{"id":398290,"date":"2026-10-09T15:30:48","date_gmt":"2026-10-09T10:00:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=398290"},"modified":"2026-10-09T15:27:34","modified_gmt":"2026-10-09T09:57:34","slug":"high-courts-roundup-september-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/09\/high-courts-roundup-september-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"High Court Roundup September 2026: IVF Age Limit, Junior Advocates’ Stipend, Talaq-E-Hassan and More"},"content":{"rendered":"
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September 2026 saw several significant rulings across India’s High Courts, addressing questions ranging from the application of age restrictions under the Assisted Reproductive Technology Act and the rights of junior advocates to matrimonial rights, child welfare, criminal procedure, advocates’ professional rights, intellectual property and regulatory accountability. The Courts also examined questions concerning Talaq-E-Hassan, POSH limitation, students’ right to dissent, maternity protection, POCSO offences and the rights of persons with disabilities.<\/p>\n

From directions on IVF eligibility and minimum stipend guidelines for junior advocates to rulings on maintenance, custody, employment, arbitration, taxation and motor accident compensation, here is a quick summary of the month’s significant High Court rulings.<\/p>\n

STORIES OF THE MONTH<\/p>\n

“Age bar under ART Act applies to individuals, not the couple as a unit”; Couple allowed to avail IVF despite wife crossing prescribed age-limit<\/p>\n

In a writ petition filed by a couple seeking permission to avail In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) to conceive a child after the loss of their son, the Single Bench of Nirzar S. Desai, J. in X<\/span> v. Chief Medical Officer<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Guj 6712<\/a>, allowed the petition and directed the respondent authorities to permit the petitioners to avail IVF services, despite the wife having crossed the upper age limit of 50 years prescribed under Section 21(g)<\/a>, Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021<\/a> (the Act). Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

State Bar Council, Bar Association directed to create guidelines for minimum stipend to be paid to junior advocates<\/p>\n

In a service matter in Vipin Pandey<\/span> v. Rani Durgavati University<\/span>1<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, Jabalpur, the Single Judge Bench of Vishal Dhagat, J., directed the Madhya Pradesh State Bar Council (MPBC), in consultation with the MP High Court Bar Association (MP HCBA) and MP High Court Advocates’ Bar Association (MP HCABA) to lay down a guideline for minimum stipend to be paid to junior advocates for 3 years from the date of their engagement as per the Bar Council’s circular. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

ADVOCATES<\/p>\n

Advocate-client privilege protects communications, not advocate’s unlawful or independent conduct; GST search of Advocate’s office upheld<\/p>\n

The instant writ petition titled Puneet Batra v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7236<\/a>, was filed by an advocate (petitioner) challenging the search conducted by the respondents (GST Department) at the premises of M\/s Bass Legal LLP (Bass Legal), including the cabin being used by the petitioner, and the consequential seizure of his CPU and other documents, and the Delhi High Court was called to decide the extent to which advocate-client privilege can operate when the Advocate himself becomes the subject of investigation. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

BCI Chairman row: Plea seeking FIR over alleged Advocate assault dismissed<\/p>\n

In a case titled Kunal Yadav v. Manan Kumar Mishra, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7436<\/a>, concerning a petition seeking registration and investigation into an alleged assault of advocates at the premises of the Bar Council of India, the Delhi High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable in view of the availability of an alternate efficacious remedy under the Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023<\/a> (BNSS). The Court observed that the petitioners had not approached the DCP concerned or the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 223<\/a> BNSS<\/a> and had not established any negligence or inaction on the part of the SHO. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

State Bar Council directed to identify advocates who have not qualified AIBE since 2021 and continue review of defaults<\/p>\n

While considering a public interest litigation (PIL) titled Amarnath Joshi Surendiran v. Bar Council of Kerala, 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 15968<\/a>, concerning advocates who had not qualified the All India Bar Examination (AIBE), the Calcutta High Court directed the Bar Council of Kerala to update the list of such advocates from 2021 onwards within 8 weeks, continue reviewing defaults in qualifying the AIBE, publish the list of advocates who have qualified in the meantime, and ensure that the District Judiciary is informed through the prescribed mechanism. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

ARBITRATION<\/p>\n

Arbitral Tribunal’s interlocutory orders not amenable to interference absent patent lack of inherent jurisdiction<\/p>\n

The Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka<\/span> v. Everonn Education Ltd<\/span>., 2026 SCC OnLine Kar 13664<\/a>, dismissed a writ petition challenging an Arbitral Tribunal’s decision to recall an earlier order and reopen evidence. The Court held that an Arbitral Tribunal possesses substantial procedural autonomy under Section 19<\/a>, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a> (1996 Act) and the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 should ordinarily not be used to correct interlocutory procedural orders of an Arbitral Tribunal unless there is a patent jurisdictional defect or exceptional perversity. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Inside the Kennel Club of India Case: Section 21 Notice, Limitation and Appointment of Sole Arbitrator<\/p>\n

The Madras High Court in C.S. Sanjay Reddy<\/span> v. Kennel Club of India<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Mad, 8663<\/a>, held that the application is maintainable on the grounds of limitation under Section 14<\/a>, Limitation Act, 1963<\/a> and notice to be served under Section 21<\/a>, Arbitration and Conciliation Act<\/a>. The Court appointed Justice T.S. Sivagnanam, Former Chief Justice, Calcutta High Court, as sole arbitrator in the Kennel Club of India arbitration dispute holding that a formal Section 21 notice becomes unnecessary where the petitioner had already disclosed all details in a prior civil suit and the respondent had responded by filing a Section 8 application acknowledging that the dispute must be resolved via arbitration. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

ARMED FORCES<\/p>\n

Investigating Officer can act as Prosecutor in Court Martial proceedings; Regulation 178(3), Navy Regulations not violative of Article 21<\/p>\n

The Kerala High Court in Union of India<\/span> v. Santosh Karwade<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 16210<\/a>, dismissed the writ appeal filed by Naval personnel and allowed the Union of India’s appeal, holding that there is no prohibition under the Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations, 1965, (Navy Regulations) against appointing an investigating officer as the Prosecutor in the same court martial proceedings. The Court further held that Regulation 178(3), which provides that the Prosecutor is a competent witness, is not ultra vires of Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

CHILD RIGHTS<\/p>\n

Centre directed to decide on regulating children’s social-media access<\/span> <\/p>\n

In a writ petition titled Ms Kirti Dua v. Union of India<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6685<\/a>, raising concerns regarding the protection of children from potential harms associated with social-media access and inappropriate online content and seeking directions to the Union of India and other authorities for framing guidelines, regulations and legislation concerning children’s access to social-media platforms, age-based regulation of content, stronger implementation of existing laws, content filtering, protection against circulation of exploitative material and verification of users, the Delhi High Court directed the Union of India to consider the writ petition together with the petitioners’ note of suggestions and to pass a reasoned order. Read<\/span> more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

Also read:<\/span> Wife’s previous kidney donation not a valid ground to reject husband’s donation application; Kerala HC directs fresh consideration<\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u00af <\/p>\n

CRIMINAL LAW<\/p>\n

Four days of alleged detention, ₹14 lakh jewellery allegedly looted: SP probe & CCTV preservation at Unnao Police Station ordered<\/span>  <\/p>\n

In a criminal miscellaneous writ petition titled Ram Kumar v. State of U.P.<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine All 27797<\/a>, alleging illegal detention and loot by police personnel and Opposite Party 7, the Allahabad High Court directed the Superintendent of Police, Unnao to conduct an inquiry into the allegations, examine and preserve the CCTV footage of Police Station Hasanganj for the relevant period, and produce the same before the Court along with the inquiry report. Read<\/span> more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

Also read:<\/span> A clear acquittal, not a technical one: Rajasthan HC holds non-disclosure of acquittal not fatal to appointment<\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u00af <\/p>\n

Director or Vice-President cannot institute complaint for company without Board authorisation; Proceedings against employee, quashed<\/p>\n

In a case titled Nilesh Suryakant Jangam<\/span> v. State of Maharashtra<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 12575<\/a>, the Bombay High Court quashed criminal proceedings against an employee and held that a Director or Vice-President cannot institute complaint for company without Board authorisation. The Court observed that the complaint itself had been instituted without proper authorisation and that no prima facie case was disclosed against the employee. Accordingly, the FIR and the consequential proceedings were quashed insofar as the applicant was concerned. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Man convicted in 2009 minor rape case released; notes parties are now married and settled separately<\/p>\n

