{"id":398146,"date":"2026-10-08T10:30:07","date_gmt":"2026-10-08T05:00:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/?p=398146"},"modified":"2026-10-08T13:20:55","modified_gmt":"2026-10-08T07:50:55","slug":"supreme-court-september-2026-explore-key-judgments-and-stories","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.scconline.com\/blog\/post\/2026\/10\/08\/supreme-court-september-2026-explore-key-judgments-and-stories\/","title":{"rendered":"NEET-UG FIRs, Safety of Women & Children, Article 22 Safeguards, AI-Hallucinated Citations: Key Rulings in September 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

September 2026 witnessed a significant range of rulings and institutional developments from the Supreme Court of India, touching upon fundamental rights, criminal justice, constitutional safeguards, elections, arbitration, family and personal laws, labour and service matters, environmental protection and writ jurisdiction. Among the month’s notable interventions, the Court invoked Article 142 to quash FIRs arising from peaceful NEET-UG 2026 protests and directed formulation of a pan-India compensation policy, strengthened constitutional safeguards governing arrest and re-arrest following violations of Article 22, took suo motu cognizance to examine the safety and security of public spaces and the broader institutional mechanisms in place to protect women and children and set aside a ₹425.27-crore customs penalty order founded upon non-existent case law and AI-generated citations.<\/p>\n

The Court also addressed important questions concerning POCSO, election petitions, the Election Commissioners Act, fisheries regulation, false promises to marry, child custody, human-rights remedies, disability pension, limitation, mining and environmental safeguards, civil procedure and the scope of writ jurisdiction. Particularly noteworthy were the rulings holding that statutory presumptions under the POCSO Act are rebuttable, that mere subsequent failure to fulfil a promise of marriage does not attract Section 69 BNS absent fraudulent intent from inception, and that a technical failure of the NCLAT e-filing system cannot prejudice a litigant who made a bona fide attempt to file within limitation.<\/p>\n

Don’t miss out on the latest Supreme Court judgments, judicial appointments, collegium recommendations, popular Know Thy Judge series and important updates featured in SCC Weekly, capturing the evolving landscape of Indian jurisprudence.<\/p>\n

Top Stories<\/p>\n

FIRs quashed, pan-India compensation policy directed: Inside Supreme Court’s NEET-UG 2026 Protest order<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

While considering applications seeking invocation of its powers under Article 142<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> for quashing FIRs arising from the students’ protests against irregularities in the NEET-UG Examination, 2026, a three-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJ., Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ., held that it was a fit case to invoke its extraordinary powers in order to do complete justice between the parties. Keeping in view the future prospects of the young protesters who had bona fide participated in peaceful protests, the Court quashed the subject FIRs and directed that any other FIR relating to the same incidents between 20 July 2026 and 25 July 2026 shall not be pursued or investigated and shall be taken to have been closed.<\/p>\n

The Court, however, permitted registration of a fresh FIR against the 2873 individuals identified by the Delhi Police, and directed formulation of a pan-India policy for compensation to families of students who committed suicide in connection with NEET-UG Examination, 2026 within 90 days.<\/p>\n

[Shailendra Mani Tripathi<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1754<\/span><\/a>]<\/p>\n

Supreme Court declines to transfer Satya Niketan PG Hostel Building Collapse case from Delhi HC to itself<\/a><\/p>\n

While considering the continuing proceedings arising from its earlier directions concerning building safety and inspections, dealt with the implications of a tragic building collapse at Satya Niketan, Motibagh, New Delhi, resulting in 7 deaths and 12 injuries and taking note of the proceedings initiated by the Delhi High Court and the submissions of the Amicus Curiae, the Division Bench of Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan, JJ., declined to transfer Satya Niketan PG Hostel Building Collapse case from Delhi High Court to itself and directed the parties concerned to file comprehensive affidavits and reports regarding compliance with its earlier directions.<\/p>\n

[Loganathan<\/span> v. State of T.N.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1834<\/span><\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

Supreme Court Takes Suo Motu Cognizance of Crimes Against Women and Children; Directs 4-Week Safety Audit Across Delhi-NCR<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

