Telangana High Court: In a batch of appeals filed against an ad interim ex parte injunction order passed against The News Minute (‘TNM’) and others, restraining them from publishing content about Megha Engineering and Infrastructures Ltd. (‘MEIL’), the Division Bench of T. Vinod Kumar* and P. Shree Sudha, JJ., allowed the appeals, holding that the impugned order amounted to a gag order which was passed without adhering to the established legal principles.
Background of the MEIL Defamation Case
A defamation suit for damages was filed by MEIL against the appellants herein, including Spunklane Media Pvt. Ltd./ TNM , for their publications made in 2022. MEIL also filed a mandatory injunction application to restrain the appellants or their representatives, employees, agents, or anyone acting on their behalf from publishing, circulating, spreading, or otherwise communicating such content to the public which contained libellous, slanderous and defamatory content against Megha Engineering and its management.
The said defamatory publications alleged MEIL’s involvement in financial misconduct and political dealings. In one of the news reports, the appellants stated that MEIL funded the marriage of a senior IAS officer’s daughter. Furthermore, in another publication, the e-magazine of DISHA published that MEIL expanded its business nationally by providing election funds amounting to Rupees 27 crores to Bharatiya Janta Party, alleging a ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement.
The Trial Court, vide the impugned order, granted ad-interim ex parte injunction in favour of MEIL. Aggrieved, the appellants filed the present appeals.
TNM contended that the impugned order was a ‘gag’ order, which violated Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. They further contend that the impugned order violated principles of natural justice, particularly the principle of ‘audi alterm partem’ as the said order was passed without giving an opportunity for hearing to the appellants.
Analysis
At the outset, the Court stated that as per Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’), any Court while granting ad-interim ex parte injunction order without issuing notice to the opposite party shall record reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. Any person being aggrieved by such an order cannot approach the appellate or revisional Court straight away and is required to avail the remedies provided under Order 39 itself.
Stating this, the Court noted that in the instant case, the appellants preferred the present appeals without availing the alternative remedy provided under Order 39 of the CPC. However, the Court opined that the present appeals were liable to be allowed since the impugned order was contrary to Order 39 Rule 3 Proviso and Rule 31 of the CPC.
The Court stated that the impugned order was passed without specifying any period within which the appellants were required to take steps to get the same vacated. Therefore, the said order also took away the right of the appellants to file counter, which the Court is required to consider within 30 days from the date of granting an initial injunction under Order 39 Rule 3-A of the CPC.
Considering the ad-interim ex-parte injunction passed in the present case, the Court stated that it was not only unreasoned but also did not specify the period during which it would be in force before the appellants appeared in the matter. Thus, the passing of the said order was contrary to the mandate under the CPC and impermissible. In this regard, the Court referred to Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das (1994) 4 SCC 225, which laid down the salient principles that every Court must follow before granting ex parte ad interim injunction.
The Court held that the nature of the impugned order amounted to a gag order since it scuttles the throat of the press, i.e., the appellants. A gag order refers to judicial or executive action that prohibits individuals from expressing or making any public statements. The Court remarked that while gag orders were recognised as a tool to maintain the integrity of legal proceedings, their application should be scrutinized. The Courts must ensure that ‘gag’ orders are necessary, proportionate, and do not infringe upon constitutional rights, particularly the fundamental right to free speech. Any restriction on the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) must strictly conform to the grounds enumerated in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. In this regard, the Court referred to Mohd. Zubair v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 16 SCC 764, wherein it was held that Gag orders have a chilling effect on the freedom of speech.
Referring to S. Basavaraj v. Bar Council of India, 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 104, the Court reiterated that gag orders or orders of restraint or injunction should be passed only when necessary to prevent a substantial risk to the fairness of a trial. In the absence of any such substantial risk, the Court cannot pass any restraint or gag order. The Court also referred to Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media (P) Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1115, wherein it was held that it is not the duty of the court to tell the media: delete this, take that down.
The Court further reiterated that the words ‘freedom of speech and expression’ must be broadly construed to include the freedom to circulate one’s views by word of mouth, in writing, or through audio-visual instrumentalities. Therefore, it includes the right to propagate one’s views through the print media or any other communication channel. It is obvious that subject to reasonable restrictions placed under Article 19(2), a citizen has a right to publish, circulate, and disseminate his views, and any attempt to thwart or deny the same would offend Article 19(1)(a).
Upon examination of the allegedly defamatory publications, the Court stated that it was evident that MEIL filed the suit for damages about the alleged defamatory content nearly a year after the initial publication. Furthermore, it opted to file a suit for recovery of damages for defamation, rather than a suit for defamation, which specifically addresses the defamation. Furthermore, the Court noted that MEIL deliberately suppressed the fact that it filed another suit seeking similar reliefs against similar publications, and the said suit was pending adjudication.
Thus, the Court held that this act of suppression by MEIL amounted to a clear abuse of the process of law, and since the ad-interim injunction was granted without adhering to the established legal principles, the Court further held that the impugned order could not be sustained.
Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.
[Gajjala Narasimha Reddy v. Megha Engineering and Infrastructures Ltd., C.M.A. Nos. 22, 45 and 51 of 2023, decided on 28-05-2025]
*Judgment authored by: Justice T. Vinod Kumar
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For the appellants: T Rajinikanth Reddy, Sai Sanjay Suraneni, and A Chandra Shaker
For the respondent: V Seetharama Avadhani and Senior Counsel K.V. Bhanu
Buy Constitution of India HERE
