{"id":399634,"date":"2026-10-26T09:00:16","date_gmt":"2026-10-26T03:30:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=399634"},"modified":"2026-10-24T10:02:21","modified_gmt":"2026-10-24T04:32:21","slug":"settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/","title":{"rendered":"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

An analysis of settlement finality, clearing-corporation rights and the insolvency moratorium, examining whether close-out netting, collateral appropriation and completed securities settlements can survive the Section 14 IBC moratorium and how the proposed Securities Markets Code should be reconciled with Section 238 of the IBC.<\/p>\n

The question nobody has had to answer<\/p>\n

The insolvency of an ordinary trading company and the insolvency of a stock-broker who clears trades for the public are not the same event. First<\/span> threatens the debtor’s own creditors. Second<\/span> threatens strangers: the counterparties to trades already struck, the clearing corporation that has guaranteed those trades and, behind them, the settlement system on which every other participant depends. Indian insolvency jurisprudence has grown up almost entirely around the first kind of failure. The second has been left to the bye-laws.<\/p>\n

That gap is about to become untenable, because three developments have converged. First<\/span>, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026<\/a> has recalibrated the moratorium, given the Committee of Creditors closer control over liquidation and, for the first time, laid statutory foundations for group and cross-border insolvency.1<\/sup><\/a> Second<\/span>, the Securities Markets Code Bill, 2025 (Securities Markets Code), introduced in the Lok Sabha on 18 December 2025, consolidates the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956<\/a>, the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992<\/a> and the Depositories Act, 1996<\/a> and — critically — lifts settlement finality and the netting of clearing-corporation obligations out of the rulebooks and into primary statute.2<\/sup><\/a> Third<\/span>, in July 2026 the departmentally-related Standing Committee examining the Code recommended that the clearing corporation’s priority be strengthened from a claim expressed to be “subject to” the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016<\/a> (IBC<\/a>) into one expressed to operate “notwithstanding” it — precisely to close the gap the Ministry itself had conceded, namely, that the moratorium bites in resolution even where it might spare liquidation.3<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The result is a clean, unmitigated question. When a clearing or trading member is admitted to a corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP), does the clearing corporation’s right to declare default, close out open positions, net the member’s obligations and appropriate its margins, deposits and collateral survive Section 14 moratorium? Does the finality of settlements already completed survive the estate’s claim to be made whole? And once the Securities Markets Code is enacted, how is its “notwithstanding” priority to be reconciled with Section 238<\/a> IBC<\/a>?<\/p>\n

The originality of the enquiry lies less in its components than in their intersection. Each body of law is separately well-settled; the point at which they meet has never been mapped. The pre-Code cases that made the exchange a secured creditor were decided in a world of membership “cards” and defaulters’ committees, and against tax authorities rather than a moratorium. The insolvency cases that subordinate competing statutory claimants to the waterfall were decided against customs and electricity dues, not against settlement systems that carry systemic risk. This article joins the two lines and proposes how they should be reconciled.<\/p>\n

The settled baseline: The exchange’s rights over a defaulting member<\/p>\n

Before demutualisation, the legal character of a stock-exchange membership, and of the exchange’s rights on default, was worked out in a compact line of authority that remains the doctrinal foundation.<\/p>\n