In view of a series of deeply disturbing news reports detailing egregious crimes against minor girls and women across Delhi-NCR, a Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., initiated suo motu proceedings to examine the safety and security of public spaces and the broader institutional mechanisms in place to protect women and children. Emphasising that the right to live with dignity, free from the fear of violence, is an intrinsic facet of Article 21, the Court observed that public spaces cannot be permitted to become zones of high risk due to inadequate illumination, poor surveillance, lax patrolling or other preventable administrative deficiencies.<\/p>\n

“The right to live with dignity, free from the fear of violence, is an intrinsic facet of the fundamental guarantee of life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a>. Public spaces, including parks, roads, buses, metro stations, subways, foot bridges, etc. cannot be permitted to become zones of high risk due to grossly inadequate illumination, poor surveillance, lax patrolling, or other preventable administrative deficiencies.”<\/p>\n

[In Re: Recent Rape Incidents in Delhi NCR<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 2018<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

Notable Supreme Court Judgments in September<\/p>\n

ADVOCATES<\/p>\n

Can candidates with prior open\/distance mode degrees enrol as advocates after regular mode LLB? Supreme Court allows provisional enrolment<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

In a batch of appeals concerning the eligibility of candidates for enrolment as advocates where the law degree has been obtained through the regular mode, but the preceding educational qualifications have been obtained through the open, distance or correspondence mode, the Division Bench of Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ., considered requests for provisional enrolment pending final adjudication of the appeals and directed the Telangana State Bar Council to provisionally enrol the applicants. The Court further clarified that,<\/p>\n

“the provisional enrolment granted pursuant to this order shall not create any equity in favour of the persons concerned and shall abide by the final decision in the respective civil appeals”.<\/p>\n

[STS Gladies<\/span> v. BCI<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1921<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

ARBITRATION AND ADR<\/p>\n

Mere conduct of arbitral proceedings at a place does not make it the “seat” of arbitration: Supreme Court restores Section 34 petitions before Sundargarh Court<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

In a case concerning the maintainability of petitions under Section 34<\/a>, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996<\/a> (“the Act”), challenging an arbitral award, a Division Bench of Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva*<\/span>, JJ., held that the petitions filed before the District Judge, Sundargarh were maintainable. The Court held that the petitions were filed within the limitation period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act and that Cuttack could not be treated as the “seat of arbitration” merely because the arbitral proceedings were conducted there. The Court further observed that neither the order appointing the sole arbitrator nor any agreement between the parties designated Cuttack as the juridical seat of arbitration. Holding that the mere appointment of the arbitrator by the High Court at Cuttack did not confer jurisdiction on the courts at Cuttack, the Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restored Section 34 petitions before the District Judge, Sundargarh for adjudication in accordance with law.<\/p>\n

[Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.<\/span> v. GSCO (Gurmeet Singh and Company) Infrastructure (P) Ltd.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1981<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

ARREST AND DETENTION<\/p>\n

Re-arrest after Article 22 violation requires judicial imprimatur; SC lays down additional safeguards<\/a><\/p>\n

While dealing with a question of “wide constitutional import”, i.e., whether an accused who has suffered breach of both Article 22(1) and (2)<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> can thereafter be re-arrested for the same offence; and, if so, under what circumstances and through what procedure, the Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan*<\/span> and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ., held that re-arrest after illegal arrest\/detention requires judicial imprimatur and provided additional safeguards for re-arrest after Article 22 violation in addition to the ones in Mihir Rajesh Shah<\/span> v. State of Maharashtra<\/span><\/span>, (2026) 1 SCC 500<\/span><\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Consequently, the Court, with the aim to strengthen the constitutional architecture governing arrest, held that:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n

    Article 22(1) is a mandatory constitutional safeguard and not a mere procedural requirement.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  2. \n

    Written grounds of arrest must ordinarily be furnished to the arrested person in a language understood by him and “as a matter of course and without exception”.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  3. \n