The Delhi High Court in Vakul Kapoor<\/span> v. State<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7015<\/a> stated that the appellant and the prosecutrix are living their married life with their respective spouses. Therefore, sending the appellant to jail, who has otherwise clean antecedents, would be nothing short of a travesty of justice. Thus, the Court accepted the appellant’s submissions and treated the period of custody already undergone by the appellant as sufficient punishment to meet the ends of justice, and accordingly directed the appellant to be released. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Suicide note absolving accused weakens prima facie case for abetment of suicide; Bail granted to husband<\/p>\n

While considering a petition seeking regular bail in an FIR registered for the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 108<\/a> read with Section 3(5)<\/a>, Nyaya Sanhita, 2023<\/a> (BNS) in Himesh Karki<\/span> v. State of H.P.<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine HP 5784<\/a>, a Single Judge Bench of Rakesh Kainthla, J., held that a suicide note absolving the accused weakens prima facie case for abetment of suicide. The Court observed that the suicide note stating that the deceased was committing suicide on her own and that no person should be harassed, carried greater prima facie value than earlier diary entries and letters alleging matrimonial harassment. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

“Predator of innocent girls”: Bail denied to man accused of using fake matrimonial profiles to induce women into sexual relations on false promise of marriage<\/p>\n

The Delhi High Court in Gaurav Jaiswal<\/span> v. State (NCT of Delhi)<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7438<\/a>, refused to grant bail to an accused alleged to have operated 9 different matrimonial profiles using varying identities and particulars. The Court observed that the creation and operation of multiple matrimonial profiles, including one in which the accused posed as a woman, prima facie lent credence to the prosecution’s case that he was a “predator of innocent girls” and held that the case was not fit for grant of bail. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Disclosures by co-accused cannot by itself justify continued custody; Parity and absence of specific role favour grant of bail<\/p>\n

In a case titled Shantanu<\/span> v. State of H.P<\/span>., 2026 SCC OnLine HP 5782<\/a>, involving offences under Sections 103<\/a>, 127(2)<\/a>, 125(2)<\/a>, 61(2)<\/a> and 3(5)<\/a>, Nyaya Sanhita, 2023<\/a> (BNS), the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that disclosures by co-accused while in police custody cannot by itself be used against another co-accused to justify continued custody. The Court further held that, where similarly placed co-accused had already been granted bail, no specific role had been attributed to the applicant, and the trial was likely to take considerable time to conclude, continued incarceration would amount to pre-trial punishment, thereby entitling the applicant to be enlarged on bail. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Victim’s credible testimony enough to sustain rape conviction despite no external injuries<\/span> <\/p>\n

In T. Thanaraj<\/span> v. State of T.N.<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Mad 7886<\/a>, while hearing a criminal appeal, a Division Bench considered whether the conviction of appellant\/accused for rape and allied offences could stand on the basis of the victim’s testimony, corroborative circumstances, and medical evidence despite the absence of external injuries and held that the victim testimony can sustain rape conviction when it inspires the confidence of the court and is natural, consistent, and trustworthy. While affirming the core prosecution version, the Court modified the conviction under Section 376(2)(f)<\/a> IPC<\/a> to Section 376(1)<\/a> IPC<\/a>, set aside the conviction under Section 354A (2)<\/a> IPC<\/a>, and maintained the conviction under Section 366<\/a> IPC<\/a>. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

CUSTOMS<\/p>\n

Failure to redeem confiscated gold bars within stipulated period cannot be attributed to petitioner where Customs failed to quantify applicable duty<\/p>\n

In a case titled Prikshith Jhaver<\/span> v. Commr. of Customs<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7204<\/a>, concerning the redemption of 12 confiscated gold bars seized from the Petitioner at the Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, the Delhi High Court directed the Customs Authorities to quantify and communicate the applicable duty to the petitioner, observing that the petitioner had approached the respondents within the prescribed period seeking such quantification, but the respondents had failed to respond. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

CYBER CRIME<\/p>\n

“Detrimental to confidence and trust of foreign nationals”: Relief denied to accused persons in large-scale international cyber fraud targeting foreign nationals<\/p>\n

