Supreme Court: In an appeal filed by anti-trafficking activists challenging a cryptic order passed by the Allahabad High Court, which had refused to quash the criminal case against them for offences under Sections 186 and 353 of the Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’), the division bench of PS Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi*, JJ., quashed the criminal charges. The Court held that the uncontroverted allegations in the chargesheet did not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC.
Regarding Section 186 IPC, the Court emphasized that for an offence to be made out under this section, obstruction must be accompanied by the requisite mens rea, meaning the intention to prevent a public servant from discharging his official duties. The Court found that the appellants’ actions were not intended to impede the interrogation but to ensure that it was conducted in a more effective and secure environment. This factual context negated the existence of the mens rea, or intention, to obstruct official duty, leading the Court to quash the charges.
Background
Guria, a well-known organisation combating human trafficking and the commercial sexual exploitation of girls and children in Uttar Pradesh, earned national and international acclaim for its efforts. However, its members, the appellants, were accused of overzealousness during a raid to rescue bonded labourers and minor children from a brick kiln in Varanasi, leading to them being branded as criminals.
The incident began when the first appellant, a Project Coordinator at Guria, filed a complaint with the District Magistrate, Varanasi, alleging bonded and child labour at a brick kiln. Following this, a team, including the appellants, was sent to inspect the site. The appellants claimed to have found children and labourers, who were brought to the police station, but were reportedly taken away by the kiln owner.
In contrast, the informant’s complaint stated that no children were found at the site and accused the appellants of forcibly removing the labourers in dumpers, obstructing the discharge of official duties by not allowing the joint team to record statements. As a result, an FIR was filed under Sections 186, 353, and 363 IPC, though the charge under Section 363 was later dropped after a statement from a labourer. The Magistrate took cognizance of the charge sheet, which was challenged in the High Court. The High Court, however, refused to quash the charge sheet, leading to the present appeal.
Analysis and Decision
The Court said that the High Court had failed to consider either the facts of the case or the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants. In a perfunctory manner, it had merely noted that the issues involved disputed questions of fact, which could not be adjudicated under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’). It also observed that the appellants had the right to seek discharge before the Trial Court. However, before arriving at such a finding, it was incumbent upon the High Court to ascertain whether the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR or chargesheet constituted an offence, or whether the continuation of the proceedings was legally barred, wholly vexatious, or amounted to an abuse of the process of law.
The Court stated that the summoning of an accused was a serious matter, as it directly affected the liberty and dignity of the individual concerned. Judicial intervention under Section 482 of the CrPC to eliminate vexatious proceedings was of pivotal importance to protect individuals from unwarranted harassment and misery, and to ensure that unmerited prosecutions did not overcrowd the already burdened criminal courts, thereby allowing space for deserving cases. The Court emphasised that, when faced with the agony of a baseless prosecution, it offered little consolation to a litigant to be told that inherent powers could not be exercised merely because he had the option to approach the Trial Court for discharge. It further reiterated that the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of court were much broader in scope than the power of discharge and could not be curtailed simply based on the existence of such an alternative remedy.
The Court noted that the High Court had completely failed to advert to the facts of the case and had mechanically recorded a finding that the matter did not warrant intervention at the preliminary stage. In view of this omission, the Court stated that it had undertaken the exercise itself.
The moot issue, it observed, was whether the uncontroverted allegations as narrated in the chargesheet disclosed the ingredients of offences under Sections 186 and 353 of the IPC.
The Court further outlined the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 186 IPC as follows:
(i) Obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of public functions;
(ii) Such obstruction must be done voluntarily and with the intention to prevent the discharge of official duties.
Regarding Section 353 IPC, the Court highlighted that the following ingredients were required to attract the offence:
(i) Use of assault or criminal force on a public servant during the execution of his duty; and
(ii) Such act must be committed with the intention:
(a) to prevent or deter the discharge of such duty; or
(b) as a consequence of anything done or attempted to be done in the lawful discharge of duty.
The Court also noted that the terms “force” and “criminal force” were defined under Sections 349 and 350 IPC, respectively, while “assault” was defined under Section 351 of the Code.