    Breach of Article 22(1) renders the arrest unconstitutional and entitles the person to immediate release. Such release is not merely release on bail; it is release from illegal and unconstitutional detention.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  4. \n

    Subsequent filing of a charge sheet or taking of cognizance cannot validate an unconstitutional arrest.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  5. \n

    After release for breach of Article 22(1), the investigating agency cannot itself decide to re-arrest the person. It must first furnish the grounds of arrest and move the Magistrate with reasons and necessity for custody, including an explanation for the earlier failure. The application must carry the endorsement of the immediate superior authority.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  6. \n

    Re-arrest in such circumstances requires judicial imprimatur.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  7. \n

    The 24-hour requirement under Article 22(2) is equally mandatory. Detention beyond that period without production before a Magistrate is unconstitutional.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  8. \n

    Where an accused is released following violation of Article 22(2), the investigating agency must follow the same judicially supervised procedure if it subsequently requires his custody.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  9. \n

    Compensation may, depending on the facts, be awarded as a public-law remedy for violation of Article 22(2), without prejudice to an appropriate private-law remedy.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  10. \n

    The jurisprudence concerning re-arrest after grant of default bail does not govern cases where the accused has been released because of violation of fundamental rights under Article 22.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

  11. \n

    The gravity of the alleged offence cannot furnish an independent basis for relaxing constitutionally prescribed safeguards. Personal liberty can be curtailed only in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and law.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    [Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol<\/span> v. State of Punjab<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1939<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ITS MISUSE<\/p>\n

    Supreme Court sets aside ₹425.28-crore Customs penalty order built on AI-generated fake citations<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    In a case concerning imposition of penalty under Section 114<\/a>, Customs Act, 1962<\/a> for misdeclaration of natural diamonds as lab-grown diamonds, a Division Bench of Dipankar Datta*<\/span> and Sheel Nagu, JJ., held that reliance upon non-existent case laws, fake citations and AI-hallucinated ratios proved fatal to the sustainability of the order-in-original. The Court observed that while use of artificial intelligence (AI) as an assistive tool to speed up the decision-making process could not be denied, “assistance can never be substituted for adjudication” and entrusting AI with “the pilot’s seat” would be “both imprudent and dangerous”. Finding that the respondent had relied upon dubious material in the Order-in-Original dated 8 October 2025 imposing a penalty of ₹425,27,99,100 on the appellant, the Court set aside the impugned order of the Gujarat High Court dated 20 January 2026 as well as the Order-in-Original. The proceedings were revived for fresh adjudication by an officer of the same rank other than the officer who had passed the original order. The civil appeal was accordingly allowed.<\/p>\n

    [Vijay Ghanshyam Gadiya<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1741<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    COURTS, TRIBUNALS AND JUDICIARY<\/p>\n

    Judicial Officers are not employees: Explaining the Supreme Court’s case for raising the District Judge retirement age to 62<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    In a writ petition, arising out of the long-running litigation concerning the service conditions of the subordinate judiciary, raising issue of enhancement of the age of retirement and superannuation of members of the District Judiciary throughout the country, the 3-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJ., Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ., in order to ensure the “preservation of experienced judicial officers, while removing the clog of deadwood, blocking the entrance of young blood invigorating the system”<\/span> directed the States, namely Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, M.P., Maharashtra, Sikkim, T.N., W.B., who had consented to the enhancement of age of the Judicial Officers from 60 to 62 years to enhance the age subject to suitability and performance assessment. Retired officers in these States permitted to exercise option for rejoining service subject to stipulated conditions. The Court directed the other States\/UTs to reconsider their stand.<\/p>\n

    [All India Judges Assn.<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1784<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    CRIME AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN<\/p>\n

    Inappropriate conduct or corporal punishment without sexual intent does not amount to sexual assault; Supreme Court quashes POCSO proceedings against school teacher<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    In a case concerning allegations of sexual assault under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012<\/a> (POCSO Act) against a Geography teacher accused of beating 2 minor girl students and touching their backs, waists and necks while teaching them, a Division Bench of Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ., examined whether such conduct, in the absence of the requisite “sexual intent”, could constitute sexual assault under Section 7<\/a>, POCSO Act<\/a> and attract the aggravated offence under Section 10. The Court held that although a teacher is expected to exercise greater sensitivity while dealing with young students, particularly girl students, inappropriate physical conduct or corporal punishment, by itself and without the requisite sexual intent, could not justify prosecution under the stringent provisions of the POCSO Act. Holding that continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law and cause extreme prejudice to the accused, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n

