Discharge of serviceman or denial of disability pension based on unreasoned medical board report would be unsustainable in law: Supreme Court

Supreme Court: In an appeal filed by an Army sepoy against the Judgment passed by Armed Forces Tribunal, wherein the claim of the appellant for grant of disabilities pension was denied, the division bench of Abhay S. Oka and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh*, JJ. held that if any action was taken by the authority to discharge a serviceman or deny him a disability pension based on a report from the Medical Board that failed to disclose reasons for the opinion provided, such an action by the authority would be unsustainable in law.

Background

The appellant was enrolled in the Indian Army on 17-11-1988 as a sepoy. After serving for more than nine years, he was discharged on medical grounds due to being diagnosed with Schizophrenia. His discharge was based on the opinion of the Invalidating Medical Board, which convened at the Command Hospital. The board determined that the onset of the disease had occurred in August 1993, while the appellant was stationed at a peace station. The board further concluded that the disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service and was constitutional in nature, unrelated to his service. The disability was assessed at 30 percent for two years. Consequently, the appellant’s claim for a disability pension was rejected by the Principal Controller of Defence Accounts (Pension), Allahabad, through a letter dated 4-01-1999, which was communicated to him by the AMC Records on 15-01-1999.

The appellant challenged the rejection before the first appellate committee, but the appeal was dismissed. He then sought to address his grievances through a Member of Parliament, but the Ministry of Defence informed him that the matter had already been considered, and his appeal had been previously rejected by the competent authority. He was also notified that he had not filed a second appeal after his initial one was dismissed. Dissatisfied with the rejection, the appellant approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, though his claim was dismissed along with the claims of other applicants seeking similar reliefs.

Before the Armed Forces Tribunal, the appellant argued that he had been declared medically fit at the time of his enrolment and that no adverse conditions were noted. He contended that the disease had developed during his service, was unrelated to his family conditions, and therefore, he was entitled to a disability pension. However, the Tribunal rejected the claim of the appellant. Thus, aggrieved, he filed the present appeal.

Analysis and Decision

Taking note of its previous decisions in Union of India v. Keshar Singh (2007) 12 SCC 675; Union of India v. Surinder Singh Rathore (2008) 5 SCC 747; Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. A.V. Damodaran (2009) 9 SCC 140; Union of India v. Jujhar Singh (2011) 7 SCC 735; and Union of India v. Talwinder Singh (2012) 5 SCC 480, wherein the Court had examined Regulation 173 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, the Court noted that this regulation dealt with the primary conditions for the grant of a disability pension, which provided that such a pension would be granted if the disability was attributable to or aggravated by military service. The Court emphasized that the determination of whether the disability was attributable to or aggravated by military service was to be made according to Appendix II of the said Regulations.

Thus, the Court stated that Regulation 173, read with Appendix II, clearly indicated that for the grant of a disability pension, the disability must be attributable to or aggravated by military service. The definition of what constitutes a disability had been elaborated in Appendix II of the Regulations. The Appendix clarified that there must be a causal connection between the disablement or death and military service for attributability to be considered. The benefit of any reasonable doubt would be given to the claimant, with this benefit being applied more liberally in cases involving field service. Additionally, how a disability could be attributed to military service was further explained in Regulation 423 of the Regulations for Medical Services for Armed Forces, 1983.

Having kept the aforesaid aspects in mind, the Court examined the records, particularly the original records of the Medical Board Proceedings that were produced before it, and noted that under Regulation 423(a), it was mentioned that for the purpose of determining whether the cause of disability was attributable to service, it was immaterial whether the cause giving rise to the disability occurred in an area declared to be a field service/active service area or under normal peace conditions.

The Court observed that the appellant had not been suffering from Schizophrenia when he entered service. Therefore, it was deemed that the disease had arisen while in service, as provided under Regulation 423(e). In fact, the absence of any findings indicating that the appellant had been suffering from the disease prior to entering service was confirmed by the Form regarding his past medical history. Further, the Medical Board had not considered the medical history of the appellant before coming to the conclusion that the disease the appellant was suffering from is constitutional and did not arise during service.

Upon perusal of the aforesaid entries made in the Form, the Court highlighted that no reasons had been assigned at all regarding the nature of the disability on which the Medical Board’s opinion was based, specifically that the appellant was suffering from constitutional personality disorder. It had been explicitly mentioned in the form that the Medical Board should fully state the reasons for its opinion regarding disability.

The Court opined that the requirement for the Medical Board to provide reasons was crucial, critical, decisive, and necessary for the purpose of granting or denying a disability pension. It was not merely a formality, but an essential piece of material on which the pension sanctioning authority was required to base its decision regarding the grant or refusal of the disability pension.

