{"id":400735,"date":"2026-11-07T09:00:28","date_gmt":"2026-11-07T03:30:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=400735"},"modified":"2026-11-06T18:14:12","modified_gmt":"2026-11-06T12:44:12","slug":"systemic-integration-philosophical-holism-article-31-3-c-vienna-convention","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/11\/07\/systemic-integration-philosophical-holism-article-31-3-c-vienna-convention\/","title":{"rendered":"Systemic Integration as Philosophical Holism: Reconstructing Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention through Dworkin, Gadamer, Quine and Wittgenstein"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

This article explores the philosophical foundations of systemic integration under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, drawing on the theories of Ronald Dworkin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, W.V.O. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/p>\n

International law has never been more fragmented.1<\/sup><\/a> Over the past century the international legal order has undergone an extraordinary process of specialisation. Distinct legal regimes now govern trade, investment, human rights, environmental protection, maritime affairs, intellectual property, international criminal responsibility and countless other fields, each administered by specialised institutions, adjudicated by tribunals with increasingly autonomous jurisprudence, and cultivated by communities of lawyers with distinct interpretive traditions. Viewed from one perspective, this represents a remarkable success: International law has acquired the sophistication necessary to regulate an increasingly complex global society. Yet specialisation has also generated a persistent anxiety, namely, that international law may cease to function as a coherent legal system and evolve instead into a collection of self-contained normative enclaves.<\/span><\/p>\n

The expansion of specialised legal regimes<\/span>2<\/sup><\/a> generated concerns regarding fragmentation<\/span>3<\/sup><\/a> and provided the backdrop to the International Law Commission’s celebrated study, prepared under the chairmanship of Martti Koskenniemi, which remains the most influential attempt to address the challenges created by the diversification and expansion of international law.<\/span>4<\/sup><\/a> At the centre of the Commission’s analysis stood Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, whose principle has since become known as systemic integration<\/span>5<\/sup><\/a>: interpreters are directed to take into account relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties when construing treaty obligations.<\/span>6<\/sup><\/a> The doctrine has become one of the principal mechanisms through which international law seeks to preserve coherence amidst increasing specialisation. Campbell McLachlan’s influential reconstruction of Article 31(3)(c<\/span>), Joost Pauwelyn’s work on normative conflict, Stephan Schill’s theory of multilateralisation and the broader anti-fragmentation literature all place systemic integration at the centre of efforts to reconcile competing regimes, and the doctrine is frequently invoked to explain how international law<\/span>7<\/sup><\/a> maintains its systemic character despite the absence of a centralised constitutional structure.<\/span>8<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Yet while much of the existing literature explains how systemic integration operates, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the deeper jurisprudential assumptions that make the doctrine appear both necessary and desirable. The fragmentation literature generally proceeds from the premise that coherence should be preserved<\/span>9<\/sup><\/a>; it seldom asks why international lawyers continue to regard coherence as an essential feature of legality despite the decentralised<\/span>10<\/sup><\/a> structure of the international legal order.<\/span>11<\/sup><\/a> This article argues that the answer lies beyond doctrine<\/span>12<\/sup><\/a> and within legal philosophy.<\/span><\/p>\n

The central thesis of this article is that systemic integration is the jurisprudential expression of philosophical holism. The fragmentation literature presupposes that legal meaning is relational rather than atomistic<\/span>13<\/sup><\/a>: international norms derive significance not in isolation but through their place within a broader legal system<\/span>14<\/sup><\/a>, and systemic integration therefore reflects a deeper commitment to a holistic understanding of law.<\/span>15<\/sup><\/a> The article develops that claim through four philosophical traditions. Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity explains why coherence possesses normative value<\/span>16<\/sup><\/a>; Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics explains how coherent interpretation becomes possible<\/span>17<\/sup><\/a>; W.V.O. Quine’s epistemological holism demonstrates why meaning itself is relational<\/span>18<\/sup><\/a>; and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance explains how normative systems may remain interconnected despite the absence of hierarchy.<\/span>19<\/sup><\/a> Together, these thinkers provide the theoretical foundation that the fragmentation literature has largely assumed rather than articulated.<\/span>20<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

The article further argues that climate-related investor-State arbitration provides a practical demonstration of this thesis. Climate-transition disputes increasingly require tribunals to navigate the interaction between investment protections and environmental obligations. Such disputes reveal the limitations of atomistic approaches to treaty interpretation and demonstrate the continuing relevance of systemic integration as the mechanism through which investment law absorbs evolving climate norms.<\/span>21<\/sup><\/a> Part II examines the fragmentation literature and the emergence of systemic integration as a doctrinal response to specialisation. Part III reconstructs the philosophical foundations of systemic integration through the work of Dworkin, Gadamer, Quine, and Wittgenstein. Part IV applies these insights to climate governance and investor-State arbitration. The article concludes by suggesting that systemic integration is not merely a doctrine of treaty interpretation but an expression of an enduring commitment to coherence as a condition of legal understanding.<\/span><\/p>\n

Fragmentation and systemic integration in the existing literature<\/p>\n

Few developments have shaped contemporary international legal scholarship more profoundly than the debate surrounding fragmentation. Throughout much of the twentieth century, international law was frequently conceived as a relatively unified, albeit decentralised, legal order. By the close of the century, the rapid proliferation of specialised treaty regimes, international organisations and adjudicatory bodies had fundamentally altered that landscape. The resulting concern was not merely quantitative but qualitative: as specialised regimes matured, they increasingly produced norms and decisions capable of overlapping, diverging or conflicting with one another. Investment Tribunals interpreted treaty protections in ways that occasionally appeared inconsistent with environmental obligations; human rights courts invoked principles not always mirrored within trade jurisprudence.<\/p>\n