    [Bhaskar Paul<\/span> v. State of W.B.<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1833<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    Presumptions under Sections 29 and 30, POCSO Act are rebuttable: Supreme Court acquits man convicted for penetrative sexual assault<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

    In 2 appeals challenging the Delhi High Court judgment dated 3 July 2025, which had upheld the appellant’s conviction under Section 363<\/a>, Penal Code, 1860<\/a> (IPC) and Section 6<\/a>, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012<\/a> (POCSO Act), the Division Bench of Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria*<\/span>, JJ., held that the statutory presumptions under Sections 29<\/a> and 30<\/a>, POCSO Act<\/a> are rebuttable and do not dispense with the prosecution’s obligation to establish the foundational facts of the offence and prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. On examining the evidence, the Court found material contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with medical and forensic evidence which did not support the allegation of penetrative sexual assault. Holding that the appellant had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption and that the prosecution had failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court acquitted him of the offences under Section 363<\/a> IPC<\/a> and Section 6<\/a>, POCSO Act<\/a>.<\/p>\n

    [Deepak in JC<\/span> v. State (NCT of Delhi)<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1914<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

    ELECTION\/ELECTION PETITION\/ELECTION TRIAL<\/p>\n

    Defects in Form-25 may bar corrupt-practice allegations, but do not render entire election petition non-maintainable: Supreme Court<\/a><\/p>\n

    In an appeal arising from the Gauhati High Court’s order passed under Section 86<\/a>, Representation of the People Act, 1951<\/a> (the Act), whereby the election petition filed by the appellant, an advocate and politician (INC) against the respondent (Lok Sabha MP), the successful candidate elected from No. 7 Karimganj Parliamentary Constituency, Assam, in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, was rejected due to manner of attestation of the petition copies, absence of attestation in the copy of Form-25, and alleged missing pages, the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran*<\/span>, JJ., held that defects in the attestation of Form-25 do not warrant the peremptory dismissal of the entire election petition under Section 86 of the Act. Where due attestation is absent, the allegations of corrupt practices may be struck off, while independent grounds challenging the election must be considered on merits. The Court further clarified that no particular form of attestation is prescribed under Section 81(3), and different endorsements may suffice where they convey the same meaning. Consequently, the Court held that there was absolutely no reason to sustain the High Court’s order.<\/p>\n

    Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, reversed the High Court’s order and restored the election petition to the files of the High Court. It further directed the High Court to verify whether the original Form-25 contained due attestation of the affirmation on oath and<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. \n

      if duly attested, proceed with the election petition on merits; and<\/p>\n<\/li>\n

    2. \n

      if the required attestation was absent, allegations of corrupt practices should not be permitted to be urged, while the remaining independent grounds, if any, should be considered on their merits.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      [Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury<\/span> v. Kripanath Mallah<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1698<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      Supreme Court split on referring EC Act challenge to larger bench; pitches permanent 5-Judge bench for constitutional issues<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      While considering the challenge to various provisions of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023<\/a> (2023 Act), especially Section 7<\/a> of the 2023 Act<\/a> which deals with composition of Selection Committee for the appointment of Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), the Division Bench of Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ., delivered a split verdict over referring this matter to a larger bench for consideration.<\/p>\n

      Datta, J., opined that it has been clearly laid down by judicial precedents that free and fair elections are a basic feature of the Constitution<\/a> and that the Election Commission of India (ECI) should be insulated from exclusive executive control in relation to appointments of the CEC and the Election Commissioners (ECs). Hence, Datta, J., rejected the plea for referring the matter before a larger Bench.<\/p>\n