In a writ petition titled Karolyn<\/span> v. State of U.P<\/span>., 2026 SCC OnLine All 31160<\/a>, filed by several accused persons in a large-scale international cyber fraud against their arrest, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that it was filed on misconceived grounds, as the accused persons were furnished grounds and reasons for arrest through the recovery memo, and phone calls were made to the nominated persons. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Bandhan Bank Directed to Defreeze the Petitioner’s Bank Account; Ordered to Hold Suspicious Amount Under Lien<\/p>\n

The Gauhati High Court in Ismail Hussain<\/span> v. Bandhan Bank<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Gau 6695<\/a>, held that restricting the account holder from doing any transactions impacts the person’s right to earn a livelihood and to carry out business transactions, which comes within the right to life guaranteed under the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court directed the bank authorities to defreeze the account by placing a lien only to the extent of the suspicious amount specified by the investigating authority, i.e. ₹1700, and to permit the account holder to operate the bank account with respect to the remaining balance. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

DISPARAGEMENT<\/p>\n

Delhi High Court rejects Bombay Shaving Company’s amended Switch4 Advertisement in Gillette disparagement suit<\/span> <\/p>\n

While hearing a case concerning the alleged disparagement of Gillette’s products through an advertisement for Bombay Shaving Company’s Switch4 razor, a Single Judge Bench in Gillette India Ltd.<\/span> v. Visage Lines Personal Care (P) Ltd.<\/span>,<\/span> 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7220<\/a> took strong exception to the portrayal of Court proceedings in the impugned advertisement. The Court described the portrayal as an “outright mockery”<\/span> of the Court, questioned the defendant’s continued use of such a promotional approach, and directed Bombay Shaving Company to take down the impugned advertisement from all platforms controlled by it. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a>  <\/span> <\/p>\n

Gillette’s Disparagement Plea: Bombay Shaving Company Restrained from Running Revised Switch4 Advertisement<\/p>\n

The Delhi High Court in Gillette India Ltd.<\/span> v. Visage Lines Personal Care (P) Ltd<\/span>., 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7466<\/a>, prima facie found that the purportedly “revised” advertisement, concerning Gillette’s products, had no perceptible difference in its impact from the original advertisement. While considering the plaintiff’s application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A<\/a> read with Section 151<\/a>, Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a> (CPC), the Court directed Bombay Shaving Company not to run the revised advertisement till the next date of hearing and directed that the plaintiff’s interim injunction application be heard along with the contempt application. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

ELECTION LAW<\/p>\n

Husband and wife are separate legal entities; Spouse cannot be compelled to clear public official’s dues for electoral participation<\/p>\n

In a writ petition titled Ramlaxman Meena<\/span> v. State of Rajasthan<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Raj 5583<\/a>, seeking direction to the respondents to issue No -Dues Certificate to the petitioner for the purpose of contesting the upcoming Panchayati Raj elections for Gram Panchayat at Falenda, Rajasthan, the Rajasthan High Court held that the petitioner could not be compelled to clear the dues recoverable from his wife, an erstwhile Sarpanch, as a condition for obtaining the certificate and contesting the election. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

FAMILY AND PERSONAL LAWS<\/p>\n

Stray instances of living together after separation do not amount to “condonation of cruelty” in divorce proceedings<\/span>  <\/p>\n

In a first appeal filed by wife (appellant) against a divorce decree passed in favour of her husband (respondent) titled Munmun Karmakar nee Ghosh<\/span> v. Abhishek Karmakar<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 12448<\/a>, on the ground of cruelty, contending that the ingredients of mental cruelty were not made out as Section 27(1)(d)<\/a>, Special Marriage Act<\/a> operates on the principle of fault, which was not established in the present case, the Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree of divorce dated 30 December 2021 passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court at Calcutta, holding that the appellant-wife was guilty of mental cruelty and that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. Read<\/span> more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

‘Pious wife’ and ‘Bahu’ remarks unwarranted and regressive, cannot replace child-welfare assessment: Family court’s interim custody order set aside<\/p>\n

In an appeal challenging the order of the Family Court directing restoration of interim custody of the minor child to the father and relocation to Singapore under Section 12<\/a>, Guardians and Wards Act, 1890<\/a> (Guardians and Wards Act), the Division Bench of Bharati Dangre and Ashish S. Chavan*, JJ. in Kshitija Anup Gogate<\/span> v. Anup Anil Gogate<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 11690<\/a>, held that the Family Court had not identified any imminent danger, neglect or circumstance demonstrating that continuation of the child in the mother’s custody was detrimental to him. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Technical barriers cannot defeat guardianship for person with mental illness<\/p>\n