The starting proposition is that membership is not property. In Vinay Bubna<\/span> v. Mumbai Stock Exchange<\/span><\/span><\/a>, the Supreme Court held that a broker’s membership card is not personal property capable of being sold and distributed among his creditors; on default the member’s rights in the card cease, the right of nomination vests in the exchange, and the card is not ordinarily attachable.4<\/sup><\/a> The characterisation was not new. In Naresh Chandra Sanyal<\/span> v. Calcutta Stock Exchange Assn. Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a> the court had already accepted that an exchange’s articles may validly provide for forfeiture of membership rights on default, the member’s rights ending according to the articles;5<\/sup><\/a> and it was reaffirmed in Ahmedabad Stock Exchange<\/span> v. CIT<\/span><\/span><\/a>, where the card and its sale proceeds were held to be beyond the reach of the income tax authorities, being a personal privilege rather than the member’s asset.6<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The second proposition concerns the exchange’s rights over what the member does own: his deposits and securities. In Bombay Stock Exchange<\/span> v. Jaya I. Shah<\/span><\/span><\/a>, the court explained that on default the member ceases to enjoy membership rights and the exchange may deal with his assets under the governing rules. The defaulters’ committee holds the “other assets” not beneficially but as a trustee-like custodian, applying them pro rata under the bye-laws, and the rules governing membership and default are statutory in character.7<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The keystone is Bombay Stock Exchange<\/span> v. V.S. Kandalgaonkar<\/span><\/span><\/a>. There the Supreme Court held that the first and paramount lien created by the exchange’s rules over a member’s securities is a statutory lien that makes the exchange a secured creditor; that whether the lien is statutory or contractual is immaterial once security exists; and that, a government debt in India not being entitled to precedence over a prior secured debt, the exchange’s claim ranks ahead even of income-tax dues where the taxing statute confers no express paramountcy.8<\/sup><\/a> The court was careful to preserve the ownership analysis of Vinay Bubna<\/a> case<\/a><\/span>9<\/sup><\/a>: the deposited securities remain the member’s assets, but they are encumbered by the exchange’s lien and, on default, pass into the distributive scheme of the rules. Ownership, as the court put it in the Jaya<\/span> I.<\/span> Shah<\/span><\/a>10<\/sup><\/a>, sits under a kind of eclipse while the defaulters’ committee performs its function, reviving only once the scheme’s purpose is spent.<\/p>\n

Four propositions emerge, and together they are the settled law:<\/p>\n

1. Membership is a personal, inalienable privilege, not the member’s property, and is not available to his general creditors.<\/p>\n

2. The exchange holds a first and paramount lien over the member’s deposits and securities, which makes it a secured creditor.<\/p>\n

3. That secured status carries priority even over the sovereign, absent an express statutory paramountcy for government dues.<\/p>\n

4. The member’s remaining assets are administered through a statutory default machinery on a defined order of priority, with only the residual surplus reverting to the member.<\/p>\n

The migration of the security: From the card to the clearing corporation<\/p>\n

Every one of those authorities arose under the mutualised model: the exchange as an association of persons, membership embodied in a transferable “card”, and a defaulters’ committee winding up the failed member’s book. That world is gone. Corporatisation and demutualisation under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act<\/a> converted exchanges into companies; the card has no successor; and “trading membership” today is a contractual registration under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Stock Brokers) Regulations, 1992<\/a>, not a proprietary privilege that vests in the exchange on death or default.<\/p>\n

The security has migrated with the structure. What now stands where the card and the defaulters’ committee once stood is the clearing corporation and the layered pool of value it holds: the members’ cash and securities margins, its collateral, its contribution to the core Settlement Guarantee Fund, and the netting and close-out rights it exercises on default. The Securities Contracts (Regulation) (Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations) Regulations, 2018<\/a> give this architecture its regulatory spine, providing for settlement and netting, for the bye-laws, rules and regulations of the clearing corporation, and for the clearing corporation’s rights over member collateral.11<\/sup><\/a> Rusoday Securities Ltd.<\/span> v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a> confirms that the modern relationship is continuous and rule-governed: a member’s obligations to maintain capital and deposits survive even a withdrawal of trading facility, and the exchange enjoys a measure of discretion in dealing with withheld securities without being fixed with a mandatory duty to register them in its own name merely because they are withheld.12<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The doctrinal consequence is that Kandalgaonkar<\/span><\/a>13<\/sup><\/a><\/span> cannot be transplanted whole. Its logic survives — a rule-based first-and-paramount lien makes the market infrastructure a secured creditor who outranks even the crown — but its factual vehicle does not: the personal card, the defaulters’ committee, the contest with the revenue outside any insolvency process. The modern question is whether that secured-creditor logic, re-expressed as the clearing corporation’s finality-and-appropriation rights over collateral, can withstand the one adversary the old cases never faced: The IBC<\/a> moratorium and its waterfall.<\/p>\n