      Per contra, Sharma, J., opined that the present petitions are eligible to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Constitution Bench to adjudicate the constitutional validity of Sections 7<\/a>, 6<\/a> and 8<\/a> of the 2023 Act<\/a>.<\/p>\n

      Given the split opinion over whether the present petitions and the applications should be heard by a Constitution Bench of 5 Judges, the present Division Bench thus directed papers to be placed before the CJI for considering the desirability of constituting a Constitution Bench of such number of Judges as may be considered appropriate, to decide the question of vires of Section 7<\/a> of the 2023 Act<\/a>.<\/p>\n

      Furthermore, taking grim note of the time taken to decide references, the Court requested the Chief Justice to explore the necessity of constituting a permanent five-Judge Bench to decide pure constitutional issues. The Court emphasised that pendency of references for far too long (any period between 5 and 20 years or more) does not reflect well on the institution.<\/p>\n

      [Jaya Thakur<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1980<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      Also Read:<\/span> Inside Justice Satish Chandra Sharma’s opinion referring EC Act, 2023 challenge to Constitution Bench<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      Also Read:<\/span> Independent Election Commission and Analysis of the Collegium System: Inside Justice Dipankar Datta’s opinion on the EC Act challenge<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ)<\/p>\n

      6 passes out of 257 applications: Supreme Court directs Tamil Nadu to facilitate purse seine fishing transit through territorial waters, emphasises cooperative federalism<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In a case concerning the right of fishermen using purse seine nets to access the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) beyond Tamil Nadu’s territorial waters, a Division Bench of Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ., held that the Union and State regulatory regimes operate in distinct and autonomous spheres, with the Union competent to regulate fisheries beyond territorial waters and the State competent to regulate fisheries within territorial waters. Emphasising “cooperative federalism”, the Court held that there was no conflict between the Sustainable Harnessing of Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone Rules, 2025 and the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 2020. Noting that delay in processing access pass applications virtually amounted to an “unwritten ban”, the Court directed the State to ensure timely clearance of applications and frame necessary regulations designating a channel for transit of fishing vessels through its territorial waters to the EEZ for purse seine fishing.<\/p>\n

      [Fisherman Care<\/span> v. Union of India<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1749<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      FALSE PROMISE TO MARRY<\/p>\n

      Subsequent failure to fulfil promise of marriage, without initial deceitful intent, does not constitute offence under Section 69 BNS: Supreme Court<\/a><\/p>\n

      In a significant judgment, while examining the scope of Section 69<\/a>, Nyaya Sanhita, 2023<\/a> (BNS) in the context of an allegation that sexual relations were established on the promise of marriage, the Division Bench of J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ., distinguished a promise to marry made with a fraudulent intention from the outset from a genuine promise that is subsequently not fulfilled because of circumstances arising later. The Court held that a mere subsequent failure or refusal to marry does not, by itself, attract Section 69<\/a> BNS<\/a>. There must be material indicating that the promise to marry was made without any intention of fulfilling it when the promise was made. The Court quashed the FIR, holding that the allegations in the FIR disclosed a consensual relationship and did not establish deceitful conduct within Section 69<\/a> BNS<\/a>.<\/p>\n

      [Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani<\/span> v. State of Gujarat<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1818<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      FAMILY AND PERSONAL LAWS<\/p>\n

      Supreme Court permits mother to relocate minor children to UK; holds father facing POCSO prosecution disentitled to custody<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In a case concerning the custody and relocation of minor children, a Division Bench of Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta*<\/span>, JJ., held that the appellant-mother’s frequent changes of employment and residence could not be characterised as a “nomadic life” and that the paramount consideration in determining custody was the best interest and welfare of the children. The Court took note of the disclosure made by the minor son before the psychiatrist at NIMHANS, the consequent registration of the POCSO FIR and the charge-sheet filed after investigation and held that granting custody to the respondent-father, who was facing POCSO prosecution, would be unwarranted. The Court further held that the observations made by the High Court on the veracity of the POCSO allegations were premature and uncalled for and accordingly expunged the same. Considering the mother’s financial standing, employment in the United Kingdom, the pending criminal proceedings and the children’s continued reluctance to be in the father’s company, the Court permitted the appellant-mother, for the present, to relocate the children to the United Kingdom and get them admitted to a good school, subject to the directions issued by the Court.<\/p>\n