In a case titled Nibedita Dutta Chaudhuri<\/span> v. State of W.B<\/span>., 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 12781<\/a>, the Calcutta High Court held that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia with 65 per cent certified disability cannot be excluded from consideration for legal guardianship. Applying the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016<\/a> alongside the National Trust Act, 1999, the Court directed authorities to consider the sister’s guardianship application expeditiously. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Mere completion of ITI course or ability to move independently does not establish financial self-sufficiency; Maintenance for disabled child despite attaining majority affirmed<\/p>\n

In a criminal revision petition was filed under Sections 407<\/a> and 482<\/a>, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973<\/a> (CrPC) challenging the orders dated 31 March 2022 and 10 January 2023, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 3rd Court, Ranaghat, Nadia, whereby the trial court rejected the petitioner-husband’s challenge to the maintainability of maintenance proceedings under Section 127<\/a> CrPC<\/a> initiated on behalf of his major son suffering from 70 per cent physical disability. Uday Kumar, J. in Samit Pramanick<\/span> v. State of W.B.<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 14034<\/a>, held that the impugned orders suffer from no material irregularity, or legal impropriety, and the trial court has correctly interpreted the statutory safeguards protecting a physically handicapped adult dependent. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Talaq-E-Hassan a valid form of divorce; registration must be sought before competent authority under Assam Act, 2024<\/span> <\/p>\n

While hearing a writ petition concerning registration of a divorce pronounced through Talaq-E-Hassan, a Single Judge Bench in X<\/span> v. State of Assam<\/span>2<\/sup><\/a><\/span> while referring to Shayara Bano<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span>, (2017) 9 SCC 1<\/a>, held that Talaq-E-Hassan is a valid and recognised form of Talaq and is not prohibited under law. The Court noted that the authority approached by the petitioner for registering the divorce was functioning under the repealed Assam Moslem Marriages and Divorces Registration Act, 1935. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE<\/p>\n

Satya Niketan PG Hostel Building Collapse: Citywide PG Hostels inspection directed, inquiry into regulatory lapses, fixing of Officials’ responsibility<\/p>\n

In a public interest litigation (PIL) filed in the wake of the collapse of 2 buildings being run as PG hostels for boys at Satya Niketan, New Delhi, housing around 50 students, resulting in the death of at least 7 persons, the Division Bench of Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, CJ., and Tejas Karia, J. in Aniket Kumar Gupta<\/span> v. State (NCT of Delhi)<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6754<\/a>, expressed serious concern over the inadequate hostel facilities available to out-station students, the safety and security of students residing in PG hostels, and the measures adopted by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and other authorities to regulate such establishments. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

DDA directed to process pending freehold conversion applications; says revised policy cannot apply retrospectively<\/p>\n

Dealing with the long-pending issue of DDA leasehold to freehold conversion policy, the Division Bench of Prathiba M. Singh* and Vikas Mahajan, JJ. in DDA<\/span> v. Mala Sahni Seth<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7108<\/a>, noted that there were a large number of pending applications for which conversion charges had already been collected, however, they were not being processed because the portal had been shut down. Thus, the Court stated that any fresh policy would ordinarily have to be prospective, and that all pending paid applications must be dealt with as per the policy prevailing when the applications were filed. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

EDUCATION LAW<\/p>\n

Caught with cheating material but not caught cheating? That’s not enough for major unfair means penalty<\/span> <\/p>\n

In a petition filed under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution of India<\/a> titled X16<\/span> v. University of Delhi<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6713<\/a>, seeking issuance of writ of mandamus directing the respondent to set aside the adverse findings recorded in the impugned Unfair Means (UFM) proceeding and declare petitioner’s examination result, in view of the absence of any incriminating material found in the petitioner’s possession, the Delhi High Court held that for imposing the major penalty under Clause B of the applicable guidelines, it is not enough that cheating material is found in the candidate’s possession or vicinity, but the record must establish “actual use” of the material for copying or cheating. Read<\/span> more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

Ad interim relief granted to PCI-approved pharmacy college, inclusion in upcoming Central Admission Process rounds directed despite State ban<\/p>\n

