis as it could have enabled more fool-proofing of the prosecution’s case. However, in the present case, the victim has correctly named and identified both the Respondents right from the beginning of the case till the further levels of proceedings. Therefore, merely on account of non-availability of DNA analysis, the case of the prosecution cannot be discarded, especially because the purpose of identification has been fulfilled on the strength of other credible evidence.
The Court further added that mere discovery of an error, irregularity or omission in the framing of charge does not ipso facto render the decision of the Court as invalid. In fact, even a case of non-framing of charge is not liable to be discarded on that ground alone. However, the Court deemed it fit to call upon the Trial Courts to be vigilant and cautious in framing of charges. The prosecutors representing the State are also duty bound to render suitable assistance during the trial and to remain vigilant in identifying the errors in statement of charges. The Court further emphasised that the, “Trial Court does the job of raising the building from the scratch, brick by brick. In the performance of this onerous task, some mistakes are quite natural”. While finding defects, the Appellate Court must carefully weigh the mistakes and analyse their consequence on the outcome of the trial. “We may suffice to observe that not every mistake is fatal”.
On the issue of non-compliance of Section 223 CrPC as was observed out by the High Court, the Court noted that Section 223 lays down various conditions wherein different persons who have committed different offences could be charged and tried jointly. It provides that the persons alleged of committing different offences, but as a part of the same transaction, could be charged and tried jointly. There is no definition of “same transaction” in the CrPC, and this determination is contingent upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Perusing the victim’s statement, the Court pointed out that that the allegations pertained to two specific instances of rape along with a general allegation that for 2-3 months, the Respondents 1 and 2 continued to rape her. The nature of acts committed by the Respondents and subsequent intimidation to keep the victim silent were of a similar design. Further, there was a certain proximity of time and place as the incidents were committed within a continuous time frame and at different places in the same village. However, it was also admitted that they never committed the acts together and always acted separately. The Court further pointed out that legal position on Section 223 CrPC could not be termed as res integra. The Court stated that when a ground of nonjoinder or misjoinder of charges/trial is taken before an Appellate Court, the test to be applied is whether such non-joinder or misjoinder has resulted into a failure or miscarriage of justice and has prejudiced the accused. It is not enough for the Appellate Court to merely hold that the Trial Court ought to have tried certain persons jointly or separately in the facts and circumstances of the case. That is where Patna High Court clearly fell in error in the present case as per the Supreme Court. It was thus opined that the joint trial of the Respondents did not cause any prejudice to them and no case for failure of justice, on account of the said irregularity, appeared to be made out.
[X v. Y, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1878, decided on 1-9-2025]
*Judgment by Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For Petitioner(s): Mr. Daksha Kumar, Adv. Ms. Tanishq Mehta, Adv. Mr. Aftab Ali Khan, AOR Mr. Deepak Kumar, Adv. Ms. Ankita Baluni, Adv. Ms. Sonakshi Monga, Adv.
For Respondent(s): Mr. Talib Mustafa, Adv. Ms. Raksha Agrawal, Adv. Mr. Lzafeer Ahmad B.F., AOR Mr. Manish Kumar, AOR Mr. Divyansh Mishra, Adv. Mr. Kumar Saurav, Adv.
Buy Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 HERE
Buy Penal Code, 1860 HERE