      [X<\/span> v. Y<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1979<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      HUMAN RIGHTS<\/p>\n

      Direct recourse to Human Rights Court without prior Commission inquiry permissible; SC upholds Rule 6, Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In the appeals challenging Karnataka High Court’s judgment and order dated 17 July 2025, whereby it had struck down Rule 6, Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006 (2006 Rules), which enables a victim of an offence arising out of a violation of human rights, or specified persons acting on the victim’s behalf, to approach the Human Rights Court directly and prescribes the procedure to be followed thereafter, holding the same to be unconstitutional, inconsistent with the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993<\/a> (Human Rights Act), and beyond the State Government’s rule-making power under Section 41, Human Rights Act, the Division Bench of Vikram Nath*<\/span> and Sandeep Mehta, JJ., set aside the impugned judgment and order, holding that Rule 6, 2006 Rules, is valid and intra vires the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Court constitute two distinct and complementary mechanisms under the Human Rights Act and the Rule 6 merely supplies the procedural machinery for invoking the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Court under Section 30 and does not create a substantive or parallel regime. The Court, further, held that a prior inquiry or recommendation by the National\/State Human Rights Commission was not a mandatory condition precedent for approaching a Human Rights Court.<\/p>\n

      [Sayad Asifulla<\/span> v. State of Karnataka<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1817<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      LABOUR AND SERVICE LAWS<\/p>\n

      Supreme Court on Disability Pension: Entitlement Rules 2008 Substantially Retain 1982 Scheme; Burden Shifts to Ex-Servicemen After 15 Years<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In a batch of appeals concerning entitlement of ex-servicemen to the disability element of service pension, a Division Bench of Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe, JJ., examined the legal effect of the Entitlement Rules, 2008 (2008 Rules) vis-à-vis the Entitlement Rules, 1982 (1982 Rules). The Court held that, assuming the Entitlement Rules, 2008 have legal effect, they substantially reproduce the 1982 scheme on causal connection, onus, attributability and aggravation, subject to the limited qualification under Rule 7 shifting the burden upon the claimant where the claim is preferred after 15 years. The Court, however, noted that the Union had failed to demonstrate the source, time and manner in which the 2008 Rules were validly promulgated so as to repeal or supersede the 1982 Rules, and emphasised that the applicable pensionary rules must be formulated and notified authoritatively by the competent authority.<\/p>\n

      The Court further held that the opinion of the Medical Board deserves due weight and ought not to be substituted merely because another view is possible, while directing tribunals to scrutinise the opinion and reasons of the Medical Board in pending matters. Dismissing the present batch of appeals on the grounds of delay as well as on merits, the Court clarified that in claims preferred after 15 years, the burden under Rule 7 of the 2008 Rules shifts upon the claimant to prove the conditions of entitlement.<\/p>\n

      [Union of India<\/span> v. Col. NC Isaac<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1895<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      LIMITATION<\/p>\n

      Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit | Technical glitch in NCLAT e-filing system cannot prejudice litigant; SC restores appeal before NCLAT<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In an appeal arising from the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s (NCLAT) order, wherein the appellant’s challenge to the National Company Law Tribunal’s (NCLT) order approving a resolution plan in respect of Rolta India Ltd., was dismissed as time-barred after refusing to condone a delay of 1 day beyond the maximum condonable period under Section 61(2)<\/a>, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016<\/a> (IBC), the Division Bench of Dipankar Datta*<\/span> and Sheel Nagu, JJ., applied the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit and restored the appeal before NCLAT, holding that Section 61(2) IBC does not permit the NCLAT to condone delay beyond 45 days, however, where a litigant’s bona fide attempt to file within that period is frustrated solely by failure of the NCLAT’s e-filing system, the period of system failure may be excluded and the first bona fide filing attempt treated as the date of presentation.<\/p>\n