It was this concern that prompted the International Law Commission (ILC) to undertake its landmark study. Significantly, the report did not portray fragmentation as an accidental defect within international law but as the natural consequence of legal development<\/span>22<\/sup><\/a>: Specialised institutions possess expertise, specialised treaty regimes permit regulatory sophistication, and specialised legal vocabularies allow greater doctrinal precision. The challenge arose not from specialisation itself but from the possibility that specialisation could undermine the systemic unity upon which law depends. The report repeatedly emphasises that international law remains a legal system notwithstanding its decentralised structure — an often-overlooked observation which reveals that the fragmentation project was never simply an exercise in conflict resolution but an effort to preserve the idea that international law continues to constitute a coherent normative order. The debate therefore ultimately concerns a foundational jurisprudential question: what makes a legal system a system? The anxiety generated by fragmentation presupposes that coherence possesses value; the search for interpretive techniques capable of preserving coherence presupposes that legal meaning is not entirely self-contained. The problem of fragmentation is accordingly not merely institutional. It is philosophical.<\/span>23<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Koskenniemi and the fragmentation project<\/span><\/p>\n

Although frequently cited as an authoritative statement regarding treaty conflicts and interpretive methodology, the ILC report’s deeper contribution lies in explaining how a decentralised legal order can continue to function as a legal system despite increasing specialisation. The report does not lament diversity<\/span>24<\/sup><\/a>, nor does it advocate the elimination of specialised regimes; concern arises only when specialisation produces competing claims regarding legal authority and normative priority. It identifies several manifestations of fragmentation — conflicts between successive treaties, conflicts between specialised and general norms, tensions between regional and universal regimes, and divergent interpretations by different adjudicatory bodies — yet its most enduring contribution lies in its insistence that these difficulties be approached through ordinary techniques of legal reasoning rather than through the creation of hierarchical structures.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is here that Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) assumes particular significance. The report famously describes systemic integration as a “master key” capable of opening the door to the broader legal environment within which treaties operate. The metaphor reveals an implicit assumption regarding the nature of legal meaning<\/span>25<\/sup><\/a>: a key is valuable only because there exists something beyond the immediate text that requires access. The meaning of a treaty cannot always be derived from its text alone, because that text exists within a wider normative context. The report thereby rejects an atomistic conception of international law: treaties are not self-contained linguistic artifacts but form part of a broader legal system whose norms interact continuously<\/span>26<\/sup><\/a>. Although never framed explicitly in philosophical terms, this reasoning consistently reflects a holistic understanding of legal meaning — norms derive significance from their relationships with other norms<\/span>27<\/sup><\/a>, and fragmentation becomes problematic precisely because those relationships risk being overlooked. The fragmentation project thus represents more than a doctrinal exercise; it is an attempt to preserve a holistic conception of international legality within an increasingly specialised world.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. McLachlan and the principle of systemic integration<\/span><\/p>\n

If the ILC report supplied the broader intellectual framework, Campbell McLachlan provided the doctrinal architecture upon which modern understandings of systemic integration rest. His central insight is deceptively simple: treaties do not exist in normative isolation. States conclude treaties against the background of an existing legal order, and treaty interpretation therefore necessarily requires consideration of other relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties.<\/span>28<\/sup><\/a> This proposition rejects the assumption that treaty obligations can be understood exclusively through textual analysis; interpretation becomes an exercise in situating treaty provisions within the network of legal relationships surrounding them. McLachlan’s approach proved enormously influential because it offered a practical response to fragmentation without requiring institutional hierarchy — coherence through interpretation rather than subordination. Yet it also reveals an important philosophical commitment: that legal meaning is relational, a treaty provision deriving significance not solely from its linguistic content but from its position within a wider legal order.<\/span>29<\/sup><\/a> McLachlan demonstrates how systemic integration operates; he does not fully explain why legal meaning should be regarded as relational in the first place.<\/span>30<\/sup><\/a> The answer to that question lies beyond doctrine<\/span>31<\/sup><\/a> and within legal philosophy.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Pauwelyn and the problem of norm conflict<\/span><\/p>\n

Where McLachlan approaches fragmentation through interpretation, Joost Pauwelyn approaches it through conflict. His seminal Conflict of Norms in Public International Law<\/span><\/span>32<\/sup><\/a> remains one of the most sophisticated treatments of competing international obligations. Rather than asking how treaties should be interpreted, Pauwelyn asks how conflicts between norms should be resolved, focusing upon conflict rules including lex specialis, lex posterior and hierarchical norms.<\/span>33<\/sup><\/a> Beneath these doctrinal mechanisms lies a shared assumption: conflict rules are meaningful only if conflicting norms are understood to exist within a common legal framework. The identification of conflict presupposes the possibility of comparison<\/span>34<\/sup><\/a>, and comparison presupposes systemic connection.<\/span>35<\/sup><\/a> Pauwelyn therefore addresses fragmentation from a different angle while remaining committed to a fundamentally similar vision of international law<\/span>36<\/sup><\/a>: The legal system may contain competing norms, but those norms remain part of a larger juridical order.<\/span>37<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