The insolvency overlay: What Section 14 freezes, and what it does not<\/p>\n

Section 14 is deliberately broad. It stays the institution or continuation of suits and proceedings, including execution; the transfer or encumbrance of the debtor’s assets; any action to enforce a security interest; and the recovery of property in the debtor’s occupation. Section 14(3) then carves out only notified transactions and the surety in a contract of guarantee. In P. Mohanraj<\/span> v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a>, the court read “proceedings” expansively, held that the moratorium is not confined to civil suits, and located its object in preventing any depletion of the corporate debtor’s assets during the resolution window.14<\/sup><\/a> But the moratorium is a shield, not a discharge. It is personal to the corporate debtor and does not travel to natural persons, as SBI<\/span> v. V. Ramakrishnan<\/span><\/span><\/a> held of personal guarantors.15<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The most instructive authority for present purposes is ABG Shipyard Liquidator<\/span> v. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs<\/span><\/span><\/a>. There the court drew the line that governs every competing statutory claimant: the customs authority may assess or quantify its dues, because assessment is not recovery, but it may not enforce. It cannot sell or confiscate, because that would be a proceeding against the corporate debtor in violation of Section 14 [and of Section 33(5) in liquidation]; its claim must be lodged and pursued through the Code, subject to Section 53 waterfall.16<\/sup><\/a> The assess-but-not-recover distinction is the structural template for the securities question — with one decisive difference, to which I return: customs recovery threatens only the estate, whereas unwinding a completed settlement threatens third parties and the system.<\/p>\n

Section 14 therefore freezes coercive enforcement against the debtor and its estate. It does not extinguish liabilities, bar mere quantification, or reach assets that are not the debtor’s property at all. That last exclusion matters. The liquidation estate under Section 36, and the resolution professional’s custody under Section 18, both exclude assets owned by third parties though in the debtor’s possession. A defaulting broker’s client collateral and client positions are not the broker’s property; properly segregated, they never enter the estate, and their portability to a solvent member is not a “transfer of the debtor’s assets’ caught by Section 14 at all. The estate’s reach is to the member’s own book, net of what belongs to others.<\/p>\n

Does finality survive the stay? Two characterisations<\/p>\n

Everything turns on how the clearing corporation’s rights are characterised. There are two possibilities, and the article’s central claim is that the choice between them — not any “later-in-time” rule — decides the case.<\/p>\n

Characterisation A: A secured claim within the waterfall —<\/span> On this view, Kandalgaonkar<\/span><\/a>17<\/sup><\/a>is carried forward literally. The clearing corporation is a secured creditor by virtue of its lien over member collateral, and it takes its place in Section 53 distribution like any other secured creditor. If so, the moratorium stays its enforcement, its collateral realisation must await the process, and its recovery is capped by the waterfall’s ranking. This is the reading the Standing Committee feared, and it is the reading a mechanical application of Section 238 and Innoventive Industries Ltd.<\/span> v. ICICI Bank<\/span><\/span><\/a> — where the Code was held to be a complete Code overriding inconsistent law that would frustrate the insolvency process18<\/sup><\/a> — would produce.<\/p>\n

Characterisation B: A systemic carve-out outside the estate —<\/span> On this view, settlement finality and default close-out are not claims against the debtor’s estate at all; they are the mechanism by which the estate’s contents are determined. A completed settlement is, by definition, no longer the debtor’s asset or liability to be marshalled — it is spent. Close-out netting does not “recover property from the corporate debtor”; it computes a single net figure, and only that net figure — the residual surplus, if any, after the clearing corporation is made whole — is the debtor’s property that falls into the estate. On this reading the clearing corporation’s action is not a “proceeding against the corporate debtor” within Section 14 at all, any more than the crystallisation of a set-off is; and the Jaya I. Shah<\/span><\/a>’s19<\/sup><\/a> “eclipse of ownership” supplies the doctrinal bridge, since collateral committed to the default waterfall is not cleanly the debtor’s “property” for Section 14(1) purposes until the waterfall’s purpose is spent.<\/p>\n

The distinction is not academic hair-splitting; it is one the court itself has begun to insist on. In Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.<\/span> v. Raman Ispat (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a>, the court refused to apply an overriding clause mechanically and looked instead to the statutory scheme, and to the distinct treatment of creditor classes, before deciding where a claimant sat.20<\/sup><\/a> That is a warning to Characterisation A<\/span>: a claimant who asserts a statutory first charge does not automatically vault the waterfall, as the still-contested reception of STO<\/span> v. Rainbow Papers Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a> shows — a decision that folded a statutory tax charge into the class of secured creditors and has been read narrowly since.21<\/sup><\/a> If the clearing corporation is merely another secured creditor, Paschimanchal<\/span><\/a> and the post-Rainbow Papers<\/span><\/a>22<\/sup><\/a> caution place it firmly inside, and subordinate to, the waterfall. The clearing corporation’s protection, if it is to be robust, cannot rest on its being a better secured creditor. It must rest on its not being a waterfall claimant at all.<\/p>\n