      [EPFO-II<\/span> v. Mamta Binani<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1900<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      MINES AND MINERALS<\/p>\n

      SC permits conditional sale of minerals from expired mining leases; allows amalgamation of mining blocks with virgin forest land subject to strict safeguards<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In a long-running litigation concerning mining activities in Karnataka, while considering the applications concerning sale of minerals lying with erstwhile lessees after expiry of mining leases and amalgamation of mining blocks of different categories with virgin forest land for auction, the three-Judge Bench of Surya Kant, CJ., Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ., approved Amicus’s 11 condition framework for disposal of minerals from expired leases, holding the conditions to be mandatory, while permitting amalgamation of Category A, B and C mining leases with virgin forest land subject to strict statutory and environmental safeguards. The Court clarified that amalgamation or execution of a composite lease does not, by itself, authorise mining in virgin forest areas without the requisite statutory approvals.<\/p>\n

      [Samaj Parivartana Samudaya<\/span> v. State of Karnataka<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1899<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE<\/p>\n

      Once Trial commences on all issues, one issue cannot subsequently be tried as preliminary under Order 14 Rule 2(2)<\/a> CPC<\/a>: SC<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In a civil appeal arising out of a suit for declaration, recovery of possession and consequential reliefs, a Division Bench of K.V. Viswanathan and Arun Palli*<\/span>, JJ., examined the scope and application of Order 14 Rule 2<\/a>, Civil Procedure Code, 1908<\/a> (CPC), particularly the stage at which an issue of law relating to jurisdiction or a statutory bar may be tried as a preliminary issue. The Court held that while the framing of all issues does not, by itself, exhaust the power under Order 14 Rule 2(2), the statutory occasion to direct an issue to be “tried first” ceases once the Court has embarked upon the trial of the issues generally. The Court emphasised that the provision contemplates a prospective ordering of trial and does not authorise the Court to retrospectively sever an issue from an ongoing composite trial.<\/p>\n

      [John Mathew<\/span> v. Santha Paul<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1940<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      WRIT JURISDICTION<\/p>\n

      Certiorari is supervisory and not appellate; it lies where material documentary evidence is ignored resulting in a perverse finding: Supreme Court<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In an appeal challenging High Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Articles 226<\/a> and 227<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> against concurrent findings of a statutory arbitrator and Delhi Co-operative Tribunal (Tribunal) regarding claimant membership and subsequent allotment of plot in the respondent Society, the Division Bench of Atul S. Chandurkar*<\/span> and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ., declined to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court, holding that the High Court did not exceed its certiorari jurisdiction in setting aside the orders of the arbitrator and the Tribunal.<\/p>\n

      The Court held that a High Court’s interference under certiorari is permissible where statutory authorities ignore material documentary evidence and arrive at a perverse finding; such intervention corrects an error of law apparent from the record, rather than amounting to impermissible appellate reappreciation of facts.<\/p>\n

      [Prakash Narain Sharma<\/span> v. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1725<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n

      Supreme Court: Article 226 Writ Petition cannot be treated as Article 227 to deny right of appeal<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

      In a case concerning the maintainability of a writ appeal against an order passed in proceedings under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution<\/a> challenging orders of Revenue Courts, a Division Bench of Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ., held that a writ petition filed under Article 226 could not be treated as one under Article 227 merely to deny the aggrieved party an appellate remedy. The Court reiterated that the extraordinary jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts under Article 226 cannot be scuttled or whittled down by legislation and that Revenue Courts exercising statutory quasi-judicial powers cannot be equated with judicial courts. Holding that the validity of orders passed by such Revenue Courts could be tested in exercise of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court set aside the impugned order dated 20 July 2023 and restored Writ Appeal No. 576 of 2023 to the file of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for consideration afresh on its own merits and in accordance with law.<\/p>\n

      [Vrindavan Chaturvedi<\/span> v. Pushpa Devi Khemka<\/span><\/span>, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1787<\/span><\/a>]<\/span><\/p>\n

      Appointments, Recommendations, Transfers, Designations in September<\/p>\n