The Court explained that criminal force was defined as the use of force by a person to commit an offence, or as an act done with the intention that such force would cause, or be likely to cause, injury, fear, or annoyance to another person. It further clarified that assault involved any gesture or preparation made with the intention of causing apprehension in another person regarding the use of criminal force. The Court emphasized that the use of criminal force or assault on a public servant was an essential element for the offence under Section 353 IPC to be attracted.
Coming to the facts of the case, the Court noted that the uncontroverted allegations in the chargesheet did not disclose the use of force or any threatening gestures that could give rise to an apprehension of the use of force against a public servant. The physical relocation of the labourers did not amount to the use of force, let alone criminal force, on a public servant.
In view of this, the Court concluded that the uncontroverted allegations in the chargesheet did not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC.
Turning to Section 186 IPC, it was argued that the appellants had obstructed the discharge of official duties by not allowing the statements of the bonded labourers and children to be recorded at the site before removing them. However, the Court emphasised that obstruction under Section 186 must be accompanied by the requisite mens rea, namely, the intention to prevent the public servant from discharging his official duties.
The Court noted that the statements of the labourers unequivocally indicated that no force had been used to remove them, and that they were promptly released thereafter. These statements did not reflect any intention on the part of the appellants to impede the discharge of official duties. Rather, it appeared that there had been a genuine difference of opinion between the appellants and the concerned officials. The members of the social organization were under the impression that the interrogation of the bonded labourers and children should be conducted at a neutral location, i.e., the police station, whereas the officers had preferred to record the statements at the site.
The Court acknowledged that the manner and mode of interrogation was to be determined by the labour officers. However, it found that the appellants’ actions were not aimed at impeding the interrogation, but rather at ensuring it was conducted in a more effective and secure environment. This factual context negated the existence of mens rea, i.e., the intention to obstruct official duty.
When the profile of the allegations emerging from the facts renders the existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently improbable, the Court held that such prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of law and is liable to be quashed.
The Court observed that the malicious animus of the labour officials toward the appellants was evident from the reports annexed to the counter affidavit. A report submitted by the Additional Labour Commissioner of Uttar Pradesh to the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights regarding the incident, contained allegations that the appellants had offered bribes to the labourers to induce them to make false statements. The Court noted that such insinuations were wholly unfounded and not supported by any of the statements recorded during the investigation.
This hostile stance adopted by the department, the Court held, further reinforced the conclusion that the registration of the criminal case was driven by malice and personal vendetta against the appellants.
Furthermore, the Court added that even if the ingredients under Section 186 IPC were assumed to be disclosed, the prosecution under that provision, simpliciter, was fraught with several insurmountable legal hurdles, as:
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Firstly, Section 186 IPC is a non-cognizable offence, and in the absence of the ingredients of a cognizable offence under Section 353 IPC being disclosed in the FIR, prior permission from the Magistrate, as required under Section 155(2) of the CrPC., was necessary for the registration of the FIR. Since no such permission was obtained, the Court held that the registration of the FIR and the subsequent investigation were legally flawed.
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Secondly, cognizance of the offence under Section 186 IPC had been taken on a police report, in breach of Section 195 of the CrPC. Section 195, inter alia, stipulates that no court shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 186 except upon a complaint in writing from the aggrieved public servant or their superior. In light of this legal bar, the Court concluded that the cognizance taken of the offence under Section 186 on a police report or charge sheet was impermissible in law.
The Court further noted that it was argued that since the FIR had been registered for both cognizable (Section 353 IPC) and non-cognizable offences (Section 186), even if the charge under Section 353 IPC were quashed, the police report under Section 186 could still be treated as a ‘complaint’ in view of the Explanation to Section 2(d) of the CrPC.
However, the Court clarified that this legal fiction does not remove the legal embargo under Section 195 of the CrPC, as the provision mandates that the complaint must be made by the aggrieved public servant or their superior, and not by the police officer.
For the reasons outlined, the Court quashed the impugned prosecution and allowed the appeal.
CASE DETAILS
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