The submission of this article is that Characterisation B<\/span> is correct for completed settlements and close-out netting, and Characterisation A<\/span> correct for the residual surplus. The systemic function of finality — that a settlement, once final, can no longer be unwound — is precisely what distinguishes it from a customs demand or an electricity due. Allowing the estate to claw back a completed settlement does not merely re-order priorities among the failed member’s creditors; it destabilises the counterparties, and the guarantee fund that stood behind trades struck in reliance on finality, and through them the settlement system itself. The IBC<\/a>‘s object, as Mohanraj<\/span><\/a>23<\/sup><\/a> frames it, is to preserve the debtor’s estate as a going concern. It was never to convert the debtor’s insolvency into a solvent third party’s loss. Read with that object, Section 14 does not reach the finality mechanism; it reaches only the net residue the mechanism leaves behind.<\/p>\n

Competing non obstante clauses: Clause 70 and Section 238<\/p>\n

Once the Securities Markets Code is enacted with an express “notwithstanding the IBC<\/a>” priority for clearing corporations, the interpretive problem shifts from the silence of the present to the collision of two overriding clauses. Here the settled learning on competing non obstante provisions controls, and it does not favour the crude answers.<\/p>\n

The first move is always harmonisation, not a contest. State of Bihar<\/span> v. Bihar Rajya M.S.E.S.K.K. Mahasangh<\/span><\/span><\/a> holds that a non obstante clause removes an obstruction but does not automatically repeal or wholly supersede other law, harmonisation remaining the first task;24<\/sup><\/a> Chhattisgarh State Coop. Bank Maryadit<\/span> v. Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit<\/span><\/span><\/a> requires courts to reconcile apparently conflicting provisions and to avoid rendering either otiose.25<\/sup><\/a> Only if reconciliation genuinely fails does the analysis move to priority — and even there, Solidaire India Ltd.<\/span> v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a> qualifies the familiar “later special statute prevails” rule with the command that the object and purpose of both enactments be examined,26<\/sup><\/a> while KSL & Industries Ltd.<\/span> v. Arihant Threads Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a> shows that a “not in derogation of” formula signals intended coexistence, so that a later Act does not abrogate an earlier special law by mere implication.27<\/sup><\/a> Madras Petrochem Ltd.<\/span> v. Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction<\/span><\/span><\/a> makes the governing criterion explicit: the outcome turns on legislative intent, statutory purpose, and whether the later statute preserves the earlier.28<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Applied to Clause 70 and Section 238, these authorities point away from both “the IBC<\/a> always wins” and “the later Code always wins”, and towards a field-of-operation reconciliation. On a proper reading the two provisions do not occupy the same field. Section 238 secures the integrity of the collective insolvency process against outside claimants who would seize the debtor’s assets; Clause 70 secures the integrity of the settlement system against the systemic contagion of a member’s failure. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd.<\/span> v. Amit Gupta<\/span><\/span><\/a> — where Section 238’s override was affirmed but the Code was still to be read in context and by harmonious interpretation29<\/sup><\/a> — and Paschimanchal<\/span><\/a>30<\/sup><\/a>, with its insistence on examining the scheme rather than applying the clause mechanically, both authorise exactly this fields-analysis. The systemic-risk rationale is the interpretive key: because the settlement-finality field is one the IBC<\/a> was never designed to occupy, giving Clause 70 effect within that field does not “frustrate the insolvency process” in the Innoventive<\/span><\/a>31<\/sup><\/a> sense at all; it removes from the estate only what the estate was never entitled to disturb.<\/p>\n

Two refinements keep the reconciliation principled rather than a blank cheque for the market. First, IBBI<\/span> v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu<\/span><\/span><\/a> — cautioning that a specific statutory reference incorporated into the IBC<\/a> is frozen as on the date of enactment and demands careful textual analysis before later changes are read across32<\/sup><\/a> — warns the drafter that a loosely worded Clause 70 will not be read to sweep more broadly than its systemic justification. The carve-out must be drafted, and read, no wider than settlement finality, netting and the default waterfall genuinely require. Second, the carve-out cannot reach the residual surplus: once the clearing corporation is made whole, the balance is the debtor’s property and returns to the estate and Section 53 order. To that extent Section 238 is not displaced at all; it governs, as it should, everything the systemic mechanism leaves behind.<\/p>\n