The Bombay High Court in Shri Shamrao Patil (Yedravkar) Educational & Charitable Trust<\/span> v. Pharmacy Council of India<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 12697<\/a> noted that the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) had already granted approval to the petitioner-institution after carrying out an inspection. The Court observed that the issue regarding the jurisdiction of the State authorities to impose such a blanket ban would be considered at the final hearing. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Big relief to FMGE aspirants; Procedure for issuance of duplicate NEET-UG scorecards simplified<\/p>\n

In a batch of writ petitions filed by medical graduates, who had misplaced or lost their National Eligibility cum Entrance Test-Undergraduate (NEET-UG) scorecards of previous years, seeking issuance\/release of duplicate scorecards in order to complete their applications and participate in the Foreign Medical Graduate Examination (FMGE), scheduled for 31 October 2026, the Single Judge Bench of Jasmeet Singh, J. in Ayush Kumar<\/span> v. National Testing Agency<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7468<\/a>, allowed the application issued directions simplifying the procedure for issuance of duplicate NEET-UG scorecards to enable FMGE aspirants to participate in examination. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

GOODS AND SERVICES TAX<\/p>\n

GST on Copyright Licensing of Films; Digital Content Cannot Be Equated with “Software”<\/p>\n

In a writ petition challenging orders confirming goods and services tax (GST) demand by classifying licensing of copyright in cinematographic films as licensing of information technology software, the Division Bench of M.S. Karnik* and Sandesh D. Patil, JJ. in Dharma Productions (P) Ltd<\/span>. v. State of Maharashtra<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 12696<\/a>, held that licensing by the original copyright holder falls under Service Accounting Code (SAC) 997332, and that classification must be determined by the essential character of the supply, not the mode of transmission. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Also read:<\/span> Section 74, CGST Act cannot be invoked without foundational facts of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression: Supreme Court<\/a><\/p>\n

INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAWS<\/p>\n

CIRP and subsequent jurisdictional proceedings constitute sufficient cause: SAP India’s Arbitral Tribunal mandate extended by one year<\/p>\n

The Bombay High Court in SAP India (P) Ltd<\/span>. v. Cox and Kings Ltd<\/span>., 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 12690<\/a>, held that the petitioner had made out sufficient cause for extending the mandate of the Tribunal. The Court observed that the arbitral proceedings had been adjourned sine die after the respondent was admitted into the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) and the moratorium under Section 14<\/a>, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016<\/a> (IBC), came into force, following which the respondent invoked fresh arbitration involving a virtually identical claim. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK<\/p>\n

A century of goodwill belongs to the Firm, not the family: What the Fox & Mandal ruling means<\/span> <\/p>\n

The Calcutta High Court granted summary judgment in favour of Fox & Mandal in a passing-off dispute titled Fox & Mandal<\/span> v. Somabrata Mandal<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 12350<\/a>. The Court held that Fox & Mandal had established prior use, reputation and goodwill dating from 1896, while the defendants had no legal entitlement to the firm’s goodwill or marks. Finding no real prospect of a successful defence, the Court permanently restrained the defendants from representing any association with Fox & Mandal. The Court observed that an action for passing off can succeed even if there is a likelihood of injury or damage. Read<\/span> more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

Mankind Pharma’s “KIND” formative marks protected against deceptively similar pharmaceutical marks<\/p>\n

In a trade mark infringement and passing off suit instituted by Mankind Pharma Ltd., a Single Judge Bench of Jyoti Singh, J. in Mankind Pharma Ltd.<\/span> v. Coskind Pharma (P) Ltd<\/span>.3<\/sup><\/a>, granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from dealing in pharmaceutical products under the marks “Florakind”, “Coskind”, “Etorikind”, “Pandokind”, “Rabelkind” and “M-Predkind”, or any other identical or deceptively similar “KIND”-formative mark or trade name. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

JURISDICTION<\/p>\n

No Delhi jurisdiction over Maharashtra FDA notice to VIMAL Elaichi’s brand ambassadors; mere location of business and FSSAI in Delhi insufficient<\/span> <\/p>\n