4. Schill and the multilateralisation of investment law<\/span><\/p>\n

Stephan Schill’s theory of multilateralisation<\/span>38<\/sup><\/a> argues that the thousands of bilateral investment treaties currently in force collectively constitute a multilateral system: although formally bilateral, they generate common standards, shared jurisprudence and interconnected legal expectations. The argument is particularly significant because it demonstrates systemic integration at work within a regime frequently criticised for fragmentation — investment law lacks a centralised court, a formal constitution and a comprehensive codification project. Yet, Schill notes, bilateral investment treaties are structurally largely uniform and have thus produced certain fundamental principles of international investment law, while Arbitral Tribunals repeatedly draw upon decisions from other cases and interpret treaty standards in light of broader developments in international law, creating uniformity in the regime. The multilateralisation thesis therefore depends implicitly upon a holistic conception of legal meaning: bilateral treaties become components of a larger system because they are interpreted as such.<\/span><\/p>\n

5. Towards a philosophical account of systemic integration<\/span><\/p>\n

Despite their methodological differences, Koskenniemi, McLachlan, Pauwelyn and Schill each presuppose that legal meaning is relational rather than atomistic — that norms derive significance from their place within a broader legal order. What remains largely unexplained is why this assumption should be accepted. The existing literature explains how systemic integration operates and why fragmentation creates practical difficulties; it does not fully explain the philosophical foundations<\/span>39<\/sup><\/a> of coherence itself.<\/span>40<\/sup><\/a> The remainder of this article addresses that gap through the work of Ronald Dworkin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, W.V.O. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein.<\/span><\/p>\n

P<\/span>hilosophical holism and the foundations of systemic integration<\/p>\n

1. Introduction: From doctrine to jurisprudence<\/span><\/p>\n

Whether expressed through the language of fragmentation, treaty interpretation, norm conflict or multilateralisation, the dominant literature presupposes that international legal norms derive meaning from their place within a broader legal order. Yet this assumption is rarely examined directly.<\/span>41<\/sup><\/a> The omission is understandable: the development of systemic integration was driven largely by practical concerns, as tribunals confronted overlapping legal regimes long before scholars asked whether the underlying interpretive techniques reflected deeper philosophical commitments. Nevertheless, the persistence of systemic integration suggests that more is at stake than doctrinal convenience — the principle reflects an underlying theory of legal meaning. This chapter argues that systemic integration is best understood as the jurisprudential manifestation of philosophical holism. Each of the four thinkers considered addresses a distinct dimension of the problem: Dworkin provides a normative justification for coherence; Gadamer explains the interpretive methodology through which coherence is achieved; Quine supplies the epistemological foundation for relational meaning; and Wittgenstein demonstrates how normative systems may remain interconnected in the absence of hierarchy.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. Ronald Dworkin and the normative case for coherence<\/span><\/p>\n

Among modern legal philosophers, Ronald Dworkin provides perhaps the closest jurisprudential analogue to systemic integration. His theory of law as integrity emerged as a response to positivist accounts that treated law primarily as a collection of discrete rules. In Law’s Empire<\/span><\/span>42<\/sup><\/a>, Dworkin argued that legal interpretation should seek the understanding that best fits and justifies the legal system as a whole. The significance of this argument lies not merely in its conception of adjudication but in its understanding of legal meaning: individual rules do not possess self-contained significance; their meaning emerges through their relationship to broader principles that render the legal system coherent. The ideal Judge — Dworkin’s famous Hercules — must construct an interpretation that treats the legal order as expressing a unified scheme of political morality.<\/span><\/p>\n

The parallels with systemic integration are striking. On one view, Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) merely expands the range of materials available for interpretation; on a Dworkinian view, it reflects the conviction that treaties derive meaning from their place within a larger legal order. The ILC’s anti-fragmentation project exhibits the same aspiration: fragmentation is problematic not simply because it generates doctrinal complexity but because it threatens the coherence that allows law to function as a normative system. The search for systemic integration is therefore analogous to Dworkin’s search for integrity — both seek to preserve the possibility of principled legal reasoning by situating individual norms within a coherent whole. This observation reveals an important feature of international law: in the absence of a centralised sovereign, coherence cannot be imposed through hierarchy but must be generated through interpretation. Systemic integration thus becomes the mechanism through which international law approximates Dworkinian integrity.<\/p>\n

3. Gadamer and the hermeneutics of treaty interpretation<\/span><\/p>\n

If Dworkin explains why coherence matters, Gadamer explains how it is achieved. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics rejected the notion that interpretation involves the mechanical extraction of meaning from a text: meaning emerges through a dialogical process between interpreter and text, proceeding through what Gadamer famously termed the hermeneutic circle.<\/span>43<\/sup><\/a> The circle rests upon a deceptively simple insight — the whole can only be understood through its parts, while the parts can only be understood through the whole.<\/span><\/p>\n

This formulation bears a remarkable resemblance to the structure of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention. Text, context, object, and purpose, subsequent practice and relevant rules of international law each reflect movement between individual provisions and broader legal structures: a particular clause is interpreted through the treaty as a whole, the treaty through its legal environment, and that environment is simultaneously shaped by the treaties that comprise it. Viewed through a Gadamerian lens, systemic integration ceases to appear as an exceptional interpretive device and emerges instead as a natural consequence of the interpretive process itself. Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) may accordingly be viewed not merely as a substantive interpretive rule but as a codification of the hermeneutic structure of legal reasoning — the unavoidable movement between part and whole that characterises all meaningful interpretation.<\/p>\n