Comparative and normative anchors<\/p>\n

India would not be inventing this settlement; it would be joining a settled international consensus. The comparative materials both confirm the carve-out and discipline its width.<\/p>\n

The European Union’s Settlement Finality Directive (98\/26\/EC) is the closest analogue. It protects transfer orders entered into a designated system, and the netting of such orders, from being unwound by the insolvency of a participant; it disapplies the “zero-hour” rule that would otherwise backdate insolvency to the start of the day; and it makes collateral security provided in connection with a system enforceable notwithstanding the insolvency of the provider. Its animating premise is exactly Characterisation B<\/span>: finality is a systemic property that insolvency law must respect, not a priority that insolvency law may re-rank.33<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI)- International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures generalise the point into a global standard. Principle 1 requires a financial market infrastructure to have a well-founded legal basis with a high degree of certainty across all relevant jurisdictions; Principle 8 requires clear and certain settlement finality; and Principle 13 requires default rules and procedures — including close-out and the application of collateral — that are enforceable despite a participant’s insolvency. Principle 14’s requirements on the segregation and portability of client positions and collateral underpin exactly the point made above34<\/sup><\/a>: Client assets should be kept out of the failed member’s estate and moved to a solvent member, not marshalled by the resolution professional.35<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

India has already accepted this logic in the payments domain. The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007<\/a> gives statutory finality to the netting and settlement determined by an authorised system provider, and protects it against anything inconsistent in other law, including insolvency law.36<\/sup><\/a> There is no principled reason to ring-fence Reserve Bank of India (RBI)-regulated payment systems while leaving Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)-regulated securities-settlement systems exposed. The parity argument is, on its own, close to decisive, and it is the shortest route to persuading a court that Clause 70 codifies rather than innovates. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) materials the Standing Committee invoked point the same way: The Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law treats financial contracts and close-out netting as a recognised exception to the automatic stay and to avoidance, precisely because their systemic character distinguishes them from ordinary executory contracts.37<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

A proposed framework<\/p>\n

Pulling the threads together, the following framework is offered for deciding when securities-market-infrastructure action escapes the moratorium, and for drafting the reconciliation into the new Code.<\/p>\n

The test for Section 14<\/span>: Clearing-corporation action falls outside Section 14 where, and only where, it 1) operates on a settlement that had already achieved finality under the system’s rules before the insolvency commencement date; 2) constitutes close-out netting and the application of the member’s own committed collateral to the resulting net obligation, under pre-existing default rules; or 3) effects the segregation and portability of client assets and positions, which are not the debtor’s property. Action falling inside Section 14 — and therefore stayed and remitted to the estate — is the clearing corporation’s claim, if any, to the residual net surplus of the member’s own assets after 1) to 3) are worked through, together with any unsecured shortfall it must prove in the CIRP.<\/p>\n

The test for competing overriding clauses<\/span>: Clause 70 and Section 238 should be reconciled on a field-of-operation basis: the settlement-finality field belongs to the Code that governs it, and Section 238 continues to govern the collective insolvency process, including the residual surplus. “Later-in-time” is a fallback, to be reached only if a genuine, irreconcilable overlap in the same field survives harmonisation — which, on the analysis above, it does not.<\/p>\n

Drafting recommendations<\/span>: The carve-out in the Securities Markets Code should be expressed as a field carve-out, not a mere priority. It should state that finality, netting and default-waterfall action are not “proceedings” or “recovery of property” for the purposes of the IBC<\/a> moratorium, rather than merely asserting a rank ahead of other creditors; the latter drafting invites the very waterfall analysis — and the Paschimanchal<\/span><\/a>38<\/sup><\/a>\/Rainbow Papers<\/span><\/a>39<\/sup><\/a> contest — that the systemic rationale is meant to avoid. The clause should be confined by its own terms to what systemic integrity requires, so that Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu<\/a>‘s<\/span>40<\/sup><\/a> caution against over-broad incorporation is satisfied on the face of the statute. The correlative amendment to the IBC<\/a>, or an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) regulation, should acknowledge the carve-out expressly, so that the reconciliation does not depend on litigation to discover it. And the segregation and portability of client assets should be stated in terms that track the third-party-asset exclusions in Sections 18 and 36, so that the two Codes speak the same language about whose property is in the estate.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