While hearing a challenge to a show-cause notice issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Mumbai, to the brand ambassadors of the VIMAL Elaichi advertising campaign, namely, Ajay Devgn, Shah Rukh Khan and Tiger Shroff, for alleged misrepresentation of the product in their advertisement, a Single Judge Bench in P.B. Agro LLP<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7080<\/a>, held that the mere fact that a petitioner is based in Delhi, or that certain authorities impleaded in the writ petition are situated in Delhi, does not confer territorial jurisdiction upon the Delhi High Court where the impugned action has been independently initiated by a State authority in another State and no substantial part of the cause of action has arisen in Delhi. Read more HERE <\/a> <\/span> <\/p>\n

MOTOR ACCIDENT COMPENSATION<\/p>\n

Burden of proving policy breach lies on insurer: Motor Accident Compensation enhanced to ₹ 11.90 Lakhs<\/p>\n

The Jharkhand High Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd.<\/span> v. Gayatri Kuar<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Jhar 2262<\/a> held that an insurer must specifically plead and prove a fundamental policy breach before seeking pay-and-recover relief. As no convincing evidence established absence of a permit, liability remained with the insurer. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Also read:<\/span> Falling of Tree Branch Not Accident “Arising Out of the Use of a Motor Vehicle”; To Do Complete Justice SC Enhances Compensation to ₹ 25 lakhs Under Article 142<\/a><\/p>\n

Does an Australian driving licence establish the right to drive in India?<\/p>\n

The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sameer Gaba<\/span> v. Priyanka<\/span>4<\/sup><\/a><\/span> held that an Australian domestic driving licence does not automatically entitle its holder to drive a motor vehicle in India. The Court observed that, in the absence of a valid International Driving Permit or any authorisation recognised under Indian law, such a licence cannot be treated as a valid and effective driving licence under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988<\/a>. The Court consequently upheld the insurer’s right to recover the compensation amount from the driver and owner of the offending vehicle. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

PREVENTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT<\/p>\n

POSH limitation runs from the last incident, not the fear or apprehension in the mind of the complainant<\/span> <\/p>\n

In State of W.B.<\/span> v. Lala Mir<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 13644<\/a>, while hearing a writ petition filed against an order passed by the W.B. Administrative Tribunal, setting aside the ICC’s report under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013<\/a> (POSH), a Division Bench declared that a 3-months period of limitation as per Section 9 of the Act is to be reckoned with reference to the date of the last incident of Sexual Harassment. Also, the Act does not recognize mere fear or apprehension in the mind of the complainant as a ground for lodging a complaint. Read more HERE<\/a><\/span> <\/p>\n

PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENCES<\/p>\n

Applying mouth to a child’s private part constitutes penetrative sexual assault under S. 3(d)<\/a>, POCSO Act<\/a>; Conviction upheld<\/p>\n

While considering an appeal challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court for offences under Section 6<\/a> read with Section 5(l)<\/a> and Section 10<\/a> read with Section 9(l)<\/a>, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012<\/a> (POCSO Act), a Single Judge Bench of A. Badharudeen, J. in Thomas Thomas<\/span> v. State of Kerala<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 13623<\/a>, held that the evidence proved the accused’s act of applying mouth to a child’s private part which constituted penetrative sexual assault under Section 3(d)<\/a>, POCSO Act<\/a>. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Also read:<\/span> Supreme Court permits mother to relocate minor children to UK; holds father facing POCSO prosecution disentitled to custody<\/a><\/p>\n

Sentence suspended in teacher-student POCSO case over material contradictions and lack of electronic evidence<\/p>\n

The Bombay High Court in Mahesh Chanekar<\/span> v. State of Goa<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 11691<\/a> held that the record disclosed material contradictions, omissions and improvements in the prosecutrix’s version, coupled with absence of electronic evidence, thereby indicating fair chances of acquittal, and therefore, the Court suspended the sentence imposed by the trial court. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE<\/p>\n

Individual causes of action, separate court fees; Common cause, single court fees<\/span> <\/p>\n

While considering an interim application titled Satyam A. Surana v. High Court of Bombay<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Bom 10661<\/a>, which sought a declaration that court fees prescribed under Entry 1(f)(ii) of Schedule II<\/a>, Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959<\/a> (Court Fees Act) should be levied “per petition” and not “per petitioner” in proceedings under Articles 226<\/a> and 227<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>, the Bombay High Court held that the issue must be determined on the basis of the nature of the cause of action and the character of the relief claimed. Read<\/span> more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Can a civil suit for partition, separate possession and rendition of accounts continue when division of property is covered by an arbitration agreement?<\/p>\n