4. Quine and the epistemology of international law<\/span><\/p>\n

The philosophical foundations of systemic integration become even clearer through Quine’s epistemological holism. Quine rejected the idea that individual propositions could be verified independently. In The Web of Belief<\/span><\/span>44<\/sup><\/a>, he argued that knowledge exists as an interconnected network in which the significance of any proposition depends upon its relationship to countless others: meaning is relational rather than atomistic. The implications for international law are profound. An atomistic approach to treaty interpretation assumes that legal norms possess autonomous meaning capable of being determined largely through textual analysis; a holistic approach assumes that norms derive significance from their place within a broader normative network. The ILC report repeatedly adopts the latter perspective. The concern generated by fragmentation arises precisely because international legal norms do not operate independently: investment obligations influence environmental regulation, human rights commitments shape trade law, and climate agreements affect the interpretation of investment protections. The legal system increasingly resembles the interconnected network described by Quine. From this perspective, Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) appears as the doctrinal expression of epistemological holism, directing interpreters to consider relevant legal norms because those norms help constitute the meaning of the treaty itself. Systemic integration is thus not simply a technique for resolving conflict; it reflects a theory regarding the nature of legal knowledge — treaties derive meaning from their place within a web of international norms.<\/span><\/p>\n

5. Wittgenstein and family resemblance<\/span><\/p>\n

The final philosophical contribution addresses a persistent challenge within the fragmentation literature: how can international law remain a system in the absence of hierarchy? Traditional legal theory often associates systemic unity with centralised authority, and international law lacks such authority — there is no global legislature, no constitutional apex, no universally Supreme Court. Yet international lawyers continue to speak of a legal system. According to Wittgenstein, concepts need not share a single defining essence in order to belong to the same category; they may instead be connected through overlapping similarities and recurring patterns.<\/span>45<\/sup><\/a> The same is true of international legal regimes. Human rights law, investment law, environmental law, and trade law derive from no common constitutional source, yet they repeatedly employ shared concepts such as good faith, due process, proportionality, reasonableness, sustainable development and abuse of rights.<\/span>46<\/sup><\/a> These concepts function as points of connection between regimes, creating a network of overlapping normative relationships without requiring formal hierarchy.<\/span>47<\/sup><\/a> Systemic integration may therefore be understood as the interpretive recognition of family resemblance: the principle does not impose unity upon international law but acknowledges the unity already present within the overlapping concepts and practices that connect specialised legal regimes.<\/span>48<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

6. Holism and the jurisprudential foundations of Article 31(3)(c)<\/span><\/p>\n

Taken individually, each of the foregoing accounts illuminates a distinct aspect of systemic integration; taken together, they reveal something more significant. Dworkin explains why coherence is desirable; Gadamer explains how coherence is achieved; Quine explains why coherence is unavoidable; and Wittgenstein explains how coherence can exist without hierarchy. The principle of systemic integration thus emerges as the jurisprudential expression of philosophical holism. Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) does not merely provide a technical interpretive instruction; it reflects a deeper understanding of legal meaning according to which norms derive significance from their place within a broader legal order.<\/span>49<\/sup><\/a> This insight provides the missing foundation underlying the fragmentation literature: Koskenniemi, McLachlan, Pauwelyn, and Schill each assume that meaning is relational, and the philosophical traditions explored in this chapter explain why. The next chapter applies these insights to climate governance and investor-state arbitration, where the tension between fragmentation and coherence has become particularly acute.<\/span><\/p>\n

C<\/span>limate governance and investor-State arbitration: Systemic integration as a proof of concept<\/p>\n

1. Introduction<\/span><\/p>\n

A theory of legal meaning must ultimately be judged by its explanatory power, and few contexts provide a better testing ground than climate governance and investor-State arbitration. Climate change has generated one of the most significant transformations in contemporary international law. States increasingly adopt measures designed to reduce emissions, phase out fossil fuels, promote renewable energy, and implement obligations arising under international environmental agreements, while investment treaties continue to protect foreign investors against expropriation, unfair treatment and arbitrary regulatory conduct. The resulting tensions have generated a growing body of investment disputes — renewable energy reforms, coal phase-outs, carbon regulation and climate-transition policies have all become subjects of arbitral review — raising a fundamental interpretive question: should investment treaties be interpreted as self-contained instruments, or within the broader normative environment created by climate governance? This chapter argues that climate-transition disputes demonstrate the practical necessity of systemic integration: the interaction between investment protection and climate governance cannot be satisfactorily understood through atomistic models of treaty interpretation.<\/p>\n

2. Climate change as a fragmentation problem<\/span><\/p>\n

Climate change presents a unique challenge because it simultaneously implicates multiple specialised regimes: a single regulatory measure may engage obligations under investment treaties, commitments arising under the Paris agreement, environmental treaty obligations, human rights norms, principles of sustainable development and domestic constitutional requirements. The resulting legal landscape closely resembles the fragmentation scenario contemplated by the ILC. An atomistic approach would treat each regime independently — investment tribunals concerning themselves exclusively with investment treaties, climate obligations addressed elsewhere. Such an approach initially appears attractive because it preserves doctrinal autonomy, yet its practical consequences are problematic. Climate regulation is not external to investment disputes; it often forms the very basis of the challenged conduct. A tribunal assessing the legality of a coal phase-out cannot realistically ignore the broader legal environment within which the measure was adopted: climate obligations do not merely accompany the dispute — they may constitute it. The climate transition therefore transforms fragmentation from a theoretical concern into a practical adjudicative problem, and Dworkin’s concern for coherence, Gadamer’s emphasis on context, Quine’s conception of interconnected systems of meaning and Wittgenstein’s overlapping normative vocabularies all suggest that climate measures cannot be understood through isolated reference to a single legal regime.<\/p>\n