The insolvency of a market participant is where two of the most powerful non obstante regimes in Indian commercial law finally meet. The pre-Code authorities made the exchange a secured creditor superior to the sovereign, but they did so in a vanished institutional world and against a weaker adversary than the moratorium. The insolvency authorities subordinate competing statutory claimants to the collective process, but they developed that discipline against customs and electricity dues, whose enforcement threatens only the estate. Settlement finality is different in kind: to unwind it is not to re-order the failed member’s creditors but to visit his failure on solvent third parties and the system that stood behind them. That difference is the article’s fulcrum. Properly understood, settlement finality and close-out are not claims the moratorium must rank but a mechanism the moratorium must respect; the Securities Markets Code’s “notwithstanding” priority is best read not as a raw override of Section 238 but as the codification of a field the insolvency Code was never meant to occupy; and the residual surplus, once the system is made whole, returns to the estate where it belongs. Whether the courts reach that reconciliation before the first large clearing-member failure tests it remains, for now, an open question. The virtue of settling it in advance is the same virtue the whole doctrine of finality serves: certainty, before the system needs it.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n

*Advocate; Former Member, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal; Former District Judge; Managing Partner, VPS Law Associates. Author can be reached at: office.vpsingh@gmail.com<\/a>.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

1.<\/a> Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026<\/a>, which received Presidential assent on 6-4-2026, recalibrating admission and withdrawal timelines, the committee of creditors oversight of liquidation and the treatment of avoidance transactions, and inserting a creditor-initiated resolution process together with enabling provisions for group and cross-border insolvency.<\/p>\n

2.<\/a> Securities Markets Code Bill, 2025, introduced in the Lok Sabha on 18-12-2025, consolidating the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956<\/a>, Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992<\/a> and Depositories Act, 1996<\/a>, and providing statutory recognition of settlement finality and the netting of clearing-corporation obligations.<\/p>\n

3.<\/a> Report of the departmentally-related Standing Committee examining the Securities Markets Code Bill, 2025 (July 2026), recommending that the clearing-corporation priority clause be recast from “subject to” to “notwithstanding” the IBC<\/a>. The priority provision is referred to in commentary as Clause 70 and the finality provision as the netting\/settlement-finality clause; Bill-stage numbering may change on enactment.<\/p>\n

4.<\/a> (1999) 6 SCC 215<\/a> : (1999) 97 Comp Cas 874.<\/p>\n

5.<\/a> (1971) 1 SCC 50<\/a> : (1971) 41 Comp Cas 51.<\/p>\n

6.<\/a> (2001) 3 SCC 559<\/a> : (2001) 248 ITR 209 : (2001) 105 Comp Cas 76.<\/p>\n

7.<\/a> (2004) 1 SCC 160<\/a> : (2003) 117 Comp Cas 595.<\/p>\n

8.<\/a> (2015) 2 SCC 1<\/a> : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 694 : (2014) 368 ITR 296 : (2014) 187 Comp Cas 143.<\/p>\n

9.<\/a> Vinay Bubna<\/span> v. Mumbai Stock Exchange<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (1999) 6 SCC 215<\/a> : (1999) 97 Comp Cas 874.<\/p>\n

10.<\/a> Bombay Stock Exchange<\/span> v. Jaya I. Shah<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2004) 1 SCC 160<\/a> : (2003) 117 Comp Cas 595.<\/p>\n

11.<\/a> Securities Contracts (Regulation) (Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations) Regulations, 2018<\/a>, especially the provisions on settlement and netting and on the bye-laws, rules and rights of the clearing corporation; and see<\/span> Securities and Exchange Board of India (Stock Brokers) Regulations, 1992<\/a> on net-worth and deposit requirements for stock-brokers and clearing members.<\/p>\n

12.<\/a> (2021) 3 SCC 401<\/a>.<\/p>\n

13.<\/a> Bombay Stock Exchange<\/span> v. V.S. Kandalgaonkar<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2015) 2 SCC 1<\/a> : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 694 : (2014) 368 ITR 296 : (2014) 187 Comp Cas 143.<\/p>\n

14.<\/a> (2021) 6 SCC 258<\/a> : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 818 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 427 : (2021) 14 Comp Cas-OL 1.<\/p>\n

15.<\/a> (2018) 17 SCC 394<\/a> : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 458 : (2018) 210 Comp Cas 364.<\/p>\n

16.<\/a> (2023) 1 SCC 472<\/a> : (2022) 22 GSTR-OL 6 : (2022) 19 Comp Cas-OL 816.<\/p>\n