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Vijay Kumar Aggarwal<\/span> v. Shubham Aggarwal<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine P&H 29227<\/a>, while considering a civil revision challenging the dismissal of an application under Order 7 Rule 11<\/a>, Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a> (CPC), held that the reliefs sought in the civil suit extended beyond the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement, and that the arbitrator would not be able to consider the interests of other parties entitled in equity and law. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

RIGHT TO DISSENT<\/p>\n

“Smiling at protestors” not indiscipline; Students’ right to dissent, demonstrate and express support recognised<\/p>\n

The Delhi High Court in C. Arjun<\/span> v. JNU<\/span>5<\/sup><\/a> held that, even assuming the allegations to be correct, the petitioners were, at best, seen “smiling at the protestors”, which prima facie did not constitute an act of indiscipline. The Court recognised students’ right to “express dissent\/demonstrate and\/or to express support by way of cheering for a demonstration” as a valuable right and stayed the recovery of the ₹19,000 fine imposed on each petitioner pending further proceedings. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

ROADS AND RAILWAYS<\/p>\n

Speculative challenge to Priyadarshini Bus Scheme dismissed; No material found linking bus accidents to overcrowding<\/span> <\/p>\n

While considering a public interest litigation (PIL) titled Akhila P.R. v. State of Kerala<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 12388<\/a>, alleging that vehicles operated under the Priyadarshini Bus Scheme were involved in accidents owing to overcrowding, the Kerala High Court held that the allegation was not corroborated by any document and that no material had been produced to substantiate the assertion that the accidents occurred on account of overcrowding. Consequently, the Court dismissed the PIL but observed that the Government must ensure that the safety of passengers travelling in the buses is adequately safeguarded. Read<\/span> more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span>  <\/p>\n

SERVICE LAW<\/p>\n

EWS Certificate from the year before cannot be rejected without clear stipulation in recruitment notice; Coast Guard Navik allowed to continue in service<\/p>\n

In a writ petition challenging the rejection of the petitioner’s candidature for recruitment as Navik (General Duty) in the 01\/2025 Batch of the Indian Coast Guard on the ground that the EWS certificate submitted by him pertained to the Financial Year 2023—24 instead of 2024—25, the Division Bench comprising Nitin Wasudeo Sambre and Amit Sharma, JJ in Kadam Kiran Sanjay<\/span> v. Indian Coast Guard<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7081<\/a>, noted that the recruitment advertisement did not clearly stipulate the relevant financial year and contained provisions creating ambiguity regarding the validity of EWS certificates. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

SPORTS LAW<\/p>\n

Vinesh Phogat’s interim plea for participation in 2026 World Wrestling Championships Selection Trials declined<\/p>\n

The Delhi High Court in Vinesh Phogat<\/span> v. Wrestling Federation of India<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 7069<\/a>, declined to grant interim relief to wrestler Vinesh Phogat permitting her to participate in the selection trials for the 2026 Senior World Wrestling Championships, holding that maternity-related absence doesn’t warrant interim exemption from uniform selection criteria. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

STREET VENDING<\/p>\n

Prior vendor survey and vending plan by Town Vending Committee and local authority mandatory for declaring vending zones<\/p>\n

A contempt petition titled Mahavir Jain v. Amit Yadav, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6494<\/a>, was filed alleging wilful disobedience of common orders. The Delhi High Court, while considering the judgment of the Division Judge Bench, wherein, it interpreted Street Vendors Act, 2014 and gave binding directions, found no fault in the NDMC’s action in removal of the petitioners’ goods from no-vending area. Hence, the present petition was dismissed and contempt notice was discharged. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT<\/p>\n

UAPA Property Attachment: Jharkhand HC Distinguishes Legitimate Assets from Alleged Terror Proceeds<\/p>\n

The Jharkhand High Court in Sushila Devi<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine Jhar 1856<\/a> partly allowed an appeal challenging attachment of properties under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967<\/a> (UAPA). The Court released a TVS scooty owned by Appellant 1, holding that her independent employment and salary supported legitimate acquisition. However, the attachment of a JCB loader and a double-storeyed building was upheld as the appellants failed to produce sufficient documentary evidence establishing legitimate sources of funds for their acquisition or construction. Read more<\/span> HERE<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

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