Indeed, climate governance presents a more complex challenge still, for fragmentation exists not only between investment law and environmental law but within environmental law itself. International environmental law rests upon no single comprehensive framework; it consists of a dense network of more than five hundred multilateral environmental agreements — governing biodiversity, climate, marine pollution, hazardous waste, desertification and ozone depletion — negotiated at different times and for different purposes. The resulting architecture reflects the incremental and sectoral nature of international environmental law-making and is characterised by overlap, diversity and institutional pluralism<\/span>50<\/sup><\/a>: environmental protection has evolved not through a single constitutional moment but through successive responses to particular challenges, making fragmentation one of the defining characteristics of environmental law itself. The difficulty is compounded by the absence of much customary international law<\/span>51<\/sup><\/a> and by the limited guiding judicial pronouncements of the International Court of Justice<\/span>52<\/sup><\/a> and International Arbitral Tribunals<\/span>53<\/sup><\/a> consolidating environmental principles into a coherent body of law. Climate change disputes therefore occupy a uniquely significant position within the fragmentation debate: they represent situations in which multiple specialised regimes interact against the backdrop of an environmental framework that is itself fragmented. If systemic integration is indeed the practical manifestation of philosophical holism, its utility should become most apparent in precisely such circumstances. The renewable energy and fossil fuel arbitrations examined below provide an opportunity to test that proposition.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Renewable energy arbitrations and the limits of atomism<\/span><\/p>\n

The renewable energy arbitrations arising under the Energy Charter Treaty provide perhaps the clearest illustration. Charanne<\/span> v. Spain<\/span><\/span>54<\/sup><\/a>, Eiser<\/span> v. Spain<\/span><\/span>55<\/sup><\/a>, Novenergia<\/span> v. Spain<\/span><\/span>56<\/sup><\/a> and Antin<\/span> v. Spain<\/span><\/span>57<\/sup><\/a> emerged from regulatory reforms affecting renewable energy incentive schemes adopted by Spain in response to changing economic conditions, with investors arguing that alterations to subsidy frameworks violated the fair and equitable treatment standard and the protection of legitimate expectations. At first sight these disputes concern familiar questions of investment law: Did the State make representations upon which investors reasonably relied, and did subsequent reforms frustrate those expectations? Yet such framing obscures the deeper interpretive challenge. The Spanish reforms did not occur in a legal vacuum; they emerged against the backdrop of evolving energy policy, changing economic conditions and a broader international movement towards decarbonisation. The central question was therefore not simply whether expectations had been disappointed, but whether investment protections could be interpreted independently of the regulatory environment within which those expectations arose.<\/span><\/p>\n

The reasoning of the tribunals themselves reveals the limitations of an atomistic approach. In the case of Charanne<\/span>, the Tribunal emphasised that investors could not legitimately expect complete regulatory immutability and recognised that States retain authority to adapt regulatory frameworks in pursuit of changing policy objectives. In the case of Eiser<\/span>, while ultimately finding a breach of the Energy Charter Treaty, the Tribunal carefully distinguished between the State’s right to regulate and the manner in which that right had been exercised, assessing the compatibility of particular reforms with the treaty standard in light of the surrounding regulatory environment. These decisions are significant not because they expressly applied Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) but because of the mode of reasoning they employed: legitimate expectations were not treated as self-contained legal propositions but understood through their relationship with a broader framework of regulatory governance. From a Gadamerian perspective, the Tribunals interpreted investment protections against the horizon of the wider regulatory environment; from a Quinean perspective, investor expectations were evaluated as part of an interconnected normative network rather than as isolated entitlements; from a Dworkinian perspective, treaty standards were construed to seek coherence between investment protection and legitimate public regulation; and from a Wittgensteinian perspective, concepts such as reasonableness, proportionality and regulatory legitimacy functioned as shared points of connection between investment law and broader public law principles. Even when tribunals do not expressly invoke systemic integration, they frequently reason in a manner that reflects the holistic assumptions upon which the doctrine rests.<\/p>\n

4. Fossil fuel phase-outs and emerging climate claims<\/span><\/p>\n

The significance of systemic integration becomes even more apparent in disputes arising from fossil fuel phase-outs, as the claims brought by RWE<\/span><\/span>58<\/sup><\/a> and Uniper<\/span><\/span>59<\/sup><\/a> against the Netherlands following the Dutch Coal Ban Act illustrate. Unlike the Spanish cases, which modifications concerned to support mechanisms, the Dutch disputes arose directly from measures designed to facilitate decarbonisation and fulfil climate objectives, forcing tribunals to confront a question earlier investment jurisprudence could often avoid: Can investment protection be interpreted without reference to climate governance? An atomistic approach would suggest that it can — the inquiry confined to the relevant treaty provisions and the economic consequences suffered by investors, with climate obligations external to the analysis. Yet such an approach would fail to capture the normative environment within which the measures were adopted. The Netherlands did not legislate in a legal vacuum: the measures formed part of a wider framework shaped by the Paris agreement, European climate initiatives, domestic constitutional obligations, scientific consensus concerning climate change and an evolving understanding of sustainable development. To evaluate their legality while disregarding this framework would be to detach the challenged conduct from the circumstances that produced it. These disputes therefore exemplify the central insight underlying systemic integration: investment protections cannot be fully understood independently of the legal environment within which they operate — not because climate obligations automatically override investment protections, nor because environmental norms enjoy hierarchical priority, but because legal meaning is context-dependent. They also reveal fragmentation in its most acute form: multiple legal regimes simultaneously claiming relevance to the same event, where meaningful adjudication becomes increasingly difficult without some mechanism for situating those regimes within a common interpretive framework.<\/span><\/p>\n