17.<\/a> Bombay Stock Exchange<\/span> v. V.S. Kandalgaonkar<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2015) 2 SCC 1<\/a> : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 694 : (2014) 368 ITR 296 : (2014) 187 Comp Cas 143.<\/p>\n

18.<\/a> (2018) 1 SCC 407<\/a> : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 356 : (2017) 205 Comp Cas 57.<\/p>\n

19.<\/a> Bombay Stock Exchange<\/span> v. Jaya I. Shah<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2004) 1 SCC 160<\/a> : (2003) 117 Comp Cas 595.<\/p>\n

20.<\/a> (2023) 10 SCC 60<\/a> : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 489 : (2023) 23 Comp Cas-OL 524.<\/p>\n

21.<\/a> (2023) 9 SCC 545<\/a> : (2022) 234 Comp Cas 584. The review petitions against the decision were dismissed in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal<\/span> v. STO<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2024) 2 SCC 362<\/a> : (2024) 1 SCC (Civ) 135 : (2023) 241 Comp Cas 283, but its applicability has been confined to its own facts in Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.<\/span> v. Raman Ispat (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2023) 10 SCC 60<\/a> : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 489 : (2023) 23 Comp Cas-OL 524.<\/p>\n

22.<\/a> STO<\/span> v. Rainbow Papers Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2023) 9 SCC 545<\/a> : (2022) 234 Comp Cas 584.<\/p>\n

23.<\/a> P. Mohanraj<\/span> v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2021) 6 SCC 258<\/a> : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 818 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 427 : (2021) 14 Comp Cas-OL 1.<\/p>\n

24.<\/a> (2005) 9 SCC 129<\/a> : 2005 SCC (L&S) 460.<\/p>\n

25.<\/a> (2020) 6 SCC 411<\/a> : (2020) 2 SCC (L&S) 370.<\/p>\n

26.<\/a> (2001) 3 SCC 71<\/a> : (2001) 104 Comp Cas 569.<\/p>\n

27.<\/a> (2015) 1 SCC 166<\/a> : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 462 : (2015) 190 Comp Cas 328.<\/p>\n

28.<\/a> (2016) 4 SCC 1<\/a> : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 478 : (2016) 194 Comp Cas 594.<\/p>\n

29.<\/a> (2021) 7 SCC 209<\/a> : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 1 : (2021) 226 Comp Cas 432.<\/p>\n

30.<\/a> Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.<\/span> v. Raman Ispat (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2023) 10 SCC 60<\/a> : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 489 : (2023) 23 Comp Cas-OL 524.<\/p>\n

31.<\/a> Innoventive Industries Ltd.<\/span> v. ICICI Bank<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2018) 1 SCC 407<\/a> : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 356 : (2017) 205 Comp Cas 57.<\/p>\n

32.<\/a> (2024) 6 SCC 508<\/a> : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 234 : (2024) 244 Comp Cas 339.<\/p>\n

33.<\/a> Directive 98\/26\/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (Settlement Finality Directive).<\/p>\n

34.<\/a> See<\/span>, “The insolvency overlay: What Section 14 freezes, and what it does not”.<\/p>\n

35.<\/a> Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (CPMI-IOSCO), Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures<\/span> (April 2012), especially, Principles 1 (legal basis), 8 (settlement finality), 13 (participant-default rules and procedures) and 14 (segregation and portability).<\/p>\n

36.<\/a> Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007<\/a>, provisions on the finality of settlement and netting and their protection against inconsistent law, including insolvency.<\/p>\n

37.<\/a> UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law<\/span>, on the treatment of financial contracts and close-out netting as an exception to the stay and to avoidance; and, for the cross-border coda, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.<\/p>\n

38.<\/a> Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.<\/span> v. Raman Ispat (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2023) 10 SCC 60<\/a> : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 489 : (2023) 23 Comp Cas-OL 524.<\/p>\n

39.<\/a> STO<\/span> v. Rainbow Papers Ltd.<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2023) 9 SCC 545<\/a> : (2022) 234 Comp Cas 584.<\/p>\n