The Court emphasised that, as specifically provided under Clause (d) of Regulation 423, the question of whether the disability was attributable to or aggravated by service would be decided in terms of its medical aspects by the Medical Board. The Medical Board was required to specify the reasons for its opinion, and the question of whether the cause and attendant circumstances could be attributed to service would be decided by the pension sanctioning authority. The reason for this was that the future career of the serviceman would be determined by the opinion of the Medical Board, which was to be treated as final regarding the cause of disability and the circumstances in which the disability originated.

Hence, the Court stated that the rules mandated the giving of reasons by the Medical Board when rendering its opinion. The reasons provided by the Medical Board would obviously serve as the basis for the competent authority’s determination of whether the serviceman should be discharged from service and whether he would be entitled to a disability pension.

Accordingly, in the Court’s opinion, if a serviceman was discharged from service or denied a disability pension based on a medical opinion that lacked reasons, it would undermine the very foundation of the action taken by the authority, and such an action could not be sustained in law.

The Court, therefore, held that if any action was taken by the authority to discharge a serviceman or deny him a disability pension based on a report from the Medical Board that failed to disclose reasons for the opinion provided, such an action by the authority would be unsustainable in law.

The Court stated that, in the present case, no reasons had been given by the Medical Board for their opinion that the appellant was suffering from Schizophrenia, which was classified as a constitutional personality disorder. Furthermore, all the relevant columns in the Medical Board’s report had been left blank. In the Court’s view, the finding given by the Medical Board was merely an opinion or conclusion, without any explanation as to how the Medical Board had arrived at the conclusion that the appellant’s disability was a constitutional personality disorder.

The Court emphasized that there was a difference between a “conclusion” or “opinion” and the “reasons” supporting such a conclusion or opinion. The reasons for the conclusion reached by the Medical Board had to be explicitly stated. A bare conclusion, without the underlying reasons, could not be treated as sufficient justification for the discharge of the serviceman and the denial of the invalid pension, as per the Regulations referenced above.

The Court viewed that, in the absence of the required particulars, which should have been recorded or mentioned to reveal the appellant’s medical history, the opinion given by the Medical Board stating that the disease was a constitutional personality disorder, could not be sustained. This was found to be in violation of the mandate contained in Regulation 423(d) of the Regulations. Legally, the Court opined that the Medical Board’s opinion, not being based on any reason or material, should be treated as arbitrary. In the absence of the grounds and materials needed to reach a particular conclusion, the Court considered the Medical Board’s decision to have been made without the application of mind.

The Court remarked that “the provisions for grant of disability pension are in the nature of a beneficial scheme intended to provide succour to servicemen in hard times who have been discharged from service after having served the nation with dedication. Accordingly, a liberal approach must be adopted while construing such beneficial provisions.”

The Court held that a much more liberal view ought to have been adopted while dealing with cases of servicemen being discharged from service due to suffering from Schizophrenia. It was recognized that such servicemen might face numerous impediments and difficulties in proving the causal connection between the disease and military service.

The Court clarified that in a situation where the serviceman himself had not applied for discharge, but had been discharged by the authority, the onus of proving the disability and the grounds for denying the disability pension would lie heavily on the authority. Since it was a statutory requirement that the opinion of the Medical Board serve as the basis for the discharge, the Court viewed that if the opinion of the Medical Board was devoid of reasons, the act of the authority, based solely on an opinion without reasons, could certainly be questioned.

The Court held that the authorities had failed to discharge the burden of establishing that the employee deserved to be discharged from service due to such illness without the benefit of a pension. As a result, the Court considered such action to be arbitrary and liable to be interfered with.

The Court said that it was incumbent upon the Medical Board to assign reasons for treating the disease as a constitutional personality disorder, which could not have been detected at the time of entry into service, especially since the onset of the disease occurred only in 1993, approximately five years after the appellant’s entry into service. In the absence of any reasons being provided by the Medical Board for their opinion that the condition was a constitutional personality disorder, the Court expressed that it would be unfair to the appellant for such an opinion to be treated as final and binding, thereby depriving him of any service benefits.

Hence, the Court held that the order of discharge of the appellant and denial of disability pension to him based on a medical opinion without providing full reasons to support the opinion cannot be said to be valid.

Deciding whether the matter should be remitted to the Medical Board at that stage for reconsideration in light of the Court’s observations, the Court concluded that adopting such a course of action after about 27 years since the appellant was invalided from service on 18-05-1998 would not be in the interest of justice.

Resultantly, while the Court did not disturb the order of the appellant’s discharge from service on the grounds of medical invalidity due to Schizophrenia, it directed the respondents to grant the appellant disability pension with immediate effect, along with all attending benefits, as per the rules. However, the appellant would not be entitled to any arrears of invalid pension, except for the last three years.

Consequently, the impugned order rejecting the disability pension, passed by the Principal Controller of Defence Accounts (Pension), Allahabad, the order passed by the First Appellate Committee, and the order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi, in OA were set aside with the above directions.