5. The Paris agreement and the transformation of context<\/span><\/p>\n

The emergence of the Paris agreement has fundamentally altered the interpretive environment within which investment treaties operate. Historically, investment treaties were negotiated during a period in which climate governance occupied a relatively limited position within international law; contemporary tribunals interpret those same treaties within a markedly different legal landscape. The significance of the Paris agreement therefore extends beyond its direct legal obligations to its contribution to context. From a Gadamerian perspective, the agreement contributes to the horizon within which treaty interpretation occurs; from a Quinean perspective, it forms part of the web of norms that shape legal meaning; from a Dworkinian perspective, it contributes to the principles through which coherence is achieved across the international legal order; and from a Wittgensteinian perspective, it expands the network of concepts connecting environmental and investment regimes — sustainable development, intergenerational equity, climate resilience and transition planning increasingly form part of the shared vocabulary of international law. Climate governance is no longer an isolated specialist concern but part of the broader normative environment within which multiple areas of international law operate. The Paris agreement thus affects interpretation even where it does not directly determine outcomes, demonstrating the practical significance of systemic integration: relevant rules of international law matter not because they replace treaty obligations but because they help define their meaning.<\/p>\n

6. Systemic integration as climate adaptation<\/span><\/p>\n

The preceding discussion permits a broader conclusion: Climate governance has transformed systemic integration from an interpretive option into a practical necessity. The increasing interaction between investment law and environmental law means that tribunals can no longer treat investment treaties as isolated legal instruments; the normative consequences of climate change inevitably influence the interpretation of investment protections. Systemic integration provides the doctrinal mechanism through which this interaction occurs. Importantly, the doctrine neither subordinates investment law to environmental law nor requires Tribunals to disregard treaty obligations in favour of climate objectives. Its function is more subtle: it allows investment law to absorb evolving climate norms while preserving the autonomy of investment treaty obligations — adaptation without amendment, permitting the legal system to respond to changing normative conditions while maintaining continuity with existing treaty frameworks. In this respect, systemic integration performs precisely the role predicted by philosophical holism: Legal meaning evolves through relationships between norms rather than through isolated textual analysis.<\/p>\n

C<\/span>onclusion<\/p>\n

Climate transition disputes provide a practical demonstration of the article’s central thesis. An atomistic approach struggles to explain why climate obligations should matter when interpreting investment treaties; a holistic approach explains the interaction naturally. Investment treaties derive meaning from their place within a broader legal order, and climate governance has become an increasingly significant component of that order. The climate transition therefore serves as a proof of concept for systemic integration. The doctrine persists not merely because Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) requires it, but because contemporary international law increasingly operates through interconnected normative relationships. Climate governance reveals what fragmentation scholarship and philosophical holism together suggest: International law remains a system whose parts derive meaning from a whole.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n

*Advocate, Bombay High Court. Author can be reached at: mikhailbehl@gmail.com<\/a>.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.<\/a> C.W. Jenks, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties” (1953) 30 British Year Book of International Law 401, 403.<\/p>\n

2.<\/a> C.J. Borgen, “Resolving Treaty Conflicts” (2005) 37 The George Washington International Law Review 573.<\/p>\n

3.<\/a> A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, “Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law” (2004) 25(4) Michigan Journal of International Law (summer 2004) 999—1046.<\/p>\n

4.<\/a> Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law<\/span>, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalised by Mr Martti Koskenniemi Document A\/CN.4\/L.682 and Add.1 (13-4-2006).<\/p>\n

5.<\/a> Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law<\/span>, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalised by Mr Martti Koskenniemi Document A\/CN.4\/L.682 and Add.1 (13-4-2006), Chapter V: Systemic Integration and Art. 31(3)(c<\/span>) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Fragmentation of International Law.<\/p>\n

6.<\/a> Art. 31(3)(c<\/span>) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.<\/p>\n

7.<\/a> Cube Infrastructure<\/span> v. Spain<\/span> (Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Partial Decision on Quantum) ICSID Case No. ARB\/15\/20.<\/p>\n

8.<\/a> Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL)<\/span> v. Sri Lanka<\/span> (Award) ICSID Case No. ARB\/87\/3.<\/p>\n

9.<\/a> Oil Platforms (Iran<\/span> v. United States) (Preliminary Objections)<\/span>, 1996 SCC OnLine ICJ 5 :<\/span> (1996) ICJ Rep 803, 858, para 39 (Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins — “fair and equitable treatment of nationals and companies … are legal terms of art well known in the field of overseas investment protection”.)<\/p>\n

10.<\/a> Samantha Besson, “Theorizing the Sources of International Law” in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Eds.), The Philosophy of International Law<\/span> (Oxford University Press, 2010).<\/p>\n

11.<\/a> H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community<\/span> (Cambridge University Press, 1933) New Edn. 2011.<\/p>\n

12.<\/a> H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law<\/span> (3rd Edn., Clarendon, 2012).<\/p>\n