40.<\/a> IBBI<\/span> v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu<\/span><\/span><\/a>, (2024) 6 SCC 508<\/a> : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 234 : (2024) 244 Comp Cas 339.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

by V.P. Singh*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":67011,"featured_media":399657,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[42503,1191],"tags":[117969,117972,117974,117971,117970,117973,96531,117975,117968],"class_list":["post-399634","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-legal-analysis","category-op-ed","tag-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium","tag-clearing-corporation-priority-ibc","tag-clearing-member-insolvency","tag-close-out-netting-india","tag-section-14-ibc-securities-settlement","tag-section-238-ibc-and-securities-markets","tag-securities-markets-code-2025","tag-securities-settlement-finality","tag-settlement-finality-insolvency-india"],"yoast_head":"\nSettlement Finality and IBC Moratorium: Clearing Corporation Rights | SCC Times<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"An analysis of settlement finality, close-out netting and clearing-corporation rights under the IBC moratorium and proposed Securities Markets Code.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"An analysis of settlement finality, close-out netting and clearing-corporation rights under the IBC moratorium and proposed Securities Markets Code.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"SCC Times\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/scc.online\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-10-26T03:30:16+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"886\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"590\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Editor\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Editor\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"22 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Editor\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe\"},\"headline\":\"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-10-26T03:30:16+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":4579,\"commentCount\":0,\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp\",\"keywords\":[\"clearing corporation insolvency moratorium\",\"clearing corporation priority IBC\",\"clearing member insolvency\",\"close-out netting India\",\"Section 14 IBC securities settlement\",\"Section 238 IBC and securities markets\",\"Securities Markets Code 2025\",\"securities settlement finality\",\"settlement finality insolvency India\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Op Eds\",\"OP. ED.\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/\",\"name\":\"Settlement Finality and IBC Moratorium: Clearing Corporation Rights | SCC Times\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-10-26T03:30:16+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe\"},\"description\":\"An analysis of settlement finality, close-out netting and clearing-corporation rights under the IBC moratorium and proposed Securities Markets Code.\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp\",\"width\":886,\"height\":590,\"caption\":\"Settlement finality and IBC moratorium\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/2026\\\/10\\\/26\\\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/\",\"name\":\"SCC Times\",\"description\":\"Bringing you the Best Analytical Legal News\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe\",\"name\":\"Editor\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Editor\"},\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.scconline.com\\\/blog\\\/post\\\/author\\\/editor_4\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO Premium plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Settlement Finality and IBC Moratorium: Clearing Corporation Rights | SCC Times","description":"An analysis of settlement finality, close-out netting and clearing-corporation rights under the IBC moratorium and proposed Securities Markets Code.","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code","og_description":"An analysis of settlement finality, close-out netting and clearing-corporation rights under the IBC moratorium and proposed Securities Markets Code.","og_url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/","og_site_name":"SCC Times","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/scc.online\/","article_published_time":"2026-10-26T03:30:16+00:00","og_image":[{"width":886,"height":590,"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Editor","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_title":"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Editor","Est. reading time":"22 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/"},"author":{"name":"Editor","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe"},"headline":"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code","datePublished":"2026-10-26T03:30:16+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/"},"wordCount":4579,"commentCount":0,"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp","keywords":["clearing corporation insolvency moratorium","clearing corporation priority IBC","clearing member insolvency","close-out netting India","Section 14 IBC securities settlement","Section 238 IBC and securities markets","Securities Markets Code 2025","securities settlement finality","settlement finality insolvency India"],"articleSection":["Op Eds","OP. ED."],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/","url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/","name":"Settlement Finality and IBC Moratorium: Clearing Corporation Rights | SCC Times","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp","datePublished":"2026-10-26T03:30:16+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe"},"description":"An analysis of settlement finality, close-out netting and clearing-corporation rights under the IBC moratorium and proposed Securities Markets Code.","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp","width":886,"height":590,"caption":"Settlement finality and IBC moratorium"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/26\/settlement-finality-clearing-corporation-insolvency-moratorium\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Finality Against the Stay Settlement Finality, Clearing-Corporation Priority and the Insolvency Moratorium After the Securities Markets Code"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/","name":"SCC Times","description":"Bringing you the Best Analytical Legal News","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/84e42bab48238baf12c7e33b3d9761fe","name":"Editor","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/34e366be721c41333586de05faa13743195f5b142dcd7a015c6fabd2389521d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Editor"},"url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/author\/editor_4\/"}]}},"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/Settlement-finality-and-IBC-moratorium-1.webp","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/399634","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/67011"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=399634"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/399634\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":399659,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/399634\/revisions\/399659"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/399657"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=399634"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=399634"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=399634"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}