13.<\/a> J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms<\/span> (Oxford University Press, 1975): “International law is a system of interlocking norms.”<\/p>\n

14.<\/a> H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law<\/span> (Rinehart, 1952). “It is in the first-place general international law to which the ‘Principles’ refer. Particularly international law created by treaties is discussed merely in order to show the possibility of developing international law in a technically progressive way.”<\/p>\n

15.<\/a> Liam Murphy, “Law beyond the State: Some Philosophical Questions” (2017) 28(1) European Journal of International Law 203.<\/p>\n

16.<\/a> Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire<\/span> (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 225<\/span>—<\/span>275.<\/span><\/p>\n

17.<\/a> Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method<\/span> (2nd Revised Edition, New York: Continuum, 1989), pp. 268<\/span>—<\/span>307.<\/span><\/p>\n

18.<\/a> W.V.O. Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief<\/span> (2nd Edn., New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 8<\/span>—<\/span>28.<\/span><\/p>\n

19.<\/a> G.E.M. Anscombe (Tr.)<\/span>, <\/span> udwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations<\/span> (Blackwell, Oxford, 1953), Ss. 65<\/span>—<\/span>71.<\/span> <\/span><\/p>\n

20.<\/a> Campbell McLachlan KC, The Principle of Systemic Integration in International Law<\/span> (Oxford University Press, 2024) “techniques of integration form a core part of legal reasoning common to law as a discipline”.<\/p>\n

21.<\/a> J. Crawford, “Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law” (2006) 319 Recueil des Cours 35.<\/span><\/p>\n

22.<\/a> Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law<\/span>, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalised by Mr Martti Koskenniemi Document A\/CN.4\/L.682 and Add.1 (13-4-2006).<\/p>\n

23.<\/a> Higgins R., Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It<\/span> (Oxford University Press, 1995) “the applicable international law is continuously constituted and reconstituted through the process of legal reasoning”.<\/p>\n

24.<\/a> Chapter VI: Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law<\/span>, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalised by Mr Martti Koskenniemi, Document A\/CN.4\/L.682 and Add.1 (13-4-2006).<\/p>\n

25.<\/a> McLachlan KC Campbell, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c<\/span>) of the Vienna Convention”, (2005) 54(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279.<\/p>\n

26.<\/a> H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community<\/span> (Cambridge University Press, 1933) (2011 Edn.) “parties conclude a treaty not in a legal vacuum, but against the background of existing rules of International Law”.<\/p>\n

27.<\/a> Whether by way of “relationships of interpretation” or “relationships of conflict”.<\/p>\n

28.<\/a> Campbell McLachlan KC, The Principle of Systemic Integration in International Law<\/span> (Oxford University Press, 2024).<\/p>\n

29.<\/a> Campbell McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention” (2005) 54 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279<\/span>—<\/span>320.<\/span><\/p>\n

30.<\/a> Speaking in the context of the non-binding nature of awards issued by Investment Tribunals: “Thus, often when tribunals look to prior decisions, they are not necessarily looking for a rule of decision ipse dixit. Rather, they are seeking to learn from the application of the general standards in prior cases, and to compare and contrast with the facts, and their legal context, that are before them. This process of reference to prior example, whether by application or distinction, is integral to all legal reasoning.” Campbell McLachlan KC, The Principle of Systemic Integration in International Law<\/span> (Oxford University Press, 2024).<\/p>\n

31.<\/a> J. Paulsson, “International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International Law” (2006) 5 Transnational Dispute Management 1.<\/p>\n

32.<\/a> Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law<\/span> (Cambridge University Press, 2003).<\/p>\n

33.<\/a> C.W. Jenks, “The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties” (1953) 30 British Year Book of International Law 401, 407.<\/p>\n

34.<\/a> S.A. Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties<\/span> (Leiden Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), pp. 5<\/span>—<\/span>7.<\/span><\/p>\n

35.<\/a> J.B. Mus, “Conflicts between Treaties in International Law” (1998) 45 Netherlands International Law Review 214<\/span>—<\/span>217.<\/span><\/p>\n

36.<\/a> Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory<\/span> (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978) 156 and 152<\/span>—<\/span>194.<\/span><\/p>\n

37.<\/a> Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases between Australia and Japan and between New Zealand and Japan<\/span>, decision of 4-8-2000 (jurisdiction and admissibility), UNRIAA Vol. 23 (Sales No. E\/F.04. V.15) p. 23.<\/p>\n

38.<\/a> Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law<\/span> (Cambridge University Press, 2009).<\/p>\n

39.<\/a> E. Denza and S. Brooks, “Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom Experience” (1987) 36(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 908.<\/p>\n

40.<\/a> In Cube Infrastructure Fund<\/span> SICAV<\/span> v. Spain<\/span> (Decision on Jurisdiction, Liability and Partial Decision on Quantum) ICSID Case No. ARB\/15\/20 [19-2-2019, Lowe (President), Spigelman and Professor Tomuschat].<\/span> The Tribunal found that Art. 31(3)(c<\/span>) provides a basis by which “the lacunae not covered by the treaty itself must be filled in by recourse to the general rules and principles that make up the legal universe of international law” but the award offers little explanation as to why there was a need to fill up the lacunae by this process.<\/p>\n

41.<\/a> See<\/span> E. Denza and S. Brooks, “Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom Experience” (1987) 36(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 912. BIT’s present a “particularly compelling reasons” to refer to general international law in interpretation as their purpose was to enhance mechanism for protection of rights, rather than to extend the rights themselves.<\/p>\n

42.<\/a> Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire<\/span> (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986) pp. 225<\/span>—<\/span>275.<\/span><\/p>\n

43.<\/a> Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method<\/span> (2nd Revised Edn., Continuum Publishing Group, 1989) pp. 268<\/span>—<\/span>307.<\/span><\/p>\n

44.<\/a> W.V.O. Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief<\/span> (2nd Edn., New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 8<\/span>—<\/span>28.<\/span><\/p>\n

45.<\/a> Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations<\/span> (Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1953), pp. 65<\/span>—<\/span>71.<\/span><\/p>\n

46.<\/a> Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law<\/span> (Cambridge University Press, 2003).<\/p>\n

47.<\/a> J.A. Frowein, “Jus cogens”<\/span> in R. Bernhardt (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law<\/span>, Vol. 3 (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1997) p. 65. See also<\/span>, Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties however encapsulates the rule of jus cogens<\/span>, a rule of hierarchy sensu stricto<\/span>, whereby a treaty would be invalid if it were at the time of its conclusion in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law.<\/p>\n

48.<\/a> An example of which is the OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of the Council of the OECD on the Draft Convention (1967), Notes and Comments to Arts. 1 and 9. “The standard of fair and equitable treatment afforded conforms to the minimum standard which forms part of customary international law.” Available at < https:\/\/legalinstruments.oecd.org\/en\/instruments\/OECD-LEGAL-0084>.<\/p>\n

49.<\/a> The obligation upon a party to perform its obligations under a treaty i.e.<\/span>, the principle of pacta sunt servanda<\/span> is itself derived from customary international law. Hence the binding force of treaty cannot be derived from the treaty itself but must reside in some rule of international law which exists independently of a treaty. See, Mobil Investments Canada<\/span> v. Canada<\/span> (decision on Jurisdiction) ICSID Case No. ARB\/15\/6, IIC 1456 (13-7-2018, P. Greenwood, Rowley and Griffith) 170.<\/p>\n

50.<\/a> UN Secretary General, Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment-Related Instruments: Towards a Global Pact for the Environment<\/span>, UN Doc A\/73\/419, para 2 (30-11-2018).<\/p>\n

51.<\/a> Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law<\/span>, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalised by Mr Martti Koskenniemi Document A\/CN.4\/L.682 and Add.1 (13-4-2006).<\/p>\n

52.<\/a> Case concerning<\/span><\/span> Gab\u00c4\u008díkovo<\/span><\/span>-Nagymaros Project<\/span>, 1997 SCC OnLine ICJ 2 : 1997 ICJ Rep 7; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay<\/span> (Argentina<\/span> v. Uruguay)<\/span>, 2010 SCC OnLine ICJ 3 : 2010 ICJ Rep 14; Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia<\/span> v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening)<\/span>, 2014 SCC OnLine ICJ 6 : 2014 ICJ Rep 226.<\/span><\/p>\n

53.<\/a> OSPAR<\/span> (Ireland<\/span> v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland<\/span>) (Award), 2003 SCC OnLine PCA 2 (2-7-2003, Professor Reisman, Griffith and Mustill) ICGJ 377 UNRIAA 59, 126 ILR 334; Rhine Chloride<\/span> (France<\/span> v. Netherlands<\/span>) (Award) PCA Case No. 2000-02 (12-3-2004, President Skubiszewski, Kooijmans and Guillaume), Vol. 25 United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards (UNRIAA), p. 267<\/span>, International Courts General Jurisprudence (<\/span>ICGJ), case no. 374, 144 ILR 259; Iron Rhine<\/span> (Belgium<\/span> v. Netherlands<\/span>) (Award), 2005 SCC OnLine PCA 1<\/span> (24-5-2005, President Higgins, Schrans, Simma, Soons and Tomka), Vol. 27 United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, p. 35<\/span>, International Courts General Jurisprudence<\/span> 373, 140 ILR 30; Indus Waters Kishenganga<\/span> Arbitrations<\/span> (Pakistan<\/span> v. India<\/span>) 2013 SCC OnLine PCA 2 (Schwebel, Berman, Professor Wheater, Caflisch, Paulsson, Simma and Tomka) (Partial Award, 18-2-2013) 31 UNRIAA 1, ICGJ 476, 154 ILR 1 (Final Award, 20-12-2013) 31 UNRIAA 309, ICGJ 478, 157 ILR 362; Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration<\/span> (Mauritius<\/span> v. United Kingdom<\/span>) (Award) PCA Case No. 2011-03 (18-3-2015), Shearer (President), Greenwood, Hoffmann, Kateka and Wolfrum) 31 UNRIAA 359, ICGJ 486, 162 ILR 1; South China Sea<\/span> (Philippines<\/span> v. China<\/span>) (Award on Admissibility) PCA Case No. 2013-19 (29-10-2015), Mensah (President), Cot, Pawlak, Soons and Wolfrum 33 UNRIAA 1, 170 ILR 1.<\/span><\/p>\n

54.<\/a> SCC Case No. 062\/2012.<\/p>\n

55.<\/a> ICSID Case No. ARB\/13\/36.<\/p>\n

56.<\/a> SCC Case No. 2015\/063.<\/p>\n

57.<\/a> ICSID Case No. ARB\/13\/31.<\/p>\n

58.<\/a> ICSID Case No. ARB\/21\/4.<\/p>\n

59.<\/a> ICSID Case No. ARB\/21\/22.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by Mikhail 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